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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of the Dissertation 
T.b.~ problem of this dissertation is the evalua-tion of .the .relation-
Ship betwe~P. the empirical evidence and the resultant theistic.cosmology 
in the Phl:~osophy of Edgar Sheffield Brightmano Philosophy "is an at-
L 
tempt to give a reasoned account of experience as a whole .. " This account 
must begin in the conscious awareness of the immediate empirical datum, 
.: ... 
or what Brightl!lan refers to as either the 11Situation Ex:perienced,tt or as 
2 
the 11Shini~g Present." But the Shining Present is meaningless when con-
sidered apart from the objective.world giving rise to all its sensations 
and perceptions. This objective world Brightman refers to as the 11Illumi-
• ~ t • => ,. • • • • 
nating Absent.n By its very nature the Illuminating· Absent must for_ever 
remain "absent., 11 Only inference and hypothesis can bridge the gulf be-
tween the Shining Present and the Illuminating Absent.. Hence, the ob-
" 'I .,jo ;, (, :. ' .. • • •• 
jective world, as well as all experience that is not now actually present 
. 3 
in conscious awareness, is referred to as "Situation Believed-in.u 
1 .. E.s .. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion (N.,Y.: Prentice-Hall, 1946), 
p .. 21. All references are to Brightman unless otherwise identified. 
2" All these terms will be explained in detail in Chapter III. 
3o A Philosophy of Religion, Po 347o 
l 
. ,· 
The clue to the nature of the Illuminating Absent is found in the 
Shiming Present, and the only way of discovering the nature of the lllumi-
nat~ng Absent is the coherent observation, examination, verification, and 
interpretation of the data of the Shining Present. In considering these 
·data the method of synopsis and the criterion of empirical coherence make 
posBible the formulation of the most reliable hypotheses concerning the 
nature of the Illuminating Absent. Any other method or criterion is in-
adequate for giving 11 a reasoned account of experience as a whole. 11 The 
problem, then, is: Does Brightman, using the data of the Shining Present, 
suggest the most coherent hypotheses concerning the cosmological aspects 
of the Illuminating Absent? 
2. Limitations 
The problem may be understood more clearly if the limitations are 
indicated. There will be no attempt to trace ·the historical development 
of Brightman's thought except briefly in his biography. Further, there 
will be no attempt to compare Brightman's thought in any detail with that 
of another thinker. Nor will this be a detailec;l evaluation o.f all aspects 
of his thought •. It will be noticed, however., that the problem is one of 
relationship between evidence and conclusion, and hence will require a 
'· . 
consideration of both the evidence and the conclusions drawn before the 
relationship between the two can be evalua.ted. Moreover, in a system of 
philosophy such as that of Brightman there will be many C.<?nnect.ions wit.l-l 
. . . . 
other aspects of the same system<> Consequently, the de.scriptive chapters 
are broad in scope. 
· It will be seen in the study of 11 the empirical scheme" that the term 
2 
ttempiricaltt refers to any conscious experience, whether sensory, rational~ 
intuitive, or mysticalo Empirical evidence means all conscious evidence.1 
In the study of nthe scheme of evidencen it will be noted that pnly data 
relevant to an hypothesis can be considered as evidence for that hypothe-
sis. All the relevant data must be included if one is to remai:p. trp.e to 
the method and the criteriono The relevant data for a cosmology are the 
four aspects of reality, or the four types of objects to which thought 
refers, namely, physical things, universals, values, and consciousness. 
Examination of all_ of these in and of themselves would carry the study far 
afield, but each must be considered in so far as it is relevant to the un-
derstanding of the cosmological wholeo The scope is admittedly broad, in-
volving the fundamentals of Brightman 1s personalistic idealism .. 
3. The Methodology of the Dissertation 
. 
Either of two different approaches to the problem would be legiti-
mate.. The one more likely to be expected from the first readin15 of the 
title would be the statement of Brightman's theistic cosmology ~nd then 
the empirical evidence which led him to his conclusions. Roughly, this 
is the approach in his book, The Problem of God~ 2 The other would be just 
the reverse, examining the data relevant to a cosmology and then stating 
the cosmologicai conclusions resulting from the evidence citedo ·The 
latter is characteristic of his revised Introduction to Philosophy,3·and 
1. Since all evidence is empirical in Brightman's usage, the adjective may 
seem redundant. It is used in the title for·the sake of emphasis .. · 
2. The Problem of God (N .. Y .. z The Abingdon Press, 1930) .. 
3. An Introduction to Philosophy (Rev. ed .. ; N.Y.g Henry Holt, 1951}.. Un-
less otherwise indicated, all references will be to the revised edition. 
3 
has beel!l ·selected for the present purpose for i;.wo reasons. Firs-:t;,: an accu,-
rate statement of his theistic cosmology requires the use of terms which ·. 
need ca.l'eful and sometimes detailed definition. Incorporating these, defi-
ni tions into the statement of the theistic cosmology would make it appear 
more complex and difficult to comprehend than it rea.ll.;r is. Second.ly, the 
latter approach demonstrates by its structure a basic dialectic in tha. 
thought of Brightman, namely, the datum self, the objective world, and. God, 
and seems more characteristic of Brightman ts approach. . ... 
The key to the structure of the study can be fou.nd in the title. 
This is not evident in the first.two chapters since they describe :i.ntro-
ductory material .... -material which is, nevertheless, fundamental •.. (An under-
standing of Brightman's philosophical·method and criterion of truth as ~ 
well as his reasons for using his method and criterion is essential for 
the understanding of other aspects of his thought.) But beginning with 
the tMrd chapter the relationship between the structure and the title is 
evident. The task of the third chapter is the detailed definition and 
description of what is referred to here as ·· 11the · empir5,.cal scheme.u The 
empirical scheme includes a definition of·the terms; a q.escriptiol} ·Of the 
datum self with which all experience begins, the .types of empirical data 
•• J : 0 • .: •• • • •• 
i.n the experience of the datum self, the empirical situations which arise 
!.rom the contrast between the immediate empirical datum and the ·types of 
data experienced, and finally,. the empirical whole of per.sonali.ty; ~the 
c~~ax of the empirical process • 
. ··· The task of ~e fourth chapter is a,.d~tail:ed definition and de ... 
s(fription of what is ref·~rl;'~d to here a-s 11the· scheme of ·evidence:" The 
scheme of evidence includes the definition of te~s, the epistemic prqcess 
4 
involved in the larger empirical process1 the objective reference. of the· 
~pistemic process, the .relev~t ~ata.of the objective reference of the 
epistemic process (which are the evidE;lnce), and finally, the way in which 
the scheme of evidence 'makes pos:sib.le. a .world view .. 
The task of the fifth chapter is the detailed description of the the-
istic cosmology resulting from the evidence of the previous chapters, in-
cluding the relev~~ definitions, despriptions of nature as pheno~enal~ 
nature as nownE;lnal, natu~e as Divine Jl.ctivity, and the specific relation-
ship between God and nature. 
The sixth chapter will attempt to .des.ol':i.'be 'the dialectie of evalu-
ation, to find the·mast reliable Gr~t~rion tor thE;l evaluation, .and then 
to examine in the light of that criterion the more important hypotheses 
that have b~en enumerated ip. the ear~er chapters,. it will seek to in-
. dicate the more important p;robl~ms in :6rigQ.tmants .pb,ilosophy as they 
relate to the task of this study·as a whole. 
The seventh chapter wil1 attempt to show in very brief form how the 
unsolved prob1ems of Chapter VI might .. approach a"mo~e ooherent·aolution 
through ·a metaphysical repl'ien.tation; .. reservip.g for the final chapter a 
.,. -
. ·,-
brief listing of th~ con.clusiop.s~ 
It should be noted here that tne first five ghapters will be purely 
descriptive of Brightman's own thought unle$s indicated otherwise in the 
footnotes. Befo~e any aspeot.of any philosophy is evaluated, the thinker 
should be permitted to make his .position clear. Worthy evaluation 
ne.cessariq presupposes comprehension. This task i·s attempted with ·both 
diligenoe and respect. It may well b~ that Bri~htman will express his 
position with suoh clarity and persuasion that the obs~rver will be 
5 
ponvinced. On the other hand, the obs.erver ~ay find some sound reasons 
to disagree. ln either case, the problem is the evaluation of the re-
lationship between the empirical evide~ce.and the resultant theistic 
cosmology in the philosophy of Edgar. Sheffield Brightman. 
4. Previous Relevant Resea:t?ch 
· ~lthough there have 'Qeen no majq;rstud:i,..es of the specific problem ... 
as stai{e,d above, there have been some that are relevant to it in that 
they consider some pha~e of the pQilosophy of Brightman which will be 
included J..n thts study. For the most part, similarities are descriptive 
I.·' 
only, but si~ficant relationsh-ips between this si{udy and others will 
be indicated in the footnotes. Only the more important studies will be 
cited here, with discussion li.mj.ted to their problem, their general 
point of view~ and their! general rel~v~nc~ to this study and to a 
general evaluatiqn • 
. After the publication of The Problel;ll of God in 1930, and The 
Finding of God in 1931,1 in which Brightman outlined his basic con-
caption of God as int?rnally limited by 11 The Given, 11 studies of ·major 
proportion began to appear. One of the tirst was a dissertation by 
John.James McL~ney, The ~heis~ ?f Ed~ar.Sheffield Brightman.2 In the 
pre,face the ~jlthor indicates that the pu,rpose of the essay is to evaluate 
1. The Finding of God (N.Y.: The· Abingdon Press, 1931). 
2. Published S.T .p. dissertation, (Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
University of America, 1936). 
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Brightmq.n 's belief that thei~m and religious obligations can bl3 de-
fended on th~ basiEl of pers~maJ,ism ••. He. examines. both E!rief1tman Is 
epistemology and his theism,. charging that. the latter is totally de-
pendent upon the conclusions of ~e former. · Failing to grasp the 
s:i,.gnit:i,cance of inference for Br:i.g:h~n's sy~tem•of thought, M;clarney 
. .. . 
charges that the epistemology is to~lly solipsistic, and that there-
fore, the theism is of little value.. The study is careful and detailed, 
but limi.ted by an qbvious Thomist:\c·'oias·w}lich seem,s to prevent objective 
' . ' 
evaluation. The writer confuses :erightman 's definitions with those of 
A quina.~:~. With -thE! u-onc-e-pts tttai:th tt :an-d ttc-erta:i,ntyn the confusion is 
particularly unfortunate. H~s general approacn·a~d ·point of view can be 
peen from a quotation f~om the conclusion of his study. 
·,.'.; ~· ;, ·~rt"':i"S"'w±th reg!!."&t~~that yre ri()te :P.rotesso:r .. Br'i~ht~n ts 
unfp.m.:j:.liar;i.ty with Thomistic ·literature.· The authorities 
which he cites for T.hom?-"st:i;c.:opinions are infrequent and 
secondary, while no evidence appears to support the con-
.rjecture that he has read Saint Thomas in the original 
text or through the elucidation of the: foremost commen-
tators• This disregard of·the Greatest Catholic thi~er 
in philosop4y and theologr has undoubtedly had its effect 
on Profe~sor Brightman'$ thought. Fidelity to reason, 
that indispensable loyalty which·kust be the hall-mark of 
true philosophy, would not so frequently, if inadvertent-
' ly, be honored in the breach, were Professor Brightman to 
'9e guided by the spirit of Thomas, that is to say, the 
Spirit of reason.l . 
In 1939, Edwin &w;Ltzer ~cnardson 'wrote a dissertation on 11.A Gompa.r-
ison qf the Idea of God Held by Edgar Sheffield Brightman with the 
'· , 
Traditional Idea of God as Eeld by Thomas Aquinas, Rene Descartes, and 
1. J. J. McLarn€lY; The 'I'hei~m of Edgar Shef,f.'ield Brightman, pp. 150-151. 
(• I ' 
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Herman Lotze.nl This studyis admirable for its-careful descripti,on 
of the development of ~he. concept pf "The Given" in the thought': of 
. . 
Brightman_. Althou;gh 9bject.ive q.nd scholarly, and written under the· 
supervision of Edgar Sheffield Brightman and Albe~t Cornelius Knudson; 
first and second r~aders respecttvely; the study is limited," by the com-
' pl~~e otp.:ission of any critical eval:uation. _ More.over:, the title is. _some-
what misleading .. · The study actua.lly is a compar:i,.son of the ideas of ~~d 
held by Brightman and Knu~son, the critical evaluation'of which could 
have maae a -q.nique contribution to-personalistic literature under the ~ 
I ' 
guidance of the same men. Nevertheless, it is accurate description of 
Brightman's thought until 1939. 
In 1950 two ·mqre dissertations. appeared on Brightmants conception of 
God. .Arthur Philip Gleason, in ''The Conception of God in :the Thought of 
)!:cigar Sj:teff;Leld Brightman, 11 4 attempts. to .shoW the inadequacy not only of 
Brightman 1 s conception of God, but' of bis. whole "philosophical frameworktt 
as well.. In his concluding chapter he cite:;; as criti-cism_s of Brightman'.sl 
philosophical framework (1) Brightman's insistence on reason,, (2) the 
failure of 00herence as the only criterion, · (3) the failure of 
' 
Brightman 1 s metaphysics to answer th~ problem of re~ ty, · and (4) the 
:t;ailure of Brightman 1 s empirtCC!-1' argqments for theology. As criticisms 
of Brightman's ~~ligious phi+osophyh-~ f!Uggests tha,t (1) the Finite God 
I I 
is not necessitated by nor does it ·solve the problem of evil,· (2) The 
Given is not ~ logical necess~ty, and (3) the Finite God is questioned 
l.• Unpublished Th.D~ .¢iss~rtation; Boston University Scho~~ of· Theoiogy, 
19~9-~ 
2. Unpublished Th.D. di:;;sertation, Northern Baptist Theological Seminary, 
Chicago, 19,?'0. 
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by certain propo~itions. 'rhe most serious ;l.imitat;i,.on of. this study is 
the f~l~re qf the author to ~ve ~ogic~ support for the hypotheses he 
suggests. , Tqis is not <m, object~ve study but rather a passionate attempt 
to refute Brightmants entire phi~9sop~y.fr~m the preconceived and1 un-. 
defended criterion of bib';l,ical traditi.pn •. ·.·It is an "evru;tgelical'l 
approach, giving fi ttle place to progressive argument and much weight 
to preconceive~ conc~usions which are riot ~oherent~y defended, but 
rather assumed true !rom the beginning. His concluding .paragraph is as 
follows: 
The resu~tant iQ.ea Of a firrl,t.e God depends upon one's · 
acceptance of Br~g~tman 1 s philosophic pr~nciples as well 
as~his solution of the problem of evil and his attempt to 
esta'Qli~h his 11horrib~e given.n I't has been previously 
shown that there ate some philosophic weaknesses \.o his 
system, h.;i.s so:)..ution of!ered for the problem of evil is of 
no reJ,.igious or philosophic value, and that the Given is· 
neither a logic9-l or religious necessity; therefore we 
oan conclude that hi~ idea of a finite God is without 
adequate support. There are a few points that should be 
presented against the idea of a limited God itself. The 
history of the Hebrew~hr:i.;3tian fai t}'l ;i.s a vi tal monument 
against any idea of Gpd so limited he is thwarted. The 
urP.verse as it is now as well a,s it was at the moment of 
creat'ion brings strong proof that God was qm.ni.potent •. 
Worshiping a God that is as limited as his creation* just 
because he may l,ove more is no incentive to worship let 
alone become an obj act o;f fai ti+•. Brightman 1 s God is a 
God of emp~Ilici:?m; therefore he can be nothing mo;re than 
an empirical God. Brighi:lnan has left us w'i th a fin:i te 
God that is neitl+.er rationally nor religiously possible, 
actually it is a n slander to reason. nl . 
The <;>ther cJ:i.ssertation appearing ;i.n 19,50 was 11Belie:f; in the Person-
1. A.·P. Gleason, "The Conception of God in'the Thought of Edgar 
. .Shei;field B:!:'ightmp.n, II p. 260. .This passage is also found verbatim 
. on pages 245-246 exoept that tne word ncreation,.11 marked with an 
~asterisk, appeared as 11 creatures.n· 
·t· 
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ality o£ God: A Study o£ Theistic Persori~lisms ~n Reaction to Non-
theistic Idealisl!ls ,-·t: by 'George Douglas Strat~n.l 'J;'h.e. s.tudy, i~ div1:ae·d 
. : . . ·. ·. . . ~ .... ~ ~ ~- .::.. ,.;: . ~ ... ... .·. . 
into three ·PQ+"ts. The £irst part, "'P~rson~l. vs. ImPersonal Idealism, n 
attempts yO a,how that idealism implies person91ism. The second part_, 
11The:i,.stic vs. Non-theisttc Personalisms,~· endeavors to sustain the con-
oept qf Ultimate Personality. The third part,. 11Finite. or Iminite God, n 
strives t9 refute ~rightman' s concept o£ the Fif.li.te God. This study 
leans heavily .on Bo:wne, Royce, and HoWison. In general, the spirit 
.. ""-
and approach a,.re near.er to KnUd~on'than to Brightman •. !'The cogent 
argument for personalism is· 'practical' .rather than 'purely -intellectu-
al1.112 The E?tudy is valuable for its·broad description,. but limited in 
that very little o£ the critical ev~uation touches the real problems. 
Personalism a.:nd the Problem of Evil, by F'Ioyd Hiatt Ross..D;.;i;$ an. 
' . 
essay pased upon a dissertation.suhmitted to t-he Graduate.School o£ 
Yale Unive;r-sity.. In this t,hought,£ul and well organized study Ross 
describes the person~li~m of Borden Parker Bowne, shows how this position 
is continued in the though~ ot A. c. Knudson, and then, how and why 
~rightl!lan attacks the personalistic spl-ution to the. pr.oblem of evil. 
Ross concllldes that there is a duallsm oi.process in Brightman's system 
as it relate13 to God_, and that the .a,.dequate solution of the problem o£ 
evil require~ The Given, but demands that it be placed outside of God. 
1., Unpublished En..D. dissertation, Columbia University, 19)0. 
2 .• G .• D .• Straton, "Belief in the Personality of Qod: A Study of Th.eistic 
Persona;Lisms in Rei3.ction to Non-theistic Idealisms," p. 12. 
3. New Haven: YalE1 University Press, 1940. 
1.0 
.. :'· 
Had Ross developed this suggestion in more detail h~ essay would have 
been the richer for it. 
In 1951 Merrit Barnum Queen wro~ a dissertation called ttpersonalism 
and Practical Judgment: A Critique of Conception of Personality Held by 
B. p. Bowne and~ .. s. Brightxnan.ni The title is somewhat misl~ading. Not 
only are ~e's and Brightman•s conception of persopality related to each 
other, they are also related to the s~alled Yearbook authors: R. Bruce 
Raup, George C. Axtel:Le, Kenneth D. Benne, and B. Otha~l Smitp.. The pri-
mary concern in this comparison of two personalists with four naturalists 
. . 
is that their common emphases, especially the str.ess upon the central im-
portance of personality, "be more widely adopted for the guidance bf pro-
grams of democratic education, pending the_appearance of more adequate 
interpretations.n2 It is a thoughtful inquiry, valuablli3 for its social 
implications, but having little r~levance for the pre~ent study. Another 
dissertation, liThe Role of Experience and Value in Naturalistic and Per-
sonalistic Thought as Represented b.1 the Philosophies of Clarence Irving 
lewis and Ed~ar Sheffield Brightman," by James Rus~ell Ga;rcmer3, seeks to 
determine and appraise the r~lationship between personalism and naturalism 
concer:n,:i.ng experience and value. ln evaluat:i.ng B,rightman ts view of ex-
perience, he makes five charges. First., 11Brightm.a,n •s d~finition of expe-
rience is so broad that it effaces its own meaning and thus renders itself 
I I. I I I ) 
useless.a~ a 13yst~matic tool.tt4 This charge oyerlooks the .fact that the 
.. ·' ·-
1.. ·unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Colum.b;i.B. University, 1951. 
2~ For more detailed discussion'of this idea1 see page 188. 
3. Unpublished:Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1953. 
4. Se~ page 6o. 
11 
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.,scope .Qf:·~ te~ ilay oonstitute it,s meaning;, and the further fapt that ex-
.... '· .. .:.. . . 
perience for Brightman is not meant to be. a philosophical tttool.u S~cond­
ly, ttin equating experience with conscious life,. Brightman leads us .di-
re<;}tly toward the egocentric predipament •. nl Thirdly, llErightman 1s resolu-
. ' ... 
i;iion of e:x;Perience ini{o the entirety: of ·mind precludes the posE)ibility of 
. I I • 
experience ;i.tseJ,f.tt2 II{this criticism Gardner misunderstands Brightman's 
interpvetat~o~ of the whole mind. Fourthly, »Brightman's claim th.a-t expe-
. ' 
rience has an objective .set of referents .is inconsistent with the asse~-
' ! 1 I I ' I I 
tion ,that ~;x:perience. iS. all we have. nJ In defending this charge, a par- . 
. tial truth, Gardner overlooks the she.rp distinction that Brightman makes 
between Situation-Experienced and the "Situation ... Believed-in• Finally, 
ttBrightman Is VieW of the sell' a~ the primary datum of experience renders 
I ,. I I· ' ' ' j t I . . )I • 
his epist~~ol~l?l :i,ncoher~nt_and undermine~s_his argument for the objectiv-
ity of value.n4 Like the second and four~, ·this criticism has some valid-
ity,··.~u.t in explaining this acousation'Oardner is so bz.-ief th~t he fails 
to ma~e any mention of how Srightman's view of the self "undermines his 
argument foil the objectivity of value.tt _In his criticism of' Brightman's 
view of value he challenges the Finite God as 1ess than supremely good,5 
as co:mmanding less than the highest ~espeot,6 and as falling short of full 
conviction.? He concludes that personalism and naturalism do not meet in· 
1,. See page 62·. 'Ihe problem of the egocentric predicament will be dis-
cussed in detail in Chapter vr·. 
2:. See page 64. 
3.. See page 65. 
4. See page 67. 
5. See page 187. 
6. Ibid,. 
7 • See pages 188-189. 
their p:P.ilosophies of e;q>erienp~ and :vaiu,e 1 ·but do meet in. their· method .. 
of verific~;ttion and emphasts · on conte~tUa.l 'interpretation. · 
The .most recent dissert~tion, ttA_ Comparison of the Value Theories . 
of E. S. Brightman and A.. N., ~itehe~d, 11 by Wilbur Handley Mullen, seeks 
ttto compare some of the ~sic ax:j_ological conceptsnl in the thought of 
. . . . . . . . ' ... 
these men. Mullen finds that Brightman rs criteria. of valu.e ar~ ttcoher-
e:q.c~ and the ·principle of respect for personality. n2 MUllen is sympa-
thetic w;i;th Brightman's P.ersonalist~c_· point of view.. His conolusions are 
largely brief summary statements of a descripti,ve rather than an.evalu-
a ti ve na. tu.re ... 
In four·· other disser~tions, relevant only by title., ~ightman 's 
trougQt play~ a minor role. In The Idea of God in British and American 
Personal Ideal.ism_,3 Ger~ld ~omas Easkfield is concerned primarily with. 
I ' ' • ' 
the systems of Howison,; :R,a.shdaJ,l1 and James Ward. Brightman an<; Knudso.n 
' 
combined peceive less than a page. Hiram Ches~r Weld, in ttSome Types of 
Personalis~ in the United Si{ates, tl4 treats Howison, M. W• Calkins, and 
Bowne. Morris Jonathan Morgan in ''Macintosh ts Critictsm of Personalismtt5 
and Go~den o. Thompson in nThe Philosophical Probl~m of the Definition of 
Matter in Twentieth Century Thought, n6 do not stress Brightman 1s point of 
viewo 
1. 
. 2 .. 
3. 4. 
5. 
6. 
See page 67, unpublished Ph~D. dissertation, Boston University, 1955. 
Ibid • 
Washington, Catholic University of America, 1933.· 
Unpublished fh.p., di~sertation; Bpston University; 1944. 
Unpublished P~.D. di~iserta.tt.on~ l3o:;,ton Un;i;ver~ity.t l~45. 
Unpublis:O.ed Ph.D. dissertation, l39st<?n lJp.iver~rit-y, l-~51. 
Several. other brief studies might be 'Jnentioneq. ..(l.ndrew Bt;Lpning 's 
artic~e, 11Professor Brightman 1s· Theory of a Limited God,n;L and D. G. 
Maci!ftosh 1s .discussion, IIWhat H~s. Professor J3rj.ghtman Done to Person-. 
alism? 11 2 are particularly v-aluable criticisms.. James·A. Martin ~akes· 
some.,pe~etrating <?bser:vai,;iol)s co·ncerni.ng Brightman's thought in Empirical 
Philosophies of Religion.? In so far as they are relevc;mt to the present 
I . I 
study _they will be footnoted .later •. · Rann:ie Belle. Baker 19 The. Concept .. of 
a Limited God,4 and Gordon Il .. Clark's kChristian V")..ew 9f Men and Things5 
are so. biased and emotional in their treatment of .Brightman that they are 
o.f little value. Other relevant lesser. studies will be listed in the 
bibliography. 
5. A Bl;'ief Biography_ of Brightm~. 
The understanding of Brightman'~ personalistic idealism does not 
' . . 
require a kn9w~edge of his l.ife, ·but a brief biographical sketch should 
' 
add to the interest if not to the understanding. No man's thought is 
completely independent of his physi~al environment, and ~lthough the· 
purpose here is not to outline any detailed influences of Brightman's 
physical environment on his thought, it does seem appropriate to in-
clude in. a atudy qf this n.a. ture the bio~aphical aspect o:f' a system. of 
.· . 
.. !f.~ 
1; Harvgrd Theological RevieW1 2.7(1934) 3 pp. 145~168-
2: RaligJ,.9n in-U:fe~--rcl9~·2-y~- PP• 304 ... 307. · · 
3;.· .N-.-:Gl-1\ing~"s Crovfn Frese, 1945; . 
. u: W~ahingtoiu Shenq,p.do9h, l?ub~ House, l93L.. 5: Grand Rapids; Wrn~ l3. Ee:rdrnans fub. '0o. J '1952. 
. .. 
Edgar Sheffield Brightman, the only child of George Edgar and M~ 
Sheffield Brightman, was born September 20th, 1884, in Holbrook,.Massa-
qhusetts.l His father, a. Methodist clergyman., 11was conservative, yet 
cheerful and a.ffectionq.te, and his ethical conception of the Fatherhood 
of God preserved him from a practical illiberalism~:n2 His mother. was 
llhighly endowed, read the best bqoks·, and began teaching !Ji.i:ri/ French 
and botany at a.n early a.ge.u3 He P~ad classical literature while very 
young and graduated from h;tgh school in Whitman, Mass., at 16 years of 
age, having been greatly influenced by the inte:;Llectual ~timulation of 
the principal, Mr. :OUdl~y :L.., .Whitma.l'slJ, ... 4. 
His ·parents thought him too youthful for college so he worked a 
year .for the f. R., Howes Grocery Store and Meat Market in Provincetown,5 
entering ~own University in the fall of 1902 •. At Brown his chief 
interests outside philosophy we:t;e "Greek (especially.Homer apd Lucian), 
the theory o£ evolution, argumentation, Browning, and Omar Khayyam. 116 
His philosophical heroes were .first Plato, Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus, 
Berkeley a.nd Nietz;sohe. Thenhe beca.nie more interested. 'in the thought 
1,. For a. brief autobiography see IIReligion as Truth 11 in the fil:'st volume 
of :Oontemlora.r>y America.p; T!:le0*_o.g;Y., edited by Ver>gilius Ferm, (N. Y •• 
Round Tab .e PreseJ 1932), PI"¥ ~5'-5'e.. For a. more detailed and intimate 
account see Dr. Ja.nnette E. Newha.llls.biographica.l·sketch in The 
Philosoph:Loal Forum, 12(Boston University, .;195.4); 9~21"' Other bio- . · 
graphicial sources are given.in Dr. Newha.llts article. 
2. 11Religion as r.r:t'uth, II p. 55 4 . 
.3. Ibid. 
4. Ibfd. 
5. J. E. NewhallJ IIEdga.l:' Sheffield Brightman, A Biographical Sketch," 
P• 10. 
6• 11Religion a.s Truth, 11 p. 56. 
of Kant and SohopenP,auer, movi:rig ·to the absolutism of Josiah Royce~. 
until· "swept off his feettt by the p:ra.gmatism of William James • He gradu-
ated from Brown. :1J11906 but remined an e:x:tta tw'o years to earn a. Master 
'... . ..... 
. , . ~. ' 
of Arts. degree. In addition to his studies d'l.ll'ing the·se two years he 
taught at Brown and Pembroke and preached each Sunday in Wiok£ord, Rhode 
Island .• l 
·In the autumn of 1906 he entered Boston University School of 
Theology where he came under the influence of Borden Parker· Bowne, whose 
personalistic philosophy left a permanent mark. He said;· "Bowne g~:ve me 
a. personalism 'Which seemed to me to combine the truth that there wa.s in 
Royce and James with a o.ri tic ism o£ the errors o:£ each:. n2 · Oompletiil:g his 
seminary training in two years:, he went to Ge~ma~ :where he studied in 
the University of Berlin under Mllnsterberg, Deissmann, Gressma.nns and 
Harnack; and in the University of Ma'rburg .:under J.fllicher .and.Wilhe·J.m 
Herrmann. But before the close of the third semester he was called to 
Nebra.ska Wes+eian University to replace Benjamin Van Riper who bad go~ 
to Boston University after the death of Bowneo3 
In .June of 1912 he received his Ph.D. degree in philosophy from 
Boston University.4 .The following month he was married to Charlotte 
u{llsen, whom he had met :i,.n Berlin. Two years later she bore him a son, 
Howard ulhsen Brightman, who was only eleven months old. when she died of 
1. J. E. Newhall; ttEdgar Sheffield Brightman, A Biographical Sketch, It 
P• 11. 
2. "Religion as Truth, 11 p. 57. 
3•· J. E~> Newhall, ttEdgar Sheffield Brightman, A Bi~graph;ical Sketch·, tt 
P• l3• . 
4. Ibid. J p~ 14 •. 
·a facial . cancer in Mct,y 1915 ... ~,:·.·. 
The same year Brightman joined the faculty at Wesleyan• Univer-sity· 
in Middletown, Connecticut,· as Associate Professor of Etlaics and Re-., .· 
ligion. While- at Wesleyan he published his first book, The Sources of 
the Hex.ateuch. He also married Miss ]rma B. Fall of Middletown, ~tla 
whom h€ had two children, Miriam Fall, born in 1921, and Robert 
Sheffield, born in 1928 • 
. :rn 1919 he accepted an invitation .t.o join the ..faculty of .the.· Gradu,.,.. 
ate School. of Boston University. When an anonymous donor esta,blished a 
chair of philosophy in 1925, he became the first Borden Parker Bowne 
Professor of Philosophy.-~ From his pen came a steady .stream of bb9ks, 
.articles,.lectures, and sermons which elevated t:q.e .stature of th\? uni-
versity, and gained him' world renown as on~ of. the ch:J-ef exponents· of 
personalistic idealism.. In addition to his acaqemic duties he ass~ed 
committee and academic responsibilities.;, among them being Ghainnan o~ 
the Board of. the Graduate School for· more than e~ghteen years. When a. 
University Lectureship was establish,ed at Boston University in 1950, 
.Brightman. was honored. as the first appointee e 3. for more; than thirty 
years he enriched.the life of the university until a co~onary thrombosis 
in Oct9ber, 1949 forced him to r~tire from muc;:h of his teachipg rel?pO~?i­
bili ty o He continued writing, revi~?ing his Introduction to Philosophy . 
l .. J; E; Newhall, 11Edgar Sheffield Brightman, A Biographical Sketch~ 11 
p; 14~ 
2. Ibid .• , p. 16~ ~-
3.. Because of illness he was unable to deliver his lectu!'e · (Persons ·,and 
Values., Boston University Press, 1951) until April 16, 19.~!. -
17 
and completing in first draft ten and a half chapters of his 11Meta.,., ... 
.. · .. 
physics 111 before a shock, in October 1952, left him unable to continue 
his work.. ttAfter a gallant fight for recovery, he died on February 25, 
1953. ti2 
A detailed account of the evolution of Brightman 1 s thought is not 
integral to this study. Suffice it to say that for a time~ under the 
influence of the logic of Alexander Meiklejohn, Brightman was a rigid 
determinist, denying the freedom of the will, until the arguments of 
B~ P. Bowne and E. G. Spaulding led him to see .the necessity of freedom 
if reason is to function. For the most part, he accepted the main 
principles of personalistic idealism as taught ~Bowne, but he did feel 
that Bowne 1 s thought needed to be supplemented and corrected ttby great-
er attention to empirical fact, both in ps.ychology and in the physical 
~nd biological sciences, and also by a more concrete and adequate view 
of the wo;r:k of reason.u.3 These influences, with lla renewed study of 
Darwin and later evolutionary theory, especially E •. Noble's Purposive .. 
Evolution, 114 led him to his theory pf the finite-infinite temporal God,~~ 
his major break with Bowne as well as with, traditional.theism. The re-
lation between this empirical emphasis and the resultant theistic cos-
mology is the problem of the following .chapters;. 
1 .. J .. E .. Newhall,.. "Edgar Sheffield Brightman, A Biographical Sketch, 11 
p .. 18 .. 
2. Ibid ... 
3 .. 11Religion as Truth, 11 p. 57. 
4, Ibid ... 
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CHAPTER II 
BRIGHTMAN 1 S FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 
Th~ preceding chapter indicates that the problem to be investigated 
is the evaluation of the relationship between the empi~ioal evidence and 
the resultant theistic cosmology in the philosophy of Edgar Sh~ff'ield 
Brightman~ S~oh a problem involves the basic structure and content of 
Brightmanrs philosophical l;lystem. This wil;J, be pointed out in the thi~d, 
i'o\l~t4., and fii'th chapters. To understand these chaptel:'a it will be help-
ful to outline Brightman's f'unda.men~al prinoiples~..-his definition oi' phi-
losophy1 his definition oi' truth, his philosophical method~ and his cri-
tel:'ion of truth. Such i,s the purpose of the present chapter which begins 
with the def'i~ tion o:f philosophy. 
1. The Definition of Philosophy 
i. The Importano~ of Definitiop. 
De:finition is essential in all clear thinking. Indeed, definition 
is the process of clear thinking 1 the process of bringing into sharp re-
lief any object of thought~ and then l:'elating and contrasting it with 
other objects of thou.ght,l In so far as the object of tnought is hazy~ 
to that extent at least the interpretation of that object and its relation-
l. A Philoso:phY p;f Religion, pp. 88, 91. 
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ship 'With other obj acts will be correspondingly hazy. 
The im.po:rtance of definition was central .;for Brightman. nn1 living 
is trying to discover what we mean, what others mean, what the world and 
1 
God mean. All living, whatever else it may or may not be, is definingo 11 
Unless the subject was clearly understood Brightman devoted the opeoing 
paragraphs in lecture and in essay to defini tiona. He often quoted a 
phrase of Borden Parker Bowne: "We must sterilize our intellectual instru-
ments.n Instruments are meant for precision. Words are the instrrunents 
of thoughto The word here is 11philosophy.., 11 "What, then, ~s philosophy? 
And once defined, what ar~ its fundamental principles? 
ii.. The Preliminary Definition of Im.losophy 
The etymology of the word suggests that philosophy means the love 
2 
(philia) of wisdom (sophia). But the love of wisdom can hardly be called 
an adequate defi~ tion u~ess it is understood that the philosopher 1 s 
love of wisdom goes beyond a description of facts. ·More than the de-
scription of facts~ he seeks ttthe value of the facts" and llthe relation 
3 
of all the different kinds of facts to each other. 11 Thus the philo so-
pher 'Will take the facts from one branch of learning and relate those 
facts to the facts of other branches for the purpose of·discovering the 
4 
"total mea.Iri.:p.g and value of human experienc~. u The suggested definition 
of philosophy is ttthinki:p.g which seeks to discover connected truth about 
1•' E.S. Brightman, The Spiritual Life (N.Y.: .Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1914.2), 
p. 11. Because of the importance of defioition, each chapter will 
·' begin with a section. on llpreliminary orientation." 
2. An Introduction to Philosophy, Po l. 
:rf"Thido;·; :P•- ~r. · · . 
4o Ibid,. . , · ., 
:·~ 
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( 
all available experience.ul Philosophy is a systematic attempt to under-
stand all experience concidered in its totality. 
This definition .of philosophy involves at least four presuppositions: 
;first, the trutP.~:ls impor~n,:h.t secop.4, !1~~:.,.-true is the wholetr; third, the 
at};empt to.;:undeist&nd: experience must be systemat:Lc (and to be systematic 
some method of procedure must be found. that. "'iS~-a~te tq .the goal), and 
fourth, aqy sy~tematic attempt to understand experience as a whole must 
involye a criterion of truth that is adequate to the goal of philqsophy 
as defined. Each of these presuppositions will be conside~ed in.turn. 
2. The Import911ce of Truth 
i. The Definition of Truth 
To def:t.ne philosophy as nthinking which seeks to discover connected 
truth about a.ll available experieneett is to make truth the goal for the 
philosophical seqrch and hence to make it all-important. Remove the goal. 
and the struggle is without meaning. 
For Brightman, truth is the accurate description of the real. 
What, then, is truth? This question, a,s we as:k; it, does. 
not mean; What is the whole truth abou.t things? It means 
simply~ How shall we define the word true? Sometimes, 
~vide~tly, we denote by it the moral quality of loyalty, 
o~ of honesty, or of veracity. Logic ·is interested in the 
term, not as applied to the character of personsp but as 
a,pplled to propositions. • •• A true proposition is one 
that describes or refers to a s~ate .of affairs that is as 
described. In other words, a true:proposition is one that 
corresponds to a real state of affairs.2 
By 11real11 Brightman means personal eiperience • .3 
l. .An. Introduction to, Philosoph;y-, p. S. 
2·., Ibid., ·p_p. 46-47 • 
.3· •. The··meai'ling o1· reality will be discussed in Chapter IV. 
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iio "Religion as Trut.htt 
In an article entit:led, ''Religion as Truth," Erightman lists the 
propositions which are tlfundamental in all ffii~7 thinking, especially in 
the field of' philosophy of' religion.tt1 Those prcpposition.~ are: 
.. ~ . 
1. Logical coherence is the sole criterion of' truth. 
2. Religious experience furnishes data for truth about r~ 
ligion. 3. The study of' history is both necessary and 
dangerous in the search for religious tru.t.h. · 4. All truth, 
including religious tru:th, i.s hypothetical. 5. Religi-on is 
essentially metapcysical. 6. The real is personal. 7 o The 
l:'eal is va,luable. 8. The church is worthy of su.p~ort. 
9. The social. order is in need of' radical reform. 
Some of these prop~sitions are not particularly relevant to the present 
study}· The l;I..st is included here net only to show the proposition which 
Brightman considered fUndamental but also to indicate py the title of' the 
article the importance of truth in his philssophieal system. The more 
important of' the proposi tians will be discussed individually below. 
3. •• The True is the Whole" 
i. Hegel and Aristotle 
.. ,•: 
The phrase nthe true iS the wholett is :Bagel's concept, "Das Wahre ist 
da.s Ganze.u4. By it he meant that everythi:ng must be considered in relation 
to the rest of the universe if the whole truth about it is to be·)aaovm. 
Bei:ng a philose>pb.er he wanted to see how things work tpgethe:t-. He sw.ght 
the ,::Whole of which the particular is a part. Al thoug}l the phrase belongs 
with Hegel, the ;idea was developed years before in the philosophy of' 
1. Eo S., Brightman, "Religion as Truth,tt Gontem.pora:ry American Theology:, 
ed. V. Ferm, Vol. I., PP• 51-81. The quotation is from page 58. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Propositions 8 and 9. 
4. ttReligion as Truth," P• 58. 
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Aristotle. 
Aristotle thought of philos~phy as 'the ·.study of being as: .. a whole~ 
Renee, "AristOtle shows 'that philcsophieal statements require a oompre" ' 
herlsive view. of. all expenenee.n1 In the Polities, Aristotle :indicated 
that "the whole is neces~arily prior :to the Pa,rt.•i2 B:r;tghtman, suggests 
that for Aristotle this meant 
that you eantt understand a lJ1Bril. until yoU. first underl)tand' 
his soeial baekgrc:>nnd, the "state" to .which he beJ.engs ,;· 
that society precedes the individual.,; '0r,, more broadly, 
th'at there ean1t be an apple Without an apple tree, or an 
applE1, tree without seil, ra~.t' a;t d sun. In short1. he 
meant to say that no faet exi~.,ts by itself alone. .Nothing 
can be adequately understood without considering its re-
·lation to other'things, whether the relation be like that 
of a hen to ,its egg or tpat .of a pebble to a wave that 
washes over 'it~l · 
. . 
For Brightman, ''the tne is the whole" means that the part is less 
than the whoJ.~ and e'annbt ,'t?e.adeqnil.:tely" understood when "abstracted~ from: 
the whole. Eve~hing must be considered in relation to ever.ything else. 
Truth "means· the adequate, the 'suffieient.il1t Hegel t s temethod o.i' constantly 
relating eaoh piece of experience to others until all h.as been S'llrveyed is 
for ·me the ,f'ui::tdamental road to religious insight.••-' 
ii. The Em;irieal Demand. for Understandin~ th~ ~oJ.e6 
' . . ~ 
.. 
If J.ife is to make sen.?e, philosophy is necessary~ On one occasion 
~me experiences the calm ~~pose of a summer sunset with the. Silhwett.e of 
J.. An Introduction to Philosophy,···p. 3. 
2. Ibid. 
3e ·Ibid., Po 4. 
4._.TI:'i'eS;piritua:t Life, p. 26. .· .. ,'. . , . 
5. "From Ratfonalisin: to Ernpiz;_oism,n, Ohris'tian Gentuey, 86(1939), P• 277. 
6. The· meaning of "empirical'ft 'will be .given ·in detail in the next chapter. 
'Far the: present. purpose it is sufficient i;o ind.i.cat·e that it is synony-
mous 'With n experien tiaJ. .n 
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·~ ..... 
·~- '-' .... 
burdened fruit trees suggesting an orderly and purposive universe. At the 
same time; one sees the crippling disease choking an adolescent life su.g-
· gesting a universe that is at best indifferent and perhaps even hosti1e 
to individual· hi.llllan welfare.l In the thoughtful mind there arises the 
· q~estion of the relation between the beauty of the sunset.. and the s.1lg-
t!; 
gested purpose of the fruit on the one hand, and the horror of the fevered 
disease on thB other. Since bQth beauty and suffering exist, both must be 
. seen in relation to a lalrger whole, the nature of which will explain the 
existence of both in one world. This is what is involved in HegeJ.t s dia ... 
lectice One begi~s with the thesis; then one must move to what has been 
omitted from consideration, ,the antithesis; then one must arrive at a new 
understanding having utili~ed the increased knowledge, relations, etc., 
the s.ynthesis. The s.ynthesis in turn becomes a new thesis and the dia-
leotic mQVes on, eternally illustrating that the true is the 'Whole. I.f 
philosophy is .a systematic attempt to understand experience as a whole 
it presupposes the truth made explicit in Hegel--a truth that is c~ntral 
in the thought of Brightman.· 
The goal of metaphysics is· to think as concretely as pos-
.sible about experience--concretely, that is1 not in the 
popular sense, but in the etymological (ngrowing together") 
and Hegelian sense. To be concrete, in· this sense, is to 
think interconnectedly and "holistically;" >d. t is to see 
the parts as related to the whole to whi.ch·they belong and 
to cre~te a wav of thinking in which no aspect of experi-
ence is negleeted and all aspects are seen in'their re-
lations to each other.2 
l~ The illustration here is the authorts. 
2. »Metaphysics," Chapter II, p. 10. All footnotes to the ttMetaphysiosrt 
refer to the original typewritten manuscript in the Boston Uni'V'ersi i(y 
School of Theology Library, used with the permission of :Mrs. Edgar S. 
Brightman. 
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4~ The Need for an .Adequate Method 
i., The Problem of Method 
It has been suggested1 that every systematic attempt to understand 
e:x;:perience as a whole necessarily presupposes some method. Without some 
method there can be no system. The two Wi:>!"ds may be used synonymously 
since there can be no method until there has been some previous thought 
about· some ·kirid of·.~·ystem. To assert that one may have an unsystematic 
method is to reduce the concept of method to meaninglessness. Method 
means ttan orderly pracedure,.tt2 One may use an unsystematic appr<.lach to 
the problems of life, but that approach could hardly be referred to as 
a method .. 
Some aspects of i:he problem of method are as follows: Where is one 
to begin? How is one to proceed once he has 'begun? What Shall be the 
scope of the field under investigation? These questions are important 
because the conclusions one reaches may be influenced g..t"eatly by the 
method one uses. This truth will be seen more clearly .when the various 
methods are described in detail• But "the woz•d method is used to describe 
the way in which fruitful starting points and fruitful pro~"Jed.ures are de-
termined.. The study of methods is called methodology .n.3 
ii.. The Methods Used 
(1) The earliest method. "Stated simply, the earliest method man 
1. Page 21. 
2o Webster's Colle~ate Dictiona.J:Z, (Springfield_, Mass.; Go and G~ 
Merriam.Co., 193 ) • · ~- · 
3. An Introduction to Philosophy, P• 27. The following discussion of 
methods'is taken from this same chapter. ~11e headings are hiso 
... 
ever used, and the· root .. of all other methods, is a. combination, of obser-
vation and reasoning.nl In earliest form it was little more than a crude 
. 
type of trial and error. The observation was inaccurate and t!.~ reaeon-
ing was probably doininaterd·ey desite, so that priwttive ·man read into the 
~ . " ~ ... . 
world much. that colored further observation, But tb.e pressures of self-
preservation forced on him the necessity of coming to grips with his en-
vironment. Once he learned how to protect himself against the hazards of 
life through anticipation and preparatio:o., he had an opportunity to medi-
tate upon the meaning of the world round about him. ~us Thalee, living 
bf the sea in Greece (640?-546) obserVed that water took the :forms of ice, 
snow, rain, :Cog, and mist~ Since ~t a.pp.eared ·~ ~ii · Qr~~~Irl9,.- TAales eon-
eluded that everything is some form o:f water.. In this he "laid .:f'oun-
. l" 
da.tions for both science and philosophy • n2 
(2) The rationalistic (or deductive) method. Sinoe many methods are 
. . I . 
rationalistic in the broad sense of the term, this method ought to be re ... 
!'erred to a.s the deductive method. By' the deductive method is meant 
the method of' discovering (a) oerta:i.~ ba.sio truths wbioh 
are supposed to be sel:f'""'evident and necessary, su.eh a.s the 
axioms of' geometry or the immediate data. of experience, 
and a.lso (b) tha.t whioh ca.n be deduced from these ba.sio 
truths w.L th .logical neoessi t7. It consists 1 then~ of · 
discovering neoessar.1 premises and their neoe~ear,1 impli-
oations,3 · 
This method is not to be dismissed lightly'. It began in Aristotle's 
logic EU:ld. w~s leaned upon by' a. thinker of no less standing than Desoa.rtes. 
But in the ~Sense here defined £(1W philosophers would espouse it because 
•\. .. . . . 
1 ~ • • 
.. 
~ . . ·.· 
1. ~¥nt~od~Qtio~·to PhilQsORhz, .. P• 29. 
2, '"-OJ.Cl• .; 11 3. :JA;q:, PP_-. 30~31, . .. 
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..of the difficulty of.. being absolutely certain a.bout the fundamental :C~ll-!P. 
,, 
capt.s. If the fundamental premises are, false.,;, the whole st:ructll.re is .. 
doomed. Furthermore_p our ex:peri.ence of perceptions and- values is not 
I r, 
~(per~enced as the conclusions o£ syl1Qgisms4 
(3 ) .. The e?g?eriment.a.l (or inducti.v~.L.!l·ethod.; In contrast with the . 
me:lthl)d of'· deduction$ the method of induction or expe:rinl,ent· is the refined 
version of the earliest method of trial ana error,4 , The st.ages invol:v:ed . 
are~ "observation, formatiqn of some ge..TleralizeQ. hypotb.ese.s, teet;ing 
(confirmation or rej action) of this hypothesis by controlled exper;Unent 
(or .P ·as in astronomy 9r geology., by renewed observation). "l The ... greater r 
the number of hypotheses and the forms of experiment the grea:~er the 
value. of this method., ;. 
Valuable as this method is (and when· properly interpreted it is 
basic in all sound Ph:ilo~~phy), :it _is· in~omplete. when i".aed alone. It is 
limited by .the fact that some c1.mditions ca.w.J,ot be subjected to the 
experimental technique, and that all conditions that can be so subj e,cted 
involve the presuppositions o:f experiment. 1111There must be ·an experimenter 
' :· 
who is a ~ni tary self, there must be the obs~rv<ible · Ja.ta o:f consciousness, 
purpose,· recognition o:f the validity ,of reason, memory and time, and 
~ 
aoknowledgement of an objective world and of society.to 
2.7 
(4) The a.naJ.ytic method.. 11The. anal.,ytic l!).,e~hod·, as the nam.e implie~., 
is a complete analysis of per.ceived objects into their constituent parts·-~;3 
lo An Int:roduetion to Philosophy:, Po 32o 
·~t: iVThe :rresuppositions of Ex:periment.~~81l The Personalistp 19(1938h 
~.. -
~ J-Ul .Lntroduction ·to Philosophy; p. 33 .. 
... · ·.•. . . 
' •• 'Q ·t I 1 .. 
1
'• 
Included. in the analytic goal weuld be the relations between the par~s s·~ 
that "analysis and synthesis are correlative f'unctions. of' the analytic 
method., 111 All serious philosophers accept ana.J.ysis as a necessary stage 
in understanding., but to make it the exclusive method is to end in difi'i-
culty., Used. alone the method of' analysis is, too narrow. 
(5) The Kantian (or critical or transcendental) method. Kant as-
sumed the truths of' the basic sciences of' his day'and then sought f'or 
the nece·ssary presuppositions ef' those truths. These presuppositions 
he f'ound to be space and time (f'orms of' sensibility) and the categories 
of' thE? understanding.2 He calied the method "·~ranscendental11 because :n:e 
used i;t as synonymous wi tb. 11 a prior;t..., tt that :t.s., Uili versal and necessary. 
His method., valuable as it is, is limited in application because of its 
relation to the science of' his day. 
( 6) The dialectical (or Hegelian) 'method. :. Hegel 1 s dialectical 
method has already been mentioned) It begins wit~.,P,.o~~··"a.ss.erB.oii·a'Bout 
. . . . . . . : 
. . . . . . 
exper1:€3fia'e~':r,.Th1..s ±s:.:C.a:lled-ther-··the:fri'B:;~·: TheP..;--::·finding .. t.h13.:t every be-
·~:~---. . . ..~ .. ,.~ ··.:. 
ginning is incomplete, it cqnsiders the relevant data which have been 
omitted in the thesis. This phase is called the antithe,!;!,;Ls. Out of the 
dialectical tension between the thesis: and anti thesis :l.t moves on to a 
new oztientation., the synthesis. The synthesis then qecomes a new thesis 
• 0 ...... I''O!'l!i'· • . ••. 
and the dialectic moves. on eternally, demonstrating !fegel'·S''~·PJ.'"'ina.:i~le tlia:t. 
the true is the whole • 
.. l~. ~- ~·~ ."::. . .._· .. 
i .. ~ An Introduction to Philosophy; 
2;' Ibid.,u P• 3S. 
3~ Page~23'~ 
P• 33~ 
. ·'; . 
" . \ 
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(7) ·The romantic method. Hard to define,. ttthe romantic method in ..• 
philosophy may be described as the tendency to base a world view ehi\3fly 
on feelings and instinctfi..~•1 It cannot be called a method unless it ,·is 
taken in a lal:-ge:r context42 Though its limitations in bu:j..lding a philo ... 
sophical .system are.,apparent, ·its chief contribution is· the clarion call 
that the intel~ectuB:l head fail not .to heed the feeling heart .. 
( 8) The synoptic method. For Brightman~ Usynopsis is .the ebara.eter-
istic-m;thod of philosophy .tt3 . This method. "P;o~supposes that the rational-
istic, experimental, analytic~ critical, dialecticC+l, and romantic m·ethods 
ha.ve all been tried, and that the;l.r resu.lt.s are before the mind.; 11 ~. It· 
views things as a whole rather than:Niewing the constituent p~'bs9 
We are arguing tb.a.t what is called scientii'1.e met.hoo 
is not adapted to give an account of the values of life. 
There appear to be two fundamental reasons why it must be 
inadequate. First~ it explains wholes in terms of parts 
· ~d hence cannot grasp values, which are essehtiallzy- . 
who:iesj and, 'secondly, it precludes a:n:y recogJ:rl. tion of a 
moral and religious ·order.> · 
·, 
Over against the analytical method. of science Brightman places a method .. 
better suited to deal with reality as a whole. He refers to it here as 
"p.ersonalistic. 11 
Any ~nterpretation that would carry us beyond our mere 
states of consciousness requires assumptions or hypotheses 
that find their only possible verification in their ca- · 
paci ty consistently to satisfy the fundamental principlei), . 
dernandq and need.s of our nature. P-ersonalistic method in~ 
sists that the facts of logic, mathematics, and sense 
. ~ ·An.~lritror,luction to Philosophy, p. 38. 
2. See the definition of method on page 2). 
3~ 1lll Introduction to P.nilosophy, P• 39:. 
4-o Ibid~ . ·• .. . 
. 5.,. ··uThe Personalistic Method in Philosophy, 11 The Methodist Review, 
103(1920), P• 371. · 
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experience are not the onlY nor the most important facts. 
The moral and religious experiences of men are also facts. 
Pe~s~nalism postulates God as their explanat~on.l 
.In his Philosophy of Religion, Brightman ref'ers to the same method 
as the empirical method, the method he chooses above otherS beeause it is 
so inclusive and liberal that it does not require that the field be 
cleared of all opposing methods. n&ther it finds a place for all points 
of view, inclttding its own objections to itself.2 
In the second chapter of his "Metaphysics, tt he discusses metaphysi-
cal method at length. Here he calls it either "radical empiricism, 11 bot-
rowing a phrase from William :James, to indicate that the method will as-
-sume no source of information about the real other than experience,n3 or 
"personalistic method,'' because ••it 1:1ses the data of persenal conscious-
ness (there being no other data available) and is guided by the purposes 
and ideals of personal consciousness."4 This metaphysical method has 
several characteristics.?· First, it is empirioc:!-1, that is, it is 
.· .,..,;.. 
thoroughly grounded in the facts of experience. All that is avai:l:able 
to ma.n for the foundation of a philosophy- is the data of experience. Sec-
ondly, this nethod is _experimental_, expecting an active relationship with 
the data of experience rather than a merely contemplative one. It is, 
thirdly, persona~istio in that all methods depend upon the actual reality·. 
of persons. "Abolish. persons and you abolish experiment ...... Experi-
lo "The Personalistic Method in Philesophy," p. 369. 
2. Page 7. 
3. "Metaphysics,'~ Chapter II, p. 12. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Pages 12ff .. 
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mental method1 to be inte;t.ligent, .. must be personalistie. 111 ~·ere can be 
no observation witho~t an observer. tt;persona,4~tie method reqii'i.:e~s 
interpersonal communication and i.nter~ction.-"2 
It may help to clarify the method of synopsis if it is 
more specifically related 'to analysis. Thought must start 
in its first stage with experience as given (the datum)-
a confused-synopsis• ·The second stage of :thought mustbe· 
that of analysis--however incomplete. In the third stage, 
each analysis must be tested by its relations to the origi- : 
nal synopsis. Two questions must be asked: (1) Is the· 
, .. analysis ··complete--has 'it included every aspect of the 
original experience? (2) Is the analysi.s illuminating-
does :it help us to understand the original eiperience 
better? The analysis is useless unless the· relation of 
its results to the datum analyzed are clear~·- These three ;:; . 
stages keep on repeating, as more thorough methods of 
analysis . are developed and· the meaning of the dati1I!l is· 
deepened.3.. . . 
The methodological process relating analy,sis and synopsis Brightman 
ref'ers to as the flight of the arr<;>W of intelligibility. 4 Th~ arrow -
starts from the preanalytic whole, the unintelligible given, flying 
tOYTard the goal of analysis (~alytic parts) only to discover that the 
bull 1s eye is not wholly intelligible, and hence,~ with nsW- aim, it flies 
back toward the synoptic whole~. having bean e~icn~d :;c,lu;;ough l:ihe results 
of the flight toward analysis. Like Hegel's dialectic, the flight goes 
.< 
on forever, 
but the essence of it is that fuller and truer intelligi-
bility is found at the synoptic end than at· the analytic 
end of the flight of the arrow. The arrow can never rest 
in a developing world, but its true target is a.. synopsip_ 
enriched by analysis rather than an analysis much ex~ ·-
hausts synopsis and renders it superfluous. For it is in 
. '.·· 
--~ tUl\[etaph:ysicS'; 11 Chapter II, p. 11-·• 
9 Ibia · · 
' -
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:3 .. ; m~~oducti~n to Pb.ilosopb,y, 'p. 41. 
4o "Metaphysics, tt Cl$apter II, P• 18; .An Introduction to Philoso;ph;r,:, P• 4lo · 
g,ynopsis that actual experience, the seat of'verification 
and process and life, iR found. Such is the point of 
view of those who hold to synoptic method.l 
The method of synopsis has several limitations. Often it does not 
lend itself to ttrigorously precise application," nor are its'conclusions 
"susceptible of being demonstr.;1ted mathematically.u2 Its conclttsions are 
I 
/ 
seldom absolutely certain, l:::ut what it lacks in certainty it makes up in 
empirical adequacy... 11If the goal of philosophy is to be reached or even 
approached, it vtill b~ by the use of synoptic method •. u3 
5. The Need for an Adequate Criterion of Truth. 
i, How the Need Arises 
:# . . •;-: 
The method of synopsis or llradical empiricismtt is one that seeks to 
include and relate all the facts of experience., The philosopher using 
,.. 
this method recognizes that no other method is adequate to the goal of 
pl1ilosophy as here defined. But to seek deliberate~y to inc~ude all the 
facts of experience in the philosophy of the wh~le is to expose oneself 
to experiences that appear mutually self-contradictory. It was pointed 
out beforeh that the burdened fruit tree silhouetted against the autumn 
sky suggested a universe that is purposive and friendly to m.arts while the 
diseased death of the adolescent suggested a universe .. that is hostile, or 
at best, indifferent, to individual human ·value. , Before one can come to 
an interpretation of the whole he must have some means of measuring and 
. :·: . . •. , .. 
ld An Introduction to PhilosophY,,' P• 41. 
2~.· Ibid. 
3 .~ 'Tbid .. " pp 0 41-1.!.2 • 
4 .. Page.24. 
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deciding which .!i)f these conflicting hypotheses :i,.s nearer the truth. If 
the true is tl;le whole, one is justified in presupposing that oont.ra-
dictory hypotheses cannot both be verif;l.ed ~s true.. The .immec;liate 
problem, then, is a criterion of truth ~hat is adequate for the goal of 
a philosophy that is willing to include Within its scope all the data o£ 
experience.. The problem of an adequaiie crite±:ion of truth .is f!O central 
in the thought of Brightman that the next section will be devoted to his 
discussion of the various cri-teria of truth .•. 
ii. The Various Criteria of Truth1 
(1) Custom. Although primitive ~an is 'Pelieved to have been a 
e~eature of instinct,;; very early in the history of the human race his 
conduct was influenced by the customs and ;ideals of his group. In t:P,ese 
customs he found his personal security; ,by thes~ customs he judged the 
virtue of his action, pro'l:>ably without ev~ questioning the. beliefs as-
sociated with these customs even when they conflicted with the customs of 
other tribes. But to a modern mind it is immediately obvious that custom, 
though it may well serve as a source of informat~on about any .society, is 
inadequate as a. criterion of tl"';lth. 
(2) Tradition. While many would recogni~e custom as no test of 
truth, they would tliink ·more highly o£ trad!'tiOri.c>: ~nustom is more or 
1 .. A criterion of truth presupposes a definition of truth. Brightman's 
definition has been given on page 21. The order of the criteria de-
.scribed here follows that of the second chapter of Br-ightman t s Intra-
.· · ·ducti.ori t·o· P.b.iloso.Ebz.. The order is both 111ogical and, roughly speak-
;r· .ing, historical'! \pe-.47. ). In a footnote Brightman indicates: 11 the 
. ~:grouping of the criteria into three subdivisions and the addition. of 
~ .. ·(consistency' are due to a suggestion made 'l:>y my colleague, .Pro.fessor 
·: 'L. ·Harold DeWo1f11 '(p. :47. )~ 
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less caprici0us, but tradition MS been tested oy the.su:ccessi.ve gener-
ations .. 
Common sense pleads the cause of tb.e tr~di tionalist; •for . 
(it would justly ask) if millenniums of past human effort 
have been unable to discover truth,. what prospect-has the 
modern philosopher of finding i t?l . 
Although one recognizes that tradition holds man above barbarism, 
only the extreme provincialist could ignore the conflict among different 
traditions. liTradition, then, must be judged by some standard which is 
valid for a m;re substan~ial r·aa:son th~ that it is traditional. n2 
(3) Consensus gentium. While ·sam~ que:?tion custom and tradition as 
valid criter~a of truth, :others find in the '*agreement of the nations" 
t~e adequate ·test.. Surely any belief tb,at is shared uni versal.'Ly must 
reveal something -true about .the univer~e. The difficulty .. here is that~ .. 
"there is no universal .agreement on any matter: of ilnportance, 013 Further-
more,. once it was universally be~eved th9-t the earth was flat.. I£ any-
thing were um:versally· believed i.t might well be .true,. but it would not 
be true merely becauae ~t was believed universa.lly. · One ·:riJ.ust seek 
farther f.or an adequate criterion. 
(4) Authority.. Some there are who would quickly recognize that, 
agreement of. the n~tions (consensus. genti)lin) ·is no ·test. for truth be-
cause-the masses are not qualified to decide what is truth. Tb.e-crl""'-· 
terion must bear the mark of authority. Thus, in :legal matters the 
Supreme Court is the final authority. On ethical issues ~he Bible or· 
the Church is .the autl;l.Ority, and hence the· criterion of -truth. Bu.t when 
1 .. .An Introduction to Philo~~phy~ P• 48~ 
2. ]bid-•. ;· P• 49; . 
)., APhilosophy of B,ellgion, ~P· 124. 
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authoriti~s suoh as the saored soript:ures o! th13 differentreligions are 
seen to disagree, which is the authority? *'Author± ty is not a test of'· 
trutho The source of the authority is the test of the authority.n=l-
(5) Instinct• It might be argued that that which is instinct:\.ve 
- . 
in man might be used as a guide to trv:t;h. n~~inct is a fact of immedi-
ate ex:perience.tt2 But several problems then arise. First, what is in-
stinct? The authorities cannot agree on an answer• Secondly, ttif in-
stinct is a criterion of truth, are we to trust the beliefs that arise 
from sympathy or from resentment, from fear or from curiosity? To this 
query instinct has no reply. n3 If every instinct has equal right, how 
is one to judge between conflicting instincts? Instinct, however it is 
interpreted, may be essential in self-preservation, but it is not an 
adequate test of truth. 
(6) Feeling. ttDiscouraged by the attempt to discover a criterion 
in the facts of instinct, one may fa~l back on one•s own fee~ing as.the 
ultimate test of truth.n4 One .rpa.y believe or act as he does merelr 
because he cannot overcome the feeling that some suggested proposition 
is an accurate description of reality. Bu,t, the prpblem.. is,_ how is one 
to decide between conflicting feelings? At one moment, under one ~ind of 
influence, he has a feeling of o:n,e kind; at another moment, under, 9-
different kind· of influence_, he has a fe~l:i,ng ~o tbe contraryo Feeling: 
itself provides no solution to its own confliet.5 
1. An Introduction to Philosophy, P• 51.· 
26 Ibid., Po S2. 
3 .. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., p. 53. 
5. "A Meeting of Extremes~ Operationalism and Personalism," Journal of 
Religi0n, 31(1951},·· 241. 
(7) Sense perception.' In sense perqeption th~· m:ihd fihds ·a· c~rtain­
ty that is satisfying when in sear~h for a. criterion of truth. Sense· · 
perception is the mind's only pridge to the o'bjec~ive world. ·The data 
of sense are there; they are obViou~ and in~ubitable.· But to make'sense 
perception the criterion Qf trUth is to ~~ each perception equaLly 
valid. Although the railroad tracks C!-PPear to converge, experience indi-
cates that they actually do not. Experience .dema.n'ds that ~ei:t~~ per- .. 
cept:l.on be subjected to a higher authority-; "Sense (lata must be seen in 
the light of the rest of expe+ienoe and Jil'ust be rationally interpreted.ul 
Important as it is as a source of lmowled.ge, · sensation is no testl for· 
truth. 
(8) Intuition. Intu.i tion1 Jj,~e feeling a.nd sensation, is something 
of which we are immediately aware. Indeed, ''all ~~ediate perception is 
called intuition. 112 Hence, .. like sense perception and feeling, intuition 
is undeniable. Experience shows that intuition is a source of truth,· but 
experience also shows "that it is unable to cti,.stinguish 11 a genuine intu·-
itton"from a disguised appeal to feeling (a rationalization or desire) 
without ·consulting, s,ome criterion otll.er th~ intuition .itself. 11 .3 .. 
(9) Correspondence. "A proposition is true i.f what it asse.t'ts cor-
responds to the object q.bout which the assertion is made.uh If this. is 
true, why not let the definition serve as a criterion of whair is defined? 
'l'he d.iffi.cul ty is that the defini t:Lon is a defiili. tion of truth rather 
·1-=i;'.-A Ph1..lo8-ophy of Religion, p,. .12). 
a.~ . .An Introduction to Philosophy, P• 57. 
:3<~ A .P.I:r.iJ.osophy of Religion, p. 12). 
4•~ Ibid. 1 P~ l26o . ' 
. ·' 
o:· 
than a. criterion of _t~t~ •. But corr~spondenoe falls short in that it· 
cannot be appl1ed.. Ideas cannot be· compared w:f_tP. the objec-ts they r.epre-
sen:b;. they can be compared o:nly :with. o.t.her idea~ •. A present proposition 
cannot be compared w:i.. th a proposition in th.e ·past as that comparison 
would require. the presence of the past, an obviO'IfS impossi.bility •. 1 ThUSj 
correspondence as here defined is a de;f'init~6n:rather. than a criterion o:f· 
truth c. 
(10) Practical consequences. '+'his is the: essence 0f pragmatism. 
11Speald.ng broadly and ambiguous4.y at first,. we. may say that it ·is ·th:e ·· 
theo:cy that the -test of the truth of all think;Lng is-to be :found in :its 
pr.actical consequences.tt2 If a,n idea wo:riks, ~t is true. This criterion 
has be~n: influ~~tial in the develo:Pment of Juneric?U philosophy, ·but. i. ts 
immediate difficulty is: What ·is m~ant by .. p;-acticaJ.? .And when ·can it be · 
said that an: idea has worked?' 
· If llpract:Lcal.n and Hw0rk11 are not. defined exae.tly, the use 
of them as criteria. only .. adq.s to the confusion of t:P,ought 
and .be·lief •. But if th.ey: are def~ed $Xactly and used ·· .. · 
thoroughly, they t-q,rn into a mandate to .. examine all the 
evidence, especial;I.y !all of th.e consequences of. action, in .. · · / 
the light of the mind's tot8rl. experien?e.3 ..... . "' 
Pragm.at:i,)Sm or practical consequencesm?-st ,~ook beyond ~or a crit;exion of 
what i~, ~ractical or what :Lt means by ''wor.K.u . _ ·,.:. 
. . (11) Consistency. If it is true, a~· po~pt~ o~t ~ar~er, 4 tha~ the 
true . is. :the wP,ole and that suep. f. proposition presupposes that ii:l.con- · 
. __ i ... "A. 'lliiioso"phy of Religion, p. 12q. 
2~.~ .A,n, I:n,tr.od,uc.t.ip:n, .to ;P,b.;ilosephy, p .• • 61~ 
3~"·A. PAi::L;osophy .~f, ;Re]J..gion,_ P-•- UB. · ,., 
~ .. ~age ·2_2 •.. ·. . --··. . . ... • 
. .. 
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sistent prop~sitions cannot both be true, then consistency suggests 
itself as a criterion of truth. Certainly all true· proposi tiona are con-
sistent. 11 Bui; :froltl 'all true propositions· are consistent' it does not 
- . 
follow that 'all consistent. prop~sitions are true~'? .. Th-is wo'iiad"'"'be m··· 
obvious fallacy of illogical conversion."]. Two different systems of 
il;ieas may e<;Leh be if1ternally self-consistent but inconsistent with each 
other. Two ideas may be consistent and yet clearly false. The mind 
needs to go b~yond mere cQpsistency, then, if it is to discover a re-
liab~e criterion of truth. 
(12) Coh~ence. If custom, tradition, consensus gentium, ~d 
authority-the social criteria-and instinct, feeling, sense perception, 
and int\ti tion-the cpi teria based on innnediate perception-if all t.J::ese 
criteria supply" data without providing an adequate guide for their in-
terpret~tion, and 
if, among the rational c~iteria, correspondence gives us 
a good·definition but an inapplicable criterion of truth; 
if pragmatism fails because of its ambiguity in defining 
the end relative to wnich true ideas are practical, and 
.if consistency applies only as a negative test, or only 
to necessar,y truthsl can the coherence criterion succeed 
where alrl other~ have failed?2 
. ' . 
Coherence me~s going be,rond mere cons~stency to ~ inclusive syste~ 
atic consistency; it means literal.ly, "sticking togethertt and offers the 
. . 
following criterion: ".Any proposition is t:n:ieJ·~if it is· both self-· .. 
consistent and cohere~tly· connected with ou,r system of propositions as a 
Wll.!Jle .• ~·~ .. J.l'rpm ~hi~ it is evid~nt that coherence, as a criterion, is very 
l•;~ Introduction to. PhilosoP!g~ p. 6'1'. 
2•~Ibi.d.·,. p • .'68 .. .'. . .... I. • ; .. 
·).·Ibid,, P• ·69; 11Re4gion e.s Truth," P• 58. 
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closely related to the synoptic method. The relationship is seen clearly 
in the following quotation. 
According to the criterion of coherence, a proposition is 
to be treated as true if (1) it is self-consistent,. (2) it 
is consistent with all of the known facts of experience, 
(3) .it is consistent. with all other propositions held as 
true by the mind that is applying th:is criterion, (4) it 
estab1ish~s explanatory and interpretative relations be-
tween various parts of experience, (5) these relations 
include all known aspects of experience p.nd all known 
problems a pout experience in its details aud: as a wlao:ile .1 
Two additiomal facts about coherence should be pointed out. 
(1) Since coherence requires a reference to the whole of 
·. experience, some hypothesis about the nature of the whole, 
is essential to the working of this criterion. (2) since 
experience and science are constantly growing,. the appli-
cation of coherence cannot arrive at fixed and static 
results-.. It is a principle of constant reerga:rrl.zat;ton1 . a 
law o£ criticism and growth, rather than a closed system.2 
In his later writings Brightman stressed the importance of cohere~ce 
as empirical~3 "To restrict empiricism to necessary logical tautologies 
. . 
and sensory data is not to be truly empirical. . • . •. " Includ~ aU the 
data and fact~ of ~e~i·ence or ·give---up ·the claim to empiricism.u4 . 
For coherence to lay claim to. all possible. eXperience in.measuring 
truth and to admit i;hat complete knowledge is a goal ever desired but 
. ~ . . ,.. . . 
never achieved (because of the very nature of the pursuit) is to open 
' -
itself to sever~ objections. Those seeking absolute certainty will 
object' that coherence·'~leadS' only t~··relative: truth::> .One oan never 
1. A PhilosophY.:_. o!,_ ~ligion, P• 128. 
2•·Ibid•; pp~ 12~-129. 
3·~ 'ii'fier'so:qalistic Metaphysics. of .th~ S~l.f! Its Distinctive Features1 11 
• ,. Radha.kti.sb.ilan;. ea~ ·w~R. Inge· (London: .Allen and Unwin, 1951) 1 P• 291. 
~ . ., "Meta,physics, 11 Oh~pter III, .P.• · 2~.. . . 
5. ··An Introduction to Philosophy, p ~ 71. 
I 
\ 
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know with absolute certainty. Moreove;', present knowledge will probably 
be so utterly revised in the distant future that what is now regarded as 
truth may then be seen to have been error. so·~·~ri~tman points 6ut tl).at 
~ch of the knowledge thought to be adequate will-need-revision; but not 
all of the knowledge"' now possessed by. man is relative .... 
. • .. If' 
Further, i:t may be pointed out that,. ev·en in our present 
vision of truth, there are elements which :are absolute in 
the sense that they cannot be thought. as untrue wi tb.o:ut 
self-contradiction. Such are the i1IIlllediate data of. eJCper.i-
ence, self-consciousness, the validity of the laws of _ 
formal ~ogic, and· perhaps -other principles,.especially 
coherence itself.l 
But the chief, reason for accepting the criterion of coherence as 
valid is that, like self-existence, 11it cannot· be denied without being 
affirmed,.n2 To deny that coher·ence is the test of .truth one must. appeal 
either to contradiction or to some form of coherence. 11And even if I 
' . ~-
appe~ to the. realm of contradiction and incoherence, if I mean what I 
say and stick to it, I am again appealing to coherence. If I do not mean 
what I sa;y, it is time to stop talking.tt~ 
iii. The Implications of Method and Criterien in Philosophy 
One reason that Brightman found method and ori terion so important in 
philosophy is that· if either is too narrow in theory or in praatice.to 
include -all the data of experience, the conclusions· to which .they· lead 
will he correspondingly limited. To know a thinker's method and cri-. 
terion is to know in advance the restrictions and limitations under 
l1o Ap. Introduction tq Philosophy, p. 71.· 
2 •. l"Qid,,_ .P, ... 72 .... 
)-. Ibid., PP• 72..,.7J. 
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whd.ch he works and henc.e to know something· of his conclusions• 
A man. r s criteF.;l;o1',l. o:Ftru th iS :bhe key to tbe. under- ·.,. :.• 
standing of -all his thought. If we know that a man will 
view as true only the laws of formal. logic and what. ca;n . 
be cogently deduced by these laws from rational. principles, 
then we know all we need to know a'Qou t th·e type . of re-
ligious construction of Which that man Will be capable.· 
Again, if we know that he will believe nothing that he 
cannot verify in sense experience, we are already in pos-
session of the main outline of his thougb,t; beyond which 
he cannot wander and remain coherent. • • • Some cri- · 
terion predetermines all thought-construction that is not 
merely haphazard.l · · 
The criterion of coherence asserts that basically '\ihere is onJ.y one road 
to truth and that is taking all data into account and relating them into 
the most meaningful pattern. 2 The lim:i. tations and. the freedoms of this 
criterion will be seen in further detail in the next chapter" 
This chapter has attempted tp outline the fundamental principles in 
the philoso.phy. of Brightman. He defines philosophy q.s "thinking 'Which 
seeks to discover connected truth about all availabl~ ~erience. 11 Such 
,1 . . 
a definition indicates the :importance o~ truth as the· goal of the philo-
sophical search. He accepts the Hegelian principle, "the true is the 
whole, 11 which is closely related to h:i,.s method of "radical empiricism'' 
and his criterion of empirical coherence. The following chapter indi-
. . . 
cates in detail what he means by "empirical" and then attempts to 
elucidate ttthe empirical scheme" in his thought. 
'lo::·nru:tscblfs Criterion of Religious Truth,u .American Journal of Theology, 
.. 2l(l9l7)' 212. . . '• . 
2.:: '"'The ·Contributio:r;r o:f 'Philosophy ·fo~·tl5.e. Theory of Religious Education," 
·• • .,~13ostdn University Bulletin, l3(July l,5, l924), 9 •.. 
¥~ -.. -~ •. . . . ' . -· . .. • 
. ... 
,. ..... ' ..... 
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CH.AP.rER III 
THE EMPIRICAL SCHEME 
A brief preview of 11the empirical. scheme111 should prove helpful in 
understanding the more detailed discussion which f.ollows.. For Brightl!lan, 
"empirical" ~efers to any conscious experience, and since all experienc~ 
is conscious, empirical refers to ~ experience. The empirical scheme 
is the process of experience. This process begins "With the ;immediate 
empirical datum, the datum self. The datum. self is a complex locus of 
awareness involving both activity and data or qualities. The present 
chapter will deal with the data only as general types and only as they 
contribute to the empirical scheme. In its more complex and reflective 
form the self becomes the empirical-·whole--personality. When adequat-ely 
definE;~d, "perso:p.ality is the key to reality';Wi2 
lo The Meaning of the Empirical 
i. The Ambiguity of the Term "Experience" 
"There is scarcely any term about whi.ch so much confusion prevails 
·among philosophers as about the term experience. 11 3 This term has been 
• .. ' :' 
1. The terminology is the authorts. 
2. See B. P.'.Bowne; P~rsena.Iis--fB9stoni Houghton Mifflin; 1908). 
3c. "l!:lq>erience; 11 @'Perience; .,annual .Oo:t.J.ege. of Preach~s, (Evanston: The 
General Conference Commission on Courses of Study bf the Methodist 
Episcopal Church, 1935), p. ·1.2., · · 
,_ 
subjected to such a variety of uses that its meaning among philosophers 
is ambiguous. David Hum.e narrowed it to refer to no more than the barest 
sense impressions abstracted from thought.1 Immanuel Kant broadened the 
term to include not merely the impressio:ris of sense but rather these im-
pressions as ordered and built into a world of phenomena through the ac-
tivity of thought.2 More recently John Dewey nas broadened the term to 
refer to any happening that might eventti:ally affect some o:ganism,3 
whether the happening ·be an intensely cons·cious mystical experience or 
the apparently unobserved freezing and thawing of some Arctic icicle. 
Between these extremes there are countless definitions which give rise 
to no end of confusion. Much of the thought of Brigq.tman has been di-
:cected toward the goal of defining and expla.:ining the meanings and ,impli-
cations of experience. 
ii~ The Definition of Ex:perierice 
For Brightman, e:Jtperience refers to '8.11 tb:"e data 'and processes of" 
consciousness,. ttThe term experience is used, in its widest sense, for 
our entire conscious life: all our perceptions, memory, knowledge, be-
"' .. 
lief, hope, reason, etc.n4 .Any and all conscious awareness of any 
object, process or relation is experience.-
. Experience is defined ••• as synonymous with conscious-
ness or awareness. Experience- w:tll include the whole 
stream of consciousness or the entire field of. attention. 
The impressions of sense and the work of thought are 
parts of experience, but they are not all of it; experi-
1;• "Experience, n p. 12. 
2 .. ;-: Ibid. 
~..;··Ibid~· . 
4.-:AilY.n.trodU:ction to Philosophy, P• 77n. 
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ence also includes emotions, imaginations, vr.tlls, ideals, 
and values.l · · 
Conscious awareness, then, is the key to the definition of experience,. . 
llhatever enters conscious awareness is experience, and whatever does not 
enter conscious aw~eness or consciqusness is not experience. 
iii" The .Ambiguity of the Term 11Empirical1' 
' -
The noun, "experience, 11 and the adjective, "empirica11 11 are .?iosely 
related. .Ambiguity in the .former has led to a:mbigui ty in the latter. 
David H~e, .following his n(U'rOW de.fini tion of experience, and· the l<?gi-
.. 
cal positi~sts 1Ilaintain that only that which appears as sensory can. be 
called empirical. Others would limit the term to re.fer only to what is 
<?P~n to public inspection. 2 Brightman does not limit the tei'lll in a:ny of 
these ways but uses it as synonymous with all experience. 
By the empirical·.' •• is not meant merely sensory experi-
ence" What is meant is our total .fi.eld of consciousness, 
including all sens~impressions~ all feelings, impulses, 
desires, and tensions, and even our reasoning processes, 
which are prese~t in experience at certain times, and so 
really belong within the field of the empiricist~3 
.. ~ . . 
The empirical, then, refe~s to any item. of experience, immediate~ pres-
' . . 
ent 9r presently r_~embereP.. .as past ~ediate ·consciousness. 
iv~ The Empirical and the Rational Related 
The positivistic and othe~ narrow views·o.f empiricism and experience 
have been influential in the arti.ficial separation between em.pirttcism and 
J:.- 11Expefience:,·tt Po 12. 
2. ·~Metaphysics, u Chapter V, p. 16-. 
3.~. liDialectical '.Censions in the Christian Idea and Experience of God, 11 , 
~- S·ei:niri.ar Quarterly, 6(May; 19371,, ~~ .. : .: · ·. 
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rationalism in the-philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centurieso 
"Properly understood:,· experienee should be rational and' rea.Son 'Should· be 
empirica1·."1 · Neither can e:xist properly m:chout the other. I-deally they 
function as interdependent. .Tliu~noareason BJ!>.d exper1.ence are not UQ 
separate pow6!s, but reason is a function of experience and experience is 
a movement toward rational totality.t12 To divorce them by emphasizing 
one to the exclusion of the other is philosophically hazardous. Undue 
emphasis on the empirical in the narrow sense leads ·co the confusion of 
the part with the whole. Undue emphasis on the rational to the exclusion 
df the empirical leads to an abstract philosophy with little contact with 
experience. Wholesome thought demands a sustained equilibri~ petween 
the two. 
Hegel has led me to see that true z·ationalism is simply 
the principle of confronting every part of ·exp'erience · 
with our view of the ·whole, while true empiricism is the" 
principle of accepting ·only that view of the whole which 
is honestly built up by observation of the accessible .' 
parts of experience,) 
The empirical principle requires that the soaring intuition or imagi-
nation maintain some contact with the reality of actual experience.4 
v. The I'mport~ce of Experience in Philosophy 
To define ~perience as any and all conscious awareness, as both 
sensing an~ reasoning, as both rec~gnized present and remembered past, 
is to make experience central in a thorough philosophy_ •. All judgments, 
... ..,_ '• 
1• 1~Metaphy.sics;, 1t Chapter V~ p, Jli... . 
J;.,. 1~An-~pir.ical.Approach· to .God,ll' P.hilospphical Review, 46(1937),, 1?5.· 
::;3. !:'From Rationalism to Empi:dcism, 11 P• 277 .. 
4. · 1.'Me£'apl:iysics,~'r Chapter X, p. 18. _ 
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.and· knowledg~ -d~p~nd upon elements in conscious awareness that are 
either i,mmedi.ately .p:resent or are recogniz~~ and remembered in the 
present as ·past experience. ·But all e;x:periemce ,.IIJ.Ust have peen at one 
time_immediate-ly presep.t i:p cc;:p~p~~us awareness .. These experiences, 
some o.f which are hazy, and others of which are vivid; some of which are 
r~latively simple while others are very _complex;- some of which are 
largely sens_oty while others are predomi:nan:bly theoretica~; some of which 
are . chiefly eiP.Otional while others are voluntarily controlled1-these 
~eriences. ru."'e the raw material. and,· when, criti.cal; suggest the 
blueprint of a.rzy- orga.D.ized philosophy •. The sole function of philosophy_ 
. 2 is the interpretation and criticism of exper1ence. No theory has the 
..... ~ight to disregard any of the facts of experience.~ 
· Ev!3I'Y metaphysics ••• must start. with the facts of human 
experience, no matter. how objective the metaphysican's in-
terest may be; and every first principle that is propofled 
must be tested by its application. to human experience.,4. 
2._ The Immediate Empirical· Datum 
~.. The Need for Beginning with the Datum Self 
~he. elementa of . conscious •. awareness which constitute experience 
l. .An Introduction~ to .Philosophy,· p. 113. 
2. "The Tasks Confronting a Personalistic Pni1osophy, u ·Personalist, 
2(1921), ·. 260 .•.. 
3. 11The Personal Relation Between God and Children," Relig:!.ous Education, 
. '. 16.(1921).., 26. . -4. UPersonality as a Metaphysical Principle,u Personalism in Theology, 
.. ·~,ed., E. ·s., ~ghtman, p. · 43i"'' In "'this same. article Brightman. defines 
· ·" a first pJ?inci'ple as that whieh • ".enabJ.es us to at·tain a maximum de-•• 
·-""' gree of cgherence· in om; thoughtS., 'j:;l).!J.s ·serving as a guide for. dis-
crimina.tion between true' and .false tqo1,1gh,ts,'*. P• .40. 
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cannot and d,o not float around in the air unattended but rather must have 
a_ definite loaus in a complex but unified groupi:p.g called a self or ex-
.. 
perient. All experience is experience for some conscious experient, some 
datum self. Philosophy must begin with experience that is recognized as 
conscious awareness for some self', and hence all philosophy must begin 
.- • ...If· 
with the datum self. Perceptions in conscious awareness are immediately 
given (and all that is immediately given) •1 As 'immediately given, 
. C?o~sciousness does not need to be i:nferredo It is its-· awn evidence and 
it~ existence is absolutely irrefutable unless one is willing to abandon 
all thought. TP.e datum self is experienced directly, and hence is unde-
niable o 2 . "!low do you know that there is such a being? The ··first answer 
is that in my_immediate experience I. am such a being. I find myself; I 
do not invent myself. I am experience. tt3 
Philosophy begins, then, not with some self in general, but with 
. ··' 
some sp~cific locus of' awareness. The datum f'or experience and philo so-
phy for each self is the experience of that specific self. Experience as 
conscious awareness is utterly individual~stie. Selves oannot and do not 
li tera;J..ly share experience in the sense that any part of one enters in or 
becomes . any part of the other. Rather a self directs its e:x:per:j.ence in 
.,., .·. 
such a way as to stimulate experience in other selves. Hence the datum. 
·.self ·is ~atum only for that self. 
what we immediately experience as the sta:r;ting-point of. 
all our thought and action and the present fact-at ~11 times 
;, ,, 
l. A PhiJ.osoph'Jy of Ide~. (1\f.Y.: Hem;._!!olt~ :·1928), p ... 13o _ 
:2. ttThe.. Dialectic of Religious Experience," ~losophi-aal Review,· 
38{J..929 )..~~ 563. . .. . '. ~.. : .. '· .c 
3·'·u·per·sonality< as a Me:tiaphys±cal·P.rinoiple,n p. 45. 
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., is our own self. .All of O'lil.r perceptions, feelings, ~, 
thoughts, desires, volitions-every so-e.§.lled state of · 
· consciousness-belongs to that complex whole 'Which is 
the total fact of experience for each one of us and. is 
called the self ,.1 . · 
ii., .The Defiri:ii..tion of the Datum Self 
The word datum means "what is given.tt The self refers to and is a 
'Whole. of COJ;lscious e:x:perie;;,ceo2 The present experience of a:rry locus of 
conscious awareness is the datum self or the empirical sit~ation.3 
Present consciousness and only present consciousness is the immediately 
given datum.. Contrary to the suggestion of some realists that the datum 
i~ sensible a~pearance--qualities like color, shape, sound--and contr~ 
... 
to the critical realist that the datum is an essence or quality of some 
sort, the only datum is tne mind or consciousness.4 This is not. me~t to 
suggest that the datum. is identical in quaJity in each case of exi~tence. 
The complexity and the potentiality of the individu.al datum varies to a 
; 
.(" ~· 
great extent, depending on many factors, among them being integration and 
volition.. But the only present datum is the entire preaen:t self, whatever 
its capabilities and developments may be.'t; At a.nY par·ti~ular moment of 
consciousness the datum may appear in any one of a series of phases of 
d.evelopment as the datum is constantly reordering itself, bu.t there-
ordering is immediate conscious experience. This definition affirms the 
ne.ed o:f beginning with the datum self. .All else is an inference from 
1. liPersonalism as a Philosophy of Religion," Crozer Quarterly, 
~ 5(19'28),' ~383. 
2,io'.~·.·· ·, '' .. · .. ·•·· 
3,~ . A · P,b.i:Losophy; of Relig:i on, p. 22 7 •.. 
4. A' Phil'oso;phy of Ideals, pp.l4-15. 
5;. .ttThe Dialectic of Religious Experien~e:,tt P• 5f>O .. 
: _.•,,', .. , 
.£· :: • :. 
·~ .. 
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something. beyond the datUliJ.• 
Reflection leads to the cb.nclusion that the gi:ven is 
-always a datUI)I. self. o That is, i.t is a conscious experi-
ence, connected by memory and anticipation With past and 
future 11 datum selves, 11 as well as being connected by 
causal .. interaction with its environment.~ 
The definition of the datUm.' will be enriched if it is noted :that 
Brightman uses. several terms as synony;mous w.ith 91self,ve namely, mind, , 
consciousness, and e;x:peri:ent. Soul and person are suggestive of a·m:ore 
highly integrcited self.,. capable of reflective. self-consciousness, of 
,• 
reasoning;, and of appreciating ideal values. .Although a more detailed 
discussion of the terms tlpersonu and 11personelity11 will be given later, 
it would be helpful here to point out the dist;inetion be"waen a self and 
a person •. 
.Any conscious being is a seli', no matter how elementfl.Ty its 
consciousness is. In fact, we may use the word self as a 
limit notion, and speak of the minimum· s·elf as th.e l.east ·. 
possible consciousness that can be. We do not know whether 
such a self really exists or notJ but we have :g0~d reason 
to believe that there are very elementary subhuman selves, 
unable to reason or to entertain ideals. When a self 
reaches the stage of being able to develop self-conscious-
ness, reasoning:powers,.and experience of ideal valuesJ we 
call it a person.2 
iiio The. Traits of the Datum Self. 
The importance of being conscious can b.az·dJ.y be o·v.eremphasized. The 
peculiar types of evolutionary :oaturalis:r;, Fre11dian and Watsonian behavi<tr-
ism, and sQllle forms of idealism (espe~iall;r Bergsonis.n} t.w.t depre~te 
l. "Do We Have ·Knowledge-By-Acquaintance. of the Self?nv Joornal of 
: ,-l?h:il'osophy;, 41(1944),. 695. The trai·ts of the datum. self mentioned. 
. · .-lle:J;."e and· the· environment to- Which they refer w:ill be discussed in 
.. the pages.· immediately following .. ,. · · 
2., ltPersonality as a Metaphysical P.tinefj;Yle, n p.· 41no 
cc.nsciou:snes.s a:G.t~.~work their own dest:ruction tb.ro1_1gh ar~ents that 
are self-..refutingf presupposing khe causal sigi:d!:i.can.ee of consciousness. 
Now, either those assertions a!">& true because ,they: are con-
.sciously reasonable inferences .from conscious-ly observed 
.facts,. or else conscious',reasoning and observation is i:r-
relevant to their truth. But if there is no genuine cau-
sation within. consciousness~ the .fact that they seem· 
reasonable to consciousness ~s of. no importance at all. 
Everything 'in. consciousness is a product ·of physiologicaJ: 
processes, and there can be no real control b.y judgment 
or thought. Hence the view which denies causal signifi-
cance to consciousness destroys itself.l 
. . 
One must begin "With the immediate and all immediate .fact.s are .facts 
of consciousness. A:rry theory that is adduced or any statement that is 
offered about any possible theory or object must arise in consciousness 
and find its evidence in conscious awareness. 0'I.f, then, aJ.l .facts, all 
theories, all values, and all reason, reside u::..timatel:y in consciousness, 
it would· appear that cons.ciousness has rescued itself .from its. position 
. 2 
o.f unimportance .• 
The significance of consciousness can be seen even more clearly if 
some of the more salient characteristics or. t~aits of the datum self. are 
identified., Xhe nature o.f the traits is such that they cannot be listed 
as mutually exclusive or externally exhau.stiv\3., Thai::' mutual over-
lapping defies rigid enumeration, but some traits are distinct enough to 
be identified. 3 
(1) usel.f-experienc~~ 1,1!1i.fied complexi:ty of consciousness (Stern's 
1. liThe Importance of Being _Conscious," ff_~r~ of Pb.ilosophical Studies, 
' 4(1929), 503 .. 
2., ·Ibid.,, p.,~ 502; . •; . '. ··~ . 
3 o F'Or"Brightman 1s rli scussion see, A Pb.ilosop~z.2f:.fulligion,.,·pp... .35J:,-i-35~ · 
. and UPersonalistic Metaphysics of the Self & Its distinctive l''ea-c.ures, II 
PPo 295-298. 
unitas muJ.tipleJE)~>nl The. self is a. u:oj:ty in. change:, a union o.f both , 
change ru1d identi i;,y": The s el.f endures, . and because :;t t endures it 
changes.. Self-experience is meant to sugge-st the ability o.f the seJ..:f to 
endure, that is, to maintain 'identity through change; it is not meant to 
suggest reflective. sel.f-consci~~sness, a trait o.f personality.2 
(2) 11Qualia-distinguishable qualities, at least SEinSt2. quillties 
and perha~s pther qualities of .feeling."3 The sensation here referred 
to is 11given, 11 lacking logical necess:i:ty. Whether it is illusory and 
deceptive or whether it is trustworthy as t.he point of interaction of the 
' self with an external world depends largely upon the quality of the 
. . 
sensing self. Notwithstanding its lind. ta.tion and perils, it is funda-
.,. 
mental in. experience. 11Every sensation is a.n integral part of some self, 
and has its existence subjectively, i.e. in a subject.vvh Feeling here 
refers to no more than liking or disliking what is sensed. 
(3) Time . and time transcendence. -Th:.s charact;eristi.c :i.s closely re-
lated to the first lis·ted above. If the sel.f maintains identity through 
change, .. if the self endures through the flux of passing e:x:pe:r.i.ences, :Lt 
must e:x:perience time, and in that experieucep endui-"ing, transcend time. 
"The complex:i ty of . the specious presen·t a.nd memory (h~wever dim) elevate 
~very self above time to some extent. n5 Time t.ranscendence here does 
not mean that the self would continue to exist were all time abolished, 
but rather· that' it transcends pa.st and present time • 
.;,. •·. 
1, A Philoso;pby of Relig{~n, P•· 351. . . 
z: ttPersonalistic Metaphysics of the Self.ii~ p·;, 297·.· 
~-~ A .Ph:i;,lo;oph,y of Religion, p~ 351~ . 
4& WPersi:mali:stic Metaphysics of i?,h.e Sel;~'~- P• 296.~ 
5. A P.h.ilosophy of Religj.P:cr,: -p .. ·-"1f.":: -;:, S.' · ~ •· ' 
.,..., 
-~-: ~·4_._:::?: :. f - !· ~ ~ ;~.·- ;-, ~t ~ 
-; v 
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(4) Space and space transc~nden~. · 'VAJ..l selves must necessarily 
experience :~:im.e because this i.s a world of process; it i.s highly prob-
, 
able that some kind of space-consciousness is also universal~ 111 But aJ.1 
.• . 
selves experience not only the sen..~atj.ons of space bu.t. they have 'What 
m:i.ght best be described as non-spatial experiences. Because of. the so..: 
called non-spatial experiences the self has the feeling of space trans-
cendence, a transcendence that goes farther· than the transcend.ence of 
time. To abolish time would be to abolish experience itself, but it is 
conceivable that the self could continue to experience e':en ,though space 
were utterly abolished. 
:. 
Temporal experience is·necessary to the existence of a 
self under any conceivable condition. If time were a- : 
bolished, nothing that . could be called a self would re-
'maino Further; every aspect of a self's experi:ence is 
temporal. fut if space were abolished, a self' might 
conceivably exist as a thinker of ari thm.etic ·and algebra 
(if not of geometry), an acknowledger of duty and harmo-
ny, and a lover of God .and man. 2 , . 
(5) .Awareness of meanin~.- · ·'1The simplest self t!'eats its experiences · 
as -signs o:f further exp.eri ence; . thus it is in an e.l..ement8.ry way aW-are of 
meaning.n3 Meaning here does not refer to well-developed purpose, ~t' 
merely to what is involv:e.d when a paramecium da: .. ·ts toward foodo 
(6) Process and conation.-- -'t'b.e fi:rst t..b.ree characteristics mentioned 
suggest that the self is in constant process of change/ -a series o:f 
;r, 
changes through which it mai.ntains au identity. Integral in this process 
is .the s.elf' 1s ~~striving for ends (conation); to be a self is to ex:peri-
1~ A Philosophy of Religion, Po 351. ~ 
2 11 n.Pers.pna.:p_stic .. Metaphysics of the Self, tt . Pt. 295•.-,'296 • ·· 
3 • .A Philosophy of Religion, p. 351. ·:, · '· · 
-~-
ence a q,esire for,:f,'uture, expez?.enp~,·if' onl.y,the eating of i'oocl. and the 
1 . . 
continuance of lif.e1..11 Conation m:i:ght be explained in terms. of will.·· .. 
.. 
Though will suggests .a more highly developed self, it is a function of· 
2 
every self'. This rilling may be. no. more than a desire for change of 
present condition. !tWill is integral to every sel:t: at every stage of 
its development. Will may be blind or seeing, selfish or unselfish, 
secular or worshipful; but at all leyels,· to be is to .will~u3 • 
~(7) Response to environment. ·'Though tb.e self may not bE? aware of 
the causal effects of its environment or even of.·the existence of an en~ 
vironment, tt re$ponds to the effects of the environment in its experi-
ence.h 
(8) Privacy •... ·"Every self is di:t:•eetly. e:x:perienced only ~-.itself.n5 
This is a trait of the lower self that is unders-tood only by. the higher 1 
self. The paramecium proba.bJ.:y is unaware of the ultimate ·privacy .of 
consciousness. Two selves may sense the same general object, but they 
are unabl~' to· share any pro;.t· of that ~e:rience in any lite;al way. 
. . 
Consciousness (and consciousness alone) is directJ.:y accessible only to 
i~s possessor.6 . h sU1lliilary it might b~ said th~t the self is an ~cti;e 
conscious, self-existent, organic unity or s,ystem.7 
1. A Philosophy of Relig?.on, p. 351 
2.. "Personalistic Metaphysics of the Self," p •. 297. , • · :. 
3• Ibid. 
4. I"P.hilosophy of Religion, P• 352. 
5. Ibid. 
6. liiin.troduction to Philosophy, p. 184. 
7; liThe Finite Self, 11 Contemj?orary IdeaJ.ism in .America, ed. C. Barrett 
~.(N.Y.: Macmillan, 19,32), p .... 172~ ~ This is an excellent statement of 
~- Brightmanr::s "early. conception a;£" the self Jl n thoui;, int,enaing to suggest 
· ~- the existence of an·· Infi:oi te Self in contrast to the Tini te se];;f • · .,. 
. . 
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iv.. The Need t'or Going beyond the Immediate Datum Self 
11
.Any treatment of the self is incomplete unless it takes into con-
sideration not only the experience of a self but ?lso the world to which 
::\.t ref.ers and. of which it is a pa.rt."1 The traits of the datum self 
mentioned earlier bear witness to .the fact that integral in the under-
standing of the self is the understanding of the relationship of the 
self to its t;;lnvironmep.t. Every experience is of something, pointing to 
an object that is beyond the experience of it.2 The object may be il-
lusory; it w.ay not exist as we suppose it to exist, but the irrefutable 
fact is that all experience refers beyond itself, binding the .. experient 
to a largE;lr universe. To deny that such ari environment exists, whatever 
its inner nature, is the position of traditional solipsism. But solip-
sism, holding to the reality of no'l.iliing except present experience, is 
., 
self-refuting,. To defend such a view one must depend upon reason,. and 
"reason requi.fes an explanation of the present data in terms of their 
relations to something else. That 1something else' is partly ~he mind 1s 
own past, but chiefly the environment of mind.u3 To deny that th:i,s total 
environment includes other experients is ·t.o fly in the faoe of. experi-. · · 
ence itself. 
The objective reference of the self to its environment is essen-
tially threefold. It includes, first of all, the memory of immediate 
experiences in the past life of t.he enduring e:x:pe;ient. 4 Regardless of 
1-. "The Finite Self, 11 PP• 194~·195. 
·2. 11Ex:perience1 11 p. 12. 
3. .A. Philosophy of Ideals, p. 23 • . 
4. UPersonality as a Metaphysical Pr.inciple,u P• 48. 
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how dim or irrelevant ,the·se memories may be, the fact of the reference 
of m~mory i:t.se+£ ~s indefea·sible. Seeondly, ,ref.er;ence.i·s made :t<:> th:e :, . 
· object .. of present experience. "A-t. every moment we are th~ng of some.:. 
thing, feeling, ;3omething., related tD· something· that is'. ether: than our 
th.j.nking, feel;ing, . or act of relating.n1 The e.ssence of a memory is not 
so much that we remember a given experience but that that eXperience had 
a me~ngful referent. Thirdly, "there· is always some re.£~rence~to· the 
!uture;·"2 The trait of conation and the traits of time, and process pro-
vl.Q.e the envirornp.ent for the self to make the reference to the~ experience 
anticipated, now recognized as a futu;re event. 7b.e' scheme of the totaJL 
empirical situation with .the tlweefold objective. reference re9.cuires for 
its complet-ion a,.. going beyond the immediate datum sill to an objecti.ve··t 
.... _,. 
worl.Q. to whic:P. experience refers (cf. the next section) and to the 
intr;i.cately r~organizing level of the self known as ·pers<?.nal.i:ty: ( cf,. . ·, • 
'section 5). These twp aspects of the. sell ar~:·Jim~~;ht.:r.d~_end~ilt 
and henee 'will ·overlap. 
\ .. 
3. The Empirical·Data 
i& The Sensory Data 
The objective reference of the immediate empirical datum is such an 
integrq.l part of the datum self that the separation of the two may appear 
~tificial. The trait of the datum self that links it inextricably to an 
. objective world is sensation. Sensation means 11that mode of mental 
i~ ''Pers·ona:lity ·as· a ·Metaphysicai Principle," P.• 48.~ 
2~ Ibid. 
55 
functioning referred to immediate stimulation of the bodily organism~"l 
'·. . . 
The data of sensation (or the sensory data) are the sensations of objects 
affecting the organism. Just as sensation links the self to the objective 
world to which it refers, so the data of sensation form the beginnillllgS 
for all thougq.t. The sensory data are basic to all mental growth; they 
a,re obvious and indubitable. The sensation is itself the conclusive 
evidence of its own existence. 
Nothing else could be the criterion of the existence of 
a sensation than the sensation itself; if you per.ceive 
the sense datum, no argument could increase or diminish 
the certainty of your perception; and if you do .not 
perceive it, no argument could call it into being.2 
Sensation bare and uninterpreted has, very likely, no significance. The 
interpretation of the sensation, namely, the perception, may involve 
error, but the.:;f~ot.. thC!-t t.A:.~:·~13nsatio:n..,P..f .a ce:5.tain 'qu~~· o:t; color,; 
hard.ness,.size, etc., is now being experienced and interpreted is an 
irrefutable fact in itself. It is given in experience. 
The facts of sensation are not only obvious in themselves, they are 
pbv:i.ously objective, that is, suggesti·ve of an external world. The sen-
sation has a definite character and indicates something definite about 
an external object. 
The.hypothesis that sensations refer to objects of some. 
· sort, and that they ro:•e produced. by some sort of reality 
·other than the mind of the observer, is one that brings 
order and coherence into the realm of sensation.3 
l. Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, (Fi.ft,h Edition). 
2-.~ 4\n: Introduction to Philosoph_z, pp. 5h~·55. 
3 .. Nature and Values (N.Yo: .Abingdon-Uokesbu.zy, l945), P• 41. • 
. . : . . 
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ii. The Intuitive Data 
Intuition· r~fers "t1o "all immediate perception.u1 11By intui:tion. is. 
meant immediate knovvledge, that. is, awareness of .a content (a quality or 
a princ;iple) as given in e:i:j;>erience and not de:r'i.ved ;from reasoning.n2 
Sensation itself is a kind of intuition, one example of intuition. Like 
sensation, intuition is. immediate urJrlerrl.able experience. The data o£ 
•.!,., 
intuition can be ·said to be·immediate experiences and hence obvious and 
indubitable. Doubting the. data. o:f' intuition is sell-contradicitory in 
that the doubting presupposes the actual data which are being doubted. 
Although sensation is a kind o.f. intui·tion, sensory da"ba are not the 
only immediate certainty., 11That, I ~· sel.f-consciousy-tha:h I take atti.-
. . ~. . .. 
tudes toward other selves, and that :my mind thinks in terms of uni:- .-
versals-a.ll this is just as ~ediately ce;·t.ain.. as is .sense perception.'~ 
Value e:x:periences4' as .,:well a<S tlte e:x:pelriel!We.-of space' and time are: .. 
intuitional.5 The intuitive data of' experience ref.er. to all data im-
mediately perceived by the mind.· 
iii. The Rational Data 
Although the data of sensation are the beginnings and the raw 
material for early thought, and alt.hough the facts of sense and intu•-
ition arc obyious and indubitable; as seen before; these data would 
. 
remain largely disconnected and bare sensations and intuitions without 
1 • .An Introduction to Philosophy, P• ·.57. 
~.~ A· Philosophy of· Religi.on, p~ ~5. · 
3 • ·.An: Introduction to· Plii.;!;.osopbz, p .. 51~ 
4; Ibid-.;,· pc. lli4·. · . . 
5. APhilosophyof Relig;i.on, p .. l2$o 
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~1le 'creative activity of' thought or reason. 
Reason is the :function of' surveying a.l1 the :facts in 
a si tuatio:ri "and qf' understanding their 'relations and ' ~ .. 
their implications. To use pbilosophical terms, reason 
is a coherent e..."'q)lanation .basad on a synoptic view o:f · 
experience.l 
It is the creative activity of' re~son that not only makes possible the 
genesis of' knowledge but- commands the self ·to go beyond the initial 
'-\· 
conscious awaren~ss. A coherent understanding of' the data of' conscious 
awareness would be impossible without th:is u.r.d.f'ying interpreting quality. 
.. . 
It should be pointed out, however, that reason depends upon the ability 
of the mind to remember and anticipate.2 Were not the immediate self' 
both linked and iden·tif'ied with the self' of' the past and the self' as 
anticipated in the :future by the experiences of' memory and anticipation, 
coherent thought or meaning would be impossible. But· in :fairness to 
reason it should be pointed out further that memory and anticipation 
without the judging power of' reason would be "w.Lld :fanciesu3 with little 
. . 
i:f any lasting value. So it becomes obvious again that tb,e mind is an 
active integrated system with traits and abilities that defy rigid 
cl:assi:fication. 
But the rational aspect of the m:ind- is distinct enough· from ·the 
sensory aspect that one may justl.f.iably speak of sensory and rat'i.onad..· 
data. The .s.ensory data are more .ea.sil:y dif.:Cerent.iated than the rational 
data because of' their basic simplicity and givenness •. The rational data 
,~~.a.~~~e~~l category would include all the functioning of' reason as 
.. 
'1.. :Personality and Religion (N.,Y. .. : Abingdon Pxess, 1.934), P• 27 • 
. 2~ liPer.s.onality .,as a Metaphysical Principle, vv p. 46 • 
.3•o . Ibid~ . . . 
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d,;e;f.'ined.above • .Any .inference, or judgment, or evaluation, or any other 
activity o.:t; thought whereby the da·tia of sensation and intui'tion are 
measured or remembered.; st:r:uctured or anticipated in an orderly way 
might be called rational data. 
ivo The Irrational Data 
For the normal consciousness the greatest concern b.1 far is with the 
sensory; intuitive, and rational data. But :it would be unempirical not 
to mention another aspect of the total data of consciousness, namely, 
what might be classified as the irrational data. Here reference is being 
made to the data of conscious awareness that are incoherent or chaotic. 
11Much conscious experience, as it comes, is neither rational nor valuable, 
b~t all of it is. fact."1 This classification includes all hypotheses 
that are incorrect, confused, perhaps even deliberately drawn against the 
best evidence, that is, sinful. Si:q..,;i.s by its very nature irratio:cal. 
Not only do men seek and approve low aims, but human 
nat:ure is so illogi"cal that the same man may in differ-. 
ent moods entertain a high :ideal and a low one which 
conflicts with it$ he ma:y even obstinately assert two 
incompatible ideals at the same time.2 
One cannot explain sin rationally· because it is essentially deliber-
. . 
ate incoherence.. From a strictly rational point of view sin would amount 
to stupidity., Who would dream of choosing a value recognized by himself 
as the lesser of two or more greater values in a rational decision? The 
demand of coherence would fo:r'bid it,. But the sinner is not loyal to 
coherence~ Why not? Because of lack of integration or because of 
: ................ . 
i~: Pers6:rlility ·and Religion, P: 1~. 
~ ~.- ~ Philosophy of Ideals, p. 7 6. 
·deliberate malevolen·o.e?. 'What,ever the expl.a.nation may. be,. experience 
testifies t:Q.at on a level of, incomplete ·integr·ation .. (or .relative in~o­
herence) _one ~oes that which ·may be defined as.siriful; .but on.a level. of 
integration (or co~erence) this type of deliberate action ceases.1 It is 
a fact 4 nev~rtheless, that there are data which are. properly termed ir-
rational and recognized as such, whatever the explanation may be. Pride, 
for exampleJ)· is unreasonable. 2 "The man who doesn't care whether he is 
good or bad can hardly expect to find inner satisfaction in his religious 
~ . ' ~~ 
lif~. He is a conscious sinner.n-' The sinner voluntarily cuts hims.elf 
off f:rom the whole, being unwilling to face all the facts, and is ttcom-
placent in the 4enial and contradiction of his. own noblest as~irati~ns:n4 
The data of consciousness that are instrumental in the sinful action 
might be referred to as confused or irrational. In so far as conduct is 
deliberate, to that extent one may infer from conduct the corresponding 
•' . 
data of consciousness. 
v. The Mystical Data 
Beyond the intuitive and the rational there would seem to be an 
order of· data that might be termed the mystical} 
~e~ience reveals .the fac~ that the relations of persons 
are mediated by experiences having a peculiarly immediate 
emotional quality. The consciousness of the presence of a 
1. Inte~ation ( pr coherence) here refers to that level of moral and 
intellectual maturity where the person is always loyal to the ideals 
he ~ecognizes as most .valuable. The interpretation is. the author 1s. 
2. "Metaphysics,,. Chapter In, P• 57. 
"~.-:..Personalit; and Religion, P• 110. . 4• Religious alues (N.Y.: Abingdon Press, 1925), P• 94. 
5* For a inore complete' discussi-on,,.. see Is God a Person? (N.Y.: Association ; :Pres·~, ~9~2), PP• 44--45. , · ,~ · ';.}· >~ 
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beloved lJ.uman. being elici:ts our m9ral nature and .our 
highest rational powers; but it also produces a uniquely 
satisfactory feeling~tone which suffuses·consciousness 
With a glow which nothing else can equal. Such experi-
ences when ascribed to div.ine irifluence are called 
mystical.l · 
.. , -··.' 
Another aspect of the mystical data might be the experiences of 
beauty, whet}ler in poetry, art, or music, or experiences similar to 
that of love. 11The search for new beauty in poetry and art seems often 
to be distracted and aimless. Yet behind it all there is a spiritual 
. 2 
fact.n 
4. The Empirical Situations 
i. The Situation Experienced 
The 11 entpirical situation11 · in one sense might be used ·as synonym0ns, 
with the datum self} When s~ used it refers to the self in the proces.s 
of experiencing. not only awareness but the contents of awareness as well. 
In this particular section, however, 11 a 'situation' means any state of 
~fairs.n4 No state of affairs can rightly be called a situation ex.peri-
enced unJ,ess it is now actually present in consciousness. The "ed 11 on 
experienced tends to suggest that the state of affairs has been experi-
enced and is now past. This is misleading. Brightman means by the 
Situation Experienced that actual state of affairs now present in 
... ' 
consciousness. The new terminology re-emphasizes what has been said all 
s ~ 
1. ·ttPersonalism as a Philosophy o£ Religion, 11 Crozer QuarterJ.;r, 5(1928), 
' .. 39.:1.· .. ' ' . . . ' ' . ·-2~ Reli_g;i.,ous 'Value.s, P• 221. See also The finding of God, P• 95. 
3tt A ~~losophh of Reli~P:on, p. 227. · \ 
4. ~·.;. p ... 3 7· . --
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along, "'lamely, that all that one experiences directly is his own 
consciousness., From the contents of that consciousness he infers the 
presence of his environment.. The accuracy of his inference depends 
directly upon the accuracy of his observation and thinking. But the 
only point of departure is the actual situation experienced, the contents 
of consciousness now present. 
In his later thought Brightman refers to the situation experienced 
with a new terminology, the Shining Present,1 a translation of Hegel's 
der $chain. It is meant to refer to 11 the present manifestation of my 
being. The present experience, in its full richness and content, is 
myself (my datum seJ,f) as I am now,.;12 To grasp the full meaning of the 
shining present one needs to understand that it suggests three signifi-
cant factors .. 3 First, all knowledge is based on experience and somehow 
derived from evidence found in experience., Secondly, all experience is 
present only as long as present awareness continues4 
When present consciousness ceases, it may indeed be re-
membered as past experience; but a remembered experience 
is not ap. immediat,e experience of what is remembered, · 
although the memory as such is present and directo4 
Thirdly, the shining present means to suggest that all presents are 
durations. The length of the actual conscious awareness depends on a 
number of factors requiring more extensive psychological investigation, 
but certainly it varies with the individual and even at different times 
in the same individual.. The important factor to be recognized, however, 
1. 11Metaphysics, 11 Chapter D. I.· . 
2• "The Shiuing 'Present'.). (Ma.nu:;wript published in Spanish in Cuba). · 
3. Ibid., p., 2. · . 
4. Ibid. 
6/) 
'• 
;i.S thfii,t ·the slilining present be underst·ood as a real duration involving 
past;, pr:esent, and anticipated futur·e~ ~This concept has been referred 
t:o by Royce as the ntime-spanvv and by Bergson as dur6e r~elle.) All. 
'· 
kn,owledge_, meaning,,.· and value are ultimately dependent on this shining 
present?- the sensations, 'intuit.:i . .ons, rea.sonings, memories, ~motions, 
anticipations., beliefs, doubtsJI ·theo::.":l.es, fears, and so on. 
ii. The Situation Believed-in 
All experience tends to point beyond itself to an objective refer-
'e'nce 'that is never immediate in consciousness. The data of consciousness 
are evidence of this objective refer<snee a.'1.d inevitably suggest its e:x:-
istence, but it is forever beyond immediate experience and hence is a 
situation believed-ino 11Although our experience is always ours, its 
object is al~ays something other than the experience. 111 The object or 
the state of affairs to which this experience refers is called the 
Situation Believed-in. 
., ·"!·:"" 
A man carmot properly sa:y tl:~at he is experiencing a fire 
in his house merely because the fire is. going on; he,ex-
periep.ces the fire only when it makes .a percepti b:j..e differ-
ence to· his conscious expel."'lence. Mora e:x:actly, the man 
can never say th.a.t he is experiencing the fi.re, ~even when. 
perceptions of its odor or heat occur; yes, even when the 
fire burns his body, the Situation Experienced is e:x:cruci-
ating paiu, not actual fire. 'I'he fire is always a Situ-
ation.. Believed-in, no matter how painfully well-grounded 
the belief may be.2 
The Situation Believed-in~ the object of the so-called objective 
" 
reference of conscious awareness is forever beyond the immediate e:x:peri~ 
~ ~ ~ ~· : '· .·· .. 
. . ' . . . . 
,,. 
\,;· 
ence of. consciousness. Though referred to ~n conscious awareness, it m~ 
rightly be regarded as absent front consci,ou$ness essentially. Thi_s .so-
called absent, objective world~ Brightman refers to as the "Ill'Ulllinating 
Absent.n1 It is that objective,world to which present experience inevi-
tably pqints, yet which must forever remain beyond the inmiediate experi-
ence of consciousness,_and hence absent. 
iii. The Situations Related 
The shining present does not literally shine• Rather it is a figur-
ative · abstl'S.oti:on meaJ;rb- to indic~J-e. neithe:r. Pl:~a~ik.lig~.~q;t': literal 
·.• ..... 
present now.2 But the adjective 11illuminatingll in the term 11illuminati:ng 
absenttt ... suggests a relationship between the illuminating absent-. and some-
tliing which it illuminates. l'b.e relationship is, of coul-se, w.i ~h the 
shining present. The shining present does not shine by its own light; 
even in a figurative sense. llThe being of the present involves and re-
quires the being of-- 'the absent. 113 The shining present is to a great 
extent an effect of what is not present, an effect of past experience 
as well as dependence on parants, friends, country,- and the phy&ical 
4 world of-nature. 
·. 
Belief in the absent is no:cto.ally accepted as true or prob-
ably true in so far as it illuminates the presen"l:i. The-
absent illuminates,~the present retlectsj_present and 
absent act and reactJ they communicate and :i..nteract.5 
"To illuminate means to be coherent with the facts a& consciously 
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eXperienced and with their fulles~ and most. adequate :Poasib:tli tie:;~.nl 
One sees immediately the close:relationship between the shining presen~ 
and the illuminating absent~:-, The present and the absent must o.ohe~e one 
with the other.·· Giving priority to the present may lead t0 positinsm or 
eyen tc solipsism, while giving priority to the absent nm.ay mean to de-··. 
vise a .formu.la to which apriorl truth is assigned regardless ()f the fa'cts 
and to belieye that the .facts (or everything important about them.). can be 
. . . ~ 2 . -
deduced from the .formula." Though both present and absent .need to be 
,. ; ~ . 
) 
recognized, one mu!3t begin with the shining present and assert only what 
coheres with it.. 
. ' 
Epistemologically the· absent depends directly upon the lmowledge of 
the present. . Were it not for the shining present, the memories o.f the 
shining present1 ~d t~e: ab~li"o/ of_ ti?-S. ~h.inii;J.g present to -endure and 
to ma,.ke objective reference, the objective world would remain forever 
unlmown., .. But metaphysically the shining present. assUlD.es and presupposes 
the illuminating absent, whether recognized as such or not.,3 E:x:perienoe 
verifies the need for the objective world pr:Lbr to the dawn of 11my11 
shining present. This necessary precondition for the genesis o.f the 
shining present would include not only the objective world and parents, 
but also the ability o:f the shining present to remember past experience. 
Between the shining present and the illUlll.inating .absent there must be 
mq.;intained a mutu~ necessary interdependent balance .. 
... 
6.~ 
In reality .( wliether we know the reality or :not) ttl~ absent , 
is the source of the present, except for such freedom as 
_the present may exercise in selecting and using what the 
absent has given it~ To deny or to min:imi.ze either the 
present·or the absent is to falsify the facts. To ass&rt 
the present and the absent is to acknowledge the obli-
gation to think rationally. In short, experience taken 
seriously entails the obligation to seek metaphysical 
truth.l 
5. The Empirical Whole: Personality 
i. The Meaning of Personality 
11 0n the one hand, personality is the most certain and indeed the 
only given reality there is. On the other, it is also the most mysteri-
ous•n2 One can explore a greater depth of divine mystery in personality 
than in any abstracti.on or physical process.,3 Even to the person himself, 
his personality is ultimately unfathomable.. This may account for the 
great ambiguity in defirri. tion associated 'With the terms 11persontt and 
"personality.n For a Watsonian, personality means largely conditioned 
. -
reflexes; for a Freudian, it suggests the subconscious, which llke an 
.•. 
iceberg lies eight-ninths below the surface of consciousness~ for a 
scholastic, it means a soul, and for a "news stand buyer of magazines, 
it signifies charm;'beauty, and poise,.n4 
In careful empirical usage, . personality should be defined in terms 
of consciousness.. Such an approach does not mean to deny the body or 
even to minimize physioiogfcal psychology, but· only to ins:i,.st on the 
. . ' 
.. 
1.- "Metaphysics ,.11· Chapter III, pp;, 58-59. 
2,.. ??h~- Spiritual Lif'e, p .. 1,32 .. 
_3._. I~cl<~s per 1.34• ,., . 
4 .. ·Personality aiJ.d'"Reli@.tm,_ p;., J.,3 ..... S~~ .9.I.so }q 'J~'o~. a ;p~r~pn~~ p'•:.:2i ~·" 
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fundamental. aspe.ot of. pers:onality as exp.erienced, namely, its con~cious 
awareness ... 
1 Personality is 11the quality of being ~ person.tt2 IIIlA person 
is a self that is potentially self-conscious, rational, and idea:J..,n.3 As 
was indicated above, 4. a sel.f is apy conscious being no matter how. ~:.te-
mE'>..ntary its conscious awareness iso But a person is a being whose 
consciousness is able to reflect upon itself, to reason, and "to ac-
knowledge ideal gqals .by which it can judge its actual achiev~ents.ii5 
ii. The Traits of Personality 
The comparison of the self and the person in the paragraph above 
should call to mind the traits of the self listed before., 6 Since a 
person is a more highly developed self. it follows that the person wouJ.d. 
have all the traits of the minimum self, developed to a higher level to 
be sure4 7 
(1) Self-experience.. .self-experience is more ·complex and meaningful 
in the person than in the self"· What to the minimum. self was mere unity 
in ehange h~s now become reflective self-conseiousnesf?. 
Self-experie:b.ce is not the same as reflective self-
consciousness; it is any consciousness of any kind experi-
enced as belonging together in one unitary whole in the 
unique wey which we mean when we sa;y, ltThis experience is 
mine~u All experience is sel:f.'-e:x:per:ience; on:cy occasion ... 
~ do we reflect consciously on the fact that tti am a 
self.n8 
1., .A Philosoph{ of Religion, p. 34.7. 
2. Ibid., Po 3 9~ 
)o Ibid., Po 350o 
4~ Page· 49.o - ·· 
5..,. •:A. PhilosophY;. :of Religion, .;p<~ 350..-
~ Page 49. . ... 
}..4 ''A'l'b,ilosophy of Religion, P• 352o 
ti:o • UPers'onality as a Metaphysical Principle, u p. 44... Note that 
;.. .. . .. -· .... 
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( 2) Qualia~ · The 9.uali._.! of the ·minimum self have become nmv qu.~-. 
ties 11 ~uch as feelings of moral obligation, of aesthetic taste, and re-
ligious obligation1 which come to be recognized as imperative normsottl 
(3) ·Time and time transcendence and (4) Space and space tran-
scendence. These tra.i. ts have become more meaningful in that better 
memory has. been developed and hence the person's recognition of himself 
as the self of his past increases the meaning.of the present and the 
futureo Non-spatial interests have been developed in the dix·ection of 
11 spiritual value~ and abstract ideaso"2 
(5) Awareness of meaning. This awareness of meaning has become 
conceptual thought with the ability to think logically and coherently 
and hence to be able to an extent (depending on its level of integration) 
to construct a system of thoughto 
(6) Conation •. ·The conation of the ruinimum. self has now become "free 
purposive self-control; u and normative willingo3 
(7) Response to environment~ This trait of the minimum self has now 
.. 
developed to the social level of free~ selected responses rather than 
responses that are mechanicalv4 
(8) Priva'V• ~his trait of personality-is recognized ar~ under-,, 
stood by the person,. but probably :is not recagnized by the minimum self 
though it is a trait of all consciousness~ Experience will forever 
the distinction between self-experience and reflective self-consc1 "',s-
ness ·is basic ·in th~ .:understanding of Brightman 1 f3. thoughto The sig-
r.d.ficance of this distinction will be shown further in Chapter VI o 
1~ ~loso;ehy. of Religion, Po 352.; 
;~ . ; -Ibid. . . 
3. liii'ntroduction ·to PhilosopW;; Pi 185 o 
4e A Philosophy .of ~eligion, p,.. $53 o . . ·. 
rem~n a J>ri:-vate a!!~z: .. , Indi~duals may stimulate one ;another to 
.. 
experi-ence a ;:;imilar situation, but the actual experience is itself a . 
completelY pri~~te ev~t. 
iii. The Environment for ·Pe;sonaiity 
One may classify ~ix dif.:t'erent aspects of the environment for 
. l 
personaJ.i ~Y•. (1) The biological refers to the brain and th~ nervous 
system stan9.ing in niost ilpmedia te causal and in:teracti ve relationship 
Wi.th the person. (2) The physical e~.~:r~:t refers to the physical 
universe, earth, air, water, etc<~ (3) ·The social enviroruile:i:J.t makes 
reference· to. the qther interrelated persons whose 11activi ties are medi-
ated to us by the p~ysical and biological environment,, and perhaps also 
' 
by telep~tliy.n2 (4) The subconscious environment refers to the consciou~ 
processes whicti,. afi'ect the person without ever actually entering his 
shining pres~nt. 
' Th~ ·'subconacio~s consists of those conscious processes 
which are connected with our organism and from time to 
t~e affect 'the n'ormal dat).lm self without being actually 
present in that self. We ca,ll them conscious because the 
evidence indiqates that they are in themselves processes 
of conscious sensation,. desire, or even reasoning; we also 
call them subconscious because they are not experienced as 
an integral part of· the conscious datum self and so they 
are ·environment of the total person, rather than a part of 
it.3 
Then in a footnote Brightman points out that in one sense the sub-
c~onsci.ous is ~ol'!e intimately associated with the person than any other 
environmental factor "because it is a series of conscious processes 
J 
i~ ·A Phiiosophi ·or Religion, P• 359 • 
. 2. Ibid. · ... 
3~ .Ibid; 
.,......_. .... 
which almost always ·(pe:t:haps always.) acc.ompany the· person as satellites 
accompany a pltmet.,nl while in an0tb.er s.ense it is more clearly a-
eluded than is the biological or physical "for our knowledge of it is 
more clea.rzy inferential. n2 
(5) The logical and ideal environment is composed of those logical 
and ideal entities which 11 enjoy a subsistence of some sort beyond our 
experience of ·them, . and. so may ·b·e called envlronmental factors. n3 
(6) 11The metaphysical environment is the total reality on which we 
. . 
are dependent .. u4 This environmental factor and th~ other five mentioned 
. . 
should be understood as environmental factors on which we are dependent 
yet which are never actually present in the datum self.. T.h.ey remain 
factors believed-in and referred to. Yet "our reasons for believing 
that there is an env:iro:nnient on which our very existence depends, and 
with which we stand in constant interaction, are so cogent that hardly 
anyone seriously denies iton5 
Brightman gives a complete definition· of personality, indicating 
its meaning, its traits, and.its relationship to its environment in his 
Nature and V~ues~ 
A persona.ll.ty is a complex but self-identifying, active, 
selective,. feeling,. sensing~ devel.oping experience, which 
remembers its past (in part), plans tor its future, inter-
acts with its subconscious processes, its bodily organism, 
a.pd its natural and social env:ironment, and is able to 
~u~ge and guide ~tself and its objects by rational and 
, ~deal standards. 
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·iv-..- The Implications of Personality 
One of the traits of the. self, which :in personality is as highly 
developed connnensurately as are the other traits,. is the ability £or 
constant reorganization ..... · The ability of the self, and more especially 
of the person, to :r;eorgani~e .the data of consciousness results in a kind 
of holistic · org~nic '_'growing~\· The-: p"ers 6ri' 'ho'dity-reco¢zes his growth or 
integrC!-tion over hj.s yesterday or last year, and hence :judgeaJrl;.mself to 
be a .~ow:i.ng conscio-q.sness o From this experience .he. assumes that others 
(he:oan detee;t integration in persons w.tth whom he associates o11·er a. 
-period of time) share a similar reeogni tion in themselves o ,,_. Thus he is,, 
led to· believe that there exist at all times personali:ties in_,;var.ibus 
stages of development or integration. Personality would be an active 
ii.nte~ated whole composed of all the shining pres·ents. PersonaJ.tity is a 
self-expe:cienced unity or whole.' [he total. anpirical'whole:would include 
all persona.l:ities, human, subhuman (if any), and superhuman (if any)., 
v o The Key to Reality 
' ~ 
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If personaJ,ity is a :tJresupposition of all critical and syst;ematic / 
· thought"' ~nd ·ali · intrinl:1ic value experience, and if all lmowledge must 
. ~ 
begin in immedi.ate pons'ciqusness, a,;nd if all exper;Lence points beyond 
. -~ 
itself, and if the only evidence there is oL. the world bei.ond is _the 
evidence in consciousness, and if to deny the exi~tenoe o~ consciousness 
is to end in self-contradiction, and if to deny the essential trustworthi-
. -~ : : ,: : . : : : ·' ; : . . 
·n,ess of consciousness as th.e _spur~~ .and criterion of knowledge is to 
:~eA-t~: ci~ne Tn "b.op~eles s skepticism, then, could it not be maintained that 
-p:ersori.ality is an adequate philosophical :principJe, that isp the key to 
... :: ,·.li 
~ ' 
. re~lity?. Though -there appears to .. be ample evidence to warrant an 
affirmative answer., actually the ap.swer. involves the further aspects 
of e.xperienc~ which are to be .discussed in the next chapter, t1The 
·Sclieme of Evidence .. u 
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CHAPrER ·rv 
THE SCHEME OF EVIDENCE 
1. P.relim.i;na.ry Orientq.tion 
What might be referred to as "the scheme of evidencett in the phi-
losophy of Edgar Sheffield Brightman is dynamically related to what has 
been described in the preceding chapter as 11the empirical schemeo 11 The 
progressive and interactive relationship between these two chapters will 
be seen in more detail' as the scheme of evidence develops •1 
i. The Definition of Evidence 
Brightman does not define evidence in any technicaJ,. philosophical 
sense. He assumes that its meaning is clea+"ly understood as indicated 
. 2 
by Webster, namely, ttthat which furnishes any mode of proo£. 11 There can 
be nq evidence of any kind without some datum experienced. Further, 
'it 
every datum is a sign} Every datum consciously perceived as individual 
and specific suggests one or more hypothesis. In so far as the data 
suggest hypotheses to the mind, these data can be regarded as evidence 
for the hypotheses they suggest. It has been pointed out before, and 
, 1. This section on preliminary orientation is largely the interpretation 
of t,he au. thor. 
2o Webster's Collegiate Dictionary. 
3" ttThe Dialectic of Religious Experience," p.; 560. 
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will be pointed out again in more detail, that sometimes the data suggest 
conflicting h1Potneses. As signs, they point in different directions, 
and hence the criterion must be used tc decide which. of the suggested 
hypotheses is th~ more coherent description of reality. Before relating 
evidence and coherence specifically, the rel~tionship between evidence 
and definition should be examined. It mu~t be stated first, however, 
that all data relevant to any h~othesis-t,hose data which apparently 
suggest the hypothesis, those data which would suggest a contrary hy-
pothesis 1 . ~d those data which would sugge~t that the hypothesis has ·· 
eithel7 inslP.'fioient e.vidence or falls short of utilizing all the evi-
dence--al~ th.ese data JnUst be considered, and when they are, they become 
evidence either for or against the hypoth~ses suggested.: Evidence should 
be defined, then, as all the data relevant to a suggested hypothesis. 
ii. The Importance of Definition for Evidence 
'Th€n:·~ seems-... to be evidence for the proposi ·tion that all clear 
th~nking i~.a problem of formulating precise definitions and relations. 
,An object o~_._though,t :.cannot be defined unti:L it is known. It ·cannot be 
known until:~t is:investigated. But investigation presupposes some.level 
of -de;t'ini tiop.__.. ·"If definition can come only at the end of investigation.9 
then it. can. never'· come, for investigation is r;tever-ending and investi-
gation can ne~er begin·-lrl:thout- definition of.,a problem .• 111 Then knowledge 
i:s impossible? Not at alll The. ability to define arry object and its 
;r:~f?-~i_ons to o:tl;ier; .Objects depends directly upon the knowledge of the 
. .' •.. 
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·object and'. its rel9-tiops. The· growth 'of knowl~ge carries with it the 
concomitant a.bi4ty for increasing~ detailed definitions_ of pbjects .pnd 
their relation$.1 
The ~I?ob:L:em of evidence ;is entirely a problem of relations. The 
relati,;onship .between two objects of_ thought will not be understood until 
·those objects:. of thought are def~ned. Then the- clearer the definitions 
of the objects, the clearer will .be the relations seen. If one ex.peri-
e;nce is seen to have no relevance to another, that is, no significant 
·~ .· .. 
relati·on to 1,-t, it is in no way evidence either for or against any hy-
. 
pothesrs suggested- by the irrelevant experi,ence.. Ordinarily, a finger-
print has no relevance to the thinkin~ of the individual, ·no causal re-
. )-
lat:L-onship.. But if harm has been done and the offender. is sought, the 
fingerprint on the weapon used' is relevant to .. the relationship of the 
objects involved only because of the knowledge of the individuality of 
fingerp+;i.nts.. Were i.t not for this knowledge of fingerprints, the par-
ticular fi~gerprint involved would not enter the system of relations, and 
hepye would noi; be regarded as evidence • 
. Evidence, it may be repeated, is entirely a problem of relationship • 
. Relation~hip presupposes two or more "objects," the nature of which is 
at l13ast.:p~tly understood. ttMy-11 present experience of sensory data is 
not. ~vidence for- 11 cnair 11 until I understand, at least vaguely, what is 
meant by chair. Indeed, the concept that describes the present pattern 
of sensations is 11 chair .. •t The child learns the meaning .of terms by 
'.: 
1. The-growth-of knowledge and the concomitant ability to define will 
... ?.·.-.be discussed in the next ... section under the .. topi~, "The Epistemic 
Process.u Here the concern is primarily with the '!relations. 11 
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ob~erv:ing v~ous pattE;~rns of. sensory data aiid· the appropriate terms to 
describe them. This learning begins with objects such as ball,. doll, 
horse, e~c. Ball is one set of sensory data patterns, doll another, and 
hors~ another~ ·"Being a good boy" involves a certain relationship with 
the'objects of the child'~ world, whether the objects be inanimate toys 
or sisters apd"brothers. Thus do objects and concepts take on elementary 
meaning for the child, and element~ definitions are fol'ml+lated. Until 
the P.efinitions are established, at least vaguely, there can be no 
knowledge of evidence or relationship. To this extent evidence, that is, 
the·:·.totaltv of·:.releyant systematic relaticms, presupposes definition. 
iii. Evid~nce and Coherence 
!. 
The 9lose relationShip between evidence and coherence can be. seen 
from the definition of evidence itself. To define evidence as all the 
dat~ relevant to a suggested hypothesis is ·to say nothing unless it is 
assumed that these data will be related to each other in such a way that 
they will e~uoidate the hypothesis. It is the meaningful relationship of 
.. ~ 
the relevant Q.ata that constitutes the e~~ence. Relating the data in 
the most meaningful way is exactly what is meant by coherence. If the 
dal;a are to be evidence for any hypothesis at all they must be related 
coherently. Although every datum is a sign, llnot all data lead where 
they.point. Some data are signs of deserts which are there; others are 
' 2' 
signs o:f oases- wnicn 'are not there_. n1 . Hence, as aeen before, some 
criterion mu~t be used to discover which are accurate signs. For any 
·~ .. 
1. "The Dialectic .of .. Religicms ~erience, 11 p. 560. 
2. Page 32. · · 
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philosophyj- therefore, th.at stresses the criterion of empirical ·coherence, 
.. . 
evidence should be defined as all of the data relevant to the hypothesis 
viewed syiloptica.lly and coherently.· ~atever the data suggest,· whe~ s0 
considered, is that for which they are evidence. If the scope of the 
data is sufficiently broad and sufficiently interpreted and verified., 1. 
the hypothesis should be an accura.te·.description of reality. Since the · 
scope and the interpretation and verificai:;ion- can never be absolu.te and 
final, the· truth can never be considered absolute. and final. But for 
the amount of truth that is knowable, -the criterion of. empirical co-
her~ce is the most instruinental in the growth of knowledge and the most 
~eliable for the testing of knowledge claims. Evidence has to do with 
relations; coherence has to do with the relation of the relations. 
i v. ·Evidence and the Shining Present 
Evidence, 'as here defined, assumes the entire empirical scheme as 
outlined in the third chapter, but more especially the section entitled 
11The Shining Pre~ent. 11 In Brightman's philosophy,. few ideas,: if any~ 
are repeated with more frequency and conviction"than that 11all our 
evi<;ience ;for every belief· we have is the evidence of consciousness. 112 
The shining present of the immediate empirical datum self is conscious 
awareness.· In so tar as anything is relevaE.t to the human empirical 
situatio!lt it must begin,· and find its meaning,· in the shining present.· 
' Memory 1 anticipation, value experience--all the meaningful diinensions of 
1· .. The process 0f verification will be described below on page 92. 
z·.~ For 'example, seP. "A Christiq.n View of Nature, II Christian Bases of 
"' World Order, (N. ·r .. ; Abingdon-a ok~sbliry Press, 191i3.), .P• ije. -·-·-:· 
.s~.e.~~so.Natl.l.re zd.Values$ PP• 56,''ll.5·, }..19·•· ~:,~, ,·,,. 
77 
life must develop. through the inescapable door of consciousness. Until 
it· appears· in·. consciousness, nothing can be regarded as exi.steniJ, much 
l:ess as evidence for something. If there is any evidence for >anything. at 
all, that .evj.cience must exist in and for ·consciousness, the shining 
present. 
v. Evidence and the Illuminating Absent 
Evidence not only as~es the shining present, it also assumes what 
. . 1 
has been· called the Illuminating Absent. All conscious awareness points 
•·. ', ...... ·· 
beyond the immediate empirical datum of consciousness to an illuminating 
absent, an object~ve world. The details of this assumed objectiye wo~ld 
wi~l b~ shown i~ a later section.2 All that needs to be indicated here 
-· is that evidence assumes at least an objective world that is a system, a 
world that .sustains an qrderly relationship in which one experience can 
be evidence f.pr the validity of another. Were. this characteristic of the 
illtimi.nB;ting absent denied, not only knowledge but also meaningful experi-
ence of the objective world would be impossible. Without the 1.llumi,~ 
nating absent there would be no·· stable ground on. which experience. could :be 
built,. This truth is assumed in both the criterion of empirical cp..:.-· 
herence and tQ.e concept of 11 the true is the whole • 11 On~ might even say 
:·: . 
that the .very orderly nature of experience :itself is evidence enough · 
for the e:xti.stence of su~h an orderly system. 
' 
.. 
_With this preliminary orienta-tion, one .may now inquire, 1'llhat is the 
.. ~P.i.B~~c p~qgess involved in the whole scheme of evidence?" 
1.":. Page 64 .. 
2. Paga"97;.; 
.. 
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· 2. The Epistemic Process in the Scheme of Evidence 
i. The Problem of Epistemology 
Ontology is logically prior to epistemology. Being is prior to 
knowing. Before an object can be said to know or to be known, it must 
be said to be. But being has no meaning apart from its being known and 
understood· Qy some shining present. Hence, to discuss being apart from 
its being known is abstri3-ct speculation, it' it is ~possible at all. There 
is: no empirical evidence that the knonng process aiJ.:.ters in any way the 
·object known.· As the knowing proc~ss and the resultant knowledge of an. 
obj eci;. . become more and more detailed,. they enhance· the appreciation of 
the object. The study of the theory of knowledge is called epistemology. 
The problem ()f epistemology· is this:1 . granting that one has been . 
able to establish coherence as the ori terion of truth, and granting that 
one has been .abl~ to reach. a coherent i~terpretation of things, one may 
then be s~d to have know];edge in his grasp. Knowledge may be defined as 
11 any tested statement about a.:n;r subject.u2 UA proposition-con.fi.rmed..-·by 
facts and .rea~on113 may be called knowled~e. But knowing is an act of 
mind-; and the obj ec't known is other than th.e mind t s knowledge· of it·; 
The problem is, how do. our ideas refer to their objects? And nhow may 
I be certain that my ideas, even when· they m~_et the reqUirements of the 
,• .. 
coherence {or any other) criterion, actually give me truth about the 
state of af!air·~ in the real ·universe beyond me?tt4 In evaluating 
~. An Int.r..odllotion to Philosophy, PP• 75-77. 
2 • "Metaphysics, " Chapter II, p. 6 • 
. :3~· 'An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 330. 
4\ Ibid.) pp •. 75~70. 
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the corresponde:qqe orii{.E;)rion of,'.,;trutb:,1 :Srightman -concludeQ. that ltit is 
impossible for us to compare ideas nth any unexperienced realit.y. We 
can compare ideas only with other ideas or experiences. 111 "Ideas cannot 
be comp~ed with their objects. tt2 Has man any reason, the:q., for be-
lieving that his thought gives him an accurate account of reality? Can 
he find within his experience something he can trust as revealing reality 
'• 
to him, as well as relating him ~o "the eternal meaning of the universe 
(if it has such a meaning)? 113 If h~ is to find any clue to the solution 
of this problem he must find it within his experience. 
Skepticism claims that there is no answer to the problem of episte-
· mology because knowledge is impossible. But if all knowledge is impossi-
ble, complete and thorough-going skepticism would have to deny even the ·-~ 
knowledge of the problem itselfo The skeptic cCl.Imot assert the impossi-
bility· of knowledge without refuting his own position, ;namely, that the 
. ~ 
knowledge of his position is possible .. The skeptic must maintain complete 
silence .. 
f"· Fositi~m claims that there is an answer within the.realm of sense 
.. ,, 
experienceo. Knowledge of the sense Qrder, and only of the sense order, 
is p6~itive .. knowledge.4 In_so £a:r as it is claimed that there is a 
reality that manifests its,eli' through sense experience, positivism re-
mains skepi}i?al. Sense .ex:P.erience supports science, but denies meta-
physics .. ; careful ex~~tion show£ that the thorough-going positivist 
1. An Introduction to Philosophy, p~ 60. 
2..-~ Ibid4., ·::po •. y6J> 
:3 •"' Ibid., P• 77 tt· 
~<>"'Ibid..:, ~p .. 78·o 
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is caught -in a dilemma: _neither be a solitary solipsist or ackno-qrledge 
. - .. .. ·- -~--- ~ 
other lninds.••1 Unless ~tb.er minds are regarded merel:y as ~elise eJI>eri-
en.ce {which for Brightman is clear~ unelft.Pirieal and incohi!fettt), to 
grant their eXistence is to go beyond positivism. To dez:tr the existence 
of other minds is to land in. solipsism, the theory that maintains that I 
alone exist. From th~s dile:mma the positivist caxmot escape. 
Returning to the )roblem of epistemology one should note tb.rf~ pert~­
nent aspects.2 F:i.rst,·knawledge is the conscious· acceptance of crrtifie~ 
propositions as true. Secondly, because it has been verified, knpWledge ·· 
is related to former experiences of verificat:ione Thirdly, hall 
. " knoWledge "i:f knoWledge of somethinglt and this sa:methi.Eg is called the 
object. The object does not refer necessarily to a physical obje~t, but 
may refer to anything that can be known. Bu.t the essential problf.w. re-
mains unanswered: Uflow do our ideas refer to reality?U 
The epistei:nic monist maintains that Uknowledge is possible ~cause it 
is essentially immediate: the idea (experience) and the object (that is 
experienced) are one and the same faqt. n3 The actual obj'eot of experience 
enters the. experience itSelf in such a· way that idea and object are one. 
'• ( 
Epistemic idealists ni.aint~·in that the tt~:oe tt is.· idea. Ideas are more im-
mediately obvious to the mind, so there· is nothing more -to the opjeots . 
than· tb.e:ir presence in consciousness in the form of idea.. The ideas ex-
perienced admit of coherent organization because they are the system of 
a supreme~ npnd.- (But if man so immediately participates in the divine 
1.; !n I:ntroduot:ion to Philosophy, p. 79. 
2. Ibid.' P• Bl. 
3. Ibid., PP• 81-82. 
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·idea, how is .the problem .. of error to be explained?) Panobjectivists 
maintain that the 11 oneu is object, asserting that it is soienti:fic to 
regard consciousness as a mode of objects, while it is arbitr~ to 
-regard objects as modes of consciousnesso. The difficulty the pan~ 
objectivist faces is the coherent explanation of truth itself., liPan-'' 
objectivism, taken literally, denies truth to the subject; and epistemic 
idealism in the end denies the object (Hegel to the contrary notwith-
standing) o ,,l· There must be a more coherent ·answer ·to the ·epistefuic 
1: 
problem• 'Brightman suggests episte¢.c ·dualism _as t1_hi.s answer• 
'> 
.·.,.·· "'". 
· Epistemic· dualism is the theov 11that eV.ery case of knowledge in-
.eludes tw'o elements,. idea and object,. neither of which is :identified 
·. '2 
.'¢-tP. or c¥J, be redtwed to the other.;.u Every idea refers to some object, 
the obj e.c.t 'being either mental or physical, mathematical or logical-·· 
anything th~t can: be kndwrlo "All that .an epistemic dualist asserts about 
.. · 
the object .is that ±t ;is not identical With the idea of it, and ail that 
he asserts abo~t th~·. idea :ts~.':t.b.at it refers to ·or knows the objecto 113 
For the.monist there are several difficulties in epistemic dualism ... 
He considers the dualistic :posttion a statement o.f the problem rather 
than a solution of it. To· set idea on.the one hand and object on the 
othe:J::: is to create a great gulf between them.. If thiS' gulf cannot be 
.... ~ 
bridged, one falls in the chasm o~ skepticism:" But, acob!'ding to 
Brightman • s dualistic position,; this is the very description of what 
kn.owledgf? ;Ls •. Experience ver:i:t'ies· that one can know a past event as 
:.-·· .... 
1~ An Introduction to Philosophy, p 11 9.3. 2~ Ibid;., P~. Bh<o . 
.... ------·~ ' ). 'Ibido 
-; ... ·-. 
.. ~ . 
.. 
• i 
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obje~i's of a. present ideao Obviously, this is ~n il~ustration of ·ep;t~rte­
mic. dualism •. "Unless knowledge of objects· other than the idea. t~<\Lt P.J.ows 
tb.em is possible, the:o. real knowledg~_ 9-Ud ,articulate experience: i~self 
~e alike impossibleott1 But one can hav~ a true ,idea about a past •. event 
if memory and experience in general are to be trustedo 
.. ... 
Furth~; the monist argues that the dualist app~ls ~~o the un-
trustworthy criterion of instinat.,n2 , Some dualists have appealed to., 
instinct and hence have become susceptible ~o the.pritici~ .. · The ·monist 
maintains tb.at the dualist has agreed that if there are objects other 
~. 1·. 
,. 
than the~ ideas, they are incapable of being proved. But;, as was shOP,n 
in the second chapter~ th~ argum~nt fro:m,. instinct is not cogent. It is 
unfortunate some dualists have appe<=!-led io it.,· 
.. . ' . ~ .. 
The analytic panobjectivist opposes epist.em:ic dualism on the b~t:3.~S 
that 11the method of science pvesupposes epistemic monism, for science is 
cpncerned with analysis of the giv.en.,n3 B,ut when .science analyzes the 
.. 
given, ;Lt arrives at mathematical points even beyond electrons .. El~ctrons 
and mathematical points are not given in immediaye. experien,ce. 
sults of science are dualistic. 
'fue re-
. .. 
Another argument. by the monist is that all cases of apparent dualism 
are to l:?e explained in the end Uby reference __ to some situation in which 
idea and.. opj ect are one.,tt4 Thought about yesterday was. immediate experi-
.... ·. . . . ·- . . ~. ::·~ t. ) ·~ .. 
enee yes"berda.Y, .. 
. I 
. :;., .:.-•"..·, . 
.. ,;, 
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bevneen k!.~(J\Vled.ge by acquaintance and knowledge bJi· desc~iption.. The 
former· he calls the ·IJsituation experienced18 and the lat.ter the "situation-
believed-i.Bo. 11 
Knowledge by· aet!Uai!:l.tance covers all immediate expecience; 
hence it may be said to include all "si tuaifions7 experienced, II 
while they are. present.. Knowledge by description, on the 
other hand, refers to situations not now.prasent; h~ce it 
desc;r.ibes 11situations.--believed-in .. u Situations-experienced 
are monistic; situations-be:Lfeved-in are dualistic.l 
Two questions then arise: 11Just how much knowledge by acquaintance 
i ~ 
is there? and second: Does knowledge by acquaintance presuppose that idea 
. 2 t 
and object are one?" To answer :the .former Brightman suggests that 
. . 
what we are acquainted with . .i;s our total personal experi-
ence, the living tissue o.f our being as a consci-ous se~- .. 
It is by the interpretatli..on o.f what we .find in our 
conscious experience that we build up all knowledge. Every 
other pretended truth is.an abstraction from our concrete 
self-l.i.fe, and. may or may not be true.3 · 
In .answering the second question Brightman denies that knowledge by 
acquaintance presupposes tha-t idea and object are orie.. The validity o.f 
intuitive· truths ttis a:Lways . other than the psychological .fact ~Jf ~" pi(,)r-
ception., The intuition has an object."4 The same holds .fo:!' self-
knowledge. Sel.f-experienc~ is :m.<?:pistic~ but as monistic it is not a case 
o.f knowledge., "In self-know;Ledge the aspect of my.a·elf that knows is 
distinct from the asp~c~ o.f· mY-self that is being knowno~15 
In one .final appeal, the m,onist. elaims·.,t:B:at tb.~:. app,iijir.'ent dualism ·. ·· 
between self.:.experience and s·eJ4r7'knG1!"f_~edge · (.af ~eal;:) !is· r.educed to an 
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ultimate mGnism beoause of the Absolute Self' in whom knowing and being 
are one and the same-, This, Brigh-tman says, ~gives an account of diVim.e 
epistemology; but leaves us human beings stip. on a dualistic basis.ttl. 
Transtemporal reference; trans-spatial reference, reality of separate 
selves and the explanation of error all suggest the coherence of episte-
mie dualismo Epi~temie dualism ~s the additional advantage of leaving 
the me~physicaJ. qu.esticn open, while the thorough-going epistemie monist 
decides his metaphysics in advance. 
ii. The Dialectic of tb.s Epistemio '?!"~cess 
The problem of epistemology suggests a further problem, namelf, the 
natur~ of the epistem.ic process o Thi~ process will be considered under 
two. aspects, th~ former being eJiled the epistemie dialeeti~ of axperienee1 
and the la~ter being called nthe method ~f philosophical interpretation~"2 
Tfle former leads logically and chronologically to the latter. Eaoh will 
be considered in turn. 
Th·e.· dialectic of the epistemio process includes t..l:n-ee factors which 
Brightman finds in all forms of knowledge: "an experienced datum, probl.ems 
... , ·' 
arisfng frOOt. it, and their ~elutions .u3 These :factors will be analymed as 
o~~·'liit~ting a dialectical processJl' dialeetioal in ,the Hegelian sensa;,4 
(l) The experience of the da'bum401 All. knOWledge must begin with "c.he 
present experience of the dat'llllll~. · The datum re.te:r;;~ to the entire present 
'{ ~ • • ·• L 
self, eXperience in the broadest possible sense. It does not· refer to 
·· .. , .(a: . 
1. An Introduction to Phj..losophy$ pG 92. 
2~ 'A Philosopby of•.Relj,giol!., Po ll6o 
3a. liThe Dialectic of Religious Experience,« ·P• 560o 
4,. Above; Po 28o 
8$ 
apyth:Lng br;:;yond t~e awareness of consciousness, if ~u,c_h there pe.;, It 
assumes that_ the_ term experience has no meaning- apart f;rpm consqiou,~. 
. -·· ... . ' .. 
awarenesf?,~ Moreover, the datum here .is no"\:) restricted to w)J.at. is ~ven 
in sense perception, the .data of sensation •. Such a res~riction would 
. . • • •. _,.. I .. o • ·• ' t• ' 
exclude value ~d religious experience unless it inte.rP;'eted these.· . ,·. 
• .. f ,t •. ,· . • 
experiences in terms of sensatio:r;t,. Rather, "the. datum ref;ers to the: · 
.. . .. . . . ' . . . 
e:o.tire consc:\.ous awareness. Unless the data are actually present in 
·conscious awareness they have no relation to knowledge at all for the 
·,_ 
.e:m.pirici st. 11 The empirical basis of knowledge is narrow; it is th,e datum-
'. ' 
•! ·. 
self'~ But this narrow realm is the essential and only basis of all 
•, - 1 
know1edge. u 
-Every individual datum experienced is ?-.sign.. Bu.t as a sign, t..l-J.e 
datilm may be misleading. Until :the dat~ .. are i:q.terpreted and related they 
may be· little more than chaos. They may be interpreted and orgaffi.zed (a 
process t~at will be dead~i:beP. ill the ~ext:· section), but this interpre-
• ' • . . ' 'J, ~. . • • • ' • 
_ tation and· organizationt.is ·a: conscious process and part of the total 
,<> t· ' II ~ ' I ' 
-·· datum self. TJ?.e datum, the~1, 11is ~ problematic datum turning into a 
s~:J;-ution,:,. a confused· self m~~g it~elf olear.11 ~ Some of the problems 
.· .... 
generated by th'~ datum: a.:t~e listed below. 
., . 
• (2) Problems arising fr~ the experience of the datum .. ·The fi.:cst 
problem is, 11What is the··~a;t~, in···detail?ii.3. This problem is cono.::erned 
•'· 
' ' 
'With the description of the actual fact. But description of facts alone 
. . . . . ; . ~· 
is i~suffig~ent for a scie~ce .. ·· The~e must be relationship and control, 
. .._, 
of 'Eeligious ~ kperi en~e, 11 p o _561. 
.. • . 
,-
86 
of empirical cau·se.. Hence, a second problem is, 110f what ideally possi-
ble past and future data are present datum-el~ents the signs?«1 But one 
must go beyond empirical cause to the category of self-transcendence. A 
third problem is, 11 0f what data ideally inaccessible to me is my datum 
the sign?112 The first and second problems deal with ideally accessible 
data,. that is~ data 11 observable as part of my actual datum and so,. em-
piric~ objective.u3 But to make sense of experience, the datum must 
have other selves and a world,. For these the datu.n:t must transcend itself 
and ~o b~ond its immediate experience to inference, since no datum self 
can have any .other self or any part of it as his immediate experience. 
A fourth problem which all thought confronts is that of validity: 
110f what logical implications is my datum the sign?n4 This problem in-
, .. 
valves tll:.e use of the criterion of empirical coherence as explained in 
the second chapter~ This wouid include the study of metaphysics, but the 
'. . ..·~ 
study of metaphysics raises a fifth problem: 110f what values is my datum 
the sig~?u5 Wben v~lue-claims conflict, one ~ust empl~y empirical co-
·- .·· 
herence to discover which v~ue-claims are true values. These problems 
as a whole lead to a further prGblem, that of metaphysical unityo 
1'0f wb.at total '\l.Iliverse ''is my datum the. s~gn?tt6 llMetaphysics;4..-s a pro-
t; 
... 
gressiveli'coh~rent int'erpret'at:i.on of aii the ~vidence ~forded by all 
accessible data, seen in the light of an attempted unification of the 
87 
/ 
attained solutions of all ptoblems..ttl . Eefore one can have a satisfactor;r 
solution to these problems he must discover what the extent and the 
nat~e of the possible solutions are. 
(3) The nature of the possible solutions. What constitutes a so-
lution to a problem?·· Certainly an adequate solution involves the eon-
stderation of all possible solutions and the sel$ction of the one most 
coherent. The ~ctual proce~s involved in reaching an adequate solution 
as well as the nature of an adequate solution depends upon the method 
of philosophical interpretation. 
iii. The Method Q~ Philosophical Interpretation. 
T~e method of philosophical interpretation _will be shown to be a 
combination of the method of synopsis· and the criterion of empirical eo-
' . 
herence. Each by its very nature commands the companionship of tb,e other. 
The method of synopsis would be meaningless without a criterion of equal 
ph~los9phical scope. Consiqering.all the data would deliver no meaning 
without measurement, and the rule of measure wo'Qld need to be adequate to 
the da;ta measured. On the other hBnd, the criterion of empirical eo-
hE;~renc~, ~hen properly understood, wouf.dbe seen. to involve all possible 
data considered as a totality, which i~ exactly what is meant by the 
•, 
synoptic method. The epistemic process, as Br.ightman understands it, 
involves both method and criterion. 
The method or process of philosophical interpretation involves ttfive 
fairly distinct stages: (l) preliminary 5,1nopsis, (2) scientific anqlyses 
1. ttThe Dialectic of Religious Experience," P• 568. 
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sy:nlbliesE!S~ (:3} synqptic ·hypotheses, (4) verification, and (5.) red.nterpre-
tation•"~; 
(l) 'Preliminary grnopsis. Inte~pretation cannot begin until there 
I . 
is some-thing, to:. ititJ;lrpret. ; The first stage, is the ~eEl-ping glance·; "the 
surveying observat;ion, whi:oh gives one "the !eel" of· the situ.ationi· I-t 
. . 
is by its very nat~re hasty' and '.inadequate, and meant to. be no more than 
orientation or introduction· to· a si tuatien. "It is -observation ori what 
~·· Loewenberg calls the prea.na.lytio· stag-e-, · a+!d consists of a tentative 
intuition• of the general field of facts to be studied•''2 
(2) Scientific analyses and syntheses. The vague orientation of 
..• ·• -
preli!liinary synopsi~ 11acquires fi~m outlines and definite content only 
by p~ocesses of scientific a.n~s~s .~d synthesis."3 The anal-;rsis, as 
suggested in the study of method, involves the isolation and examination 
• .. 
of the constituent elements to the point that. they can be analyzed no 
further •. Once the basic elements have been a.palyzed they are then ttseen 
synth~t:ically i~ th~ir relaii~ns t6 each other~ 114 "Philosophical in...; 
terpretatton is ~ely formal: and empty of r$il content unless it rests 
on the firm ground of the scientific analysis and synthesis of experi-
ence.~~5·. 
-
.. 
(3) Sypoptic Q.ypotheses. II.AlJ_ thought, scientific_or philosophical; 
proceeds by the inventi~n of hypothe~es intended to explain the observed 
·.6: 
data.n · .An hypothesis is tta tentative theor;r·or suppositio:r:- provisionally 
l•.'· A Pb.ilos.ophy o:t;,Religion, p-•. 117 .• · 
2. Ibid. .. .. 
.3 •. Ib:)_d •. 
4~· ~bi.d,: 
5:• Ibid, 
6. lbid,. 
. . 
adopted to explain· certain facts and, to ¢0.e· ·;tn the: investiga:t;.i'on of 
l 
otrrers,.tt · Brightman def;i.nes an hypothesis as "a possible solution of 
a problem.. 112 ' Problems arise from the experlence of the datum; it is . 
hypoth~tical thought that suggests possible 'solutions to the'se problems) · 
All knowledge is hypothetical .. 4 To assume that· a cer1;ain hYJX'thesis 
is the s<;>lution to a problem,assb.mes that p.lternat:ive JP<:>s:sibilit:Les :hl.ave 
peen examined and the ·best one selected. But even: th:e· belief that all· 
p()ssible sqlutions have been considered i.s itse·lf hypetbeticaJ::,: . .>.e:nQl· 'the 
.. 
JUdginent.,inyolved in making the suggested· solution· iS· no less hypotheti-
: ;r; 
cal. I I ~ 
T.o assert that all knowledge, both ·sci·entific and· philosoph§: cal, ·is 
h;Y"Pothetical does riot mep.n to su:ggest . that: .. scientific . and philosophical 
. . . I . . 
l1yp6theses are identical in na:i:nire·~ ·.A scie~tiflc hypo-j;.hesis, character-
• ' .1 ' I 
. ·~ 't .... 
:i.stic of the spirit of sci.en~e, · 11is restricted to the· ordering · o:f .. the 
~ted, subject matter~ U.nder investi'gatio~ •..•...• 115 '· On .the ·~th~ ha'lld,· a 
philosophical hypothesis, characteristic of the spirit of p~losophyj 
"has a.·far'wider scope and is sinoptic in a very special sense; for :rt 
. . 
ai.ms to relate the subject m~tter under investigation ··to a: vi-ew -:<>f .: 
:·., . . ... ; • .• . . .... c ·.· ' .. 
~ei:fenoe as a whole.!16 'The' type of hypothesis suggested will <;lepend 
upon .'jihe- -natu.~~ of:-~~~ qbj_ect· o'! immedi:ate interest ... Since the· objects·~· 
of scienc~ and the- objects of philosophy are not identical, it is not 
.i 
··1..-. Webster '-s. Collegiate Dictionary. 
2~. · nThe Dialectic o:t: Religious.,Exp~ience, 11 p. 570. 
;3,.· 'Ibid;, p. 569~ . . . . · 
.4~· 'Aiii:tltroduction to Philosophy, p. 81; see also "Religion as Truth, 11 
- .. ·.·. 67 . i 
.:., p.. . • 
.5..:~-A.Phtlosophy. of Religion, p. llB. 
6/.'Ibid., 
'·~· 
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slU'piii·sing .. t.o firid the hypo"theses differing in ·nature. With Brightman 1s 
definition of philosophy, method, and criteria~,. one would expect to find 
in the method of philosopliical interpretation a stage that would· include 
the "synoptic hypothesis.ll If the concern of ph:i.~osophy is for the. whole, 
then ultimately the l}.ypotheses. must be .truly synoptic. Thus ·synopti.c .. · 
nyPoth~ses (stage 3) go beyond scientific analyses and syntheses (stage 
2). 
Just as the hypotheses of science and philosophy d.iffer .iJ.1.. nature,~ 
so also do they differ in use. According to inductive logic a good _hy-···. 
pothesis should be such that deductions may be drawn from it. 
In the-case of inost successful scientific hypotheses ai.; 
least two characteristics of these deductions stand out. 
They are mathematically exact, and they render possible 
precise predictions of future events. Neither of these 
tr~ts is possessed by th~ hypothesis of lPhiloso~)r.l 
.·: 
tt will be. seen late:r 
1 
that ev~ry philosophical hypothesis is only proba-
... ' 
bie; never absolutely certain; because abso;J,.u.te .~certainty asSUllles absq- · 
. ' . 
lute knowledge o:f' absolute experience~ But as synoptic; that is,. as . 
going. beyond the stage of scientific ·syntheses_, 11 an hypothesis ~relates: 
the .particular to 'the universal, the present to the .eternal, the part to 
the whole. 112 Brightmq.n .summarizes the first three stages of the method 
\ 
of philosophical interpretation in his 11Metaph.ysics. 11 
,• ... ~ ... 
·.• •. 
.All serious thinking.,. ·espee5..ally m~taphy:sical .. thi~ng,., 
must start with the situation ~perienped, in the •shining 
present, which is always a partial view; yet the knowledge 
of , the part has to begin with some sort of hypothesis 
~bout~ .the whole. Our g.eneraJ,.ized scientific and philo-
sophical hypotheses reinterpr~?t.· the pctrts;.._ and our 
··'· .. : ... · .. · .... 
...... 
1,. ~1Th~ .l?~~qpalis-:tic Method in' Philosophy, 11 p. 374. 
2~. A Philosophy of Religion, p~ 119. 
··~. 
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experience of the pa+'ts both: checks and feeds our. VisiGn 
of the whole. • • • in all human insight, knowledge of 
the part and knowledge of the whole grow together. ·The · 
arrow of intelligibility flies back and forth. The meta-
physical fact that the whole is prior to the parts must 
not obscure the epistemic fact that for all human knowledge 
the parts come first.l · 
(4) Verification. The importance of verification in science, phi-
losophy, and religion is so obvious that· ·1 t· nee~ not be' emphasized.. Be-
... .; . 
fore anyone can believe a philosophical or re~gious f~th Wi~h a~ con-
viction· he must be able to verify the coherence o:f that faith. To .verify 
. ' 2 
me~s to prove to be true. Unless there is some scheme o~ verification, 
some way Gf proving one interpretation to be more coherent than another, 
there would be little point in striVing to know. Knowledge .. would be 
meaningless, as. would truth and. value. But experience testifies to the 
reality of the possibility of some scheme of verification. 
There seem to be several kinds of verification and hence some con ... 
. ' 
. ' 
fusion concerning the ultimate definition. Since verification has to do 
with the relation between an hyp9thesis and the object to l'lhich it refe;"s, 
. i· 
different types of objects suggest different types of hypotheses, and 
. ' .. 
furthfl1nl!.?re, di:t'fe:rent kinds of verification ... Feeling this to be true, :· 
Brightman points out at least three types of objects: ttobservable natural 
. . . 
processes, mathematical and logical systems, and mi~ds.u3 V.eri.fication 
of an observable nat~al process involves definition of the hypothesis, 
appropriate experimentation With' the object to which the bypoth~sis 
r.:·chapt~ n, p. 9. 
2~·wabster.'s Collegiate Dictionary. 
3·i A Philosophy of Religion, p. 119. ~ 
92 
refers, and .then careful observation of the results. The .verification or 
falsification of the hypothesis depends upon the relationship between the 
assumed hypothesis and the results. observed. Verification of a·mathe-
matical or logical system can be obtained through repeated deductive 
operations showing that the premises and conclusions are either con-
siste:Q.t or ":i.ric·onsi:stent. But verification of other. minds involve~ a 
.. .,. .. 
different process because other minds are ne:i.th,er "observable by the 
. ·. ·. l·. ,, 
sens$s 11 nor are they "abstract terms and relations." 
Since 11t:Q.e nature and limits· of verification are determiried by the 
.... · 2 
nature and limits of the field of investigation, 11 one must have a scheme 
of ver:i,.fication that is commensurate w:i.th the field of investigation .• 
(Even this hypothesis is, of course, subject to some scheme of verifi-: 
cation, and the Choice of that scheme:of veri£ication is also based upon 
some assumed criterion of truth. This is further evidence in favor of 
the criterion of empirical coherence. Which other would provide these· 
necessary qualifications?) Hence, one cannot test an hypothesis about 
the whole of experience with a method of verification that is p~culiarJ.Y 
designed for the testing of some specific part of experience. 
·,, 
It· .is therefore to be expect~d that arry conceivable veri-
i'icatiop. of a metaphysical prpposition about .. the whole ... 
would differ in some respects from the verificat~on of 
a. scientific proposition about some ~art of the whole, •. 3 
(The ·probi'~ here betwe~n · s.cience. ~d· rn~taphys:i,cs is: .. will.the scientis.t 
pez:m:Lt -the. m~ta-physician his ur~te;r-ion? The .metaphysioian .. hal? .. no· other 
":" 'T.;,". • • • ... ~ 0 • ' ••• . . .. . . . .. . 
1; A-PhilosoPlt,Y pf ~eligion, p. 120. 
z~· 11 An Em.1)irical ApprQaCh to· Godj II P• 149. 
3.~ 'Ibid. . . . . . 
~-~·-·· 
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basis for vei:'!i.fication.) 
Although there are differences between scientific and metaphysical 
verification ·because of the nature and the limit of the field of verifi-
cation, "science and metaphysics are. alike in that." each is a search for 
truth and each presupposes the rational coherence of truth."l Because of 
these similarities there are similarities between scientific and meta-
physical -verification. 11A .first likeness is that lll verification must 
begin·. apd end in the data o.f the present experience of a verifying 
person. 112 The interpretation of present person.al experience may be · 
doubted1 but the fact of present personal exper::i-ence and the fact. that > 
all interpretation and verification begin and end in present persona4 
~onsciousness cannot be ~oubted. ; 
'• · It is conceivable that verification in the strict s.ense 
is confined to the individual's own conscious experience. 
I verifY what I find i-n.my oWn actual entity, my. empirical 
situation; all else, I believe. No hypothetical entity 
can strictly be verified. That there was a past, even 
that I had a past and existed yesterday, is unverifiable, 
although a well-grounded h.ypothesis.3 · :·, . ' 
A.nyo:pS demanding social verification £or belief overlooks the basic pre-
suppositions of verification. 
Unless we presuppose the unity of the verifying self ll the 
presence of data within self-experience,. the purpose of 
verification, the validity of reason, the trustworthin~ss 
of Plernory (when tested. by reason.), the reality of timei 
and-the reality of an objective world which is tp.ere4when · ... not.. 9bserved -or verified;- no verification can occur.. ·; 
I 
Furthermore, if verification 1i:s to. be ·communicated.it presupposes the 
; .. 
l. llAn Empirical Approach to God,-u p. 150. 
2~'".Ibide. .. 
3·.:. ·A"'$ilospp~y of Religion, p., 2.34. ., 
4~ ·;Ibid~,' p. 120. See also liThe Presuppositions of Experiment." 
-
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existence of other-•:minds. How does· one k,now ·that···these preSuppositions 
exist when they cannot be verified through serise perception or mathe-
matical pro.of? ltSimply by the fact that they ~are·. beliefs wbich form a 
system cons:j.stent nth itself.and consist~nt (-?-s far as·we know) with 
every phase and _.type of experience. 111 
11A second like:r,~.ess b~tween scientific and metaphysical verification 
is that each is a t~ of system.n2 This was implied in the quotation 
above listing the presuppositions of ve:t;'ification. A single isolated 
experience would be meani~gless and hence would verify nothing. For ~ 
experiep.ce to be mea~ingful it must be related_ to other experiences in a 
system. liThe essence of verification, then, in scieno.e as :well as in 
metaphysic~, is not merely that. facts be observed, but rather that 
systematic relations of facts· .be p'eroeived.u3. 
·' •I 
tJA third likeness between scientific and metaphysical verification 
is that both C!Xe hypothe-ti.c~l.u4 .. As hypothetical, both ··~uffer the limi-
tations of the hypothesis • 
It is erroneous to suppose .that veM:ficati.9n can-Temove .. 
the hypothetical character of knowledge, unless there is 
·so:rn.e absolute proof that the hypothesis which is verified 
is the best possible ando:'that it will continue to be veri-
fied by all future data • .:;l · .. 
This is, .. of co:urse, an impossibility. 1_1No hypothesis about the real 
world can be completely verified until all exi?.erience has be.en surveyed-
~. 
. . 
1. A Philosophy of Religion, P• 121. 
·.2.;. II .An ·Empirical Approach to God, 11 pp. 150-151. 
3, • . Ibid.,. p. 151. See also A~ Ph;Llosppby ·of Religion, 
.;. Dial,ectic of Religious Experi'emce;" p. · 570. 
4,~ ·tt:.An F.lapirical Approaah t~ Gpd,:tt p~ .151. 
5 ~ ·.ltThe ·Dialectic of Religi'ous Expe:i:'ience,.Jt p. 570. 
. ~ .·, ~ . 
.. - .· 
•. 
: ~., 
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a manifest impossibility.n1 Hence; the degree of verification is di-
rectly proportionate to the degree of coherence that is involved .in the 
process of verification. The more inclusive and coherent· the . shining: 
present, the more likely is its attainment of truth. 
Personal experience, apprehended as completely as possible, 
analyzed as thoroughly as possible, tested as experimental-
ly as possible, and then grasped syiloptically as a system 
or totality--that is the basis and metho2 of metaphysics. 
That is the process of all verification. · 
(5) Reinterpretation. One might imagine that verification would be 
the .final stage in the method of philosophical interpretation.:·. This 
would be the. case were verification completely inclusive; but, as has 
been shown; all verification is hypothetical, and, being hypothetical, 
is subjected to the limitations. of the hypothesi•Ero As knowledge becomes 
more and more detailed, hypotheses become more specific and more synoptic. 
Verification becomes moJ;'e inclusive. Since .e:x:peti,f!nc~ is an ever .. EPtpand-
ii,lg .process, tb.e stag.e of verifi'cation ever gives way to ·reinterpretation, 
that is; to interpretation in the light of all new. experience ·which. is 
new evidence. in .so far as. it is ·releYant to the in~erpretation • 
. 
This fifth and final stage in the method of p~losophical interpre-
tation does not mean to suggest that ft will find all fo;mer jud~-ents 
to be false. Rather. it ·means ·to point out tbat human understanding., , · 
although .forever growing,. will forever reinain incomplete. There will 
never be an .absolute verification that requires no reinterpretation. 
This fii'th _ stage_ is fina1 only- .because it describes a process that is 
eternal •. 
•t~o' ' L; "An Empirical Approach to God,n .p .. 151.: . · 
~. Ibid., P• 155. 
3. The' Obj.ective Referei;L~e ·of the Epistemic Process 
' •• i .• ' 
i~ The Objec.tive Reference of Thought 
Both the meaning and importance of the objective reference of 
thought have been indicated before.1 Here it need only be pointed out 
that experience is "a blank mystery if there is not an objective ~;der. 112 
11Every sensation points'to some objective source,as its cause, an~ to 
~ome objective reality as its reierent.u3 Ideas refer to objects as 
something beyond themselves.4 This obj~ct~ve refe~enc~ ~s p~ssible 
because of the capacity of the personality for llself-transcendence. 115 
' 
... . ; 
Investigation of this activity of thought indicates that there are funda-
mental laws or principles of objective reference 11known to philosophy as 
.· 6 
categories~" 
'· 
'· 
ii. The Laws of Objective Reference: The Categories 
D~fin:i:q.g a category as a fundal!lental law of ,objective reference 
~eaves the key words in the definition undefined. Brightman defines a 
.:f:'p..ndamenta1-law as "one that is logically essential to the very..being of 
a system o;f.' objects to which it refers. 117 A category is 11 a princiJ?le 
essential to the very being of some universe of discourse.u8 A universe 
of discourse is "the area or order or .:t:'ealm of b.eing with 'Whic~ thou,1~ht 
1~ Page 54. . . . 
2. Personality· and Religion, p. 53.· 
3 ... , «Personalistic Metaphysic::;. of. the. Self, 11 .P.-. .296. 
4. An Introduction to Fhilosophy, P• 94. 
5 ~·~ Page 68. 
6. ,An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 94. 
7.;.~Ibid-ii .!pp~.! 96-97. . 
8 •. "M;e:tp.physics, tt Chapter VII,; p., 1 • 
. .
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(discourse) happens to 'be concerned. 111 The Qategories, then,· are rela-
tive to the specific realm or realms of being. To be philosophically 
significant the realms of being should be empirically oriented with the 
method of analysis-synopsis and the criterion of empirical coherence.2 
If the categories are relative .to the specific realm or realms of 
. 
being, and if, for philosophical significance, the realms of being need 
to be oriented with synoptic empirical coherence, it follows that the 
source and basis of the validity of the categories are empirical co-
herence and synoptic-analytic method) ''A category is what is 
. . 
essential 
. . 
to an emp:i,rical whole~ 114 The theory of the categories must be ~. based on 
experience and specified as related to the specific realms of experience 
to whiqh they apply. 
The facts of the shining present and the illuminating absent and 
the definition of ~category" suggest a type of classification of the 
categories.~ If categories .are laws essential to tb.e being of· th.e. 
systems to which·they refer, they may be classif;ied.into.two groups: 
1. "Metaphysics,~ Chapter v, p. 2. 
2 • .A:ny cla'ssification of' the realms o:f be:ing at the beginriing of philo-
sophical investigation is purely .a:r;_:bitrary sine~ being demonstr-ates 
itself in i:nexhausti ble variety. 'l!nere are realms of pleasure and 
pain,: imagination. and reason, mathematical and nomnathema.tical, etc .• 
There are realms of the seen and unseen. Of. those that are seen, . 
ther.e. ~e realms of color, shape, size, etc. UReaJ.:m.s of being may 
be added, subtracted, multiplied and divided indefinitely." Even the 
epistemic classification of Shining Present and Illuminating Absent 
should not be considered as ultimate at the start. But if there is to 
· b~ ~ classification· of the 'realms of 't!ein& that: is more than arbitrary, 
. it. m'!lst b~ e~pirically ori~n~ed ;wit~ the synoptic-analytic method and 
~. ·the coherence· criterion. See ·"Metaphysics, n Chapter IV. 
3,. ... "Metaphysics,n Chapter V, p .. .. 15~ . 4..· Ibid~ . . . . . .. 
~/Ibid~~ p. 18 .. See also An lrttroduction to Philosophy, P• 97. 
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first, those that apply to all possible realms .of being.,1 or·to .the uni:-
verse as a whole,2 the metaphysical categories; and secondly, those that 
app~ to some limited realm3 or some lesser system of objects,h the phe-
nomenal categories·.-
(l) The metaphysical categories. The metaphysical categories in-
clude, time, change and identity, and actuali ty .... potentiali ty. Each of 
these will be considered briefly. 
(i) Time. 11The most pervasive aspect of experience is time; and 
it is proposed as the m:ost fundamental category of all possible being.u5 
The temporal aspeet of all experience establishes time as a category of 
the shining present. To remove time is to render· experience impossible. 
But time is also a category of the illuminating absent, unless there is 
to be no relationship between the temporal and the eternal. If there is 
no relationship between them, the temporal being could not know the e-
\ 
ternal. Hehce~ the so-called realm of timeless ·or eternal truth should 
mean enduring throughout all time rather than abstraated from all timeQ 
Jt-I-f f9n~ a-ss-erts that anything is completely irrelevant to time, then 
tliat irrelevance obtains at all times. Thus time creeps slyly into every 
attempt to deny its u.riiversality.u6 
(ii) Change and identity.. llThe very structure of time experience 
generates, or at least strong~ suggests, a pair of related categories, 
1. "Metaphysics,u Chapter V, p. 18. 
2. An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 97. 
3.: 11Metaphysips, n Chapter V, p! . 19.~ 
4, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 97. 
5 t . .,tMEjtaphy~?ics.," OP,apter V, p. 1.9·. See also Chapter VI!' 
6. ·:roi:d.~ p. 20. · · '" · · ·· · 
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namely, . change and identity .nl The; fact of' change can !;l.ardly be denied~ 
11If' the o~ change that can be detected is a ··phange. in the time at which 
the experience occurs, that is a change.,n 2 But there is alao 1identity,. 
or permanence through change. The experience of' change presupposes 
something which endures through the change experienced o;t> there could be 
no knowled~e o:f the experience o:f change. Something must abide. "There 
is no change unless something changes. There is no law of change unless 
there is something identical in the changes.u3 
~iii) Actuality and potentiality.. ttconsulting again. the category 
of' time, we find involved in the time experience another pair of' cate-
gories, namely, actuality and potentiality.n4 To be in either the· 
shining present or in ~he illuminating absent is to be .. actual and tempo-
ral. Temporality suggests a future. "Every present of every kind is 
therefore the potentiality of a f'uture.u5 
100. 
(2) The p~enomenal categories. The phenomenal categories, .referring 
to a limited realm of being, include space (motion), value and obligatipn, 
personal identity, cause, communication, and substance .. 
(i) Space (motion.).6 In sensory experience time is always as-
sociated with space, and space with time. Indeed, there is no space 
w.i thout time because there is no . experience or thought (which is a kind 
lo IIMetaphysics, 11 Chapter V, p. 20. 
2~ Ibid., pp. 20-2l. 
3~ Ibid., p. 2l. 
4~ Ibid., 
5. Ibid. 6;- 'iiS:Ln'ce the world of space bUlks so large in human experience and in 
.. , science:;.it' may be regarded as the chief' subject matter of' the second 
;; . . ·' ' ' 
· group~" .An I:p:troduction to Philosophy, p. 97. 
I 
experienc·e) of. space without an experience of ti~e.~ Beyond the realm,of; 
sensory experience, however, it :i,.s possible to speak of time,_irrespective 
of space, as in keeping a promise to be ._loyal. ttif we may speak of de:,: 
grees of reality, time has a ;higher degree of reaJ,.i ty than space simply 
because it is more inclusive and more universal.n1 
In tb.e phenomenal order the synthesis of time and space is the cate-
gory of motion. Motion is adequate to the definition of category in that 
if it were denied the entire spatial world !ould be inexperiencable. It 
is the synthesis· of time and space in that analysis of time reduc~s ~e 
temporal to instants; a.na.J.y'sis of space reduces the spatial to points •. 
Analysis of motion· "reveals something spatial occupying different place~ 
at different timeso Motion,. then, is not merely space plus time.: but it 
is a unique co-ordination o:f changing places and changing iiime. 112 But 
motion is not a category' of ~11 possible beine, because it is not ea.-
sential to th~ realm of being of thought, value, or consciousn~ss. 
(:Li) Value and obligation. 11In what may be called the moral 
order at least two catego~ies have been discovered--th~ category of 
value and the_ ~at,egory of obligation. 1.'.3 Value· refers to the fact 11that 
moral choice presupposes an end to be chosen which is desired LD!/7 ought 
to be desired. 114 Obligation refers to "the irreducible experience of 
duty~the fa,c~ that a moral person 'ought 1 to choose the best possible 
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1.:; 11Met5i-phy§lics, 11 Chapter VI, p. 38. A footnote indicates that Appearance 
" ~ and Reality, by F. H. Bradley, made "degrees of realityu famous. 
2, Ibid., p. 46. 
3., Ibid., Chapter V, p. 2.3. 
4. Ibid;' 
value. Without value and obligation there could not be a moral order. u1 
(iii) Personal identity. It was seeri: that change and identity 
are correlative categories of all possible realms of being and that 
everything that ahanges ••changes only by virtue of its relation to 
something identical."2 Personal identity is a categorical property of 
the shining present in ttthat all actual experience occurs as a complex 
unity of consciousness11 and that every present personal identity is 
Uniquely related to experiences 'Which once were shining presents but -• 
which now are past) Personal identity is a category of the shining 
present in that if it were erased all experience, memory, and· purpose 
would be reduced to nothing. But it is not a category for all possible 
being since impersonal being may possibly lurk somewhere in the illumi-
nating absent.· 
(iv) Gause.. The category of· change leads~ directly to. the cate-
gory of cause. Were there no expe~ience of change there would be.no need 
for .~ theory of causation• bause. means the u sufficient reason why change 
occurs as '·it does, and not otherwise. 114 .. A "su:ffiei:ent reason" will need 
to take into account all the factors of experience in the ·.shining present 
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that are relevant to changeo "The test of a theory of cause, then, is · ... 
whether all the· experienced factors of change are included, and whether 
reasonable and adequate.postulates r-egarding the absent are set up.n5 
~f:erence to th,e absent must be included since past and future sense data, 
-,.-------,---;· 
1. tt:Met~physics," Chapter V, P• 23. 
2; I'bid·~·; p. 24 •. 
3~· Ibid.;' p. 25. .. 
4i· Ibid;·, Chapter VII, p. 6. 
5. Ibid .. , p. 5. 
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e.ssential to the theory of causation, may well be absent from the .particu-
lar shining p:'~f:)ent_. The reason for tL:te being of anything 11is a c0mp:;Lete 
and coherent account of what is essential to its being.n1 
'· 
The •cause' of any situation, then, would include an analy-
sis of its parts both 'material' and t formal, 1 and analy-
sis of its antecedents and a selection Qf its uniform ante-
cedents, search for its consequents and its 'goal' or 'end' 
(:if a:ny), inquiry. into the nature of the power or . energy at . 
work in it (whether 'physical, t or unknown, as in Hume, or 
volitional, as in Kant and Schopenhauer.) Whatever the 
theory of cause that is adopted, and however tentatively, 
it must include all of the considerations just mentioned. , .. 
if it is to be a metaphysical theory.2 
There are various kinds of causes. Phenomen~ caus·e:'tt·~·tj~lly.: r.ef-ers 
'.'iJ: ~:, .• : ~. oiJ\ • ' •• 
to "uniformity of ord~ or sequence. 113 Metaphysical causation has had 
varied meanings in the history of prdlosophy:4 power for Locke; activity 
and interaction for Berkeley, Leibniz., Kant, 'Whitehead, Bowne and Sellars,; 
volition for Berkeley, Leibniz., Schopenhauer, Bowne and Royce,; creativity 
for Bergson and Whi~ehead; and emergence for Lloyd Morgan and Samuel 
Alexander.5 For Brightman"; e:fficie~t cause is volitional; 6 it is agency.7 
As agency, it 11involves. choice and purpose. Choice and purpose require 
' ,. ' ·; ~ 
reference to an end chosen or purposed, and this is precisely what is 
meant by final cause.u 8 · The purposive power of efficient causation is 
exemplified in human voluntary effort. lt might be described ':further as 
'. 
creative. 
l. ''Metaphysics," Chapter VII, p. 8. 
2 •. Ibid. . . .. 
3• Ibid., Chapter V, p. 27. 
4.· Ibid. · 5 •• Ibid.,·· 
6.~>Ibid.)" Chapter VII, p. 16. 
7 .. , lbid. ,·· p. 1.8 • . 
8.·· Ibid.·· .. 
-
Efficient cause, creative evolution, emergent evolution, 
eternal creativity, .purposive novelty, personal identity 
combined with personal freedom--these are synonymous ex-
pressions in the metaphysical system that is being de-
veloped here.l 
., 
The words 11 cause" and ttreason" are closely related, and just as the word 
cause has multiple meanings, so also has reason. "When we ask for· the 
reason for anything, we may be asking for (a) its purpose, (b) itp logi-
cal necessity, (c) the evidence for believing it to exist or be yalid, 
and (d) its efficient cause.n2 These interpretations may be reduced to 
two, so that reason or coherence means 11 either logical necessity (strict 
consistency or deductive coherence) or empirically inclusive system 
(empirical coherence)."3 
·: (v) Communication. Tbe category of.~ comi:nunication is a kind of 
synthesis of the categories orpers0nal ide~tity and cause.4 All possi-
ble shining presents and all possible societies depend upon the category 
. . 
of communication, the conv~ying of meaning between one or more shining 
presents through conversation, gesture, or telepathic rapport. "Unless 
I assume the category of communicatio~, I have no reason for supposing 
that my sensory experience means anything to you or that you can under-
stand my physicalistic language. uS Without communication there. could be 
neither society nor social growth. It is a metaphysical category in two 
ways. 
1. "Metaphysics; n Chapter VII, p. 2L 
2• .... Ibido., P• 22 • 
. 3i•~Ipid. 
4.,Ibid .. , Chapter V, .p. /2.7.., 
.5 •. Ibid., Po 29. 
104 
Negatively, because a pretended communication whose refer-
ent or thou is within one shining present is no communi~ 
cation at all.· It is solipsistic trickery:; imagination,· 
qxeam, introspection?- 'It is not society.. Positively, 
because each communicator is a self-identical person who 
can be known to the other only by rational faith. T.o put 
it in what· is now familiar language • • ,. , other minds 
are. always situations-believed-in, which are in the 
literal sense absent from my shining present.l 
(vi) Substance. Of all the categories, substance seems to be the 
most perplexing because of its varied definitions in the history of phi-· 
losophy. Brightman approaches the study of this category as follows; 
The category of substance is like all categories, a 
functi9J?.'.Of the· search· for. empirical cob,erence-the in-
. elusive ·norm by which all truth, whether formal or materi-
al, is tested.- What,., then,: is the function of substance 
in . experience? It is to correlate enduring permanence 
· with cllange-s.ince permanence without change and change 
with·out permanence are both partial abstractions from our 
total experience, and each without, the other is partially 
'false to that- total experience which in its every throb · 
unites-. change with memory::~· enduring meaning, and enduring 
efficient causality~ In permanence alone there is no . 
basis for o~usal efficacy, or potentiality, .and in change 
alone there is no basis· for continuity. Permanence alone 
is false to the change in the shining present; change 
alorie is false to experiences of coherence and orgaP~zing 
thought.. Both are required in concrete uni.on.ll if we are 
to have a significant concept of substance.2 
If substance· is to· correlate pefro.anence and change it is "insepara-
bly related to continuity. n3 There· are obvious discontinuities in the 
,· .... 
shining present. liThe only empirical discontinUities that are directly: 
. . . 4 . . 
discoverable by me are those within my own shining present.n Each 
morning the shining present is aware of a d:i:scontinu.ity that occurred 
1-.. ~•Metaphy~ics, tt ? ~- Ibid., Chapter 
3:. Ibid~.; p. 5. 
4. :X:bid.~.;. P• 7., · 
-~·
Chapter V, pp. 29-30. 
VIII, P• 3. 
.·, 
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during sleep. But. awakening, the shining present recognizes. itself as 
i t~el.f through memory linkages ·and hence may be called continuous. The 
discontinuity must be seen against the background of essential continuity 
in order to be known~·l The "union of continl:rlty and discontinuity is the 
essence of what the mind is looking for when it seeks for the meaning of 
substance. 112 
To conclude that experience, thus understood, is substance would 
give rise to, the objection that no shining present is self-sufficient.· 
But it has been indicated repeate<dly that the shining present refers be-
. . 
yond itself. Hence, there must be a greater continuity in the illumi-
nating absent than in the individual shining presento This does not mean 
to imply that there must be complete continuity in the illuminating 
absent. 
·• .. ', 
Our present experiences reveal major discontinuities, 
such as . between activity ,:··lo gj.cal necessi "tiy, and sensory'· 
and normative qualia. These discontinuities 'Within the 
continuity of experience must be included in all coherent 
thought· about the abs~nt. ~It, too, must be a· continuity 
which provides for and includes the major discontinui'bies 
just mentioned, as well as for the discontinuities between 
private persons (shining presents) and the continuities 
of communication and interaction between them.3 
This investigation of substance WG>Uld suggest. "an organic interactive 
pluralism as a -xeasonable metaphysical hypothesis, a pluralism iri· which 
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continuity and discontinuity are related after the model of actual experi-
ence. Self..:.experience is then the key to all substci.nce .. 114 
:L'i "Metaphysics·, n Chapter VIII;~"'P• 7. 
Zii. · Ibid\, pp. 8-9 • 
:; •. Ibid~, -p-. n .. 
4\...;Ibi.d.ai:; pp. 11-12. 
The met~physical hypot~sis of organic intera.ctive pluralism sug-
gests both the dependence and independence of substance. No individual 
shinin~ present is completely independent of other shining presents. 
Only an all-incl-usiv.e Whole could be:independ~nt in tbi.s sense. But the. 
individual shining present is independent substance in its individual 
existence (privacy) and in its activity as efficient cause.1 "Substance, 
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then, may be defined as an interacting system of relatively independent 
substan,ces (for even God cannot be wholly in9-ependent of his _cr·eatur_e~) .u2 
_Substances involved in an interactive system would neces~arily be __ 
active. 11The only empirical activity in the shining. present, as dis ... 
tinguished :ft:om phenomenal change, is the activity of w.i-11. 11 3 Substance, 
then, is volitional activity, efficient cause • 
. 
Personalism is the view to which our thought has led us 
as true of all illuminating absents as well as of all 
shinipg presents.· To put i't o-therwise:, tor any par't~cu­
lar consciouspresent> o-ther-presents are.absents_; blit_for 
'themselves, all absents are presents_; and all constitute 
an interactive system.. This personalistic principle· 
applies 'to matter and en~rgy:, to s~lar systems and values, 
and Sheds ligh-t on the so~called unconscious or sub-
conscious.. ~h.~ personalist can find no p~son for as-
ser-ting a kind ·.of .substance 'to -which experience does not 
testify, and which stands in no coherent relation to 
experience. Substance, then, is not really a·sub-stance, 
but an in-stan,ce~ -it does no't stand-. pelow .experience .. in 
some sub-way of being: it starids revealed in experience 
as active-passive personal unity of con~ciousness. I't is 
experienced efficient cause·.4 · · 
Substance is person.5· "Does the assertion that all being is personal do 
Chapter VIII, p. 13 • 
. , 
full ju~tice to the variety_.af expf'ience?- Or is personalism a forced 
'reduction 1 ·Of the variety in experience?•;l 
Brightman.denies that the criticism has empirical foundationo 
Personalism··11 can be viewed as reductionism only -if experience includes 
·or implies or involves something that is not experience •. If such a view 
is held; it cannot rest its case on experience.tt2 The true reductionist 
is the one who 11 strips ·off the one attribute which is present in all the 
varieties of experience:, and declare~ it non-essential to su.bstance.n:? To 
reduce substance to the qualia of experience is to deny substance, ef-
ficient- cause, and reject 11 the true unity and wholeness of th:e Self • .J+ 
The shining present ·is a substance that is a whole, and just as no· arc ,. ,. 
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can: be removed from a circle and still have a circle, so also 11no part of 
the shining present can ~e :t;'emoved from the unity of personal experience. 1P 
But does not experience suggest a dualism between the conscious and 
the unconscious? .. 
This is, indeed, what is ·provided for in our fundamental ;:; 
epistemic dist.in:Ct-Hm .. of the shining present and the illumi-
nating absent.,. But personalism is the assertion that there 
are not two kinds of substance--one ·present and one absent 
from conscious experience. The distinction is epistemic, 
not ontic or metaphysical.· . There is an immense area of 
reality that is absent from any present 'consciousness, even 
that of God. Bu.t, for personalists, what is absent :from my 
experience· is present, actually or potentially,· in 'other 
experi,ence. The absent is always other experience. • .. .. 
All substance, then~ is some shining present, although 
sP.ining presents· are absent from each other·. There is, 
then, no reason for supposing that there is any unconscious 
+~ 11MetaP,bYsicsa11 Chapter VIII, P• 16. 
~. Ibid. 
)~ Ibici" •. 
4;· Ibid·:· 
5 ~ Ibid., p. 17. 
.. 
. substance; •• ~ But to suppose that there is anything 
wholly unconscious of itself is to~invent a theory that 
violates experience. 
To sum up: substance includes all the variety that 
experience reveals, and all the "other" (absent) experi-· .. 
·. ence which needs to be postulated in order to correlate 
and explain the data of the shining present. Substance 
includes activity and given content of experience in all 
its variety.- All substance· is empirical, ·personal, 
spiritual. But the concept of spiritual or personal 
' substance does not require the mysterious substratum to 
which appeal is often made.l . 
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Metaphysical realism continues to flourish. The chief arguments sup-
porting this point of view 13hould be briefzy described and evaluated. 
First, the spa,.tial character of physical objects, "both as they appear in 
the shining present and as they are believed to exist in the illuminating 
absent112 seems to suggest· 11 an impersonal anti:-mentilis·'bic realism.;,3 The 
discussion of the category of space hinted at the solution of this 
problem. It need only be. added here that 
it is a fact of experience that spatial beings and non-
spatial beings are both present in, and aspects of, the 
unitary personal consciousness that we have ~ailed the 
s}lining~ present; and there is therefore no reason why 
objective space must be imp.E.3f's6nal. Further, the sup-
position of <L "realisti611 space order makes an interacting 
relation between "realistich inateri<U substances and 
co~scious experience mysterious, n~edlessly discontinubu9, 
·and incoher.ent•. Gra:n:ted":that there are ··discontinuities in 
experd.ence:, . that fact does not warrant the manufacture of 
a.ddi tional· lJ.nemp!+ical discontinuities J?.~e th~s~ ·realistic 
substances .4 · ,. . · . 
.. •. ;- .! '· 
II ' ~~.· •• . ., •'14.: 
Another arginnemt; that seems ~o suggest a realistic substance is the 
;f.'act that there ·are objects independent of our wills. There is evidence 
l.····•Metaphysic's~ 11 Chapter VITI., pp. ~9-20 . 
.•. ~ ... . ~., p. ?~· 
-3. Ibil:h \ 
4lt ·.Ibi~"" 
I 
in the shining pr~sent of factors in the -illUminating absent that are 
both independent of and· (sometimes).resistant to our wills. This inde-
pendence and resistance are evidence that something exists indepe;ndently 
of our wills but "no reason at all for .supposing that that 1 somethingt is 
an unconscious 1realistic 1 substance. In fact, it points reasonably to 
the view. that what ·resists our will is another and gre.;~.ter wil1. 111 
. ' 
It is argued .t'ui-ther that, since the objects in the illuminating 
absent do not communicate with us as persons 'do, they are realistic 
substances, rather than persons or the activity of persons. "Although 
they do not co~nicate with us as human persons do, they interact with 
us; and only' as we find signs of their interaction in our shining :present 
do we have any ground f~r belief in their eX:istence."2 These signs of 
interaction may very·well be interpreted as "signals of communication in 
. - . . 3. 
a personal uni verse. 11 The external order may very well be mind without 
being an exact pattern of the human mind •. The interaction of the human 
mind and the external order suggests ·that that order may well be signals 
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from other mind. 'lhe reports of the mystics of a higher order of communi-
cation suggest that 1'in no case does the absence of. verbal response from 
... 
the illuminating absent prove it to be realistic substance. It indicates 
only a super~uman·r~ality."4 
Some. realists as·sert that objects are unspiritual .. and hence im-
. ·. . . . 
per~?onarJ But there is an ambiguity involved in the definition of 
.· 
:;imper~onal •.. 
When we say 11impersonal, 11 what we actually experience is 
the impartial uniformity of certain, events in our experi-
ence-•uniform. sequences of phenomenal cause that plays no 
favorites and permits no arbitrary deviations. The. im-
personal ~pect of being, then, is its law-abiding. charac-
ter-in the realm of nature. All idealists recognize this, 
·and use it as a basis for showing the rationality of o~ 
jective mind. Iht there is no ground for asserting that 
the uimpersonaln regularity of law.in· experience entails 
an "impersonaltt--unconscious, unwilling, unthinking real-
istic substance as its cause.. The supposed realistic · 
argument here rests on a confusion of ~alue with substance 
and an ambiguity in the meaning of "impersonal.nl 
The nee-realist asserts that the residue of analysis proves a kind 
of realism. Ana~sis is considered the o~ sound method of discovering 
tl;'Uth. Analysis leads ultimately to simple entities and. their relations, 
entities that are neither physical nor mental, but neutral. But, if .this 
is .true:, both realistic a.:llld spiritual substance are destroyed, leaving .no 
explanation of the activity or relations~p of the neutral entities-. only 
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mystery. 2 What this argument real~ shows ~s not any realistic substance, 
but rather that exclusive use of analysis makes exp·erience unintelligible. 
Santayana r s; eonoepi;,ion7 of "animal faith" · s,_ggests · 'that -i.t ·is· in.;. 
stinctive to believe in impersonal-matter. But all that instinct gives, 
whatever i.t :Ls., is .the feeling that. there is something out: there· not my';_. 
self. It indicates orily 11that there is an illuminating absent, not what 
it is .• tt3 The same could be said concerning the argument· that ·intuition 
proves req.lism. Intuition covers all immediate experience. it may refer 
:to. .a sud~en. i·As.ight. But it cannot be argued that intuition is the 
.... . .-
I~ .11Met$.physics, n Chapter VIII, p. 26. 
2. J:bici~~ pp. 26-27. 
3• Ibid., P• 28. 
-
·. • .. ,•• 
,, ; ' ···. ·.· 
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source of our lmowledge of substance because the intuition of one man 
conflicts with that of another.. liEvery int •tion of immediate experience 
does witness _to a fact; but no intuition of LlY phi~osophical th~~ony de-
' , 
fining situations in the illuminating absent can do more than suggest an 
hypothesis that requires critical examinatio .u1 In the discussion of a 
criterion' of truth, 2 it ·was shown that neither instinct nor intuition 
could oe trusted as the measure of any hypot esis. 
A furth~r argument suggests that realis is a presupposition of 
experimental method. But experimentation c be carried on quite irre~ 
~pective ~! metaphysical theory, the experimlntalist being, possibly, an 
idealist, a neo-realist, or a metaphysical s eptic. The fact that ~a _., 
realistic view of substance is consistent w· ;h experlmentel;l method1t~ does 
not in the slightest pro~e ~hat. It it should ~e- ;r-e~,arded as necessary 9 or· 
preferab~e to a personalist~c ~ew of substdnce.lt4 · · ··.· 
An argument from ~pist.emology claims tJat the lmowing situation. in-
1 . :· 
volves realistic substance. Bdghtman summarizes the realistic argument·,. 
as follows: 
The object is· said to be other· than and external to the ,. 
knowing process. Therefore it does not depend on being 
known •. Therefore it is not only .. in· ependent of the mind 
that knows it; it is independent' oflall mind. The object, .5 
. therefore, is som.e sor'j:, of. realisti[ .substance (or entity).. ,. 
fut one cannot argue from epistemology to mrtaphysics for thr.ee rea.sons: 
. First,_,if all knowledge requires rea.J.istic substances as 
1. "Metaphysics, 11 Chapter VIII, p. 29. 
-2;;; Pages· 3.5-3!l.' 
3, llMetaphysics~" Chapter VII~~ p. 30. 
4'1 . Ibid1 ,. . .. .5~1 -Ibi~," . _; 
objects, thQD. a mind can never be known ••• Secondly, 
epistemic dualism is ••• compatible, as epistemology, 
with arry metaphysics which admits knowledge at all. 
Thirdly, personAlists do not contend that substance is 
merely. knowledge; substance "i:s efficient cause_, and 
efficient cause is will, as distinguished from knowledge. 
There is, then, no cogency in the contentien that real.;. 
istic substances are required b.1 the knowledge situation!l 
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A !inal realistic argument accuses idealism of being anthropomorphic. 
This, ~ightman maintains, is a question-begging argument in that it pre-
supposes "that we lmow in advance that objective reality has nothing in 
' 2 
c?mmon with human experience. 11 By the same token this assumption wou~-
preclude the hypotheses that the real is spatial, temporal, mathematical, 
. . ;-
or ~ohe:rent as well as consciou~ and purposive) 
Brightman's theory o! substance may be summarized with the wo;r>ds 
~ ' .. ~· ... : .. ~ . . 
"substance is person," not in the sense that every physical object is a 
person, but rather ttsubstance is person, B:s efficient final cause, in a 
·complex unity of active consciousness •. Arry other concept of substance is 
' ' ' ~ 
unverifiable_ i~ ~rinciple and unempirical. tt4 
•. ~·. :' f ; 
Substance, then, is person or self, if we are to be guided 
: .in our thinking by the facts of experience rather than b.1 
unverifiable concepts of a substance that can never be 
present·: in any -experience. The -complete concept of sub-
stance and the.c0mplete concept of person are identical, 
althou.gh in :substance the stress· is laid on volitienal~ 
:free, final, causal efficacy of persons.5 ·· 
.... ,. 
As personal causal efficacy, substance is purposive. Brightman d:oes 
· . ./'" 
not treat purpose as a separate category "partly because to do so would 
Chapter VITI, P• 31 • 
i •• 
.· 
be to treat it ~oo abstractly, bht chiefly beca-g.s~. ;t.t is taken as ea-
. . ' ·1 
sential to the definition of both cause .and; substance•·" 'fb,e theses 
suggested are.~ 
All caus.~ is purposive,; all substance is purpo.sive. This 
.does not mean that cause and purpose or su'Qstance and ~ ., 
purpose are synonymous. What it means is that purpose is 
an es~ential and integral aspect of ev~ ~fficient cause 
and of every substance-namely, of every person. 2 
iii. From the Categories to the R~a.l.Ins of Being .. 
Earlier in the chapter3_ it was shown that the categories ·are rel.a-
tive .to the specific realm or realms of being f+'<;>m which ~ey are derived. 
..... . :.' 
and to which they applyi. Brightman makes no pretension that the dis-
...• 
cussion of the q~tegories is in. any sense COJ!lplete-. 11A selection of the 
·categor:).es most essenti.al to scientific and philosophical thought _has 
;.1 
been n~cessitated by the limits of space.n4 ·Acknowledging his indebted-:-
. . . ..~ 
ness to Sfi,.IltB\Y"ana for the term. 11reallqs of being;," ,he indicates that "a 
' . . .. o:o,fl: . . . . . . ' .• 
more adequate view .of_ the meaning of. exp~~ence may now be obtained by 
shifting the poi:Q.ji o:f yj_ew ,from a consideration of the categories to a 
consideratioi). .of ~~e r~s .. ot beil;l.g;··,l5. ~~ realms selec:bed for investi-
gation ·nar.e choseh·b~cause of 'thci.F relevance_·-~~ the met~~hy~i~~~ enter-
6 .~.:.-. 
prise. 11 · .• : 
•' 
·.· 
. . . . . . .. ~ .... •' -~ .. 
1 •. "Meta.pnysics," Chapter VIII,. p. 45. 
· 2~•: Ibid~· ' . . . · · 
... ... "·~·. 
S~.'. Page. ·97. 
~:. "ll'i~t.a:physics," Chapter VIII, p. 60. 
~~:.lbic4· see ·ci.lso An Introduction to Pnilosophy, P• 99. 
6v/Ibid~ , ·, .... · . · 
.... ............_ . 
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4.- The Relevant, Realms of Being: The EVidence 
firl.losopl;ly seeks to understand experience considered in its to:tality. 
So far the. emphasis in this chapter has been the nature_ of the .~pistemic 
process and the fundamental problems involved -in the way in which our 
ideas. refer to their objects. Knowledge of the ep:bst8mic process tells 
. ~ . ~-
one little about the nature of reality as such. Indeed, one could know 
an object without under.standi.ng the ·epistemie process involved in the 
kn,owing. fut knowledge of any object presupposes not only an epistemic 
process in a knower but also. an existent object, that is thought to be 
. . 
known.; Before philosophy can claim a world vi-ew it must consider ·th-e 
basic types or realms of ba:ing that are involved ·in a world vi9W4· . 
.. 
Brightinan enumerates four such types of being: physical things, uni-
.· ' l 
versals and particulars, values,· and consciousness-. Each of these, 1Vh'Sn 
interpreted, becom~~·;~vidence for a c·ertain world view. . .•. 
'. 
i. Physi.cal Things 
·. Bri'~_ghtman uses physical things as a starting point for metaphysics. 
Metaphysics,· as defined before; is th..e study of what is really real.~ 
Physical things are "those objects in the system of space and time by 
means of which.we communicate with each other. 112 This definition is 
1, 
mea,nt to include every object in the so-called public world of space and 
-t~e, .. and- to ... ~clude every object th9-t is not publim. Hence, an ideal 
would not _be .z. eferred to as a physical object because it cannot be 
·'~, '•!,..· 
1~· . .An Introduction to Philosophy, .pp. -10l-222..-. 1•MetaphySics, u Chap. IX-lli. 
~-~ !bid., p. 103. . 
·!-.' 
located anywhere in particular .. 1 A dreamwobj ecti although particularized 
spatially and temporally, is not physical because it is not public. 2 "An 
··t" '! 
onion of my fancy cannot be shown to my neighbor and brings no tears to 
his eyes.n3 Thought may refer to other types o.f being, as indicated 
earlier, but they are to be distinguished .from• physical things b~cause 
.; .... 
they are not particularized in a public world o.f space q.nd time. (But it 
should be noted'here that 11the public .. world is not the world o.f sense-
·data or o.f any other c;lata as experienc!rl, but rather it is the world o.f 
objects signified, the world o.f common.meanings and purposes."4 The 
.( 
... ~ ' 
empirical.basis o~ knowledge, the datum self, is narrow. Datum.selves do 
not ".flow togethertt· but they do. "think and purpose together about the 
same :w:orld. 115 ·:Ltf.d.s particularization in this co~~n world that "~i¢-
.fies what are defined as physical qbjeots~) 
•' II ' .. 
Physical things .for the naiye realis~, that is, the man whose mind 
has. ·not been trained in philosophy, are a.s· they .appear to be. 
n 
The naive 
realist takes the report o.f his senses as the truth about things. Hence, 
.for him a brick is just what it appears to be. Yfuen it is pointed out 
.. •, 
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that things .appear differently ,under different conditions, such as a. 
stick appearing to be bent where ii.t penetrates the sur.f'ace of the water, 
he sees _the problem and feels less certain o;f ·,his position~ To .the color-
blind eye; colors appear dif.ferentJ;y. than to the normal eye. The .question 
then arises,. just who has the normal senses and just.,what are the normal 
·; . 
1. An Introduction to Philosophy, P• 103. 
2:~.:. Ibia~·· · ·· · : · · 
3 ~ nifci~ : ' " 4 .•.. "The· Dialectib ·of Religi·ous· Experience;" P• 561. 
5~· IOid. 
.. , 
condition.s that.are necessary t~ have the truth .~:qout a physical thing? 
. Naive realism. then gives way to science. 
Like the naive realist, the scientist begins with appearances~ bl+t 
he very quickly discovers through care£ul experimenta~on.and observation 
. . 
that the brick is not really what it appears te •be. It appears to be a 
heavy lump o£ inert stuf.f. .Actually it is not that at all. 
. I . 
The physicist says: .. things ·are indeed such as to produce 
certain sensations in us, but the thing is wholly unlike 
the sensation that it produces, although its existence 
can be deduced £rom sensations (plus epistemological h:y--
potheses). Physical sound and color are as di££erent 
£rom psychological sound and color as the pleasure that 
arises £rom eating a good beefst~ak is £rom the,appearance 
o£ ,the steak to the eye.l ... 
The physicist discovers that the brick is composed o£ countless atoms, 
.. 
and that the atoms are composed of electrons, protons, and neutrons which 
£orm a complex energy system. The electrons carry a negative charge, the 
protons a positive charge, and the neutrons no charge at all., Though 
these £arm a complex energy system; beyond tha~ they remain ('as to their 
natures) the unexplained a b c 1s o£ physics. 
"The philosopher is unwi.lling to leave the prob).em where the scien-
tist properly leaves it. 112 The philosopher may utilize one o£ tvy-o as-
sential m..ethodological approaches, the analytic or the sy;noptic. Each o£ 
these has been ddi'ined. 3 The anal:ys:t a·sserts . that understa.pding depend~· 
... 
u,pon the process of analysis, or bre~ii;lg down ~tp the co:n:~tituent·, 
elements; the synoptist asserts that understanding requires observation 
·<i: A. Philosophy of Religion, ·:p·~ .ioa~· .. 
2" . .An."·IIttroduction to Philosophy, p. 110. 
3.~. Chapter II. ·. · · 
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,•' 
of the whole, and observati-on of the parts in relation tG the propertieS' 
of the whole. But neither the analyst nor the synoptist uses his method 
as oom.pletely exclusive of the other. Their difference is partly one o·f 
emphasis. The analyst grants that a complete analysis includes the analy.-
sis of properties belonging to wholes as well as properties belonging ts 
parts. The synoptist, by the same token, grants that his synopsis is not 
reached apart from the work of analysis. ttYet the difference of emphasis 
is very :important and issues in different interpretatiens of reality.ttl 
The different interpretations of reality come about in this w~. The 
analyst, following his basic method, breaks down his 0bject 0f tnterest 
into its most basic constituent parts, and then interJ!!lrets .,the whole of 
.·~ 
which this part is a part in te:rms of the par'lii. His method is such that 
he comes to some sort of ltentitytt or ltelementtt conclusion.. Oonoeivabl:y 
this entity may be one o.f three basic :natures: matter, mind, or neither. 
The advances of science would deny the interpretation.of Demoeritus, the 
lump· theory. Matter is, as seen on the preceding page, a complex electric 
energy sY"stem. The nature of the electron remains unknown. If there is 
a "particle'' involved in this energy system, its nature is unknown. But 
there is little evidence, for the analyst, that this energy is mental • 
• So he may conclude, with the imalytieal neo-reallst, that the basic entity 
of reality is neatral, B.either physical nor mental. "When these entities 
are grouped in certain ·relations they are physical thi:ngs; when related 
in a specific way to :a human organism, they may be called sta:tes of 
oonsciousness.tt2 
1. An Introduction to Philosophy, P• 113. 
2. Ibid., P• 112. 
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· •. As synoptist, <Brightman feels that .the pa.rt.>must be understood in 
terms .of the·whole, the lower in ·t.erms .of the higher• . He agrees th:at 
when a· physical. thing.is observed SS'lJlething is really there. Furth~, he 
agrees ~ th all scientists and .. philosophers "that an observed physical 
thing is nothing ultimate.••fo He accepts th:e findings of science con- :-;, ·.·. 
earning the structur~ of the complex electric·. energy .system., but he co;mes 
·. to a different .conclusion about the nature of physical things. 
Even· the most modern., science usually speaks of an electron 
as a charged 11particle.u The status of the particle_is,_ 
·· however;, •<D.bscare:a. Either it' does work and· is tb.r.t>ugh and 
through active, or it does no work and so is superfluous. 
If the particle performs no function other than·to be a 
' bearer of energy, it is otiose. How can it bear or carry 
energy withoUit doi~g any wor~? How could there be a .real 
particle anywhere that made no difference anywhere else? 
·The particle may be a crutch to the imagination; it is 
only a stumbling-block to the understanding. All the work 
done by 11matter 11• is energy; the particle makes no differ,.. · 
ence. Its presence adds nothing; its absence would not be 
noticed.. Such an entity cannot be sai.d to ~;tong in the 
system of nature. 2 . · 
For several reasons Brightman is led to believe that the actirlty 
.. • ? 
here described is o:f the nature of mind. 
The physical changes of things are in accordance With 
laws that can be stated mathematica+,ly·.; .. Thta. activity. 
is rational in the sense that mind' can know it and mind 
finds order in it •. It·is .. an intera'0ting system .that 
organizes many elements into rational wholes so as to 
realize eriP.s, just as mind' dc:ies-.3 .. . . 
-~· 
. 
'-4··· 
Although the sys:bem o:f physical things "is active .'like· a mind;' ~· . 
changes like a ··mind; is coherent anQ. rational like a mind, n4 .and such . 
. ' 
:-~· ~ 
.].,.,;, .An Intl:iodu-.ction to Philosophy;, p. 118 • 
. 2. Ibid., p. J.l9. 
·.~-~·Ibid;,_., p~ 120~ 
4'.- .. ~·ft.· .· ,· 
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that mind can use .j.t, ltit would be over-hasty to conclude that ultimate 
reality is therefor_e a mind.n1 Before such a synopti? conclu~ion can be 
reached the other types of reality or rea.Jms of being need to be examined. 
ii.. Universals and Particulars 
A second type of being to which our ideas refer may be called the 
"universal" as contrasted with the 11particular.u The par~:i~lar is a 
specific individual object, and can be located specifically in space and 
time. It can be immediately perceived and hence is usually referred to 
.. 
as concrete (Hegel to the contrary). A physical thing, as descriped, is 
a particular. A universal cannot be located in space and time. It is 
not :immediaiely perceived and hen.ce. is usually ref.erred to as abstract., 
11A particular 2 is a sirigle member of a:ny class," (a c1ass being 11the 
collection of e~ti ties defined by any concept, n.3 an entity being· 11what-
ever may be,talked about:or mentioned, ••• a colorless word for object,n4 
and a concept being !IDY word or group of words '1that defines what is 
common to the objects to which it ~pp).i_e.stt) .5 liA. unive:rsal is what 
all members of a class have in .c.ommon."6 "'fhus, this pin on the desk is 
slender, :t:leJP.ble,. a.Pd ·_pointed. It is individual and concrete.. But what 
is slenderness, flexibility, or pointedness apart from a:ny individual 
object that is so described? Do these universals exist as such? 
One of the debates of philosophy that has endured thiough the;· ages 
to Philosophy, p. 120 • 
has;·been the relationship between univ~sals and particulars. Plato ·: 
believed' that the universals were real apart from particulars; Aristotle 
found them to exist only ir;t particu:Lar. objects. The nominalist, who 
holds with .Aristotle: that universals are only names, argues that "uni-
' ' 
ve~sals derive their meaning from particulars.«1 The realist, who holds 
with Plato that universals are real apart from individual demonstration, 
argues that one thinks in universals. One could never lmow the universal 
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"chair 11 if there did not exist some universal that was more than and sepa-
rate from this or that or all particular chairs. The realist argues 
further, that "if you analyze the particular, you come upon the uni-
- 2 . ' 
versal." Matter is seen to be electrons and protons •. .All electrons 
·,,· 
have the same· properties., The neo-realisj:., carrying the anal.ysis even 
further, concludes that the space occupied by the electron is composed 
of mathematical points which are true universals, neutral entities.3 To 
solve the problem the philosopher must ·go beyond either of these opposing 
positions. 
Brightman works out a careful study of the ve1ationship between 
universals and particulars.4 He begins by suggesting 
that universals are all-words or the referent$ of those · 
woros, while particulars are this-words or their referents. 
All-words are words (i.e. terms) that refer to all entities 
of the kind that the word means; this-words are words. that 
refer to a single entity.5 
1..' ·Ari lritr'od.uction to Philosophy, p. 131. 
2·;.. Ibid·., p. 133. ~· 
3·•-- r'brtr .. ~ .. . . 
41i~ "Universals· 8.lad Particulars," The Philosophical Forum, 1(1943), 3-10. 
S:ii.Ibid:.,:;, 1>'.: 3.; .:·. 
'·· 
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Universals and particulars are words and referents of those words. "The 
' 
referents are beings o;f some kind. 111 The question then is: What ldnd o£ 
being have universals and particulars? or to wh~t kind of being do they 
belong? What is the metaphysics o;f universals and particulars? 
One seems to begin with particulars, but .. aotually one does not. "A 
particular could not be recognized as a particular unless it was simul-
. ta.neousl:y recognized as belonging to. something else. 112 Every word refers 
to other words. Even every this-word refers beyond itself. To say 
"this chair11 is to use a word that refers to other chairs. Thus we do 
not start either subjectiyely or objectively with bare particulars,: · 
.. Subjectively, .we start with the vague Gestalt.;which is our 
total field of consciousness, and then pick out its parts 
and its implications. Objectively. we start with what pewey 
calls Ita, problematic situation, u or at least with the a-
.wareness that every possible referent short of total reM 
ality has an environment.3 
., 
~ben set up as an hypothesis the concept of particularity has sever-
al meaningful aspects.4 First, it refers to some specific object of 
' . ~ 
oonsoiousneaa that may or may not be located in spaoeJ but is located in 
time, that is, oooura at a specific time. Secondly" 11all particulars 
ooou:r in a context and are selected out from that context by analysis ,uS 
A. sensation is an example. ~ird~, whether or not an object is a-par-
ticular or a universal depends upon the purpose of the thinking mind. An 
objeo.t becomes a this-object onlzy' when regarded from 11 thia" point of view, 
I 1 I ~ I 
•, 
l,, 11Univ.ereals ··a,nq, Particulars," P• 4. 
2.; lbi'd, ' 
), n;rd.,. P•· _$,. 
4 •. rsra: •.. s.-rs:s. 
I' •\ 
arid by- the same token, may become .universal throUgh the purpose of 
·thought•· Fourthly; particulars may be situations-experienced or situ-
ations-believed-in. Fifthly, particulars may transcend sens"e experience; 
they are not restricted to the phenomena of sense. One may .refer to a 
specific purpose as well as a specific pencil.· Sixthly_, all particu.lars 
involve universals, or are instances of universals. Absolute particu-" .. 
larity is epistemologically impossible. What then .are the universals .... 
that force themselves upon particulars? 
12.3 
Universals, as has been shown_,. are 11either all-words-,or all-objects.nl 
·There are essentially three Kinds -of universals, or llkinds of :function 
that an all-word can p~rform. 112 First, they are class-terms';' the pure 
abstract universal such as redness, sq~<;Lreness, smoothness,_ etce· ~.t:: ... 
this book;. Secondly, 11universals may be laws. 11 .3 Whereas class .terms 
apply to homogeneous particulars the universal in tJ;Us second sense 
organizes heterogeneous particulars_, having "reference to all objects 
correlated in accord rlth ~ d~fined pattern. 114 Thirdly_, a universal may 
·.· 
ref;er to a whole as well as to a class or law. 
A whole, a Gestalt, a structure, an organiSm., or an indi-
vidual (to use roughly synonymous terms) is a complex· 
organization of interdependent parts, which together 
constitute a unity With properties of its own, not de-
fined by the parts. A whole in this sense is a universal 
because it is an all-situation., You do not have a whole ', 
unless you have all its parts; anything less than aJ..l o:f 
it, or at least all that is essential to it, is not the 
whole. A universal, then is found in a complete indi-
vidual. Just as we found particulars to be universals, 
. ...,._ \-
~,·· h-(Jn:i;vers.aJ..s.. and Particulars, n p. 6. 
2.~: IbicJ... . 
,3..""'Ibiq., p. 7. 
4. 'Ibid. 
now we find a universal to be a particulara This is what 
Hegel was taJlting about when he spoke of the concrete uni-
versal.l · '· 
The first two kinds of universal are more and less abstract re-
spectively. The last is more or less concrete, concreteness being a 
mat.ter of degree. Se:veral characteristics distinguish the abstract from 
the concrete universals. Abstract universals are, first, omnitemporaJ., 
valid for all time if valid at all~ They are, secondly, not discovered 
by analyzing the given, as are particulars, but require a g~neralizing 
act of the mind.. Thirdly, 11abstract universals, like particulars, are 
2 determined and defined by purpose, .. namely_, the purpose to intef:!.d ~.~~ 
Because of their very nature, abstract universals, fourthly, "can never 
be innnanent in an experienced situation as particulars can be. ~hey are 
always situations-believed-in, that is,. referents of purposive. ~ought. 113 
Fifthly_, abstract universals 11may apply either to sense dp.ta or to any 
other type of mentionable, such as numbers, ideas, ideals, likenesses and 
differences, etc.n4 .And ~ixthly, llabstract uiu.versala, taken subjective-
ly, are all-words; and every all word as experienced is a particular 
fact.n5 Hence, the particular infects .the uni.versa~ as surely as the 
universal infects the particular. llThe point of View of abstract uni-
versals is just as impossible a stopping place for thought as is the 
point of View of abstract particulars.n6 
l. 11Universa.ls and Particulars," Po 7• 
2 .• Ibid., P•. 8.. . 
3. l:bid.) 
4. Ibid. 
5. ~bi~. 6 ... bid. 
-
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In contrast ;with ~ abstract universal,, a concrete universal;- that 
is, na complex whole which consists of parts and of properties of the 
whole not defined by.the parts,"1 may. be. complete at any given time, 
though more. than likely it will be developmental.- Further, a concrete 
universal 11cannot. be. discovered by mere analysis or generalization; it 
can be fouJ;l.d only by. intuition or by creative imagination (hypothesis).n2 
It embodies purpose, may be a situatinn-experienced or a situation-
believed-in, may be relatively homogeneous-or heterogeneous. Though 
u~ually the parts ¥'e not: identical, they must ~~ similar enough to be-
long to one.concrete universal • 
.A !.static concrete un:tyersal, like a painting, may b~. a 
this-fact (plus an all-judgment); but a temporal and 
dynamic concrete universal requires many this·'s, and an 
all-judgment that take~ account of memory, imagination, 
synopsis,··ahd growth, ~swell ~s of the .present thiso 
The concrete univefsal, as has been shown from several 
points. of view, is a particular that includes universals 
and a universal that includes particulars; and it is the 
concrete that giv~s.meaning to all abstracts as tAe source 
Whence they are derived and as the purpose which organizes 
and criticizes them.3 
. ·. From this st'\ldy several tentative .conclusions follow. First, nuni,... 
versals and pa.:r.:ticulars, although logically distinguishable, are not 
metaphysically ~stinct entities.~14 · Were they metaphysically di;stinct 
they could never interpenetrate and interrelate as experience proves that 
they do. .Secondly, the disttnction between universals and particulars in 
tP..e. wind .11.5cs .. 8:. _distinction of the purpose of thought to universalize or 
::- I • 
1:.. "Universals and Particulars, u p. 8. 
a .•. rbici., P· 9. 
3 .•. Ibid: •. · . 
J+ •. Ibid •. 
·" ' 
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.t. 
to particularize.' No meaning attaches to this or all apart from the· · · 
puJ?pose of :.thought.n1 Thirdly, 
only in a world of concrete universals can u..'rliversals and·· ... 
particulars both be at home. In such a universe the dis-
tinction between particulars and universals is· one of 
levels, or poi~ts of view, or of r~lative dialectical 
completeness. The full conjoint meaning of universality 
and particularity is expressed in a realm of minds_, which 
are the most inclusive and adequate of concre"t1e universalso.n2 ·t· 
For Brightman,·:the solution to the problem of relating the univ·ersal 
and the particular is found in what Hegelians call ;the "conorete uni-
versal,tt "a univ·ersal that is the meaning and soul of the particulars,·a 
particular that is universalizingo n3 
Personal rational consciousness /JiJ indeed :a universal-
izing particular; that is, mind is a concrete individual, 
'one function ·of which is to grasp the meaning 'of uni-
vers~~; and univer,sals are. the purpose· of mind to think 
in univevsal terms•4. · ·. · · · · 
The universal struet~e of thought suggests the solution for Brightman. 
·.: .~ 
PersonaliSm finds roam both for particular facts and for 
universals, for it :j_s·the natlire of mind to be an indi-
vidual that-universalizes. Mind experiences particulars 
and relates them to·laws. If all that is--physical things, 
· universaJ!s and particulars·· and values-be of ·'the nature of 
mind, it is then possible that universals are true of 
reality; for they refer to other mind or minds functioning 
rationally as mine f1,11?-ctions, yet also individual as mine 
is• Universals then are 'r'eal;· but they are real only in 
and for particular minds.; This result, important as it is, 
must ·he held tentatively until·we have examined both valu'es 
and persons.5 
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(At this point there should appear a note on essences. In the realms 
. , ........ 
1.· 11Universals and Particulars, 11 p. 9. 
2 .• Ibid .. , P• '10. . 
3-~.~roduc-t-ion to Philosophy, P• 135· 
4<i I'bi9: .. , p. l;,6. 
5;tr.lbi~· .. , p. 138. 
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of bei·:ni Brightman distinguishes the precategorial and the non-ca~egorial 
from the categorial~ The shining present he considers precategorial in 
that it is the logical and epistemic source of all the categories.1 And 
in the shining present itself there is a realm. that might well be de-
scribed as non-categorial, the realm of essence. An essence is 
a:ny quale or experienced content or quality~ whether simple 
or complex (that is, whether atomistic or Gestalt-like), 
·considered apart from its relations to the rest of experi-
ence and apart from activity of a:rry kind. It is both im-
mediate and abstract. u2 
Essences are lithe Slmplest of beings-... terms Without relations~ 113 
As precategorial1 essences are both pre-universal and pre-particular. 
They are. ?eutral ·to the distinc±.ion bec<:!.USe universals and particulars in-
valve relations, as -was shown above. Further.s> they have no existence 
apart from som17 shining present. 11They belong to the unity of conscious-
ness and have no other existence or function of any sort.s> except as inrter-
relating selves 'With each other. u4 This conception of· essences substanti-
ates the suggested relationship b~tween universals and particulars as 
indicated above., No essences ttare i:nhe:rently and exclusive1.y universal 
or i:nher ently a:n.d . exclusively particular. U ni versa.li t.r and particularity 
are points of view from which experience is viewed or interpreted by 
persons. 115) 
~' ....... .. 
1. "Metaphysics," Chapter IX. This is a chapter on 11 the realm of essence 11 
·· the· second· section of whieh is particularly significant here. 
2:. Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
3., Ibid._, Po 3. 4:· m·~7 P·· n·: 
5~· Ibi:d;;·p;·1.2~ · 
:.t·~~ .. ...... 
iii. Values .. i· 
An empiricai approach to the study of value, in so far as it is 
ev:Ldence for some specific world view, should naturally begin with the 
fact of value experience. This fact is indisputable.1 The experience of 
value is just as certain _q.s ·is the e;xperience'of consciousness .. But just 
as certain as either is the experience of conflicting values... This con-
flict in the life of value experience demands a careful study of the 
meaning, the soope, and the implications of the experience of value .. 
The study ·of the theory of value ·is called axiology. As·-the compre'-
l28 
hensive investigation·<Of value experience, a:ti.ology includes Btpsychology:, · · 
anthropology, history, economics--all the social sciences--as well as the 
arts, and man's ·moral and religious experiences~~2 But as a more re-. 
stricted philosophical stud-r, aid.ology includes "general theory of value, 
logic, ethics, aesthetics, and philosophy of religion; and:it profound~ 
affects epistemology and metaphysics •".3 Some of the more fundamental 
questions ·that are relevant to the present study aret What are the steps 
in· value theory? What actuall~Y' happens in ·consciousness during a value 
e:x:perience?4 Can exPe~iences o( value be ·classified-:ahd even evaluated? 
What can be said of the metaphysical reality of value? In the discussion 
that follows, each of these will be answered. 
Ther!=l are essentially three steps in value theory. WTbe first step 
1~. IIV,alu,e.s1 ~.deal~.; Norms, and E:x:i.stence9 11 Philosophical and Ph~nomeno-
., l:o~cal Research, 4(1943), 221. 
2~: :An~ntroduction to PhilosophY:, P• 141 .. 
3 .• Ibid,. . . 
4 ;· !bid :· ;:· ·. 14;3 • 
in value theory is empirical, phenomenological observation of our own 
value-claims and of reports about the value-claims of others •111 F.or 
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meaningful interpretation, each of tQ.:e two ingr·ed.ients, namely, the intro-
spective phenomenological observation and the communication of the results 
of such observation, requir~s ~aref\11 definition of the terms involved. 
Bef'ore one can think clearly or communicate adequateJ:y. about value ex.peJ:..-1.-
ence,. he must establish a language, a terminology, describing the various 
aspects of the tot~l experience of value. For example, aQY experience 
that is appreciated is a value experience. 01VaJ.ue means,whatever is · 
actualJ:y liked, prized, esteemed, desired, approved, or enjoyed b,y anyoD? 
at any time. 112 .As experienced, it is an actual value; as anticipated it 
is ~-·potential value.3 The term empirical value "expresses the fac'b.,that 
values actually occur in experience."4 The term value-claim 11expresses 
the f'act that. accompanying every value there is the e.xplici t or i.Ip.plici t 
,., 
claim that· the value now f'elt is· a ~ue value. 01 -=' Appa.Tent value "empha-
siz~s th~ possibility of doubt about our va~ue-claims and the need of 
investigat.ing them.n6 
: Careful observation of the dual aspect of this fi."l:'st step in value 
theory indicates that there are various kinds of value experiences. 
These types .of value experiences may be clas.sified into a table of values, 
though .too much importance should not be attached to t)ae classification 
.. :··~ .,·., .. ·. . .. .. .. . ... 
~. '~Values, Ideals~ Norms.? and E.x:istence, 11 p. 221. 
2~ :A Philosophy of· !teligion, .. p. 8.§. See also 11Metapbysics, 11 Chapter XI. 
3_, 'Ibid~- · ... .. :• 
4~ "Ibid;·;· ·p.· .-9I;· 
5., 'Ibid,-t PE.~- 91-92. See also "Metaphysics, n Chapter XI, p. 12. 
6~ ~-., p. 92. 
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its-elf .. ,. First there is the contrast between the .intr:i,nsic and the instru-
mental values. Any experience that, is appr.eciated as an end. i:b. and 9f 
itself is called an. intrinsic value _experience. Anything that is appreci-
~ted primarily _because of the ~eriemce it leads te ;is called an instru.-
mental value experience. Music. and money, respecti vel.y::> are good examples 
of intrinsic and instrumental values. It should be noted also that all 
. . ;~- . .. . . 
intr;insic values are instrum.ental~ but, of course_1 not all instrumental 
values are intrinsic. 
Secondly, ~ere are values which by :\:iheir very natUl"e are transient. 
Good ~ealth and_wealth~may be ve:,r transi~nt.+ In pontrast, there are 
values ldth the quality of permanence. nNothing, save my own disloyalty, 
need ever separate me fr9m truth and goo~ess, l;leauty and religion. 112 
Thirdly,_ theJ;'e.are values which may be classified as universJill in 
' M: <f •• 0 0 
that nthe _possession of them by one person makes it easier for others to 
possess them.."3 The permanent va;Lues of goodness, truth, beau,t;y., -=and .•. 
holiness would here apply" O~her.v~lues are exclusive, in that possession 
.. ., 
by .ope may exclude_~ossession by another. The latter classification would 
apply to ttall _values that depend on the possession of mq.terial things."~ 
A further:_ plassi.fica:t;ion is possible among the_ intrinsic Vfl.lu~s, that 
of hi,gher and lower~_5 The lower group is referred to as 11low~" IVbecause 
its valu_e_s are narroyver, more partial. than the ·1higb.er 9 ones; they include 
a sm~_l,_e_r __ area of value experience, and are more dependent on other values 
.• 
.. ·· .. : .·.:: .. , .... :. ·;. ,· 
for~·their 6Wn· worth.ul·. The 1ower intrinsic values are bodily values, 
"the enjoyment in consciousness iOf the well~being resulting from satis-. 
factory bodily functioning> 112 recreational values coming from refreshing 
~sement~ work values derived from creative employment, and social 
values derived from 11 association, co~peration, or sharing.n~ 
The higher group is referred to. as "higher" ttbecause its values are 
brc;>ader, . more inclusive of experienc~ as a whole, ":more independent, and 
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more coherent. 114 The higher intrinsic values include the intellect.ual, 
"experiences of truth-loving and truth-f;Lmding, 115 the es.thetic, . including 
11not only the beautiful, but the sublime,. the tragic, the c~c, and many 
other gradations, n6 the character, including both Uthe experience of ~ 
gooc;i wi~l, {.i.nf/ the conscious choice o:f what is believed right and best, ,7 
r . 
1. A :.Oilosopht of Religion, pp. 95-96. 
2. Ib~d., P• 9 • . 
3. Ibid.;. P• 97. It should be noted here that in the :first edition o:f 
his Introduction to Philosophy, Brightman plac.es the social values in 
the 1*lower11 group maintaining that. "the value o:f association is de-
pendent on the presence of the higher values. It is questionable 
.whether there is any intrinsic value Yfhatever in social relations from 
which truth, beauty, goodness, and religic;>:p. are· lacking. At any rate, 
mere association, mere co~eration or personal loyalty, without regard 
to the value of what is being realized through association, has very 
meager va:l;ue .. " (p.l46) But in his Philosophy of Religion, he plac~s .. the 
social values among the higher values; recognizing a change o:f vi'e;w, 
and maintaining ;in defense that "many a life's most highly prized 
values can be experienced only thus; and social values should be called 
'higher' if only becp.use they embody the WQrth of personality. Every 
true value is enharic.ed when experienced as a social value. 11 (p.97) But 
in the second edition o:f the :Introduction to Philosophy_, the passage 
(p.l49) is identical with the :first edition, not acknowledging the 
. change-of view,ip.dicated in the Philosophy of Religion. 
4~ Ibid~ · . 
5. Ibid~, p. 99~ See also .An I~troP.ucti,on to Philosophy, p. 164. 
6 .• ·Ibid~, · p ~ 98 ~ See also' An.- Introduction to Philosophy, p •. 165. 
7 .. :Ibid.,, p,. 97 ., See also .An Introduction to Philosophy, PP• 166-168. 
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and!the -religious),1 "experienced when man takes an attitude toward value 
2 
experience as a whole and toward its dependence on powers beyond man.n 
One reason that the classification of values should not be empha-
sized too much is the coalescence of values.. No .intrinsic value finds 
• its worth. completely isolated from other values.. This is especially true 
with the higher intrinsic values: the good, the true, the beautiful,. and 
the holy. The holy would be. of meager worth without the good and the 
true. For highest appreciation all values must be related to other. 
values. This principle leads from axiology to metaphysics. For the most. 
meaningful. experienc·e of .any intrinsic value it must be related to one's 
world view.3 
The second step·of va+ue theory-is the formulation of ideals.4 ".An 
ideal.is a generaLconcept of a type of experience which we v~lue .. tt.5. If 
one ·be~eves' · for·., example, that ·:bhe. t~achings of a· -certain religion are 
truly .valuable he· sets up as an ideal the observance· of those teachings, 
whether he actually lives ·by them or not. The .ideal is an instrumental 
value . in serving as a means to the actual intrinsic value of obeying tJ;1e 
religious teachings. ••Only the actual attai:nment. o'f the value defined "by 
the ideal is an ·intrinsic value. 116 
Brightman finds that this preliminary .definition of an ideal has 
seven impli~ations·, -v,vhieh serve to test and to enrich the definition. 7 : ..
'I 1. A Philos.ophy of' Religion, :p. 99. See also ReliPious Values. 
2;._lbid.. . . 
3. lilrn}roductipn to Philosophy'! P;• .1,50. .. :. 
4., ~y~:;h;i~~, :J.deals, Norms, and Existence," P•. 221. . . . 
5 .•. A Phil.psophy .of Religion, p. 90,;. cr~ A. Philosoph! of Id,eals,: .p:.! -68'!. 
6. Xbid. . . · 
1. ~ilosophy of' Ideals, pp. 69f'f. 
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As a genera.]J.zed,-~concep"t;· an.ideal is;.;.:first .of all_,.,!1visible .only to 
.thoughtj; It -cannot be per.ceived in sense. experie:nce.•"l Secondly, an 
ideal.. implies· "an, hypothesis about future experience.'!2 I:t: and when ·.One 
experiences. what the ideal. describes,.. he "'Vi.ll appr0Ve that experience. 
Thirdly.; 11 an ideal is. a prirm;i.ple of u.ni ty,n3 .organizing many .particulars 
into . .one universal. becau.se of a vision (however limited) of .. some whole. of 
· experience4· ... -Fourthly, "an ideal; is a principle. o:f .. control and action.u4 
This is the causal function of the ideal as an instrumen-tal value as 
noted-,above. Fifthly, an ideal is tta plan of action,u5 ,provided that ·by;. 
·action one means 11the organization of any seri.es of experiences wi 'th 
11eferenoe. ,to a purpose.tt6 The kind of ac-tion may be holy or vulgar de-
pending. up.on the. ideal •. In tso . .:f;ar.· as minds -involve social rela'ti.onships, 
an ideal .may be so cia+; hence,. six-thly., aif ideal may .be a 11 social prino:i-
ple.'*7· Man~ id-~als ~e :t;ormula'ted t.b.rqugh social rel,a;ti:pns Cllld, in a 
settse,. aJJ.. i!l.eas arei . social. Sevent:P,ly, an .ic!..e.al 1. "may, be ·a pnncipl.e . q:f 
lov.e,~ 11 .An ideal involves apProval which is na .mild. 'form of love,n8 .btrt 
t . 
. an ·ideal is not, a ·value .un-til ac-ted uppn •. UT}ie ideal is the pa't'te:t;>n; 'the 
value is the product, which c.onforms to the. pat'tern .... u9. 
!Q.though truth and falsi-ty; do not apply t,o values (values either are 
or are not), . an ideal. may be true . or '\false •. kn ideal is true, .in one 
1. A Philosophy of Ideals, 
. 2~ Ibid., p~ 70. . 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid,., P• ?L 
· 5 .• Ibid ... 
. 6,~·-'I'Qid: 
.'J~· .Ibi~, 
8 •. Ibid:, 
9. Ibid., 
··,-·· 
P• 72., 
p~. 74~ 
p. 75. 
. ,, 
.. ·: ; 
P• 69. 
.~. f) 
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sense, !1if it defines. correctly the vq,lue .ex:perienc~.it 'is intei+ded j~o 
define, :false.·if it. defines it incorrectly.111 fut in:. another, and more 
important sense, 11it is true. if the value d,efined is ~ationally verifi-
able or justifiable as being coherent.n2 As 11 a de:fini tion of any type._ of 
value-claim, whether the claim. be warranted, or got, u3 an ideal may be 
warranted or not. If it is warranted it. is a true ideal; i.f not, it is a 
false ideal. 4 To decide among conflicting ideals 1. one ;must use the cJ4-
terion o:f empirical .coherence.. (It should be noted here that values are 
cla~sified as higher and lower;· if not as true end falseo The working 
criterion :for deciding about values is: 11 that value is, in any given 
s.:ituation, the highest which con'!;.ributes most to the coherent functioni:o.g 
. 
and organization of personality .. as a .. whole. . . . the basic norm of 
values, as of all truth, is coherence.•.•f) . 
. The third step in vq.lue-theory is· prescribing norms .. 6 A. no;rm is. a 
. ' 
true ideal, :an ideal that de,fines a valu'.e that is coherently '{"etifiable. 
11 Norm mea.ps a rational concept of what ought to be .. in some area of in-
triri~ic value,..n? Norms are instrumental,: not intrinsic. Every {3uch true 
' ideal, hence every norm, is imperative, binding upon the ~11. The com-
plate definitiol:l. of a normative ideal is as follows: nan ideal is a 
general concept of a type of experience which we approve in relation to a 
. complete view of all our experience, including all our approvals, and 
1. ~·Introduction to Philosophy, p. 142. 
2:. Ibid.... ... ,. 
s.. 'ii'Valu.es, Ideals, Norm~~ and Existence, 11 p. 221. 
4·~ 'itMi3taphysics, 11 Chapter XI, p. 12. . 
5• An~Introquction to Philosophy, p. 147; cf. Nature .and Values, P• 69. 
6. "Values, .Ideals, Norms, and Existence, n p. 221. 
7. An introduction to Philosophy, p. 142 •. 
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which :we ·acknowledge that we ought to realize. n1 
FundanientB.l in the meaning of norms is the experience of , 11 ought.~ 
This experience. is 11 as genuinely unique as is the experience of color or 
of sound. 112 . It is more than a mere feeling. Ill I ought I means 'I approve 
the principle by Whi Qh I am now acting as the prim:iple by "Which all 
rational beings everywhere ought always to act when placed under circum- : 
stances similar to minet.n3 This ought-experiene.~ indicates our self-
imposed obligation for the ideal of personality.4 The rationa~nature of 
the moral law would be destroyed if attainment of this ideal· were im-
possible. ·11 0..1ghtll implies ''can." Hence one ought to act in accordance 
nth the moral laws. 
Out of the idea of duty or obligation, -Brightman deduces two Formal 
Moral Laws, the Logical law and the·'law of Autonomy. The Logical law is 
that every person 11 ought to will to be free from self-cont:r>adiction and 
to be consistent ih his intentions ."5 The proof of this .law is that · t:· 
constant self-contradictory willing is impossible. 'lhe law of Autonomy 
is that 11ali persons ought to recognize themselves· as obligated to. choose 
. . 6 
in accordance with the 'ideals Which ifu~y acknowledge.'' Unless this law 
is true, the logical law is de:rlied and the coherent life is impossible. 
· · · · ·.From the .id~a of. good or value, Br-ightman deduces six axi.o:l:-.og;L<?~1:-·.·. 
laws·~. The first, the Axiological. J,aw,. is. that .11all persons ou~h:t .t.o 
1.,. A Philosophy of Ideals, .. ·P. 86~ • > 
2,. Religious Values, p •.. 37 ~ 
J,. Ibid., P• 47. .(Of. Kant). 
4,. .Ibid., P• 48., .. .. .. 
S .. Mor"'al.Laws (N.Y.: Abingdon Press.; 
_. ·each of the 'iaws. · · · · 
6 ... Ibid~' P• 106 •.. 
. :: 
'.: 
. . 
_c?oos_e v:_alues whi:_ch are self..:-::consistent., harmonious, and coherent, not 
values. which are contradictory or incoherent With one anothe:r. n1 ~o ~deny 
the truth of this law is to deny the truth of both the Logical law and 
the law of Autonomy. Second, the law of Consequences; is that na11 
persons ought to consider and, on the whole, approve the foreseeable 
consequences of each of their choices. 112 To approve a choice, the·· aonse-
· quences of which are in discord w.i th one'i s · ideal.§!,· is to Violate the law 
of AutonoJI\V. Third, the law of the B3s·r;, Possible, is that "all pe!"Sons 
ought to will the best possible values iii every situation; hence, if"" 
possible_, to improve every situation. 113 Unless one obeys- this law he'" · 
violates both the Logical law and the law of Autonomy. Fourth_, the law 
of Specification, is that nall persons ougb.-t, in any given situation, to 
. develop the. value or values .specifically ;r;-elevant to that si. tuation. 114 
Unless one achieves· :the relevant values q.t the proper time he violates 
the law of the best pd~sible. Fifth,, the law of the Most Inclusive End, 
is that "all persons ought to choo.se a coherent li·fe in which the widest 
!• : \ 
p·ossible range of .value is !rtealized".u5 To disobey this law is t~ rtolate 
the laws of specification and the be~t possi._ble_, and the a;rlological law. 
Sixth, the law of Ideal Control, is that nall person!:! ought to ·control· .. 
their· em~~rical· values by ideal values.u6 In experience we observe that 
empirical values conflict so that. they.. ~s~ be directed. Hence, the l~ 
of Ideal Control~. !' 
Beyond the Formal and the .Axiological laws there are three Pe!rsonal~ 
istic Laws that are a kind of synthesis of form a11d content. The first, 
the law of Indi"?:dl!lalism, is. that n each person ought to realize ·in his 
own experience the ma.:x:Lmum va~1;1.e of which he is capable in harmony with 
moral law. 111 .All valn.e experience is -individual because of t:Qe privacy . 
of experience• To violate this law is to violat~ the laws of Au-tonomy, 
~deal Control, and the Best Pos.sible. Second_, th~ law of Altruism, is 
that ,11 each person ought to respect all other persons as ends in them-
selve·s, qn.d, as far as possible, to cp.:..operate·:with other~ in the pro-
. 2 
duction and enjoYlllent of shared values. 11 The earlier laws require that 
each person help .·• other persons to eXperience. values. Third:, the law, of 
the Ideal of Personality, is that ~"~all persons ought to judge and guide 
I ' 
all of their~ acts by. their ideal conception. (in harmony with the other 
laws) of what the whole of personality ought to become both indiVidually 
and socially.u3 I"f this law were not true llthe unification of value-
experience would n~t be obligatory11 ~· rlolatii:J.g th~ .Axiological law; 11the. 
highest attainable ·ideal would not be 'obllga-tocy115 violating the ·law of . 
Ide~i,Control; ·ltand the realiza;t;,ion oi that ideal in individual and 
social experience would not be obligat:or;'!6 V'!iolating "the laws of Indi-
vidualism and of Al-truism. Hence, the law.:must be ·trrue~ 
.1.· Moral Laws, p~ 204 .. 
2. 'I.bid., p~ 223. 
3 .• Ibid., P• 242. 
4~_Ibid~., P•. 243 • 
5;~ lbid. ~ 
6 .• Ibid• . 
.. _..
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In so far as an empirical stuqy of values contributes to a world 
view, .one important question remains: 'What is the status. of values in 
reality? .Are values subjective or objective?]. Subjectivis)ll may be ,indi-
vidual or social. The former refers to 11the belief that. value is wholly 
relative to the private feelings of the individuaL"2 The latter refers 
to lithe belief that values are wholly dependent on changing ind11strial, 
political, and cultural conditions. 113 Objectivity here means more. thap 
an epistemological objective reference. It consists of at, leas·t two 
... , (a}t'.that. an objective value or~ better, norm, is one that 
all minds that think reasonably o~ght to acknowledge 
(logical objectivity), and (b) _that it is~valid not only 
for human individuals and groups, but for the universe, 
the reality on which man depends and in harmonY- with 
which he lives (metaphysical objectivity).4 
... ~ 
There is no basic disagreement be·t.ween the subjectiv}st and the 
objectivist concerning the subjective reality of values. The ~ei~ence 
of values, as suggested before, is as certain as is the experience of 
·.~ .J 
consciousness. But the objectivist is not willing to adrr!it that the 
subjective experience e'Ah.austs the meaning of value. The subjectivist 
argues that values differ with time and placeo The object~vist denies 
th?-t this is evidence for subjectivity. Indeed, if there is any cri-
terion with which to evaluate the varying values, it would suggest 
the objectivity of at least the value of trUth. The subjectivist argues 
~ . ' ·~ . ~. ~- ratroquE~ion to Philosophy, p. 151; A Fhilosophl of Relig;on, 
.. " j:>,';·lQ$.,;. '~.ValUE;s, Ideal~, Norms, and Erlstence~n p. 222; A Philosophy 
-... · o:r .. Id,_eal~, p .• ,88. _ 
?<t>)\n I:qtroduction to Philosophy, p. 152. 
3:,~~. 'Ibid,.. 1 
4. 'Ibid. 
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that "the psychological nature of value is such as to preclude its objeo-
tivity.1u1 value consisting in the .fulfillment of desire. The truth or 
falsity of this assertion depends upon the psychology of valuation. 
There are five basic classifications of the psychology of valuation.2 
First~ the hedQ.fiistio, or value is what pleases oneo This account is in-
adequate in that it fails to explain adequately the values derived from 
abusing someone else. Seeond, the velu.ntaristio account, ttvmatever sat-
isfies or .fulfills purpose.tt3 But this a.eoount usually associates happi-
1.39 
ness with the realization of desire, when some desires ought not to :be :(13.1-
filled. Third, the formalistic theories, ttthat only the attitude of a 
rational and sel~-COl'lSiStent Will is truly valuable.ttli. But, Uloyalty W 
the obligati0:n -00, be rational is th~· 0ne; and olicy' value for formalism.••-' 
\ : 
Fourth, the intuitive theeries, that "intuitie>n f!-!.7 the basic psycho-
. .. 
-logical "bra~ 0f value~n6 Though each .. of these theories involves a 
partial• truth, each is inadequate 'in that heaob neglects or underempha-
sizes acrl.ua.l aspects of the ·~~erlenoe of' value in its special interest · 
in ®te aspeet~.n7 Fi£tb1 the syno};fti~ o:tt ·personalistic theories.; "\',hat 
basically all values are judged by their· relatic:m tb ah ideal of person.-
aJ:.ity-« a coneept:ion of the ldnd ·of perso~ tbat one approves and aaghii to 
beeeme.-tt:8 :.Here the emphasis is on lna.n·'s ability to build syneptic, ideals 
1. An Intreduotion to Pbilos~phy:~ P• 155. · ,. ·"' 
2. Ibid., PP• i43-i45. 
3. Ibid., P• J..44. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid.· 
6. Ibid. 
7. ·Ibid. 
8"' · Ib:L<il.,. P• 14.5. 
and ;organiz;e ·hi.S· li:fe ar.ou:o.d .. them.- The objectivist .. would, assert in . 
,.. . . . .. 
~war to the sub;Jectiv;i'st that the nature o.f value -exp~rience is su~ as 
to· involve objective. :f~ctors .·as would b~ implici 'b ·and explicit in !fue 
criterio:o. of truth. 
The subje?tivist.~.then asserts that:·if V?-lues· a.J;,'e ob-Jeoti~e and' real, 
the .Universe is a.ll-eacty· perfect. fut t)fe obj~ctivist. suggests' that one 
l40 
·of the objective values. is that of .,Perfection a.s p~fect!bilitY-; · P~h.aps, 
~nether subjectiVist would; suggest., human values ar~: ·subjective bec_ause 
·"man 1s- place ·i'n the :cosmos is temp9-:rary and prec.ari.ous .... "1 Physic~~ 
th:i;s . .'i'S. tru~,.ibut does tr1is aaeq)lateJ.:Y: ~les~ribe mck 1s place2in the. cosmo.s 
as. a. whole? The-.:ebjectivist would~ deny that i~ ·do~s, and P? the Sl.lb- ··• 
jectivist Who claims ;no· :aense .·experienoe of objecti.'V'e, the objectiv:ts_:t. 
. . ' 
would· ·Teply that ·s·ensatio:q'- is;. a 'poor mea'sure· of ·trcr:th:; 
··· Beyond these argt}jnents the objectivist maintains·,; first,_ that "value 
judgin.ents cla;i.m 'bbjecti'Vity as truly as do- Ow:' sens:e .P~ce.ptions. 112 ~gr 
sense perception ·-the sunset is ·a:~ real as t}J.e s~ne. Tb.er~ may be e.ri"c;>r 
'in value jud~ent but . ti:is fact no . mor:e refute;, .%he-. 0b~ ecti v:i. ty o;f: ~aJ.ue 
.. than does the illusion dest.r~y the ob';j·ecti'Vity of the world of nature) 
~The strongest argument of .the objectivist is the obj.ectivity of, 
If truth be a value, the objectivist goes on to say, at 
least' one valu~_,is o(>jective, in both the logical and the 
metaphysical. senses •. T:~utn., is ~he model of what we mean 
~-.by objectiVity and is also (one would suppose) one of the 
·-:. : :n1.0s:t highly prized of values, if not the highest of all.4 
]:'., An :rntroduction to Philosophy, p. 157. 
2'~ ·· Ibid'• , -p. 158 ., 
3'• Ibid·. 
it~ ·Ibid;, P• 159. 
· But the subjectivist remarks that only known truth is of value. 
~th;- as· euch, is meaningless. The objectiVist replies that if his meta-
physic·s can be the working of a Supreme Mind, ·the objectivity of the 
value of truth would reside in that Mind.l· 
A final ru:<gument favoring the object;i..vity of value is 'the nature· ·of 
the c-riterion of empiricaJ..·coherence and the evidence of its validity. 
The subj activist may object on the bases of the various kinds of co-
herence and of the confusion that reigns concerning even the principles 
of mof~l value. (Perhaps coh~ence is not being used. )L · lf this 'is eon-
elusive proof,.-. the criterion of empirical cohe:rrence ~d the objectivity 
of value cil:'e on· shaky ground. On the other hand, if -t>ne is willilig to 
agree th~t expenence most coherently· interpreted (and: this ·criterion 
must be accept8d if the debate is to be rational) makes bet.ter sense 
postdating an objective standard' of·vaiu~, this is sufficient evidence, 
. : ~ 
and all the· ~v:i.denc:e ·· tb.er'~ can be, for its acceptance. The exper:tenee c5f 
value is subjective; the true ideal or norm.'by which value is measured is 
objective. 2 The validity of coherence·de-mands some available-objective 
st'andard of judgment. 
The subjectivist may :r:enew the d~bat~ by :r;-S:ising the problem of .. evil. 
If normative ideals are objective_, does the experience of evil point to 
an objective reality of ev':i.l_, ?r:·is this experience an illusion~ 
J.• 
Certai~y the exp~rierice of what might be termed ~;evi111 or ttdisvalue" 
.. 
is no i,llusion<; . Rather, it is as certa-in as is the experience of v~ue • 
. • -:.+ ••• -;· •.• , •• - .•.. 
.. •••••••·• ....... ''!'"'"' •••••• 
~··The ·eVidence f·or such a Mind will be given later. 
2:+.' .Ait· IT:ttroduction to Philosophy, p. 16l. 
• J •. c . 
~ · .. ·. . . . .. 
H~e a .distinction needS· to be made between moral evil and natural evil • 
. Mora~ eyil refers to the incoherent :~villi~g and doing of _some valuing 
self. By its very natu.re it is incoherent "both w:ithin itself, and with 
fun,dCilJlent.al aspec~s of truth; it is contradictory and negative, not posi-
tive .and coherent .. •~1 Its nature, then, is such that it suggests no ob-
.ject~ve reality of any,ldnd. Natural evil refers to those experiences 
. .. 
which hin.der the experience of positive value, such as, 11 a will tha.t is 
mqr~ or less ;i.ncaherent,n2 11 the intellectual evil of ignorance, u3 ttmal-
.. 
adjustment,"· llincompetence, 114 and Jtthe dysteleological surdn5 as ev:i-
. .. 
'' 
denced in imbecility.; insanity, ete •. The experience of natural evil.;is i.: . . 
., 
' just as ~eal subjectively c;s is that of moral evil. .'fhe question is.: •Do 
tne vario~s experiences o;f natural evil indicate an ev;i..l that i.s. ob-
j~ctively recy.? 
.. For the philosopher who maint_ains that the u.n:i;ver~e._,~s cq,ompletely. 
m~chanioal and he~ce indifferent to human value~, th~re ;is po problem of 
. . . 
·:.· 
evil. There. is only the problem.- of the existence of llgood. 11 If value 
.. .. 
and. disva~ue are only accidents that. occur by chance, evil so-.called is 
.. ·· .. ' .. . . . 
;:, 
• just another c~ance .. occurrence. But how is that philosopher going to 
.. ~ .. 
.. 
explain what_ must be defined as g?od an~ apparently -pur;posive? Chance 
seems inaqequate. But the pointhere is. that tlle problem of e~l as such 
L .•. 
is acute only for him who finds the universe friendly to human _value and 
. ' .. , 
purpose. Although the study'of physical tp.ings suggests the activities. 
1. An Introduction to,Philosophy, p •. l62 • 
. 2 ... Ibid ... ,. p .. 244 •. 
3 .. Ibid .. , 
4. Ibid;, P• 245·• .. 
5.-~Ibid.;; 
.• .. 
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of a Supr~e Mind,.and although universals seem to be the thoughtful 
activity of a Supr~e Mind, and although one would be led to believe that 
the objectivity of norms finds appreciation in a Supreme Mind, .. one ha,.s 
yet to consider mind as a type of being relevant to the formulatio~ of a. 
world view, or cosmology. Befor~ one can come to a conclusion concerning 
the being and nature of a ~preme Mind, one needs to discover what mind 
is. I! there is insufficient evidence for postulating a Supreme Mind, the 
problem ~f natural evil n~eds to be considered 'no further. If, on the 
other hand,~ ,(and this is the only answer the objectivist can give the". 
subj activist at this. point)· th~re . .is sufficient evidence for a Supreme 
Mind, o~~ will nee4. to explain na.tural evil in tha"!J light. What the:p., 
i~ the type of being called ~onpciousness? 
·-· 
iv. · Consciousness. 
A fourth type of being to ~ch ~ur ideas may refer (and the study 
of which is essential for a world view) 'is consciausn~ss.1 Strictly 
speaking, consciousness is indefinable.2 It refers to "all the states 
and processes of thought,· feeling, will, self-expe;ience, etc:ii3 It in-
eludes q.ll awareness. ll:Everyone lmows, by immediate awareness, what it 
is to be. conscious. tt4 
In the study of consciousness method is important. Without the 
1. 'Since there has been a detailed discussion of the self in the previous 
, .chfl.p:t~:r . ., .. th!3 discussion here will be 1imi ted to aspects of conscious-
ness that are particularly relevant to the present phase of the study, 
.. fol;Loydng closely the eighth ahapter of An Int-roduction to Philosophy. 
2-.. . .An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 323. 
3 :.. .. :r~:>id ...... 
4 .. ;Lbid., p. 184 •. 
proper method one may not at~ain truth. Some of the useful methods are 
introspection, or ~turning attention to one•s own consciousness and ob-
serving it:,nl. objective observation of behavior2 (words, gestures, and 
-
,facial expressions) j and physiological psychology or "a study" of :the re-
lations of conscious processes to physiological processes, especially of 
the relations of consciousness to nervous systeJp..3 ll.All. of the data 
·gathered by the foregoing methods may be studied either analytically 9r 
fUnctionally. u4 The Gest8J..t. 'method "rests on the principle that 
consciousness experiences wholes (Gestalten or configurations) befo~e it 
notices their parts, and. that conscious wholes are ther.efore more basic 
them their. parts that are analyzed out .. 115 Brightman finds introspection 
fundamental because the privacy of consciousness requires it, 6 and lithe 
results of all the other methods must be interpreted in the light of 
introspection.u7 
There are several noteworthy theories of consciousness. One is t~e 
associationistic or analytic. Association among the impressions and 
ideas (Hume) is the basis of consaiousness 1 ; and if the faats of conscious· 
experience are to be understood, they.must be analyzed • .Although associ-
ationism gives itself to a concrete study of the facts of consciousness, 
employing the scientific method, and pointing out "undeniable laws of the 
structure of consciousness, u8 it nevertheless fails utterly to account 
1_. An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 185. 
2 •.. .Ibid.,. p. 186. . 
3. r.bid~ · 
4. Ibid. 
5.. Ibid."- p •. 167. 
6.,. 'Ibid.~, 'P • 188. 
'7.- .. Ibid,.,. .-
8. Toid., p. 194. 
. •, 
./ 
for the basic unity of consciousness, a unity which even 'the associ-
ationist experiences firsthand. 
In contrast to the analytic assooiationistic approach there i~ the 
synoptic :fUnctional approach. It aims to interpret the conscious life 
"as a' process, oonsidering.-what 'it does, what ends it'ser-ies, what 
functions it ful.fills,•i1 corisidering consciousness as a whole. This ap-
proach has been developed. 4't,es~~till.ly two different dir~ct;io~~· in 
P.i9~P~; and in. self-psyoh~lo~,; .. 
. ) ;.- f' 
·"Biological fUnctionalism is &l outgrowth both of the imler develop-
ment of psyoholegy and of the modern interest in biology•"' b. its ex-
treme· form it identifies consciousness with p~iologioal behavior, and 
hettck'lias come to be called behaviorism. Methodological beha.vi0rism 
"means merely that a stu.di ·of behavior is O'lll" only method oi gathering 
data about the co~oiousness of' other people."4 MetaphysicalJ'behaVio~-·­
ism maintains ttth.at OUr sensatiOns$ OUr thoughts 1 OUr feelings and SJ.l 
that we have called our 00nsoi0US life are (in so far as they are at all) 
simply physiological reactions· of O'lll" organism, adjusting to environ-
ment.••' In its favor, bebavi0rism has a subject matter that is .public 
and can be! sv.bjected to S:cientific study; it has no diffioulty nth the 
mind.-body' problem since m:tnd and boq are one. It avoids the prob~em. of 
·a:tJT transcendental SO\ille ·But it "rests on the denial of facts, nSmely1 
i. An Introduction to Phi1osophy1 P• 196. 2. ,fbid.· . 
3. ·n;rcr. 
4. Ib.id., P• 197 • 
5. Ibid.~ P• 198. 
-
'-'' 
the facts of introspection .• _111 Some of the facts that the behaviori~y 
. (~ 
l~ves ~nexp~ained are:_ tt~he way I feel about my behavior; my conscious 
li.fe of' -:which I am aware while unaware. of' my behavior; my consciousness 
of' the meaning of' words as quite distinct from the utterance of' the 
. ' 
words.«2 , Further .~~oblems for behaViorism are behavior.z:est:l,.lting from 
;rem~.mbered experiences, the sense of obligation to ideal va:lues; and 
.. 
con~cio-e,sness that appears irr.elevant to behavior • . M9reover, to reduce 
.· .' 
• "l 
consciousness to matter in moti9n is to lend one,self' to all the limi-
. ~ . ' 
tations of' iiat-ilrali~:\:l:iq ;materialism. These limi tat:i:cins Will appear in 
.,. 
th~ next chapter. 
·' 
.f., " 
Self-psyc~ology ''is based on .'tl).e fact that conscious states .. ~7 
processes bel~ng together in a unique w;ay.tt.3 Consciousness experiences 
:· .· • ·r 
~ tself as unified and abiding, as re.lated to past as well as to antici-
• ~ . ' ' ,, r 
.• . ~ 
pated expep.ence. '!This fac:t of' exper.iencing. ~onsciousness as bel,onging 
., • t- 1 • ~~ , I ' , .•' ! ' ~ ' 
... 
t9gether in a unigue way is called self-exper:ience. • ... A self (9r. 
person) ·~s~~ns~ious life ·~~~s· ~~rienced.u4··: Il~re again, one must 
, ·: . r: . . 
'·. ,, . 
I ,·• 
distinguish between_ self-experience and self-knowledge. Sell-experience 
. ' .• '~ .. ~ .·._:· . 
refers to any conscious awareness of' a self; se:J!-knowledgeor self'- . 
I • ,. ~~ 
consciousness refers to the reflection of.the c.onscious experienc9: of' 
the reflecting self, awareness of 11myself. 11 "The self, then; is not a 
mere unity (as the soul-theory held), nor mere .multiplicity (as associ-
.. . . . . .' . . . ., -!:· 
ationists and behaviorists believe), but it is a synthesizer of unity 
-~- ! :. ; 
1:: .An Introduction t.o 
. 2 ,. '.Ibi.di 
3• Ibid,, p~ '202~ 
4;. Ibid~, P• 203. 
,, 
Philosophy, p. 200 • 
and multiplicity~ 111 As syilthesizer, it is 'ti.'me transcending (as was; 
seen earlier)· and rio theory of the sel:f is adequate if it fails to ac-
coUnt· for this basic trait~ The advantages of sel.f..:psychology are that 
it 11is based on empirical facts, but is not con:fined to the analytic 
treatment of those facts, n2 ltis presupposed by memory, •• llis presupposed 
147 
by thinking, u3 and gives an adequate account o:£ values and evaluation~ 4 · .1: 
The charge that the sel:f is not a genuine unity since 'it can be analyzed 
into elements is sterile because the so-called elements composing the 
self have 1~no existence prior to their membership in the self or apart 
·. •. 
from> :it. n5 ·Th.e c~arge :that the sel:f is fragmentary is readily acknowledged 
,. ..,., .• \' ' 
by the self-p'sychologis:t, but he maintains.. in rebuttal that the very 
experience of.fragmentariness presupposes a time-transcending unity. 
t . :; • . • ' 
A:ftei- the interruption of consci~usness the self-resumes its interrupted 
. ' . . . 
eXistence aware of the interruption. · A more diffi'oult charge. to meet is 
that arising from the abnormal phenomena of dual or multiple personal-
.· .. 
iti.es.· ~e sell-psychologist' recognizes 11that there are or may be other 
.. t 
streams of consciousness than that of the normal 'self, connected with one 
human organismll J6 but he insists "that every such .. stream· or process .• is in 
the form of a sel:f.::.experience; however br~ef, abnormal" OJ:' transitory' it 
may be.'~7 ·' 
Philosophz, p. 204. .. · 
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A. fur.ther .problem: is 'the relat~ons,hip between the mind or self' and 
the body_ It has been pointed out tha.t this is no problem for behavior-
ism as the mind is no more than the behavior of the body. This has been 
snown as ~nadequate~ I~ediate experience involves. a relationship be-
tween th~ mind 9-Ild the b<?dy, and an adequate theory bf consci.ousness 
must meet the· demands of ·explaining this experience.. One suggested s.o-
:r 
lutie>n is that of -parallelism, 11the theory that mind and body are two 
parallel series or processes .arranged in suc.h a way that. for every state 
, .. 
of mind ther~e is a contemporaneous state of body, but· .so that mind causes 
no change in body and body no ~hange in mind."l Though. para,llelism dis-
•" 
tinguishes .between .body and mind, it puts each :in a .. closed system, ·and in 
doing so ~s bal~ unemPirical. Immediate. experience testifies to the 
relationship b~tween the two. The doublei aspect th!3ory. attempts. to d~-
•" 
fend par.allelism by asserting "that it is to be explained by assuming 
. . . .. .... 
that m;ind and matter are. two aspects of. one and th~ s.ame fact; just as an 
orang~ looks y~llow and tast.es sW-eet, but is .only one orange, so reality 
' .·:•. • ''' ' ' ' ' ' . 2 
lo.pked:at in one.way is matter, in another, mind .• " . This cre?-tes the 
~. .· . 
:t'urther problem as to how objects ttwi th ·entirely different.. :Pt·opert:i es 
m.ay be: said to. be. one and the sam.e.u3 :Neutr<:tl realism denies that ther.e 
' . . 
is an ~ltimate distinction between mind and matter, only various groupings 
of 11neu tr a1 anti ties. n Grouped in a certain way they are physical obje~ts, 
while· grouped i71. ot~er w'ays. ~i~n. r:elq.tion ,to a nervous system,~ they are 
4: .. • 
1., An :I:n:~roduc.t:i;qn to Philosophy, pp. 211-212. 
2, Ibid"'' P-R• .214,-213. 
3.e. ~~~,, p. 213. 
consciousness-. Jh-t neutral realism leaves unexplained the actual 
eonsci'Ous experience .of relationship between body· and mind. 
·-The conscious experience of relation suggests· the hypothesis of 
interaction. Interaction 11is ·the belief· that miRd and. body act on eaeh 
other,· that sometil!tes the initiative comes frOII1 one side, and sometimes 
from the ·other'. ul Th~ ·immediate experience of causal interrelation de.-
mands some' ·explanation 'of:.this interactiGm, and from an empirical poin.t 
of: view, the theory that cannot explain the• interaction must be regarded 
. . 
as i.Iladequate. The· experience of. interaction be~ween mind and body is a 
:t:act..; .·Hence, the ·charge that two realities as·· essentially different as . 
mind and· bodj/ ;could ·not interaci3~mtrst be based on an' erroneous i1}"t-erpre-
tation of either .. or ':both mind· and body~ The.y do'.interqct· in experience. 
The theory must ·begin there.· The charge that such 'interaction violates 
the law of· the conservation of.energy will have to make some adjustment 
in ·its interpretation ·of the law' of conservation,- such as, for example, 
·that the.-;lcm of ·-the c.onseti'a.!tibn' of-' energy applies only to the physical 
. Viorld,. of which the mind is not. a me'mber'~·\ Brightman finds the most 
adequate theory of the mind-body r'elatioh to be om~ of. interaction, and 
that interaction is• best explained" by inter)?r,eting ·the world- of :physical 
things as the activity ·of a Supreme Mind.2, The pr~bleril. is then one· of' 
interaction between human and Supreme Mind. Though that does not eliJDi.:.. 
. ' 
nate the p:r'oblem, it does suggest the nature .of !its solution-.·: The fact 
_t}l;a:t JIU.n.ds i.n~eract is so empirically basic and certain that to deny it 
.. 
.1 •. Ar.i'"Introd:ucti"'n to Philosophy, p. 214. 
2 •. Ibid. "~--
is to render 11 our whole experience unintelligible.tt1 
The importance of consciousness in Bri~tman 1 s system of· philosophy 
is repeatedly emphasized. 11.All immediate facts are facts of conscious-
2 
ness, and all theories are conscious processes. 11 .All observation, in-
terpretation, verif;ication, ideals, and va~ues ,. reside. u1tiinately 1i1 
c;~'sciousness·.3 Without consciousness there would be no experience, and 
hence no lmowledge or appreciation of reality. From the human stand-
point, w;i thout consciousn~ss there would be nothing. Hence, the question 
. , 
arises; Is.consciousness, at the level of personality, an adequate philo-
. . . 
sophical pri~ciple?4 Can it be regarded as the clue to the discovery of 
the nature of the real? It can hardly be denied that all the evidence 
that we have .for the nature of reality is found in consciousness, and 
hence, that the epi~~emQlo~cal imp~~;tance. of consciousness:' is ea• .. · 
tablished. Brightman asks the question in this way: 11Is human personal-
ity something that can. be regarded as real and as a clue to the infinite 
:r.eal that lies beycmd our .li:ttle selves, or is it merely an incidental 
product. of an order that .has no mind and value? 115 Answering this 
question requires .. ;tne relating of thE!. four relevant realms of being--
physical things, uniyersals, values, and. consciousness--into a cosmo-
logical whole. This is the task of the ,riext chapter • 
... 
l. An Introduction to PhilosOphY, p. 215. 
2. 11The Importance of Being Conscious, 11 P• 50l. 
3~ .. Nat'lire and Values, p. ll9. 
4~ ~ee. P,age .. 7~. . .. ... .. . . . 5. An Introduction to Philosophy, P• 217. 
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CR.API'ER V 
THE RESULTANT THEISTIC COSMOLOGY 
l. Preliminary Orientation 
The epistemic ·method and criterion of truth in Brightman 1 s philo-
sophical system require that philosophical conclusions be based upon 
adequate consideration of the data relevant to the specific problem. The 
problem of the present chapter is the description of his cosmology. In'· 
anticipating this problem, it was shown that he considers four realms of 
being relevant to a cosmology~ the realms of pbysical·,;thi:qg~, of un;h• 
versals, of values, and of consciousness. On the basis of the evidence 
discovered in these four realms he formulates his cosmology. 
i. The. Definition of Cos~o.+og;y 
' 
If one is going to study the realms of data relevant to any problem, 
he must first have some preliminary notion of the problem before he can 
select the relevant rea.J.ms. This is true with cosmology. It is impossi-
ble ~· select the relevant realms until one has some idea of its meaning. 
The definition at the end of the study will be more accurate and complete 
but this does not ndnimize the importance of the initial definition.1 
1. The importance of definition is discussed in detail on page 19. 
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To begin~ then, cosmology is ttthe branch of metaphysics dealing with 
nature.111 Metaphysics is t1an attempt to describe all types of reality in 
their systematic relations and differences. «2 It is nthe attempt to find 
a true account of reality."3 Cosmology is the metaphysics of nature~ but 
the key word~ "nature,u remains to be defined. 
ii.. The Definition of Nature 
"The term nature is one of the commonest and vaguest in the current 
philosophical vocabulary~; especially in that of philosophy' of religion • .f4' · 
' Many books have been written on the subject without. offering anr explicit 
. . . .. 5 . .·· . ·. . .. : . . . . 
da.t'initioM,/ In 18931 James O:t'r published The Christian V~ew of God a,nd 
the World without d.efining either llworld 11 or 11nat~e." In John Oman's 
__ E£ ~-- - -· -- -
book, The Natural and the Su.pernatura~, published in 19311 the definition 
-- . -·-·- -- -. -·- ------· - ____ ,-- . - . ·-- ---- - --- ... --. .• .&. -
ot nature ia oonspiGuoualy absent, Even William Temple.; in his Gif:f'Ol'd . 
Leatures,f.or l93u 1 ~a.ture1 . Man and Gad1 gives no definition of nature. 
; ' .. ~ 
No preoiae definition of nature can be found in either John Dewey 1s 
. . 
EK;eerienoe and Nature (l92~) or in Morris R. ·Cohen 1s.Reason and Nature 
--I ..... 
(l9~l). Yet the interpretation of nat~re seams to differ with each 
author, With euoh ambiguity abroad1 any study of nature should begin 
With a olea:r definition,6 
In his Merrick Lect\lX'e in 1943, IIA Christian View o:f Nature, II 
l • .An Introduction to PhilosGPffiY\• p. 323. 
2. !bid,, P.• 331. I · 
~ .. Ibid, . .,. . 
. ·' 
4, iiAn Empirical Approach to God, u P·• 160, 
~~ .. :N~tu;:e and ·values,. PP• 3lf£. The evaluation of eaoh reference cited 
is that o:f'D:r. Brightman. 
6, Ibid,, P.• )1. 
:&ightman indi,.cate.s;, that 1'nature w.i·ll .be .. t~en .to mean the world o:f · 
matter, and energy investigated .by the _.sciences o:f physics, chemistry, and 
' 
piology,: that isJ. the world· o:f things moving ·in space.111 In this de:fi,;. 
nition it· is assllll:ed that consciousness knd personality are neither 
matter nor pbysiceJ. .. epergy. Two years a:fter his Merrick Lecture, he 
published Nature and Values, his Fondren Lectures given at Southern 
Methodist University; ·in. which he indicates that 1iit is both clarifying 
I ·' ., 
and .:fruitful to identify nature, and therefore the· object o:f the natural 
... 
. ,. 2 
sciences, with the world o:f sense objects. This definition does not in-
' ~-· . 
tend to su~gest that nature is one :fixed being and that the :character o:f 
• :_ <' -:. 
.. . 
that being is l<nowri :from the beginning. Rather the i~de:finition serv~s 
~ . . . . . . 
o~y to identify the area in which .ci.eaJ:.ings with nat~re begin" u.3 na.meiy, 
"the.,~e~ thai/~~-·~b~ ~~~~oa~h~d throu~ 'the senses. 114_;_:H~nce" the re-
lationship o:f nature and ex:perience needs to be noted.: 
.•. 
.. 
iii. 
• • • ' • •• 0 ~ • • • • 
. . -~· ·-. ... • ... ~·'1.. ' . 
Nature and "~Nr-nerlence ·. ' 
.  I 
. .. · 
C?sii).O~?~~~s .. a.::I?et'apliysics· of n~:l;.ure requires a clear undei'?,tan<:iing1 
o:f the .relationship ·between nature' and' e:xperience.. Nature has just been 
defined as the area tb:at is approacqed' thr.ough the senses. Ex:perience · 
has been. defined 'in .its Widest sense as ''our entire cons.cious life .n5 
Since 11 our entir·e · consc'i.ous li.:fe" ·i!f'cludes not· only s'ens'ory data, but 
~t~~i~eJ. rational, and mystical data as well, it hardly seems coherent 
.. 
.. . ..... :• .i ' . 
1.:.' tt.A Ohr'istian View o:f Nature, u p. 67:. 
'Cj.'. Page '38~ . . . 
3?:·,Nat.u:J;"·~ 'and Values,· p. )9·:~> 
4-':* Inia~;:p.-••40·i: ·. · · ~ .• 
5~ Page' 43. · · 
h, ... " •. 
,· 
\ 
to identify nature. and experience. The experience of natur~ is bUt 
one aspect of the shi#ng present •. And although all the evidence :for 
the existence and meaning of. nature must be in the shining prese:p.t, lito 
assert that Nature is identical with any human. shining present, -or the 
sum .of all such experience, is to deny any meanimg to the objec~ve 
reference ,of tho:ught and. to become a solipsist .. nl At any Fate, a dis-
tinction must be made nbetween our experiences of objects believed to be 
located in physical space and our experiences o£ personal and social 
2 
values, ideals, and loyalties.» For Brightman this distinction is 
central.· 
Nature,. then is not in any human shining present. When 
we speak of Nature we are speaking of an illuminatirtg 
absent, that is, an objective order of some sort which 
gives evidence of its objectivity in and to the observing 
and thinking mind. All observations and thoughts belong 
to the shining present-to experience. The object to which 
, certain observations and thoughts ·refer is Nature. The 
objectivity of Nature cannot be denied unless the trust-
worthiness of experience, as rationally interpreted, is 
. denied. If experience is not trusted, no ·experienced 
forms or contents are to be trusted, no ~guments are 
valid, and desolate silence must prevailj yet, in that 
dire case, there is no reason for preferring complete 
silence to incessant speech. Nature is, because there 
is ground in experience for the hypothesis that Nature 
is. But Nature is beyond our experience in the illumi-· 
nating absent.3 
iv.: The Possible Views of NatUI'e 
... 
11The best approach to the understanding of Nature is . to-~ consider the 
:fundamentally different definitions of Nature that· have been proposed by 
, i. .L ~ 
. . 
'1.*. -:nMeta-physids, 11 Chapter x; pp. 1-2. 2: ·"A Chi-istian View of Nature, 11 p. 79. 
3:. "Metaphysics, 11 Chapter X, p. 2 •. 
·.· ~ 
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., 
important thinkers o 11~ This wou:ld mean ·:that tJ;l.ere are as ma.py pos:sible 
views of na-ture as there are important phil()sophers. But. from· the point· 
of view of: cosmology, the :myriad views may be classified in severaJ._ ways. 
Nature,-.. as.here defined, maybe viewed as impersona.lmatter of,some sort. 
Generally. such a materia~.~tic view would make consciousness dependent 
upon and derivative from impersonal reality, leaving little ropm for the 
existence of Divine Being or Divine Purpose. Or, nature may be viewed as 
essent~ally ideal, i .• e.· of the character of mind. Such a view generallzy" 
makes room for.f the interpretation of nature as the energizing of some 
mind reogarded as superpersonal, leaving room for a purposive interpre-
tation of nature and history. or, nature may be· interpreted as consti-
tuted of some ~n\.ity th~t is essentially neither non-mind nor mind, a~ 
these are experienced,, but ·of. <:i-. neutral character. Or, nature may be 
viewed as that realm of experience that· is·. composed of various combi-
nations of mind, non-mind, ~d perhaps "neutral e~tities. 112 
From ·the point of view of human values~ nature may be considered as 
.· ' ' . .. . . 
hostile, indifferynt, or friendly). &.ch e~ent~ as the devastating 
~ 
hurricane c:md the raging plague suggest hostility. Other occurrences:, 
such as th~ dissapeahince of spf?cies, the falling of the child, or the 
experiment that ends in disaster, suggest that nature is completely 
indifferent to human value.4 But the exper~ences of value, gr~h, and 
the extent to which nature responds to human, willing suggest that the 
J.• 11Me:tap~.s;ics, 11 Chapter X, P• 3. 
2. The discussion of subs.tance shou],d designate Brightman's accepted 
. :...· approach • ·· . 
3• 11A Cb.ris'b-ian V:i.ew of Nature," pi 71:~ 
u~· An introductipn to Philosophy, ·p. 265. 
uni.verse .•is :friend+.'Y· . Whatever the .cosmology, rm.y ~ystemat1c exam.ic-
nation o:f the realm o:f nature presupposes some trustworthy method and 
criterion o:f truth. This chapter assumes, as have the previous ones, . 
the validity o~ bot]l the method· o:f synopsis and. the criterion o:f empirj;-., 
cal coherence as de:fined in Chapter =t:I. ·Two views o:f nature are obvi-. 
ously contrary to this method and criterion. 
v. The Views o:f Natu:re Contrary to the Method and Ori terion 
~ 
(l) Nature as all that there is. I:f nature is de:fined as all that 
there is, and the definition means ~ter4lly what it says, then the term 
. 
11nature11 becomes a synonym :for everything. "If' nature means everything 
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it would be better to <tt>~p the wo~d· ''nature' and simply say 1 everythin~ 1 • 1~ 
·; : 
But the chief' difficulty is not in the definition but in the erroneous· 
use o:f the definition. For i:f nature, when defined as all that there is, 
really meant all that there is, it would need to include within its scope 
' •. ' II. 
' ~ 
all experience t~at is not sensory, namely, the experience o:f ideals and 
values. I:f this distinction were mad.e:; there would be no objection, but 
.• 
when nature is defined as all that there is, it usually means all that 
there is for sensory experience. The ne~ step is the assumption that 
whatever cannot be verifi~ in sensory experience cannot be said to be 
real and the whole realm ·~~·.~alue experience is. ignor~d· ~r;mlnfnuzed.2 · 
...... 
The truth is that not a.ll experiena,e· is sensory experience. The positiv-
ists and extreme semanticists who argue that everything that is meaning-
_.; ...... " ... 
. . 
l. Nat:ure, and Values, p. 44 •. 
. 2~ .A Philosophy of· :Ideals, P:- ?9; !~Met~phy,sics, 11 Chapter x, P• 3 • 
... 
ful and knowable is . sensory 
base their _Cf!-Sf3 . .:fPr, the s~sory character o:f· all objects 
of lmowledge·~~'the argument that we human beings can 
understand ea.ch other clearly only -when we speak in terms 
of physical (sensor;y) objects. They call this kind of 
understanding by the name of intersubjective .communication, 
using a physicalistic language.l 
:&~t, such an argument implicitly presupposes the validity of logical 
.. 
processes (the validity of which the positivist would not deny, although 
he would_ .. CI.eny .that logic gives knowledge of; -hhe real)2 and expJ.ici tly 
presupposes the existence of. subjects involved in this s0-called "inter-
subjective communication~it. But, 
·, , .. 
if.we do start with .personal minds, or su.bj-e~ts.,. in~d- .. 
ing to oonim:cthicate with each other; we, b~s~ our eirtfre. 
argument for the sole validity of sensation on facts: 
(subjects, minds) that cannot be experienced b.1 sensation, 
No evidence for positivism, therefore, can have meaning 
unless mind and its purposes have meaning; and if mind and 
purpose have meaning, then sensory objects are not the only . 
·meaningful referents. For meaning, we need ;more than 
sensory 11facts 11 ; we need purpusei.'u.L ideas.3 · 
Henc~,- the realm of sensory objects is not. all that there is. 
(2) Nature as illusory. To suggest (from the point of view of meta-
physics) that substance is essentially non-material and that physical 
things are not metaphysically real (in the" form in which they are pre-. 
sented to the mind through sensory experience) is not to suggest that 
~at1,1re, as here defined, is an illusion. Nature refers to the ill~:.. 
nating absent, but the ;tlluminating absent is surely real. All the evi-. 
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dence in the shining present for the existence of the illuminating a.bse:nt, 
.· ... 
11 .. Nature and Values, P.• 45.~ 
2. Ibid: •. 
"·--· 3·. Ibid.~ 
whatever its nature, ·would be evidence for the existence of nature in 
some form. Though the exact nature of the illuminating absent may be 
uncertain,. the f.act th,at it exists is as ·certai:p. as is the reliability 
of reason.. The sensorY' evidence of an external world is beyond rational 
·• 
question. 
- .· 
Personalism is sometimes taken to be a denial of the 
objective reality of nature. Nothing could be further 
from the truth. Personalism presupposes the validity of 
-science and the objective reality of nature •. l 
As objective reaJ.j:ty, nature may be sa:l.d to be phenomenaL 
- ~. . 
2. Nature as P.henemenal 
i. The Definition of- Phenomenon 
. . , 
In our terminology~" phenomena are that restricted area 
of the shining prese:n;t. which consists of spatia-temporal 
sensory experiences organized into .a system by the Kantian' · 
categories, plus all other human shining presents in which 
any part of this system is thought or verified.. These 
.·"other" presents are, of course, illulninating absents rela-
tive _to any particular shining present of a here and now•2 
·· •• : •. • •! I· ,• 
·.'• 
ii. Nature as the Realm of Phenomena. 
' I 
To define :n.ature as the world of matter and ~nergy that can be ap- ~ 
proached through the senses, 3 and then to describe as phenomenal whatever 
participates in the order: of space-motion is to suggest immediately the 
phenomenality of nature. In contrast with the view that suggests nature·· 
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as an illusion merely, this hypothesis means to assert the actual reality;· 
1.; Natur.e and Values,. P,~ lJ.l¥. 
2 .; .'~Mei;.a;physics, n Chapter X, p • 5 o 
3. IIA Christian View of Nature, 11 p. 67; Nature and Values, p. 40. 
. ! 
ofl..·nature as an. ord.er of.· phenO.IIlena •. 
· One great,advantage of·the view of Nat~re as phenomenal 
is that it affords a clear definition of Nature as con-
t;rasted 'With .. what is not Nature. , It .rescues thought from 
the vague and sentimental idea that Nature is all that there 
is. · It sharpens the problem of· the data available in the 1 • 
shining present, and the contrasts between sensory and non-
sensory experiences. It makes clear the empirical dogma-
tism which exists when sense data alone are respected and· 
admired, to the arbitrary exclusion of all other datao It. 
heightens resp'ect for science, while showing the unempirical 
and unreasonable characte-r: of what R.- B. Perry has often 
called nthe cult ·of science.ttl 
11If Nature is. I?Jlenomenal, then .knowledge of phenomenal Nature is, 
as we have said, an essential part of the factual basis of metaphysics. 
But ••• it is not metaphysics,,. nor does.' it eib,.aust the empirical basis 
of metaphysic~. 112 It emphasizes the importance of sensory observations ·.-I 
in scientific knowledge and 11stresses the role of active thought in 
science n 
' 
thEO. total 
and 11 aff6rds an empirical basis ·".for distingUishing Nature from 
. . .. . . j 
object !=>f metaphysical thought .. u . 
· Nature ·is ·a comprehensive systE¥U of uniform sequences or 
correlations 'Which describe the processes of chB:Uge in 
sensory data •. The object of metaphysics is the total 
system of reall ty that makes sense out of all e:x:perience.4 
.. 
iii. Nature as What is .Studied by Scientific Method 
There are thos~-~who objed.t to def:i,ning Nature in terms 
either of subject'matter (sensory observations and experi-
. .'ments) or of goal (discoveryr of systematic sequences or 
interrelations), and prefer to define it in terms of the 
method by which we know it--the· method that is comm.only 
called scientific or indu~tive or, in the broadest sense, 
Chapter X, p. 6 . 
. . . 
. '· 
··~ 
But this adds little to our knwledge o:f nature. Method OSJ:lllot be oon-
sidered as independent o:f all subject matter. "Form witho'U.t content ~ 
empty.n2 Method, by its very nature and :function, presupposes e.nd sug-
gests subj'Set matter. Moreover, trNa.ture is not a methOd a>:f investigation, 
It is wha.t we know after we have applied the method to the content. And 
the em.pil"ioal oontent o:f na.t~al knowledge is sensoey experienoe.n3 
~ 
. 
iv. Nature as tha.R~alm of Matter 
~en there are those wh<!) would def:i.me NaturE~ as the realm of matter, 
"If the~e.~ere a clear concept of matter it wou~d afford a useful ori-
teri'ln of na.ture.u4 Dualists find. this definition use:t\1~, t.Ihe difflioulty 
lie~ in the definition of matter. The dualist viawa matter 'as' so differ-
ent from the shining present, 'both qualitatively and quarltd. tatively-1 that 
the ocmaept of matter is seq to be in principle unver:L£:1. .. 
able, ~is does nQt absolutely disprove it. It onl1 re~ 
vea.ls ita meaninglessness £nm the point o£ view o£ any 
poeaible exper~enoe o£ any possible mind--numan1 s~bhuman~ 
or s"m.perhuman • .S . 
Henoe, to refer to nature as the realm o£ matter is to distinguish it 
nom the non~ateri.a.l1 but it is not to define what nature real:cy- is, 
unless it defines what matter really is, Two things are sures the lump 
thsor,r o£ matter is irrenonoilable with axperienee and the aonoept of 
matter nse~es usefully as a symbol of the fact that experience requires 
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objecti7e being of sQme sort if its comings and goings are to be under-
stood.111 
~ 
v. The Empirical Evidence for Nature as Fb.eno:menal 
The data of sensation are irrefutable evidence for the existence of 
... 
a world of space and motion and change. This world of space and motion 
~-. ... . 
and change is not an illus~on. It is not mere~· subjective, butts a 
world' that has an objective reality~2 It does exist as a world of phe-
nomena. To deny the phenomenal existence of :the apparently objective 
world is to shake the foundations of sCience and philosophy, and to make .. 
nonsense of experience·;as a w~ole. The charge that personalism is wholly 
subjective is without any found~~~on. 
No personalist thinks that reality depends on human minds,· c 
or that chairs and tables will vanish into .-nothingness if 
we human beings cease .to percej,va. ·them; personalism recog-·. 
nizes fully that the world of nature is a system of ob-
jective reality and activity. It differs from realism, 
no:t on the score of objectivity, but simply in the par-.. 
ticu~ar way iri which it defines the objective world.3 
' . -. . , 
Th,e data of sensation supply ample evidence for the belief in the 
phenqn.ehal reality of nature. But to assert that nature, or· the ob-
jective world of .spa.g-~ and motion and change, has no reality other than 
phenomenal or sen1;1ory is a. hasty conclusion_, a conclusion that is 
challenged by the eVidence which suggests that nature has another kind 
of_ reality, namely, noumenal. 
~ . ·· ... ··--·· 
J ..... UM~taphysics,tt .Chapter X, p .• 
2.-, .. ·,. Natu;r:e and Values, p. lilJ.. · 
3 ... :.I~ GOO. a Person?, P• ·21. 
·."! 
"1A_ . 
.J:.W. 
·.'·;'i 
3. Nature as Nownenal 
i. The Definition of Noumenal 
A phenomenan is an ~o~ject as it appears to the senses.n1 Sensory 
experience is evtdence of the existence of a phenomenal w~rldo jhis 
world of phenomena has been referred ta as nature. A noumenon is an 
"object as it is for~ th<Nght." 2 The contrast between a phenome-
non and a noum.enon is :imp0rtant sitlce thle senses taken alone deeei ve 
the experiencer. Sometimes the data of sensory experienee suggest the 
existence of an object, which upon careful. investigation is seen to be 
an illusion or a mirag~~ Such ari experience war!lls the experiencer that 
certainty involves inve~tigation and veTifieation, and suggests that 
appearance be distinguished from reality. That the traveler is seeing 
what appears to be an oasis in the middle of the desert is to him a;n 
indubitable fact. But whether there is an objective reality that corre-
spends with his sensory pattern requires further examinatiolil. The 
railroad tracks appear to converge, yet_;the engineer, :,as he travels 
·. -along, finds them parallel. In water the pipe appears be:itt; fu1·-t.b.er 
investigation (removing it f'rom the water) proves it st.raigb.t. This 
does not mean to suggest that the pipe as bent is a phenomenon while 
the pipe examined and found straight is a neumenono Even the pipe as 
folll1d straight involves deception. It suggests that its na:ture is a 
hard, round substance--a cylindrical lump of matter •• It d~monstrates 
1. An Introdletioi1 to Philosophy, p. 334.. 
2. Ibi.d., p. 333. . 
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itself in such a form, but careful examination proves the pipe to be 
completely different in essential ~alytical construction. Actually 
the pipe is countless protons and electrons in highly complicated 
interrelated activity, which, according to the pattern of their activity, 
give the sensory impression of pipe as this particula~ pipe appears. 
The contrast is made in order to illustrate different phases of the ob-
jective world. Sensory experience suggests the phenomena~ aspect of 
the objective world. The question now arises: Has nature ~ noumenal 
aspect, and, if so, w9-~t is it? Assuming the method of ;radical empiri-· 
cism and the criterion of empirical coherence, what more can or need be 
said of nature, if anything? 
ii. Nature as Energy 
It was seen in the discussion of substance that the older co~ 
ception of nature as Democri tean atoms in motion is no longer acceptable 
to science or to philosophy. Taking its place is a new energ:ism. 
Matter is no longer thought of in tery:Is of lumps or what appears to be 
inert bodies of spatially extended material. Rather, matter is now seen 
to be essentially activity or energy. The present difference am.eng 
scientists and philosopn·ers is not whether or not matter is energy, but 
rather what ·kind of energy it is. ttThe vital difference be·tween materi-
alistic energism and personalism. :t's whether the 'energy' is- defined in 
te:rjns of ~· \lnyerifiable non-menta.l power, or is iu;terpreted empirically 
in terms of. conscious 'W:ill.ltl 
.f -:; J 
l~ -"Metaphysics, 11 Chapter X, p. llo 
iii. Nature as Source of ~otional Satisfaction 
Mention should also be made of the romantic view oj: 
Nature as a source of emotional elevation and satis-
.faction. This conception is not metaphysical in the 
philosophical sense, but it is not Without empirical 
importance.l 
Men of science and pll.i1osophy often neglect the feelings of inspiration 
that come from beholding the order and beauty of natu.reo 
~e beauty and sublimity of Nature, the sen~e of 
mystical cosmic harmony that arises from contem-
plation of t~e natural order, the elevated teelings 
and thoughts that arise within when r man forgets 
. his petty self in the silent ongoing of Nature's 
·mysterious forces have been experienced by many who 
are not official members of any romantic schoolo 
Every fact of experi~nce is a fa~t, and no fact can 
be neglE?cted by a metaphysician.. .· 
To be sure, the fact that the order and beauty. of nature prove in-
spiring in the life of man in no way defines what nature is. 11The 
romantic experiences are only a small part of the ev1.dence. n3 There 
is m~ch in natur~ which neither inspires nor elevates.4 Hence, while 
the romantic aspect of nature cannot be neglected_, it cannot be re-
garded as defi.n:Ltive. 
iv. Nature as Mi;nd 
Nature has been defined as the area of reality that is approached 
through the senses. It is immed:i,.a.t.ely obvious that, this area of re-
ality is phenomenally real. The ·data of sensation insist; upon it. To 
.. 
1. "Metaphysics, n Chapter X, p. 11. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4,. nA Christian View of Nature, 11 p. 7lo 
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deny the existence of phenomena is to cast experience upon the rocks. 
But to accept the data of sensation uncritica.lly is to be deceived. The 
straight stick does appear bent when stuck into the water. The data 0f 
sensation must be verified through coherent evaluation as seen in the 
last chapter. 
The critical evaluation of the data· of sensation has led the 
physicists to discover that so-called matter is not a lump of inert 
stuff but rather quintillions of electrons, protons, neut;rons 5 etc, enti-
ties Whose patterns of activity give the sensory impression of 11things.tt 
If things are not what they appear to be, the .question irnmediateJ.y 
arises, "What are. things in essence? II Using the scientific method of 
analysis, the t:teo-realist concludes that things are composed of entities 
that have the properties of neither mind nor matter. Hence .they are 
neutral, and the variety of material demonstrations can be.accounted for 
through the variety of combinations and associations of the neutral 
entities,. 
Brightman finds the analytical method philosophical~ inadequate, 
.reality being reduced to an entity, the nature of which i·s unknowno To 
find the tru t~, the part needs to be interpreted in the light of the 
whole.1 when the whole realm ~f physical things is taken into consider-
ation it is found to be ordered5 interaetivej) and apparently purposive. 
Neutral entities leave these experiences unexplained mysterieso These 
experl.ences are characteristic of mind. Perhaps nature is a mind in 
.. 1 •. See Chapter II. 
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action.1 \.The world of personality is larger than the reaJJn. of nature. 
as here defined, 2 in· that personality includes ideals and values~ . liTo 
reduce all being to Nature is to disregard all the evidence of experi-
ence except the senses. 113 But to accept a 11realistic view of Nature is 
to go beyond.the evidence of all possible experience and to invent un-
verifiable beings .. 114 Viewing nature as mind in action seems to be the 
most coherent hypatb.e.sis o-5 
v. The Empirical Evidence for Natnre as Mind 
In a short paragraph Brightman gives in condensed form his reasons 
for accepting nature as mind. 
'Why do personalists believe that nature is mind? 
Fir,st, because all the evidence for nature is personal 
consciousness; 7here Brightman footnotes: 11Hence it is 
quite unfair for realists like R. B. Perry to make much 
of the 'ego-centric predicament.' That we are conscious 
is more than a predicament; consciousness is the ·very 
stuf.f of all given reality., 9 secondly, because we 
believe in the objectivity of nature primarily on the 
ground that it resists, yet responds to, our will; 
thirdly·, because nature is mathematically constructed; 
and fourthly, because nature expresses purpose. These 
lines of thought lead to the hypothesis that nature is 
consc~ous, bational, purposive will--in short, personal 
exper~ence. 
1. Nature and Values, P• 57. 
2. Ibid., PP• 57-!£8. 
3. "Metaphysics, 11 Chapter X, p .. 15. 
4. Ibid. 
5. The discussion is abbreviated here because the conclusion is 
rather obvious in the light of Brightman's theory of substance. 
See page 105. 
6. Nature and Values, pp. 123-124. See also An Introduction to 
Philosophy~ p. 135, "Metaphysics, 11 Chapter X, p. 13, Is God a 
Person?, p .. 15. 
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Elaboration of this evidence as well as further evidence will appear in ., 
the discussion that follows. Another passage indicating the same hypothe-
sis :is found in Personality and Relig:io~. 
Materialism, naturalism, and su.bpersonalistie realism of 
every kind are theories more hypothetical~ more remote 
from the fact~, and less empirical, than is the simple 
inference fro• personal experience that the whole uni-
verse is in some sense personal experience.l 
4. Nature as Divine Activity 
i. Nature as Divine Personal Activity 
In the preceding section it was suggested that nature as the area 
of realit,r that is approached through the senses is not only real as 
phenomena but is es~entially of the e~aracter of :mind. As mind, it is 
"conscious, rational, purposive will-in short personal experience." 
In the. discussion of the category of substance it was found that subo-
stanoe is efficient am final cause, volition.a1 and purposive, and 
hence perso:r1a1.2 If these hypotheses are sufficiently verified, :it 
.follows that nature is personal activity. As personal activity it must 
have at least the traits of personality that were described in Ohapter 
Three. It :nmst be a unity of conscious awareness, a· shining present, 
that experiences, remembers, and anticipates if it is to be fully 
personal. 
As personal activity, Nature is obviously more than human. It is 
1~ Personalit[ and Religion, p. 61. 
2. See page 11). 
-···· 
experienced as the Creator, the Sustainer, and t~e Preserver of the 
shining presents of all. l:J.~n persons 0 cen~!~s~d withl the minute. and 
fragmentary human shining present it is so vast and enduring as to be 
mystifying. Could it not be said that this personal activity is Divine? 
Before it can be concluded that Nature is divine activity, other evidence 
for God should be exarnined.l 
ii. The Evidence for the Being of God 
The examination of the category of substance and the reaJ.Jn oi' 
physical things has led to the conclusion that Nature is Divine 
Personal Activity~ or God.. The question then arises whether or not 
there is other evidence for the being of God. Brightman divides the 
chief evidence for God into six basic types, po~ting out that, if each 
is to include the whole of experience, th,ere wili be some overlapping.2 
First, the rationality of the universe is evidence for God.3 
. - ~ . . 
The experience of reason is basic to the ~xperiepce of Godo 
As we experience it, reason· is the power of· the hunlan 
mind to perceive'the relations of' its id,!3as, to see 
that some are inconsis-tent with each oth13r, that some 
are consistent; arid tha't soine are so clqs13ly related 
that they follow necessarily from 6therso4 
- -
To deny this fact of reason is to render ~xperience unintelligible 
and the world chaotic. Without reason as here defined there would be no 
l. Here the concern is the being or existence of God rather than His 
nature. His attributes will be discussed later. 
2. 'l'b.e Problem· of God, pp., l48-l6.5; The Futur..2 of Christianity, 
pp. l00-l06. . . . . . . 
3. The Problem .of God, p· .. l48; The Future of Christianity, p. 100 .. 
4. The Future of Christianity, p. ioo. 
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God; there would be nothing. Admission of the fact of reason alone is 
:insufficient evidence for the being of God9 but it is a significant part 
of the evidence in that it points to an objective world that is rational 
in stri:lcture. '"Whatever shows the universe to be ratiorui.l shows it to be 
what one would expect from the' handiwork of a Su.p~eme Mi.na.,ui and Ita 
universe in which reason pie-vails is a universe that points toward its 
God..n2 
Secondly, the fact of reason suggests "the necessity of eternal 
being.n3 Something must be eternal unless sheer nothing produces real 
existence. Although the abstract necessity of an eternal something.does 
. . ,· 
not embody the full idea of God, it does tak~ a step in that direction. 
Thirdly,. an argument similar to the first is ~the fact of conscious 
personality" as evidence for belief in God.4 Co~sciousness is the only 
reality to which there is first-hand access. "All the facts that I have 
to deal with are the facts of my personal experlence."5 Everything that 
is known about the worJ..d beyond consciousness must be known t4rough the 
. ;..< 
facts in consciousness. 6 Consciousness interacts with the objective 
world. "If consciousness and its objects were actually· as different as 
they . seem at. first glance to be3 the daily commerce between our minds and 
things would be impossib1e. 10·7 Thus conscious personalit; points to a 
J./ The Problem of God"' P• 148~ 
2 .. ·The Future. of Christianity9 
3ac"Jbid. 
Po J.OJ.o 
4~.}~&0b~e)n of'· God,)· p .. 154: ·The Flttu.re ·of Christianity9 P• lOlo 
5.; ·\The . FU .. · t. ur. e· of Christiw..i !.z~ p.. 101., 
6~,The~oblent· of God., Po 155o 
1·.'~·~ .• I' 
wo;rld beyond that is essentially of the same kind. "To this cosmic 
' ' - • • ' r ' h 
experience, in organic relations with which our mind stands, we give the 
. name God. 11 :further, the f~ct of consciousness. suggests a conscious 
cause. ".A cosmic consciousness is the only conceivable source of evo-
lution which can be ciea.rly seen to be Cl.dequate to the facts Ill as known 
by-human conscio:p,.sn~ss;o 
·Fourthly, 11the emergence of novelties points to God.u.2 By emergence 
' 
of novel.ties B:r,·ightm?:n m~ans three things o First3 that true novelties 
. '· ... - . '· . 
emerge,: new qualities that a!'e more than tta mere recombination of eternal 
unchangingoat?~s .• 1!3 To be true novelties the emergents must contain 
qu~ t:L~f> that are such that they ea.:n.not be explained as new patterns of 
some previous atoms. Life is more than inorganic matter; and perso:naiity 
-·· it '- . . ' '· 
is _more than blind and unthinking life. These are true novelties. 
Secondly, ttthere are relevant novelties.u4 ·Life and personality are 
r~~evant novelties if the discussion of the first and' third types of 
evidence is sound.· The belief that cha.:t?-ce alone :could produce, through. 
a.recomb:Lnation of atoms, Uli.fe and mind and society and genius and art 
and· religion without a:IJ.Y guidance: by purpose is a far blinder and less 
intelligent faith than the faith in a personal God.u5 Thirdly, novelties 
' . ;.. ~ . ' 
should be viewed .as· wb.ole9. 
No" study of separate cells in our organism will explain 
l..· The Problem of God, p·. 157. 
~: .• -.The Fut~e of Christi.ab:i'ty; p. 
j; The~>P.roh1""YTY of· God, P·· lSQ. .· 
Ji.;· Ibj.:~.,, lh 151. . . 
~ • Ibid.-, p. l.?3·· 
lOJ; ~he P):>oblem of.God, P• 150. 
.> 
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the co-ordinated ·behavior of our organism as a whole;· 
no study of separate sensations in our minds will ex-
plain j:he properties and purposes of our minds as a 
whole. 
To understand the full meaning of anything it must be considered in its 
context, and when novelty is considered in its complete context, it 
points to God as lithe most reasonable e:g:planation of the facts of 
experience •112 
Fifthly, value experience is evidence for God.3 Man experiences 
not o.n.JJ- the desires for every day necessities but also for 11the ideal 
-values of love, t:n:rt:h, goodness, beauty, and holiness. 114 In this desire 
there is a clue .for the existence of God. urn every man there is the 
divine spark, the recognition of the worth of life when rightly lived, 
the demand for something better than yet is. 115 Purpose in nature sug-
gests that Nature, too, strives toward ends. 
The adjustment of life to its environment and of 
different forms of lif~ to their specific needs, the 
tendency of organisms to regenerate lost parts, the 
fact that independent lines of descent develop similar 
functions using different structures--these and many 
other facts all point ~o the presence of a purposive 
power in the universe. 
Just as the coherent explanation of true novelty requires the being of 
God so also does the fact of value and purpose. 
1. The Problem of God, p. 154. 
2. Ibid. . 
3. Ibid~, p. 157; The Future of Christianity, p. 104. 
4• 'Tfi'SProblem of God, p. 157,o~ 
5. Ibid., P• 158. · · ... 
6. Ibid.,., pp .. 158 ... 159. 
~ 
t 
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Another .. type of evidence. _is that of religious experience. By re-
ligious experience Brightman means aQY experience specifically oriented 
with the divine.l Were this experience localized to a few scattered in-
dividuals the evidence might well be questioned~ but nthe testimony.? not 
only of mystics but of ordinarY believers of many faiths, is so. clear and 
abundant th~y it.constitut~s an additional ground for belief in God.n2 
~ .. 
Consensus gentium is no ultimate criterion of truth. So, taken alone, 
religious eXperience may be ~vidence only to ·the believer_; but considered 
in relation to the other evidence, it constit.utes further empirical evi-
dence for God. 
UAl.l of the other types of evidence reduce to "and must be judged by 
the 'stand~d of the evidence from system~tic coheren~e.~3 It was seen in 
the discussion of this criterion of truthh. that no singie experience is 
·-
sufficient evidence for a conclusion while isolated from the whole of 
ex:perie:q.ce. It was found furtb.er,5 that :verification is a process of re-
lating the toi;.ality of e.xperienQe in such a wa,y as to give the most 
coherent accoun~ -of ex:perl ence cons;i..dere,d in its to~ali ty o When thea e 
types of experience are considered as a whole they give a more coherent 
account of experience through the assertion of a Divine Being than does 
the denial of that Being. Hence, if experience is to be trusted(and it 
· ·must be) ·God ·is. 
1,~ 'A ·Philosophy of Rel.i~on~ · · · ·--
2,. The l?;to bf.em. of God, pp o 160-16L 
3,. 'Ibid._, P•. 161 •. 
4. Chapter ::n. 
5. Chapter :rv. 
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iii. The Preliminary Ide~ ~f God 
To the extent that the evidence· suggests the existence. of God, to .. 
the. same extent .the same evidence suggests the existence of. a God. 'With a 
certain nature.· Thus• the first type of evidence, the fact of' reason (as 
developed in the previous section), suggest~ not merely that God.exists, 
but that. God eXists as r,ational, . co:nSciou~:~ mind. 
Besides recognizing th.e immediate certainty of 
pers onal ... experience, personalism postulates confidence 
in reasonCllid. in any b.ypotheses necessary rationa.Lcy- to 
order and interpret experiericeo This gives the person-
alist his right to believe in other persons and in an 
objective natural order. He accepts, o£ course, the 
descriptions which science gives of the world of nature, 
and hence he views nature as an object.ive system of 
.. energy. When he relates the conclusions of science to 
the fact that his personal experience is a p~t of 
··nature, constantly interacting with it, he c<n1cludes 
that the most reasonable hypothesis is to regard the 
energy of the physical world as a cosmic will, the 
conscious ener~ of a cosmic person, whose thoughts are 
laws. of nature o 
Simil~ly, the second type of evidence, "the necessity of eternal 
being, n would suggest God as the unbegun. and the unending, perhaps as 
standing wholly apart from time .• 2 From the third type of evidence, the 
I 
fact of conscious personality, it would follaw that God :Ls at least 
peFsonal. The eVidence of novelty in the universe would indicate a God 
that is creative and purPf>siveo3 Values in gen,eral and religious ex-
perience in particular would suggest that God is the Creator.!l Susta:iner, 
i., "Personalism and Economic Securityn, pp. 2·21-222. 
2 •. This·; it'.will·be se,en 1ater(in S.ection v) is not Brightman's 
inter,;,p¢:'8:t.ii,~.tion of "eternal.n · 
3.~ Th.e'future of Christianitl, p. 103o 
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.,.., and Increaser gf vaJ:n.es as we~l as being the Vl1Qbject91 of 'W'Ca"Ship~ When 
. 
the various t;ypes of evidence are taken synoptically ·lfu.ey point to the 
exist~ce of a Personal God. The ~aditional conception of God as om-
' 
nipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent is unl9lllpir:tcal in that it fails to 
take into adequate . ac;: count the. problem of valu6 ... 3Xl.d-::l.isval~ o If na;tu.re 
is divine aotl:-v:i.ty1. what ab<?ut th~ a:specta of nature that seem 
.dystele o gica.l? 
iv. The Problem ·of Va.lue-and-Disvalue 
VaJ.:q.e :Q.a~ been defined ea.ri~er as ~~whatever is desired or pre-
ferred.u~ .'nisv~ue may be defined as whatever is lacking in value or 
.•. . 
obstructive to the experience of vabte. Like values, disvaJ..ues may be 
either int;rinsio or .inst::-umental. Intrinsic disvaJ.ues or evils2 include, 
. as indicated before,3 "a ,tin i!hat is inore or less incoherent_,nh. "the 
intellectual E!vil o~ ignorance,u5 tRmaJ..a.djustment>-6 "inconrpetsnce," and 
•the dysteJ.eog:i:cci.l surd·o~ 1 While the first four types of intrinsic dis-
value .may be "superseded by internal de·velopment~~ the last, the dystele-
ologieal surd is 'Ita type 'of evil which is inherently. and irreducibly' 
1. See page 129. 
2. Brightman uses the terms good .... and-avi.1 and value-and-d.isvalue as syn-
onymous, pointing out that in doing so he does not mean that. good 
refers to moral good alone but rather to all valueo If good.r·efers to 
moral good and evil to moral evi.1.9 it will be indicated as such. 
3.. Page 1.42. 
4. A Pb.ilosoph:f of RelilE:p.,E;, p'. 244., 
5· Ibid .. 
6. Ibid"' P• 245.. , 
7 o Ibid •. ~. Brightman explains ·~at a surd in mathematics is a quantity not 
. expressible ;Ln rationa.;L n~ber.s; so a surd in the realm of value ex• 
perience is an evil that is not. expres~ible in terms of good_, no 
matter 'What operations are performed o:n it. 
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evi-l and contains Within itself ·n:o principle of development or im-
provement.ul rt is not certain that such a surd ~Vil exists, though 
it is conceivable, imbecility being ~- possible example. If such surd 
evils do exist.? they' are not in a'.riy~ense i'nt.~i..'I'J.s·ic goods. 2 
Like vai'lues$ · di~values mity 'be inst.!-um.ental.. J'.n so far as arry 
event or experi5lic.e tends to produce an e:x.pe:den,:,e of disva.lue it may 
be called :an instrumental evil.. The processes of. evolution leading to 
.. .; 
the waste of life anf time (nmillions of- years seem to have served no 
·~ . 
intrinsic val~e. 11 )3 wou;td._not be exempt .from the category of instru-
mental evil., 
. . •. ~ . 
. ::~ . 
The existence of both good and evil.:> ·value and disvalue in the same 
~ve~S\? raises both a religiou.!S a.nd a philosophical pr.oblem. · Th~ ·re-
ligious problem has -two aspects,- "the difficulty of believing good to 
be ultimate, 11 and "the difficult;r of achieying good., 114 The philosophical 
problem is_ one of unifying the .. conflicting claims of experience. Some 
experience points to th_~ existence of val'u.e; some experience points to 
disva.lue. Haw is one to reconcile the existence of both good a.n.d evil 
in a purposive universe? The philosophical min.d seeks a coherent whole 
and hen~e must face the problem. of value-and-disvalue.5 
There are several attempted solutions to the Pl"Oblem of value~arid--
disvalue. First, there is that philosophy which claims that 11 evi.l is· 
1..-.., A Philosopht of ReligioE-, 
2...., Ibid •. , p .. , 2 6 .. 
3 .:. Y5id "''-' p •. 24 7 .. 
4o Ibid~, P• 248. 
5. ][bid;,, ·p. 250. 
·, 
PI->. 245·~246. 
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u.nreCJ.l, ttl; .illusion, or "error, of mortal mindon2 . Three criticisms. render 
this attempted solution invalid.3 Firstp if the natural order is non-
existent in so far as it appears evil,s a real shadow i~ cast upon the 
objectivity of. any reality.., including good. If evil is uerror of mortal 
mind,tt on what, basis can it be defended that good is not? Secondly, 
11 even if evil is error, the error e:rlsts in human consciousness and does 
as much ham .as if it were objective. u4 Thirdly, this attempted so-
lution does not exp]~ how such error could arise in a. supposedly 
pE\rfect urrl,vers,e.. Denying the re~ ty of evil mortgages the validity 
., l ' ' • 
of experj;~P,.ce. If experience is untrust.wortby, philosophy is. sel.f-
decept~on, and this attempted solution :i,.s self-refuting~ ;· ... 
. Secondly, it is held that 11 good a.nd evil. are the qutct>ID;e of p:r:o--:. 
,ceases or entitief:l which are a:xiolog?.ca.!J::l neutral.n5 Good and evil e:x:-
. . ~ 
ist.on:cy i~consciousness and consciousness is the accidental product of 
... 
unconscious processes of nature. The cosmic causes leading to va.~e . 
experience in conscio,usness are neither good nor evil, so that the 
pro'l:;>lem of good-and ... evil has no cosmic referent,. Brightman .. claims this 
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is an evasion of the problem rather than a solut.iono It fails to account 
adequate~ for the arrival of consciousness~ It denies the eXistence of 
.,. . . 
any Cosmic Purposer and hence goes ~ontrary to a.D. 'the· evidence for God. 
I~ rcP.sE?,S more problems ,thB.fl it solves. J!f previous argument has been 
s~u:p.d., . any attempted solution to the p:;:ooblem .•of va.J.ue··and-disvaJ.ue must 
take into accolint the reality of both evil and God$ 
Thirdly.~> it is suggest.ed that 11~ra.;J- evils" al:'e the 11~1t ~ 
human freedom. 11J. Unless a mind is free to choose.11· it can be blamed. 
for nothing. But hliman freedom leaves une.xp.Lained why ·there are :i.n 
the nature of things so many temptatio~'!S to evi.l choicesp and. why the 
consequences of some evil choices that are so utterly·disastrou.s.2 
Though freedom explains much of moral eviJ.p it does not expla.i.n 11 either 
the force of temptation or the debasing c~msequences of moral. ev1l.u3 
... 
Fourthly !l nonmoral ev:i.J.s have been vi.ewed as 11~nisbment fo!' 
the moral: evils.; n4 This theory assumes a superhuman punisher o If this 
superhuman pwi:tsher is God, how w:i.l.l one explaijJ. the unj11st distribution 
of plll.)isbment? .Furthe!", Sllch a, crude· theory of punitJhm.ent is ethically 
repugnant when attributed to human power5o When atttibuted to God it 
falls by :L ts ow:n weight o 
Fifthly, if not penal, pe:rhaps evil 11m.a.y be regarded as disci-· 
plinary. u.S Tho~~ i:t is true that d:i.scipline develops character, 
disciplinary e_nds that are initiated by a Divlne Being who is both om-
nipotent and just should meet t,wo ccnditons at lea~;rt. 11First_, they 
should appear wherever they are needed and only where they are needed. 
Secondly, they should be pe:i:'fect:I.:y adapted to their ideal end. It is 
1. 1., Philoso:ehy of B.elig:;i.o:t?;.., Po 260-,,;' 
21 Ibid., 
.3~ Ibid .•. , p. 261,. 
4-1 Ibid¥ 
_5., Ibid., p. 262. 
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clear that neither of these conditions is met.l 
Sixthly, cannot ~vil be thought of ttas incomplete goodtt?2 If the 
true is the whole and the true is good, then the whole is good. Anything 
less than the whole is incomplete good, and~ as incomplete, is evil. 
From synoptic logic the argument has force, but 11it is cogent only if 
we lmow in advance that every whole is necessarily good, or that this 
is true of the universe as a whole. From incompleteness alone, the good-
ness of the complete ?annat be derived. In fact, it is as true. in same 
cases to say that good is incomplete evil as to say that evil is incom-
plete good." 3 The jays of intoxication are an example. 
Whether the whole is good or evil must therefore be 
settled on other grounds than the incompleteness of 
our experience. Moreov.er, even if the whole could be 
proved to be good, and sll evils therefore instru-
mental goods, there would still remain the question of 
why the perfect whole had to contain both intrinsic and 
instrumental evils.4 · . 
Further, some hold that 11 evil is needed as a contrast to good.tt5 
It is. true that the experience of evil often enhances the appreciation 
of good, but whether it is necessary to experience evil before on~ can 
appreciate good is not so certain. ·This a.:t"gument of '~contrast-effecttt 
is not, wholly false, but it fails as a solution to the problem of value-
and-disvalue beca~se it fails to account for the existence of an 
abundance of eVil that is superfluous for contrast-effect. ttThere is 
1. A Philosopht of Religion, p. 263. 
2. Ibid., p. 2~. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., p. 265. 
5. Th':}.d. 
--
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far more ignorance and misery in the. world than is needed as an 
effective .·co:p.trast to wisdom and health.u?-. 
An eighth argument is that 11,nonmoral .e'Vils_, as well as mol(al ones, 
ar.e. a result of £reed.om.u 2 · There is llttle evidence for tij.is argum~nt 
unl.ess the. ~eedom referred to be .c~msidered the freedom. of God, .. and 
when so considered, the crlicial cr.i tioisrn. is:: !Why shoUld the freedom 
of God result :in eVil? By what P):'inciple is evil essential even as a 
result of freedom, .human or citvine? 
I ,•. 
. Another argument ponders the possibility that evils, which: to 
huma.tl: bein~~: are intrinsic su:rd.s, 11are needed in the universe as instru-
ments to beings other than men. 11 .3 There is not. the slightest evidence 
in experi:ence .for this. proposed ~elution. Supposing that. it w.ere true, 
several questions arise.. First,· 11WhY.: must humanity be fuel to the fire 
that warms the hands of another. race? 114. Secondly, by what logic could 
it be thought that imbecility and disease a.;re in~trumenta;J.. t,o the in-
trinsic. value, of some unknown beings? 
A ;tirial suggested solution_,··a· more. general: form of the·. ·one just 
mentioned, is· that ttall: evils..,...::tntri~sic and instrumental-.... s.erve an un-
kD.own good. n5 As in the previous argument the appeal here is to human 
ignorance. . rn the preVious. argument tlie solution appealed to the un-
. know good of some··unkriown being. · Here the appeal is limited to the 
.·, •: ... 
: ·'····· •• • .'·, 4. 
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unknown go.od alone•. There ar.e two ·basic objec·tions to, arry proposition 
which appeal& to human ignorance fo~ support.l 
The two main objections to the proposition rest on . 
(a) its confusion of good and· evil. and (b) the irrele-
·:vance .. of,ignorance • .By.·(q.) its confusion of good a.nd 
evil is ·meant that if we must wait for the revelation 
of the Unknown before :we decide that an apparent evil 
is a'real evil, then we should be consistent enough to 
go the. whole way· and grant that_, in .the present .state 
of our knowledge, we cannot assert that any given ex-
perience is either good or· e~l. The two are, in our 
ignorance., confusedly indistinguishable. • .•• (b) 11 The 
irrelevance o;f. ignoranc~ 11 means that our ignorance 
cannot be used to support ~ particular belief.2 
' To summarize, it should be pointed out that thought can follow one 
of four possible courses in attempting to solve the problem of value-
l .•••• 
and-disvalue. First, neutralism, which maintains that the universe is 
neutral or indifferen,t to value experience. Tf the discussion of valu~s 
' ' 9 
and evidence ;for God is sound; neutralism in any form is not the so-
lution of the problem. It ignores rather than solves the problem •. 
Second_, optimism, which claims that good is the supreme principle and 
11 evil is ei:ther unreal o; is instrumental to good. u.3 It has been seen 
"· 
that optimism thus defined essentially denies the reality of evil and 
hence calls the validity of all of experience into question. Third., 
pes'si;m_'sm, 'Which, in contrast to optimism., holds that disvalue is. supreme 
and good either unreal or instrumental. This view disregards the facts 
of immediate intrinsic value experience. Fourth, meliorism, which 
~ . ·. 
l~~. Because .'of their ilnpor'tance iri Brightman Is theistic cosm.ology they \ ·a.ra quoted here in full. 
2, .A ·Philosophy of Religion, pp. 269-270. 
3. Ibid., p. 276. 
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asserts that 11in some sense both good and evil. are real,, but good is 
dominant in that the state of affairs in the .universe is always su~·cepti­
ble of improvemen-t-. ul Obviously Brigh tma.n would find the solution of the 
problem of value-and-disvalue in some form of meliorism. 
At this point:it needs to be as.ked, What .constitutes a solution to 
' .. -~ . 
. . . . 
the problem of value-arid-dis'value· as. sta:ted? .. Previ~us discussion ;has 
shown that·~ coherent interpreta.tion·:of .. ~~erienc{3 .. pqsit~ the existence 
• • •• • '" • \, • 0 
of God as well. ~-$::-the existence cif bo.th ~ood ~<{, evil. 2 To deny the 
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existence of God is to disregard the eviden~e--enumerateci earlier. To deny 
the reality of. e;ttl:ii3T good or evil is to disregard the experience of both 
.. ' . .· 
. intrinsic evil and .i.ntrlnsic good .. 3 
. ; . 
The goal to which the: philosopher 
J...ay,s cl~m i'f? a .cohe~ent interp:J;'E3tation of the whole .. of experience and 
hence he can disreg-~d IfO experience vii thout peril. Unless the philoso-
.. "'·>. ~. • . , .. . • . . ... ' ~ 
pher is .going to .. explain evil.·away:,·~¢1.; evade rather than solve the problem 
'.. ' .. l~ I • " • ... ·: 
•. .! 
of valu~:-a.p.d-<l:i9yalue ~ he must gi ye "a rattional definition of the evil of 
evil and of _the ;good of good and of their relations to purpose in the 
univer.se. 114 That alone would be. an adequate solution. The most adequate 
soluti.on to the problem of value-and-disvalue, the:d, w;i..ll be the m~it 
coherent interpretation of the relationships between the evil of e~l, 
lating the good of good and -the evil of evil_ t,o .-the purpose in the 
1~ A Philosophy of Religion, pp. 276-277. 
2·•- _'l;'b,~ .F,.:i,n4:4r+g of God, P• 169. · 
3;. The Future of Christianity, p~ 104. 
4. A Philosophy of Religion, p. 279. 
. I ' 
universe, it follows that the:solution must take some form of either 
theistic absolutism or theistic fiffi.,tism •. As theistic,. both v:i.ews a,gree. 
that "God is an eternal, conscious spirit, 'Whose will is unfailingly 
good. nl Further :they agree that· .. 
God is a person, •• • ideals are objective, •. • • God 
is worthy of worship, ••• God is responsive to man, 
• . • • God is in some sense ... in c.ontrol of the universe., 
••• [cm§that in at least two senses God is limited: 
namely, by the principles of reason and by his own . 
self_.limitation in his creation of free beings able to 
sin.2 
The key to the solution of the problem :of value-and .... disvalue is to 
·be found in the factor that d:i.stinguishes theistic absolutism from 
theistic fini tism. Theistic absoluti'sm asserts that the will of God is 
absolute in both goodness and pawer. As absolute,. the Will of God .is 
the source of all d.isvalue e:x:cept moral evil. "The will of God faces no 
conditions w.i.thin .the divine experience which that. will did not create 
(or at least.approve),.u3 Hence all evil contains some purpose for good 
even though knowledge 'o.f that purpose is beyond human.reach.4 Theistic 
.fini ti..sm .. maintains "that the will of· God does .face co:adi tions within 
divine· experience which that will neither created nor approves. 11 5. 
Further, nwhile God's will ·is perfectly good, his power is limited by 
condi tiona which; he did not create. u6 · Thea e unwilled condi tiona w;i. thin 
1~ A Philosophy of Religion, p. 281. 
2. Ibid., pp. 301-303. 
3·- Ibid~' p. 282. 
4~. :Ail1"rl.tr64uction to Philosophy, p. 176~ · 
5·.H A Pb:j;.lo.S-ophy o.f Religion, p. -282. ·• 
6., . ..An.I:q.troduct:i.ori to Philoso:pby, p. 176. 
. ~- .. 
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the .divine experience may be interpreted as ~esulting from a form. of 
being that is either ·internal or .mernal to. that divi:Q.e experience •• 
The· key arguments advanced in favor of· theistic al)solutism are 
listed briefly." Man 1s religious nature posits an absolute Deity. Man 
finds himselfdn a cond::Ltion ..from which he needs to be ~aved. While he 
1i ves in .a·.:world. that is apparently accidental and evil, he finds within 
.. 
• . + 
·' ~ himself an ideal of rational.' purpose and perfect good. When full-blown 
th:Ls ideal is"perfection of power, knowledge, and goodness. The ideal 
is. an .. outgrowth of his logical nature as well as his religic:ms. nature •. 
If one·recognizes coherence as an_ideal, flthere arises before'the mind 
- : . • .. · .• 
an ide~l of completely eoherE;lnt va.l1,w, pow~'"• ,,and. .eternity. Thus. logic 
leads to the absoluttstts God, as did r~ligious experience."1 
Brightman finds the religious argument defective in that history 
does not bear out the contention that· the natural implication and ful~ 
fillment of the ideal~:teads. to belief in an absolute God. Gnosticism and 
Manichaeism indicate that "relie'jion can flourish when absolutism is 
denied .. tt2 ·The logical argument is defective in that the appeal to co-
herence "carries with it no a priori information about the. object which 
is coherently thought about.u3 
In addition to these, there are five further objections to theistic 
absolutism.. First, "its appeal to ignorance. 114 Theistic absolutists 
. ·I 
l .• A Philosophy of Religion, p. 306. 
2.~· Tb·id~ , p. 308. · 
3. Ibid.·, p. 309·.· 
. 4~ Ibid. 
---:·. 
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maintain belief in an Absolute God even though they recognize that they 
cannot explain the evils of nature. Brightman finds this incrediblet 
In a word, our ignorance must lead either to silence 
or to further investigation, amd further investigation 
will always have. to be b .. sed on the eviden.ce that is 
available, not on data of l'ihich we are totally igno-
rant.l 
Second, "its ascription of surd evils to divine wil~ .• ••2 This com-
promises either G0dts goodness or his pewero If evil is really 'evil, 
8lld is:willed by God, then God is either malevolent or ilJlpo~e:P.ii.•3. I.f 
. '• l ,· ' .. ,.' . ·,_) 
malevolent, God is not worthy of the name; if impotent, God is not 
absolute in power. Yet to deny that evil is evi'J.. is to count experience 
untrustworthy. 
Third, "its tendency to make good and evil indiatingil.ishable."h 
If what' a,p:pears eVil actually serves. an unknown· good, then appa.l:'ent 
~Vii is real gob d. But, td. be required t0 interpret arr:r experience as 
good ini that it serves an unknown good, when.· all the . empd.rl.cal evadenee 
su~gests that it is evil, is .. t6 cba.~enge eo'herenee and render _g~od and 
evil ind;istinguishable. :tt criticizes what is known on the basis .o.f what 
is unknown .... This could hardly be called coherenee. 
Fourth, "its eutting the roet of moral en.deavoroat' For two reaso:as 
theistic abs<Dlutism "removes aJ.l ine~tiv:e fCli' m"ral ~eform of the in• 
1. A. Philoso1t _Q;f Religion, P• 310. See also· previous quotatio:a en 
ign<Drance ·· . ree pages earlier~ 
2. A Philosopey. Q!...Religion." .p. 310. 
3. Of'o. Hume• · .'. ··' · · · 
4. A. 'Phiipsophy of Religio~• lh 311. 
5. Ibid.o·; p. ~312 • . 
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dividual or of socie-ty •111 It .denies -the reali-ty o.f tim.e, and in doirJ,g 
so, reduces th~_imp0rtance o.f striving f.or change or improvement. 
v ·~; 
Further, its optimisill suggests that the world is timelessly perfect. 
11Ii' every eVil is really:·a good, why try to eliminate evils'?"2 
Fi.fth,: 11its unempirical character,.u3. ~heisti9 absolutism treats 
"a favored set of religious'·.d-esires .as· ultima-te intuitioris-.... which ~P 
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.. , . . .. ·• 
t~en: ~s absolute an4 _a priorL u4 ··. Assuming i;h!l:t its .a prf9ri fsri. th ~ll 
some dey- b~ explaine~, it. sweeps·· aside . empirical. evide~c~ that -is con-
trary to that faith. :rD. sci" doing, :i,theistic absolutism ·'is unempirical. 
'·· ..
The expeJ:lienc~· 0f ·evil cannot be neglected or explained away wi. thout 
hazard. -~he, t.P:eistic. fini'bist ~lds hi~:.faitX:·~,~~ no favored; .Part of. 
experienc~' but on."the concrete rough-and-tumble of experience 11 .5 as a 
whole. 
Each of the'se qb~ections to theistic·,absolutism points toward 
;. .. j·: 
theistic finitism.; Fiut-tism does. ~ot appeal to i.gnorance; it-'does not 
. ~ ' . . 
ascribe surd evils; to the_ will o'f..:.G6d. It'maintains-an eternai.-d.is-
tinotion between good and evil~ Rather than cutting. the root of. moral 
. ,• . ' " 
endeavor, it is "an ins.pi.ring challenge to .eternal eooperati.ve moral 
erideavor--a co'6peration b'e'tw.een God and:·man;n6 And .. finally, finitism is 
(' ... · 
1.- ·A Philosophy· ·a:r Religion, P• 312. 
2. IOid,. ·· · 
3, Ibid., p_ •. 313; 
4,; Ibid! 
5-# Ibid.~~ ~- .. 
6., :Ipfd.; p~" 314. 
.. 
See also "The Gospel as Co-operation. 11 
empirical. But apart from its· being strong where absolutism is ~eak, 
there.;i;s .. :positi.ve evidence m .:favor of theistic fini.tisln. 
The facts ot evolution suggest theistic finitism. On the one hand 
there se.em to be 11 colossal waste in the life process" and ttseemingJ..! 
aimless futility 11 involved in evolutionary development.l On the other 
hand there., is not only the survival of the .fit but the arrival of the 
fit. 11Thus the evidence of evolution is seemingly contradictory. It 
points toward purposeless waste and futility; and it points toward pur-
·poseful creation and yalue.tt2 · To account for the purpose there limst be 
God; to account for the waste and apparent futility there must be hin..-
' drance. Hence the concept of theistic finitism. 
Theistic finitism gives a coherent account of surd evilwithout 
minimizing evil or overlooking good.\' It maintains .. that "goodness iS 
more fundamental than power.t'.3 Power as such is not worthy of worship; 
"only the power of the good is adorable, and it is adorable because it 
is good rather than because it is power. God is the goodpess in the 
universe. If there is power for evil, it cannot be the will of God.u4 
liThe st·.ructure of all experience as activity, rational form, and 
brute factu5 is further evidence for theistic fini tism. Though all be-
ing is active, activity alone is an inadequate description of experience. 
In addition to activity 11 every real object embodies 'form 1 ; that is, it 
1. A Philosophy of Religion, p. 316. 
2. Ibid., p. 317. 
3. Ibid., P• 319. 
4• Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
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conform.s to the laws of reason and embodies rational principles.'~l 
Further, ttthere is a content of brute fact, n2 the s.ense qualities of 
experience, which are not activity but are stimulus and challenge to 
activity. To summarize, 11all experience is a constalit activity, which 
seeks to impose the forms of reason on the content of brute fact.tt3 In 
that the activity is evidence for the cosmic will of God,. the form is 
etidence for the uncreated eternal reason of God, and the content of .. 
brute fact is eVidence for the.uncreated non-rational content of God, 
the hypothesis of theisM,c ,fini tism 11 affords a coherent account of the 
structure of all experie~ce. u4 Theistic fini tists lay claim. to empiri-
cal adequacy, asserting that all the j:eatures of'·.-the empirical nature of 
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the wo;rld we experience 11 are explained by 'l;'eference to the eternal ground 
of all human experience--namely the divine experience.n5 
Brightman encounters five weighty objections to theistic finitism. 
first, "its supposed religious inadequac;y, u6 in, that religion (supposedly) 
requires a God who is perfect in power: a.s well as in goodness.. I'n de-
fense, Brightman indicates (i) that 11most religious believers have , 
regarded God as finite--:-far too finite, 11 7 seeking pictures and i,mages 
--unable to grasp nthe sublime ideas of theistic absolutismn; (ii) that 
even though the desire for theistic absolutism waf? widespread., it ttmust 
1. A Philosophy of Religion, P• 320. 
2~ Ibid. . .. . . 
3. Ibid •. 
4~::Ioid., p. 321. 
5,Ibid. 
6, Ibiaq p. 324. 
7. Ibid~, p. )25. 
'··''· 
be subjected to the dialectic of reason and factn;1 (:iii) that~nthe 
object of religious worship :is a perfect ide~l rather than a perfect 
power, u2 c;oodness being more important than power in an object of 
worship;. and (iv) that _"there are certain positive religious v9-lues that 
~·attach to tl).e idea of the finite God~? :\the· believer finds. great.er 
,. 
assurance of divine sympathy and love; he can find the divine struggle 
ag;ainst natural evil a spectacle of suffering and victory which is fitted 
to arouse deep religious e~otions of both reverence and co-operation; 
such a struggle 11affords ground for belief in creative cosmic advance, n4 
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inexhaustible perfectibility, and meaningful immortality); and (v) that it 
is more natural to pray to a finite God, who may be moved by our infirmi-
ties, than to an .Absolute, whose decrees are eternally fixed.u5 
.A second objection to theistic finitism is ttits anthropomorphism.u6 
Theistic .. finitism is anthropomorphic only in the sense that it is based 
upon human interpretation of human exper~ence--the only evidence that 
there is. 11.A belief, then, may be cog~ntly criticised not fQ+ anthropo .... 
morphism but only ·for incoherence. 11 7 .Theistic finitism is a statement 
about divine. experience, the source of all being,_based on human experi-
ence. 
.; . 
.A third objection to theistic finitism is ttits failure to absolve 
1~ .A Philosophy of Religion, p. 326. 
2. Ibid. 
3;. Ibid. 
4• Ibid., p. 328. 
5• Ibid .. 
6;.· Ibid. 
'7/IJ· Ibichr, p. 329 • 
God of responsibility for. creation. 11~ Although fini. te, if God is con-
sidered the creator he"is responsible for having c~eated.a being who 
would su;t'f.er surd evils. This criticism, according to Brightman; is 
based OI.l a .false conception of. creation.· Creation is not an act o.f God 
through which he made the world out of something other'-than himself or 
out of nothing. Rather, creation·is the creative evolution o.f the 
Div:!-ne Mind,. involving nothing except the Divine Mind and human minds.·( 
created by the energizing of the Divine Mind. The evi:ls suffered by the 
human mind are not justified Uby the total outcome3 u2. nor are they in .. 
any sense the·result of God's willing.. They result from.;that aspect af 
l89 
the Divine Experience which is not willed but th.ere3 that content of the·· 
Divi:q.e-Ex.perience which necessitates the concept of theistic~finitismo 
"The '.faet that evil must enter .into any possible creation does not mean 
. ' 
that i;.he act of creation is evil."3 
A fourth objection to theistic finitism is·' "its· supposed impli-
cati<m th-at God has ~evelo:ged from zer6 .u4 Theistic fini tism.· asserts 
that time is real for God and that creativity is an eternal ongoing·pro-
cess. 11Now, the idea of future expansion to more and more in God. · 
suggests the idea of a past that is regressively less and less, until 
one reaches the liniit of zero. 11S This 11picture-thinking11 ignores the 
ne?e~sity of infinite duration. Unless time is unbegun, there was a 
' . 
'i· 1~ A Ph:Llosophy o.f Reli!£on3 p o 331 .. · 24 A quq:tati..on fr.om A. C. Knudson, see A Philosophy of Religion, p • .334. 
3~ A Ph:i;losophy of Religion, P• 3.34. 
4 . ..._ Ibid4t, p •. 335. 
5 ... :Ibid., 
190 
time before time began--an absurdity.. To deny that creation .continues 
and is meaningful to .God is even more absurd to an. empirical tb,eistic 
finitist, and the conception of a static God is equally absurd.l .. 
Taken individually or as a whole the arguments against theistic· 
finitis! are not c.onclusive. Indeed, when examined closely they in-
diyate .that a.finite God is a much more probable and co~erent obj~ct 
of oelief than an infinite and 'absolute one. 11 2 What then is the re-
sultant'conception.of God as finite? 
v. The Resultant :Conception. of God as Finite-Infinite 
The essence of Brightman 1s theistic finitism is stated in his own 
definition. 
God is a Person supremely con~cious, supremely valuable, 
and supremely creative, yet limited both by the free 
choices'of other persons and by restrictions within his 
own nature .3 
Each ,of the four traits listed in this definition will be . .considered. in 
.tu.rn •. · .. : . . . ... . : . .. ~ ,,, J.· • 
God is supremely consci~us ~ that God embodies the traits of 
consciousness on the highest possible level. To deny conscious.n~ss to 
God is-to leave the controlling principle of the universe an unconscious 
power, contrary to the evideitpe' of experience when interpreted coherent-
ly. ttTo call God'personal is to"hold that the functions of conscious 
1 ... Brightman adds. a fifth a.z-~ent:. UThe supposed unworthiness of man as 
an .. objec;t of divine love. 11 (A Philosophy of Religion, P• 336) b,p.t it~ 
~ -~~s no specific relation to theistic finitism as distinguished from 
~ · thei..stic. absolutism. 
2 •• A Pn>l.losophy of Religion, p. 336. 
3. The Problem of God, p. 113 . 
personality. are present in him to the higpest possible degree. Those 
functions are feeling, thought; and will.n1 EiriP.ence for God as personal 
is that nature COnfOriJlS tO law, man iS Capable I of responsible ChOiCe and 
moral achievement, and nature responds to man•s' will.2 
To call God personal is not the same as calling him human. Obvious-
ly, the. Being here referred to as God is far ·above the human plane.3 
. ' ~ . . -
Although the Divine Person shares with h~n persons the traits of 
personality just mentioned, the_ Divine P~rson differs from human persons 
in that he is eter~l a~d uncreat~d, creates oth~r persons, has no body 
or tiervous system:, and .has types of . .'experiencEp 'lUlknown to human 
· ·persons;;4 Indeed, »the divine. person alone is ~ompletely and. perfectly 
personal. n5 In this sense, God might be·. referred to as suprapers~kl. 
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. . . . "i . 
His experiences of· truth, 'beauty, and goodness are far above those of man, 
but it should not be concluded that his truth, beauty, and goodness are 
so far above the experiences of man as to contradict them. What is 
really true .for man is surely trU:e for G'od. Unless truth for man is at 
least partial truth for God; man C?-n say nothing of God. 
. . The second trait is that God is supremely valuableo Of all the 
I . 
characteristics that are essential for an object of worship, goodness 
is the most important. Power that is either unconscious or malevolent 
is unworthy of worship. To have any meaning, gobdness must belong to 
1. Is· God a Person?, p. 55.· 
2. Personality and Religion, ·p. 61,; ttA. Christian View of Nature, tt P• 83. 
3. The Problem of God, P• ·119. · 
4. A Philosoph~ of Religion, PP• 364-368. 
5. Ibid., P• 3 8. 
' 
some· c.onsoious experienc.e. 11If'.·the .universe ·laas. any value beyond man.ts 
.;- ' 
enjoyment of value.? it is beca11se :t'llere ,is ·a cosmic .consciousness that · 
,. 
realizes that value.; nl If. God! e:x:ists.Jl .hthe only. reasonable .. way to con-
. . · .. 
ceive him, even a~ a possibi,lity, is as ,supr~me value.,u2 This means 
that he can bring g.ood .out of. an:y.-evil.and. tha..t·.be .will all~ no evit 
.to_.frustrate his purpose permanently •. 11He may delay~ but. he cannot 
frll· •. u3 This is faith in God •. 
: Th.e third factor in t@..e. defin;i ti,an of God .is that. he is supremely 
creative. Creativity.is one of the' characteristics which ~stinguish 
the divine from the human person. 11For God t.o create means for hiin tG 
bring i:rato being by B:U a:9t of Will .. __ 11~ .):.f natur~ .is _the .energizing o+.~ 
the.· ~4i yiite nund; .· creat-ion __ is: th.e i vo:i.itio:tlai. actl.vi ty of •, tliat. '.nli.nd~. 
~ 
• 
Several hypotheses. seem .•. to follpw if this is true. :First~'· the very 
exl::stence ·of the un:i vers.e is· dep'endent. upon· t~e d:i:vin~ will. · Second;Ly:·, 
. ·.i ·;.1' •. 
11 crea:tion-impli.es t.he: immanence of. God in all··:thingsjl!!5. ·the law of 
. . . ' 
l 
evolutio.n being his method . of creation... Genuine novelty. that is 'more .. 
' th¥1 a recombination o:f existing elements is evidence-. of this crea,tivity. 
. . l ·• ·; 
One such novelty is consciousness.~. "Furthermore, .. God is creative in a 
special sense when he produces oth~r perso~s. 11 6. Creativity,as •here. de-
. . 
fined .suggests tnat nature is not the cr.eation of God in the sans~ .that 
God, p. 121 • 
. \. 
•. 
\. 
:j..t is, som~thing he .. produced by an act of will .. & .. But 0ther persons· ~e 
the creations of q9.d., They have, an inner' life of their own apart from. 
the control of·<God.~ .. Hence, in- creati:r;Lg persons. God 
. w;t.ll~ th~t -the:tte shall be pensciousness in the ·world : 
other than his own; thp.i there shall be wills which 
, :: .~e .self-determining; and :so.~~- in tlli.s:.supreme act of 
his creative power, he limits his control over the 
.. . . ,'tl;n;iver.se.2 . . .··. ·. ,. · · . . . 
Tb;~_.Qoncep~::of limitation suggests the last element of the definition 
of God.: .. .. · 
:,· .. :,.:Th:e,.four.th.aspect of ·Brightman 1·s definition of God is-that God·is 
'.t:!.,imite.d potb: by .the free choices of other persons and by restrictions 
within bj.s own nature.t13. The former part of the suggested·limitation, 
the :free choosing of persons, is gene:ral]y conceded· as· a self'-J.im:i.<tation 
and hence constitutes no threat .. to the div.ine omn:i.potenee.;, Btit the·· 
.latter half -indicat~s that· ;there is within the natu:re ... of God a J.im:ttmg 
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. . 
or hindering fac-tor.. Thi-s ·Bvightman.·calls 11 the. Given•·" Before pointing 
<:>ut -the .nature of the Given,. the,·foilr main .. types of. endence:·lead:it:rg to 
the belie:f in the Given should be described • 
. ·The first type Cif evidence is based upon th~- faets of evolutd.on·.4 
,. 
Reviewing. the evolutionary development of nature ?nd life one finds e'v±-
• . ~.: ' t'l jl • 
dence for both; design and lack of d~sign~. ar~ival and survival: of the 
' ~ . 
fit but. also. ~treme prodigality and wastefu1ness. There is much in 
1.-;.Tl:iis.point will be elaborated in the next section. 
2:.w.The Problem of God, p. 124. 
3..-'.. Ibid •. , p •. 113. 
~,Ibid_.,, . p .... l26ff • 
---- 1 
experience that is evil, the blame for which cannot be :im:puted. to man •. 
This indicates "that nature is the work of a power tb.at is achieving its 
ends in th.e face of what seems to be opposition .. n.l If the evide~oe :for· 
God, .. as ppinted out earlier,2 is conclusive, there are only three possible 
·interpretations of this 'situation. first, ttthis element of opposition is 
a product of the erea;tive will of God, chosen as ·the best means of 
attaining pis en.ds.u.3 This· bas been. shewn to be ineoherent with the 
goodness of God, the most essential attribute. Second~, the element of 
I. 
~ 
opposition is external to God. Any ulti:mate dualism, "whether a dualism 
of God and Satan or. of matter and mind;tth is Plcoberent in that it 
'• ·b 
renders any relat~on. or int.eraction between the two realms virtuall:y' 
impossible.5 Third:cy 1 the el~ment of opposition is rl thin the J18,tur.e of 
God h:imself. 
. .;·, 
The second t,ype of. evidence for a limited God is based on the nature 
~ 
of consciousn.ess.6 Three aspects of the nature of consciousness seem 
relevant herel> First, hum.an ireedom am.dr~ita relation to divine fore-
knn-ledge. .·If man is tru.ly free. to choose, then the' foreknowledge of' God 
is trUly l:imi ted. Bu. t the eoJJ+di tions UDder which oheiee is made are d~ 
termined by a power beyond hUlllAn control. Further, the effects of choice." 
. . . 
are often beyond direct human oontrol. 
l •. The Problem .of' God, P• 126. 
2 •. ~ee pages 1.68ff. . 
3. ~ 'l'b.e Problem ef God_, 'pp. 126i-127 • 
4 •. ttA Christian View of Nature•1., PPe~ 75•76. 
S. Th;is willbe disoussed ~ater, Ohapt.er VI. 
6. )he p;oelem Q:{.Gocl, PP• 13l ... JJS. 
, .. ., ,, .,.,, 
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··-If this is t~e nature of }:ruman freedom, it .. is riot 
impossible that there is something analogous in the 
divine freedom, . although only remote]y ·so,. With all · 
the creative power of God there may be something Given 
in his Nature as subject matter for.h:Ls .. ch6ice. ][ 
offer this particular argument v_ery diffidently.ul 
' .. . .. . . 
; :~ . 
.•·· ....... .-:· 
Seconclly, ·11the inseparabQ.e relation between the will and the nature of 
·. •. ·any·co~s~ious being;.n2 Every being must have a nature of some sort. 
. . '~ 
Part o£ ·the natUre o.f y<msc:i:ous be:ing is Willin~) but willing 11is not 
:;..·. 
a separate faculty or powe:r:.:; ·it is, r.ather, the act of a whole self 
possessing a specific nature.t.13 Tradit.ionalJy God has been conceived 
• • : I ~ •. 
. ' 
as self-~aused and as _po.re: .act;q_ali ty.. . D~es it follow then, that God 
I •' ~'· ' ~ ' 
can wiil''hl.mself to have a. certam·.:nat~e? 
.• ;., _,~.·· 
Is it not more . coherent to 
claim that God Wills according ·;t~ ·liJ.s ·natuie? The nature of any reason-
. ··· .• : 
able conscious being sets limits to his w:illing. Thirdly' every process 
of human consciousness is at~comb~nation of ·active and passive factors, 
.... . ' 
of form and ?ontent.4 . ~e. ~cti vi ty is .. hum~ willing; the pa~si ve ··· ... "' 
D , : • ' -., • '• 'II •:0 , 
iactors':are explained ,by_, tb,e existen.ce oi'-~ objective .world. 
. . ,. ,· . .. . .~ ' .· . ' . _\ __ _.;. ·. . . 
the divine experi~nce is, constituted in'a s~l13X way, except 
• 0 • • • ~ ' • • 
Perhaps 
for the 
fac~ .that. the understanding of the passive element need not refer to an 
ext.erhal being or. p~er., The divin-E3 nature i:rrcludes within itself the 
:..; . 
explanation of the Whole world. If cone supposes some supergod 'Who causes 
0f''o 0 • ', •, 0 
the passive element in God, .. one ·:must ascribe to him the same division of 
... . .. . 
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:activi.ty and passivity in or_der. to -e.JS;Plain 11his producing such apparent...:::··, 
... 
. . 
•. 
·.t· 
1 .• The 'Problem of God, p .. 132,... 
2. Ibid... .-. 
. 3 .•. Ibid .. ,, 133 ~ 4. Ibid~-. . .. 
•. -~ 
1J a ~ 
... 
----1 
ly mixed and partly irrational result.s."l: 
The third type of _.evidence for the finiteness. of God is based upon 
the Hegelian principle of dialectic.2 Between. the thesis and the anti-
thesis there is tension and contrast~ giving rise to a new s,rnthesis. 
~ This is characteristic of all reality for Brightman. 11This means that 
the nature of God is to contain opposition and tension. 113 
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The fourth type.of evidence ttis derived from religious experien~e_,n4 
most of which ltpoints to something-'like the finiteness we ~ssert. 115 It 
suggests a God who is both reasonable and good and who is mysterious be-
yond comprehension~ _Beyond reason in a reasonable God there seems to be 
something given with which reason and will must deal. Part of religion 
"points to a tragic reality in God. n6 God is love_, tt suffering love that 
redeems through a Cross. n? 
. 
What then is the nature of the G:ilven? 
To understand the nature of the Given_, one must see it in relation 
to the total Divine Personality. The Divine Personality consists of con-
tent, form, ;md activity. As the supreme experient, 
his content would include awareness of all qualities 
in the universe;, his form would include al.L possible 
relations; and his activity would select from among 
1. The Problem of God, p. 134. 
2. Hegel would certainly deny the finiteness of God and probab.Ly would 
deny that the principle of dialectic is evidence for a finite God. 
For an e±planation of the principle of dialectic_, see page 28co 
3~·The.Prob1em.of God, p. 13.5. 
4 •.. Ibid.~ ii~ 13 6 o 
_5 •. Ibid. 
6. Ibid •. ,. P• .137 • 
7 •. Ibid •.. 
I 
the quill ties those of ideal ;value and would direct 
the cosmic process toward their realization.l 
Said in another way, the activity is the creative will of God; the form 
is the laws of eternal reason; $-nd the content is the "passive element 
... 
which enters into every one of his conscious states, as sensation, in-
t 0 1 • -., __ • 
stinct, and impulse enter into ours.u2 
In The Problem of God, The Given refers only to the passive or 
hindering element. But in The Finding of God The Given llis the name 
which describes the total complex of eternal factors in the divine 
nature Which he did not create and with which he always has to deal in 
the eternal activity of his perfectly good will. 11 3 In explaining The 
Given, Brightman points out five aspects of the concept. First, The 
Given is conscious activity.4 It should not be thought of as any kind 
of unconscious stuff or material substance. To be in the experience 
of any person, it mus"t! be of the nature of consciousness. 
Secondly, liThe Given is complex;, it stands for the entire un-
created and eternal nature of God.;15 That eternal uncreated n~ture 
includes both "reason and moral law" on the one hand, and on the other, 
nan empirical factor, an eternal subject-matter 11 with which divine 
thought and goodness have to reckon·~s human beings have to reckon with 
sense data. "This Given enters as a partially distorting and delaying 
1. 1•.An .. Empirical Approach to God. 11 , P• 153. 
4. The Problem of God, p. 113. 
_3:.:. ·· The . ..Fi.nd~ng of God, p. 174. 
1¥. Ibid,:..; Th~ Problem of God, p. 182. 
~ .. ~Finding of G9d, p. 175. 
. ' 
197 
factor into every creative act of God.nl 
Thirdly, as part of the consciousness of God, The Given is eternal,2 
having uno other origin than God ts eternal being. 113 It follows tha.t it 
is not a product of will or creation. To ask who created The Given'is 
then like asking who created God. It is coeternal with God. 
Fourthly, The Given is internal to God.4 If it is conscious, it 
would necessarily be internal. Were it external and unconscious, it 
would leave the problems of origin, dualism, interaction, substance, etc. 
unsolved. · 
Fifthly, The Given ·is controlled.5 ncontrol implies subjection and 
1.·. Note specifically here an expansion of the meaning of The Given. 
In "The Given and Its Criticsn (Rel. in Life, J.(.L932), 134-145) 
Brightman points out specifically that in The Problem of God The 
Given referred to the "passive element which enters into every one 
of (Godts) conscious states, as sensation, instinct, and impulse 
enter into ours! At present :r prefer to enlarge the meaning of The 
Given, so that it includes all that is eternal and uncreated in the 
divine nature, other than the actual will of God •.. As I now use the 
term, The Given includes both the 'passive element' referred to aQove 
and also the eternal divine reason, with 1.ts principles of truth, 
beauty and goodness. The Given is thus both eternal content and 
eternal form. The Divine Personality consists of The Given, and of 
Creative Will which acts under the conditions set by The Given. 11 
.<P• 1.34) .. S.ee a.ls.o_ A !Philosophy 0£ Re~i~io,, "P• 33.7, where he says: 
ttTha Givb.o.J. consists of. t.he eternal$ uncreated laws of res,~on (~.., 
eluding logic, mathematical relations, and Platoniq Ideas) and also 
of equally eternal and uncreated processes of nonrational conscious-
ness which exhibit all the ultimate qualities of sense objects 
(qualia), disorderly impulses and desires, such experiences as pain 
and suffering) the forms of space and time, and whatever in God is 
the source of surd evil. 11 
2~ The Finding of God, P• 175~ 
3,.A Philosophy of Religion,,p. 337-
4., The Finding of God, p. 176. 
5, Ibid·., p. .L 77. 
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gwidance,-· but not creatien.ul. It does not :mean that all evils i.n the 
world were willed; 11:i:t does mean a possible divine future beyond every . 
.:frustration arid pai.n. 11 2 God might be described as the ncontroller o:f 
The Gi.ven.n3 His will is forever llseeking new ,forms of embodiment of 
the good; n4 new ways of imposing- never new combinations of' given 
ratienal ·:rorm on the given nonrational content.n5 Hence The Given is 
new ·seen tb be both the instrument for the exp~ession of' -divine pur.:.. 
pose and an obstacle that prevents complete_ and .perfect 13xpression. 
Though ·tae obstacle will never be fully overcomep it will never com-
pletely frustrate the divine purpose •. Out of any and all evils, God is 
able to bring some good.6 
In ~he se~se that the Divine Will is limited by The Given it must be 
considered finite. Both the knowledge and the power of .God ~e finite. 
But God is infinite in goodness ~md cf et.ern.l, durationo Hence it 
is mor.e accurate to· refer tQ a "fini.te• .. in:f."Wte" God, 7 forever 
1. The Finding of God, p. 177. 
2. Thid. 
3. ~ilosophy of Religion, p. 338. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
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6 • .At this point.- it shou:j..d be pointed out that the nonrationaJ. aspect ·Of , 
The Given as contrasted with the rational aspectg is characterized qy 
irrationality, not being contradictory or inn:uora.l, but rather being a· 
datum ttnot derived from rational premises or purposes. 11 (The Pr0blem 
of God, p. 183.) .And, of course, in contr~st with the ~ational 
aspect, the nonrational would be regarded as passive. Both wou~d be 
considered as process .. (.A Philosophy of Religion, p. 337.) 
7 • A Philosophy o:f Religi.onJJ p. 337·; Personality and Religion, 
PP• 71-100. . ' · ,_->t:. . . '.:'"i'h-
II • _( • ' 
strugg'ling against the limitations within his own personality. 
To summarize, the.~wical evidence indicates that natur.e is the 
. '· ~·. 
energizing of the divine mind, personal divine aetivity •. The examination 
of the category of substance as well\aS· the facts of reason, the ne~ 
cessi ty of-, eternal being, the fact of conscious personality, the 
emergence of novelties, value, and religious experience all point to 
the existence of God. The wastefulness of evolution and the experience 
of surd evil (primarily) challenge the belief that nature is personal 
dtvine activity. Considering all the evidence, Brightman comes to the 
conclusion that nature is the activity of divine personality struggling 
under the limitations of The Given. 
·· '· · ··• .:At ·this point :1. t should be helpful ·~o nli;)te the specific relevant re-
lationships between God and nature as here defined. 
5. Nature and God 
i. Nature and Supernature 
Nature has been defined as ' 11the a-rea that can be approached through 
the senses.nl To claim that nature_, when so defined, is all that there 
is, is to disregard all the evidence of experience except the sensory. 
The intuitive, the rational, and the mystical data of experience are 
evidence of a "morell than nature as here defined. 11If the natural is 
what is manifested to the sen$es, all experience other than the sensory 
l. See page 15:3. 
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is properly to be regarded. as experie:Q.ce of the supe;r:-natural. ul Reason-
·ing, valuing,~ willing,: remembering, anticipating-all these are pa!'t of 
an area of experience. that elevates personality above Naiture. "It is 
not usual to call this area of experience supernatural (or supersensory), 
out it is logical, and is indicated br any view whieh does not identjfy 
Nature wi tb. every-thing.u2 
This interpretation of the supernatural differs fr.om the traditional 
view 11which includes a reference to technical additional theories about 
the 1 nat~re 1 of physical and spiritual· substances and about 'human 
nature' and God.n3 . The traditional view seems to suggest that Nature is 
low when contrasted with the supernatural, that there is a gulf between 
them so great as to constitute a contradiction. The traditional view of 
the supernatural as uan intervention in or even a direct violation of 
the laws of Nature11-the common definition of miracle--is a false in-
terpretation which needs to . be changed. · 
ii. God as Transcendent t0 Nature 
The distinction between nature and superna.ture is the .. key to the 
upderstanding of God's transcendence of N~ture.4 Nature -refers to the 
sensory,; supernature refers to the supers.ensory. The sensory is only a 
part of human experience, a part that is transcended.b,r the supersensory. 
Were it not for .the experience of self-identit,r, memory, and value, the 
l,,Nature and Values, p. 46. 
2 .. 11Metaphysics, 11 Chapter X, p. 16. 
J ... Nature and Values, p. 46. 
4. Note here, God and supernature are not synonymous. 
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shining· present .could. make no meaningful. conta.ct with .the obj.ecti ve 
wor1;,d., Thes(:l.supersens.ory experiences transcend the. sensoryll·giving them 
m.§:la:oing and purpose, •. Superna:ture transcends nature on the hU)Il.an level. 
If Nature, as the activity of Qod, is only a part of h'funan experi.-:-.~ 
ence (the sensory) which.is transpended by another part ,(the super-
sensory), is it not reasonable to infer on the basis of experience that 
Nature is but one realm of the total experience of the Divine Mind? . If 
human--ideals transcend sensationsp one might. infer .that divine purp~ses.., 
and vaiuB~ transcend-the activity observed in the. real of sensory 
object-s.,l How else is one to explain the su.pernature of human. experi-
ence? Row els.e is one to explain what appears to be -supernature wi thip. 
Nature (formation and evolution of the univers~)? 
Godis more than Nature, more than the objects "investigated by the 
sciences of matter and motionJJ u and in this more. :i,.s 11the key to the 
divine ,.n2 · 
Without plansJJ ideals,o and reasons that are 11morett than 
motion1 Nature could never be known nor usedo Knowledge 
of Nature implies a knower that is not Nature.ll values 
. that are not Nature. Nature presupposes the tr~scendent 
and the supernatural.3 
'' l I ., 
In that God is more.than Nature, God can never be known adequately 
through a knowled~e of Nattire. "Nature is indeed a clue to God,n4' ~d 
enlarging the knowledge of Nature enlarges the knowledge of God. But 
r·~~E. s:. Brightman, IIPersonalism and Economic Security, It American 
Scholar, .. 2(1933), ,pp. 22l-222. 
2. n.A··cbiistian View of Nature,." p. 71. 
3. IOid~ 
4 .. Ibid'~; p~ 72. 
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• 
the "more" than Natttre which is God can never be known adequately tb.z:ough 
the study o:f Nature as the realm o:f physical objects. The experience o:f 
ideal values re~eals moral and spiritual purposes whi~h suggest the tran-
scendence of God. 
A :further suggestion o:f the transcendence o:f God is the conception 
o:f Nature as a createdworld.l This suggests the contrast between the 
creation and the Creator, the latter ebviously standing as both logi-
cally and chronologically prior to the :for.mer. But this contrast is 
overdrawn when Nati:tre is considered as an ~ontologicall;r diStinct being,tr 
as other persons are. Rather, N$.ture is a llVdeed within the divine C!lrder 
o:f consciousness.n2 The "more" than N:~ture,. ioe• the Divine Purpose, was 
at -tork in .the :formation o:f the world and is at work today. '!his suggests 
the immanence of God in Nature. In se :far as creativity is the volition"" 
al activity o:f the Divine Mind, God could ae said to be immanent in 
Nature,3 but Brightman :feels it is more accurate to speak of the imm~ 
nence o:f Nature in God.4 
iii. Nature as ~ent in God 
In pointing out the transcendence of God to Nature it was suggested 
·that Nature was one o:f the realms of eJq?erie:nce iri the Divine Mind. God 
' 
is a. un.ity-• .5- "ThC!l order··o:f Natare requires one pill.:rpose, one plan, one 
j, 
. ~1. "Metaphysics," Chapter X,, P• 12. 
,2, ·Letter"to ·,A.. o. Kl:iuds,con, ·dated March .5, 194.5. 
3·~ '*Tljle rerson~l Jtelation Between Go<il an<i; Children," Po 25., 
4. Natu.;re and Value~, P• 160. . · · 
5. A Phil·osophy o:f Religion, po 218 .. 
I . -
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mind.ul Nature should not be· reg,arded as an external created order. To 
spealt ·of God as' immanent in Nature 11involve·s a ·lurkip.g presuppositi<m 
'thai Nature is ·really external •to God9 and that God somehow enters. into 
it and dwells tW?re. 112 Yf th~ dualists are correct in holding tha}. 
natul!'e is 'something other than God., into which God comes ·to dwell or 
·something through WhiCh God ~orks, then it is preferable to speak. of God 
·as immahent in Nature. :\3ut if the personalistic hypothesis is correct, 
J.f ·Nature is the actiVity of the Divine Mind,_ the ·combination of Creative 
Will and The Given, then it is 11far truer to think .of Nature as· immanen'JJ 
in God·~.tt3 
, This· personalistic immanentism is a,.mo~iit:i;c view ·of Nature.which 
.. "'·· 
claims that any metaphysical -dualism 'Which 11divideey Nat1ilr~11 into kinds 
'of being that have no powers or_ properties in common·is a sheer mystifi~ 
'cation -that makes science imp~ssible arid philosophy dogmatic • 11 4 
. .~Ph a d,ualism is both incoherent and unempirical. 
_J It is 'incoherent because it renders a:rry relation or 
. inte~aation b.~tween the two rf?alms so contradictory 
to the defined properties of matter and mind as to 
require more than a Cartesian pine~ gland to overcome 
the conflic~.. I:t :'is unempirical because all the 
empirical evidence we ha·ve for Nature is found in the 
fQ;t:'ID. _.pi' co:rw;ciousne;ss, which indicates -that Nature 
throu'ghout its being is at least related to conscious-
ness, ;:~.ble t~ appear in it, and harmonious 'vdth its 
conditions.· From these facts it is reasonable to infer 
tP,a'):. Nature §Ild persona~ity are :constituted of_ one and 
the same kind of stuff, the stuff of personality. 
Personality is sufficiently complex to contain all the 
.. \. .• .. 
. ·. ~ . . .. . .. 
l •.. ".A Chris-tiari Vf.f!jW of Nature, 11 p. 76. 
2io: Ibid.~, p. 73. 
3!>. Ib.id., p. 74. 
·h· .. Ibid., p. 75. 
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diverse qualities and powers revealed in Nature, but 
it also is an indivisible but complex unity.l 
iv. Reality OtheT than Nature and God 
Nature has been tlefined as the area that is approached via the 
senses. So defined it w-as seen to.be, .not all-that-there-is-, but onl\Y" 
a part of reality. Nature was th~n seen to be the activity of the 
Divine Mind,· one realm of the DiVine experienceo The question then 
arises: Is the Divine Mindp in that it includes nature.? all that there 
is? The answer requires the cohe~ent interpretation of the empirical 
evidence,. 
,20.5 
The shining present experiences itself a.nd a world that may be called 
objective. Nature refers to an aspect of the objective wor~cto As· 
4 
objective, nature is not identical with the shining present. It is 
other. God is also inferred and experienced as other~ Hence.? empirical 
evidence suggests that 11my" shining present is a reality other than 
nature and God
1 
and not ttmyu shining present alone. Empirical evidence 
suggests the existence of other similar shining presents so that the 
universe is a society of persons.!l2 God being the Supreme Person. What 
then is the distinctive relationship between God and other persons? 
Nature is part of God. It is not a creatl:on in the sense of being 
ontologically distinct. Rather it is the activity of divine mind. 
Persons, on the other hand, axe creations of God as ontologically dis-
~ 1. "A C!4ris"tian .View of Nature, 11 p. 75; cf. "Metaphysics, 11 Chapter V, 
p. J.4. .. 
2 •. HA Christian View of Nature, 11 p. 80. 
tinct beings.l They have an inner life of their own, a privacy of 
consciousness.2 They experience freedom~ choice, ignorance, and error. 
If persons are. only parts of God, the experience of yolitional freedom 
and of,separateness from God are deceptionso. Yet_there is no eJ!!.pirical 
evidence. that 11P 1 am part of God ontologically. Further :i,.f "I'' am part 
of God, oth!ars are as well.. Other persons expe;rience ignorance and 
error. To claim then that ~11 is God and God is all, ~~ does pantheism, 
11is to make God 1s l)lind a congeries of ignorance and incoherence.n3 
Persons are ontologically separate from God yet constantly dependent 
upon God, dependent for both arrival and survival. Thi~ continuing 
creation is explained through the relationship·between mind ~pd body and 
God. 
Mind is exactly what we experience it to be-~~ perao~l 
consciousness. This personality we rightly judge to. be 
dependent on nature, and so partly a product of brain, 
partly a stimulator an4 guide of brain. Mi.nd, then, 
interacts with a:r;J,d is dependent on body:; ~~ich, i'or the 
personalist, means that human personality interacts with 
and is dependent on Divine Personality; £or body is ~n 
nature and nature is God in action. A brain is the 
Divine Personall ty in action a·t the point of the con-
tinual creation o:t; a human personality. Mind is not, in 
nature~ but nature ip. the Divine Mind is God 1 s way of' 
or eating human mind. 4 ' 
Reality, then, is ~ sooiety of interacting and interdependent 
persons~ all of whom are dependent upon the Supreme Pe:rson-··God, God 
l~ tetter to A. c~ Kn~g§gn3 d~ted M~gh ~' l945. ~. The ~gbl~m of God? p~ l24~ 
~. 't'A Ohli:i.§T;l.an-vrew-of Nature~n p~ 81. 
ij, Natu-~e and. Valuea, pp. l24 ... l2S, 
-- -::::e:: •. - -~- - --:=t 
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... ~~....; .. _~--- •' - .-::. ··J, .~':;·.:-~~ ,.,.-;_ -~ . . 
· ... :~~a.n'scend#.·rrtr.tt;IJ7e·, :whioh-·is i"mm~~nerit in Hi..m. But the immanence of 
.. · .· ... ,· . . .. · ... 
Nature in God is very different from GodVs immanence in persons.~ The 
immanence o£ God in other persons 
means that he wills them to exist as other than him-
self, yet dependent on him and constantly interacting 
· with him. By his continuous acti vi tyn he gives them 
data of experience~ which constitute their field of 
choice; and he also gives them the power of self-
determining freedom, freedom always within limits~ 
·yet always able to say 11yes~• or 11no 11 to any alternative 
which experience presents. The goal o~ this freedom~ 
. 'God 1s kingdom, is a society of free cooperators.2 
v. Nature and God's Design 
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As immanent in God, Natu,re is quite literally the activity of one 
realm of the Divine Personality. 11It is GodVs will directing~ shaping, 
controlling the phenomenal area of God v s conscious experience. n3 Through 
the activity of this one realm the personality of God is revealed as 
"inexhaustible consciousness of love and beauty and goodness. 114 As re-
'-
vealing the Divine Pers·ona.lity Nature serves a,double_ purpo:p~. First, 
ttit points· the way to a. union of science and religion.. All the laws of 
nature which.science discovers are laws of.God--the same God who is ~ •• 
revealed in man 1s highest spiritual experiences.n5 Secondly~ it 11 opens 
the door to what may be called personalistic nat'l;lre mysticism .. n6 Tho.se 
who find it possib:J_e to commune with Nature may find in that communion 
1.. UA Christian View of NatlJF'e; 11 p. 81. 
2." Ibid., pp. "81-82. .. 
3• NatUre and Values, P• 160. 
4 •. Ibid. 
5. Ibid~ 
6. Ibid. 
... 
both inspiration and exaltation, and in that inspiration feel lithe 
very presenc~ and life of the personal Ged.nl 
This int~rpretation of Nature yields an abundant harvest for 
religious experience. It leads to a sacramental vl~w ot nature.2 It 
suggests that in. every evil God is fellow. sufferer and in- every joy that 
Nature offers,.God is fellaw rejoicer.3 .So man can see' himseJ.f' as a co-
laborer with God. in the pursuit of fulfilling the purpose of the 
universe. 
In the light of all we know about experience, that 
purpose must include the development of more and better 
persons. If there are other purposes, we have no evi-
dence for themo . The purpose may be stated in various 
forms. Jrt is the· purpose to elicit purpose.. It is the 
. purpose to control the Given and produce.:v:;:Que .. in the. 
process. It is the aim at societies of persons will-
ingly devoted to the gpod •. Such a purpose does not • 
permit the idea of a final consummation where all po-
tenti~lities for good in.all persons shall have been 
completely realized; for the free and creative nature 
of persons excludes the idea of an end to free creativ-
ity. In this sense purpose is inexhaustible, regardless 
of delays, the recalcitrant Given, rebellious free wills, 
and the absence of unilateral progress. I'f purpose were 
in principle exhaustible in the universe, at that moment 
cause would cease to act, substance would vanish into 
the void, and ags,o~utely nothing would remain.4 
Th~ . PE3rsonalistic attitude toward. nature has. mystical, 
practiqal, and theoretical aspects. When we think of 
. nature· as conveying .to us the love of God, .• we confront 
it with something of the adoring devotion of Wordsworth's 
nature mysticism,; and who can view the Grand Canyon, the 
plains and prairies, the mountains or the ocean, without 
some sense of the beautiful love of the Great Spirit? 
1~ Nature and Values., p. 160 • 
. ~" . I bid""~ pp • 160-161. 
3~ 'nA Chi'istian View of Nature, 11 p. 82. 
4'\1. 1'Me~c;P.hysics, 11 Chapter VIII, p. 59 • 
• '· I ' I' ~ . 
208 
When we think of nature as the will of God in action, 
we experience it as the challenge of God to human 
achievement and the evidence and pr-omise of God's co-
operation with man. Here we find a metaphysical basis 
for th~ Christian doctrine of stewardship o. 1:0 .. • ••• • • 
When we think of nature as divine intelJigence-
a realm of order, system, and purpose--we see in it the 
reason of God, and we perceive that the highest human 
thinking in science, theology, philosophy, or in social 
administration of churches, nations, and world organi-
zation, are forms of communion with God. The life of 
reason, as discovery of truth, as creativity, and as 
personal integration, is a movement of man toward God. 
-Thought is a development from incoherence to coherence 
and thus is an inexhaustible approach to the divine 
reason.l 
To interpret Nature as the revelation of·Divine Personalit,r and 
Purpose 11is to open many doors, to enlarge life, to.deepen spirituality, 
and to unif'y science, religion, and philosophy.n2 
.. 
h Nature arid Values, pp. 162-163., .• Used with the publisher 1s permission. 
2·. Ibid., P• 163. 
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. CHAPTER VI 
EVALUATION 
L Prelinl:ina.ry Orientation 
i. A Review of tha Problem 
The .foregoing chapters have attempted to satisfy' the conditions of 
the problem as stated in the Introduction, namely, the evaluation of' the 
relationship between the empirical evidence and the resultant theistic 
cosmology in the philosophy of Edgar Sheffield B~~tman. The conditions 
of a problem that evaluates a~elationship require that the things re-
lated'be clearly defined. The preceding chapters have attempted this de$ 
scriptive goal. Each chapter has been organized in such a way that it 
woul.d not only define the relevant o~tents, but at the same time would 
indicate, implicitly if not explicitly, its relationship to the chapters 
both preceding and following. In the .fifth chapter; the relationship be ... 
tween the empirical evidence and the resUltant theistic cosmology has 
been spelled out explicitly in subdivisions dealing with the specific 
evidence that is relevant to th~·specific suggested hypothesis.1 
1. That one 'hypothesis can suggest, that is, be evidence for, another· is 
an element so basic in all experience that it needs no defense here. 
Brightman suggests it in asserting that every datum is a sign. This 
causal relationship can be expl~ned only if one assumes a larger 
coherent 'Whole of which the hypotheses are but partso To deny the 
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·----
1 I 
The study should have· inqicated that a prQblem involving the eval.u-
aition ..of a relatii..onship i-s ~ssentially a problem. of ~~herence• Were the 
::elationship evaluated tb.at of two or more physical objects P the previous 
statemen-t might require <iuaJ.ification~ 1 but in the ~t'esent study the re .. 
2ll 
lationship is one of evidence and canclusionp and it 'Will be seen that the 
evaluation of such a relationship involves What has been defined as coher-
ence. The ·crucial questipn is: Is the eyst~m o:t thought eoherent? That 
' 
is,- have ·all the relevant data been included? And_v have the data been in-
terpreted most coherently? The present chapter will seek to answer these 
questions as they apply to the problem at band;, assuming that combined 
- ~ . 
they constitute the best possible e;aluation of any relationship. 
i:i.· A Definition of Evaluation 
Evaluation is the proc~ss of e.x:amination in relation to some cri te-
rion for judgment. Evidence is entirely a problem of relations. Oonclu ... 
sions Bf.e no les~ tb;e results ~f relations. Evaluation, then, is relating 
some relationships with other rel.atio.twhipsjl the latter relationships 
being thought of as constituting a eoherent or tti&PD.ingful pattern wb:i.ch 
. ' 
serves as. J.:: guide .for the _whole pro_~e.s:'~. Eval.WttienJl as tl;lll$ de;fine~9··4d-· 
~ - :. - . •. ....... .. . .. -.' ." ... .. .. . . 
:mi.ttedJ.y recognizes the three basic presuppositions: f:i.rst, that a 
conscious self is doing the relating; secondly» that this conscious-
ness has understanding sufficient. to comprehend that vrhich is to be 
existence of the causal relationship between hypotheses is to deny the 
facts of' experience. .: . . . . . . .... ',"·· 
::t. Relationships' b.atweren obje_ets ~ci, ~ertween. prep0sititm8. fS~eed al.cmg 
diffe~ent. lines. · 
~;· 
e:X:aliri.ned.,; · and thirdly, that :tt acknowledge a a standard by which the 
ju.dg:ment. is made. ~his standard or criterion must "Qe established before .. 
any system of thought 'Can progress, and the criterion l!Illst be su.ch that 
it oan ·bear not only the test of its own soru.tiny, but that of all other 
c:ri. teria as ~ll. Until such a criterion is established experience will_ 
cill the criterion itself into question. Both the process and the condi-
. ti.ons· of· evalu.ati.on, as well as the :need f'6r an adequate criterion, w.i.ll 
be seen more clearly if' the dialectic of' evaluation is described. 
iii. The Dialectic of Evaluation 
The process of' evaluation can be interpreted roughly as invol~~ a 
dialeotioa.J. pattern of the Hegelian sorl._p Xlalll.el:y, thesis_p antithesis, and 
aynthesis.1 ~he thesis of this dialectic involves the perception and 
comprehension of' the hypothesis to be evaluateq. Thought cannot progress 
until the new hypothesis is understood,p "PD.dersi(anding· be:i.ng a preteq;u.i• 
site of all judgment. Here it is rec.~:>gnized, as indicated imme.dia~e:cyr 
above, that the thesis of understanding the new hypothesis presupposes 
the existence of a locus of comprehension that is sufficient~ develQPed 
to comprehend the newly suggested hypothesis and sufficiently integrated 
to have some criterion for judgment. (The subdivision immediately fol-
lowing will indicate what the criterion ought ifo be and hew it is estab-
lished.) The thesis, then, includes all that is involved when the under-
standing mind confronts and comprehends a new hypothesis-..-however the new 
1. Note that this dialectic is not unlike the process whieh Brightman 
calls' the ttMethod of Philosophical Inte~e·~»&tiann. :doeribed on 
pages 88-96. · 
bypcrtbesis mey have been suggested to the mind .. 
From the thesis the dialectic moves to the antithesis., The a.ntithe-
sis is the examination of the hypothesis in accordance with the criterion 
thai> is already as~umed in the thesis of understanding.. The process in-
volved in the ~ntithesis will depend upon the criterion of judgment., If 
the nevi ~6thesis lies eutside the scope of the cri terlon, the. process 
of evaluation 'W'ill not move beyond the thesis.. If» for example» the ori-
~rion is laboratory demonstration and the new h;ypothesis is 9 "God ex= 
I . 
i~ts, tt in the strict seie:nti.i'ic sense of the cri ter:J.Gn the hypothesis is 
outside the scope of the criterion, and before the process of evaluation 
·can move on, a new criterion will need to be established which will be 
fitted to measure the new hypothesis o Once the criterion is adequate for 
the examination of the new hypothesis, the process Iha.y move on to the 
tynthesis. 
The synthesis in the dialectic of evaluation includes the acceptance 
or the rejection of the new hypothesis as well as the total reorientation 
of the understanding in so far as the examina:tiiOl!l and either the 'ac$~ept= 
ance or rejection of the new hypothesis requires any ®hangeo ~s re= 
oriented bulk of 'W!!ldersta.nding then becomes the new background with 'Which 
other new hypotheses will be understood~ with ~ new hypotheses becoming 
2:l3 
the new thea es, the renewed examine. tiona becoming the new anti theses, and 
the new reorientations becoming the new synthesesp and so on~ inf'initum. .. l 
1. This dialectic is ~reatly oversim.plif~ed$1 since it erctu.a.ll:y involves in 
eaeh of its stages pther minor dialectics$) but it will suffice to shaw 
the scheme of ev~uation in a seotion on preliminary orien~tion .. 
iv. The Criterion for Evaluation 
,-
1 
Each of the previous subdivisions of this section on preliminar,r 
orientation has indicated the ~need for a eri:terion o:r eval:aa;tion •. More--
over, each has hinted at the criterion acc®pted.for th~ purposes of 'tihis 
study • Indeed,· tf the p"lll9pose of the study is the eva.l.uation of a rela-
tionship between· evidenc-e and conclusion, and if all evaluation is exam-
inati:on of an hypothesis in ·relationship to so~ standard for judgment 1 
then would it n-ot follow on the basis of previcus discussion that coher-
ence is the m.ost adequate criterion .of ·truth? ~t has been shown immed:i ... 
< ·, 
a:tely- above that the problem. itself. is one of c-herence~ For the pres-
e~t, 1 then, let it be said that e~herexu:;e, as Brightman defines it.o will 
stand as the criterion for evaluation.. For the purposes ·or evaluation, 
coherence.demart~s that several ~uestions be answeredo Is the theory in 
. -
and of it~elf cons:btent? Have all of the data.o 'Which have been tal£e:n 
into consideration, been interpreted correctly? But furtherJ> have all 
-the relevant data been included? If notp What are the relevant data 
wi;).ich have been omitted,· and when correctly- interpreted.o what alterna-
tive hypotheses will account for the' relevant data. more coherently? 
· These questions are- closely related to Brightman°s conception .of 
• 
~ter.nal and external criticism. He defines criticism as "re-examination 
of fundamentals: considerati·on of objections$) of alternative possibil-
ities;- of st~ing points different from the ones hitherto fav4red.u2 
l. · A. more detailed meaning . of coherence will be given belw when · evalu-
ating Brightman• s fundamAntal. phi1osophiea.l princip1eso-
. 2. A Phil.osopby of Religion, po ·438o-
2l4 
Criticism may be. internal or. external.., 
Internal cri:ticislll. is that which :may discover inconsis.a. 
tencies or inadequacies within a given system; it shows 
that if the postulates on which the system rests· be ac-
cepted, certain aspects of the system must be modified 
in order to agree 'With tb.pse postulates •. External criti--
cism, on the other band, takes its stand 'Without the 
system and ch~enges the ver.r postulates on which the 
system rests. 
Internal criticism tests the inner consistency of a system. If the sys-
. :1' .. 
tem is not internally consistent, it involves error of some kind4 Hence, 
~ 
internal criticism is the more fundam.ental4 But external criticism is 
essential to make certain that all the relevant areas of experience have 
, .. ,• 
beenincluded in th.e system.~· A system may be :internally consistent and 
yet be false in that it :may have overlooked some areas of relevant d~ta,.3 
Hence the task of external cri tieism is twofoldg to make certain all 
relevant areas of experience have been included and to suggest possible 
alternative hypotheses as more coherent explanations of the relevant 
data.4 
v. Transition to Evaluation 
Within this orientation the evaluation begins,. At this point it is 
possible to suggest that the relationship between the.empirica1 evidence 
and the resultant theistic cosm0logy is consistent.. Brightman's is a 
logical system in which the conclusions follow the premises., From the 
1. A Philosophy of Religion, p .. 4.59o 
2. Ibid., P• 46o. 
3. This, in the fourth chapter. of this stud;y, ~s called evidence •• 
4. A. Philosophy of· Religion, p .. 46o. ·' 
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data of consciousness be concludes that substance is personal, and if' 
substance is personal, all reality is personality. Hence, nature is the 
energizing of the Divi.D.e Mind.,; not as the object of -the Divine··Mind, but 
as the subject of the Divine M:indo These relationships are consistent. 
Although it is possible at this point to suggest that the relation ... 
ship between the empirical evidence and the resultant theistic cosmology 
is consistent, it is not possible to suggest whether or not it satisfies 
the demands of coherence. Coherence requires more than. consistency. It 
requires inclusive systematic interpretation. It is in the interpreta-
tion of the data of consciousness that the conclusions aXise, conclusions 
not only about tb.e empirical scheme and the scheme of evidence, butt abcc.t 
the resultant theistic cosmology as well4 Henee.ll the problem of the 
study requires that each of the basic hypotheses involved in the system 
as described:-be subjected, .as far as possiblet ·tcf'the tests of c·oherenee ... 
In this way it can be shown whether or not the relationship as a whole is 
coh~rent, and if not, at w-hat point (or points) the system needs support, 
or correction. 
The preseo:li chapter may be oriented w.i.th the 'Whole study by refer-
ring to the dialectic of evaluation. The foregoing chapters should serve 
as a thesis of understanding the new hypotheseso The present chapter 
should function as the antithesis of evaluation in that each of the basic 
hypotheses is examined in relationshl.p to the acclaimed criterion. And 
2l6 
the next chapter Will be reserved for the suggesting of any possible alter-
native l'Jn'othesee lfhich would render the sY-stem. of thought. more cohera:Qt. 
That chapter, whether it involves basic suggestions or not» should serve 
as the synthesis of reorientationo 
2l7 
2 o Brightman us Fundamenl::.al Principles 
i. The Defini:tion of Philosophy 
I'b is assumed that the thinker has the right to establish his own 
defi:Di tions as long as he recognizes the pri:mary- precondition of cu.mmuni, ... 
cation, ~amely, that of ntual~ understood symbolso Tha~ isp it is hiS 
responsibility to make himself up,.derstoodo To deey- him this right is to 
prevent creative thinking, since the more intricate the philosophical sys-
tem, the more refined the 1.a.ngtta~E:I. and the more precise the definitionso 
But to grant the right to defini:ti.m,.aans that one can evaluate a defi-
nition only on the basis of the. prescribed preconditionso The prilnary :re .. 
quirement of a de:f.':i..nition is that it be unders·tandable 9 that it make 
sense. Of course, all definitions invelve terms which require further 
definition, so that the adequacy of a definition can be ari'irmed 0~ when 
it is seen in relation to the whole of 'Which the ter.tn defined is a parto 
Brightman defines philosophy as "an attempt to give a reasoned ac ... 
count of experience as a who~.,nl. Eaeh of the key words in this defiDi.-. 
tion has been: defined in previous discussionD and on the basis of that 
previous discussion it can be asserted that the definition is neither in ... 
C()nsistent nor i.ncomprehensibleo The definition is designed with the goal 
of pb:il.Gsophy in mindo It contains w.i.thin itself in embryonic f'onn. both 
the :methed and the criterion of truhh .for the goal of philosophy' o To 
charge that it is a loaded definition because it contains within itself in 
embryolrl.c form both its method and criterion of truth is to overlook the 
1.. A Philosophy o.f Religionp P• 2lo 
-,_ 
I 
. vert nat'are of the thing defined~ namelyg phiJl.osophy.ll- 1111hi@h hopes to be 
both ~ystematie and inclusive.. Any pursuit of such a nature would neees-
·· sarll.y_ seek not only to inelu(ie· all the relevant data but to relate them 
in·a· systematic way as wello The seareh for the systemati~ and incl~sive 
"interpretation of all experience is what Brightm.ari means by philosopbyo 
. 
Other definitions may be equally adequate9 depending ~ion the definer 8s 
definitions taken as awhole9 that is9 considered in their relationships, 
but certainly BrightmanVs definition o£ philosophy passes the tests of 
omhererioe. 
ii. The Importance of Truth 
One of ·the; basic assumptions in the thought· of Brightman is the im= 
.. 
2l8 
porta.noe of\. tntho He defines truth as an accurate des~ription of a real. 
state or affairs .1 A:ny interest of a'riY kind presupposes the importance of 
truth on some level of thoughto Just as the skeptic f'ilnds that his a.tgu-
ment is self~refu.ting (in that the denial of the p~Cssibility o£ lmmrledge 
presupposes the reality of the lm.owledge necessa17 for the dell'Aialh so 
also be ·-who denies the importance of truth assumes the same if he main-
tains his position with a:ny persistent concern., When phil~ophy is so 
~ 
br0ad.J.:y defilledjl to der.ry the importan~e or tnth is to del!IW thl!l possibility 
of meaning in thoughto 
iii. u The True is th.e Wb.6leOt . 
Brlgb:tman accepts the'Aristotelian and Hegelian principle that 99the ' 
true is the wholefl not as a definiti<Dn of tnth but ~ather as em indica- • 
1. An Introduction to Philosopb;y) p .. 47 o 
', 
• 
ti.on of both method and criterion of tr'Q.th in philosophy~ Obviously, 
:from the definition, the true is not the whole in the sense of being all 
that there is. Truth is an accurate deficription of a real state of ai'-
:fairs, and that description does not ex~aust the reality it describes. 
':Che definition ho:J_ds regardless of the :Qature of the real., Rather, the 
proposition, "the true is the whole,n m€jans 9 as indicated in the second 
chapter, that to {mow the whole "?ruth ai)out a proposition it must be co~ 
sidered in its total relationship. Only by consid~ing a prop?sition ~ 
its total situation can one lmow the full m.ea:ning of its trutho 'When so 
defined, the principle cannot be denied witho:':l~ le_~v:ing_ ~?-o~~ ~~~r~ 
chaotic. Both the epistemic process and the scheme of evidence support 
the concept as here definedo 
iv. . The Method of Empirical Synapsis 
The propo,s.ition~· n~ true is the whole,'i suggests the method trutt ..... _ 
Brightlrla.n :finds m<>St adeq')1B.te fer philos:op}V, a Ill.ethod. tba..-t. might be aal.led 
. . . . . . .. - - - ... .•.. . .. - -·· .. 
The :fanner is suggested by the adjective nempiri.caJ.~ ... -tha.t a11. r..e~t 
data be taken into consideration, and the latter is suggested by the term. 
. . .. 
n synopsis .n As indica ted in the second chapter, Brightina.n defines synopsis 
I " • .. "' _, 
in such a way thai> it includes all the otber :methods, i,e, .ll of experiment, 
d.ia:u~ctic, :analysis_;._1 ete. 4 All the relevmt data must be considered in 
_ ............ , 
their totali;hy, not ta t11e exclusion of the analys~s ?f the _p~_rts __ n?.r to 
tire d~nial of the reality cif the parts as parts, but considered as a 
whole (or as wholes) because the :fuD. meming of the data is not ava.ilar. 
ble until they are considered in their totalityo Furthermorep it is more 
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coherent to interpret the part in terms of the 'Whole thaD. the whole in 
terms of the parto 
At this point it is essential to distinguish the part from the whoJ..eo 
The distinction is a relatd.:ve oneo If the objeet of attention is a h1llllS.lil. 
body:, the head :is a part,g :while the entire physical organism is the whole. 
If the object of attention is a molecule, the atom is a parto But if the 
atom is the. object of attention, the electron is a part., If the object of 
·attention is the universe, man and nature are but parts o! the larger 
disc'Ourse~· Change the area of discourse and the two parts~ na:m.ely.? man 
and nature~· may become very complex wholes o 
A further distinction that must be made is that between being and 
meaning,,. existence and purpose.l. Exist'ence may ar may not involve 
censciousness, ·depending upon the "objeetra under eonsideration.. For :mind 
-to· ·exist, it must iiDTolve consciousness because mind without consciO'US .... 
ness is absurd... Consciousness is integral to the definition. c.f mind., Bu-t 
what of an apple? Its existence could be said to depend upon mind only if 
mind created it. The human: :mind discovers i tp~ and the discovery is sn.ch 
tha.t it suggests to the mind that it is diseovery rather than creatiol!4 
Whether or not the same thing could be said were the electron substituted 
for the apple remains to be seen. But as long as the physicist classifies 
~he electro:n. and the apple as members of 'the same essential order (ioeo 
physical, however he would define peysical) the same could be said for 
the electron. If the electron is an abstraction in the sense ·that it can-
1. Detailed definitions of these terms will be given later., But it is es.., 
·ential at this point to nate -the distinction .between them in order to 
understand the methodo 
not be· observed rega:t"dJ..ess of' the power of the instrument» then it might 
be said to be a creation oi' the" mind.o ana•.Jmui.$tlr,~(~,.q;fin~'tt. in .order to 
. . . .. _ .. ., 
exist. The point a-t ~ch observation c~ases as a, -phenOm.enon and the 
point. 'Where the mir.rl begins to c o!lStruet ~qllies:e.a: in crder to explain 
'f..~ lr· 
the observed· phenomenon is. of great importance both to physies and. to · , 
philosophy, becaMe of :i.ts bearing upon .the distincti~n bet~en e"X:istence 
and meaning •. "• -
:wm.le existence ma:y or my nat involve conscioo.sness.o 1. meaning or 
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purpese n~eessa:rily involves consciousness.,· Mesning initolyers the eantents 
or interpretation of' consciousness when .it .is aware o:f some phase .o:f ex.-. 
istence.. Purpose -is conscious willing toward some desired goal., No o:ne 
collld deny that exi:st&nce apart from conscieu.sness is meaningless9 but 
that is insufficient reason for making meaning a criterion o:f exi~ence~ 
Etistence as such is meaningless» bllt it is comprehensible~ To deny its . 
reality because it is meaningless is to make reality synonymous- \tlth mean ... 
ing. 2 The part as a part abstracted f'ro:q1 the whoJ.e is acknowledged as 
. . . .. 
~aning1ess,. w~e only a part» but that is not to deny its. existence. It 
'Will be shown ·later wey e:x:istenee doss n¢ necessarily presuppose con- . 
sciousnesso 
In se far as empirlcal synopsis includes genuine analysis the part-
1. At le.ast· en .the ·human levelo It Will be shown later why the problem -· 
cannot be solved in one grand SWeep by elevating it to the level.of 
Divine Consciousness. . · 
2. This challenges the preposition that Wthe real is the rati.onaJ.t~ or that 
nthe real is personalo" The evidence for this chall.enge w.tll be given 
later. ~ 
whole and eJdstenee;.;.purpose distinctions must ·be kept in mind.. When. one 
uses· -the analyt-ic. method to conclude that phenomenal real.ity is some kind 
of entity, such as ·a neutral entity-, he is using the method of analysis 
o:.;~··~'-· ... •;:;:<!-~!to:: }~";.···· ': 
no more abs-tractly. than i~. ·the .. metaphysician· who concludes that reality 1 
' -·-~:,;·."'·.· 
is" essentially acti 'Vi ty ... · To . discern the eonstituti ve nature e:e'· reali t,y 1 
one· must use the analytic method. It is conceivable 51 then 51 that the· con... 
elusion of the n~alist' is just as ;'~e-synaptic .. as that m:. tba 
idealist,. 
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· r Brightman's discussion of empirical synopsis as the· bes.t·llleth.\lld for · 
philosophy' is essential.zy sound.· It is sufficiently analytical to include 
eveey. essential part of every whole.~~ and sufficiently syuGptic to i.n.cl.ude 
every relevant detail. As he describes it,: :it is irrefutable. To deny· 
either of its two essentials, na.meJy, inclueivenesa and ~atemafiie IL1.,,.. 
sisteney, is to render thought chaotic •1 Whether or not he is unfailingly 
loyal to it as described, remains to be seen. 
l• In ~irica1· Philosophies Of Religi2,! (N;, Yo& K:ingvs Crown Pl-ess.~~ ... 
194'; .11 page JB ; James A. Martin, follcming an a.rgoment in Professor 
J. Loewenberg's artiele0 1~t is Empirieal?w (Jour. of Philo~ 37 (1940) Jl 5•J.4) p chargeS that a method nso :inelusfu and liberalW is 
guilty of the tt:f~y of the suppressed correla.tive.9 111 by which 
Loewenberg :means to suggest that every propQsit.:i.on must have a 0 sigriif ... 
'icant · eerrelative.,n Moreover.~~ a. method siet broad that it includes· aJJ. 
methods· "loses any specific ccpn.otation m;td makes a1 terna.tive methods 
Ul!lthinkab1e. n ·But both Martin and Loewenberg fail to indicate why· 8.lfi3' 
meaningful preposition nnist have a 11sigi4.fieut correlative~~n Farther-
more,,;~· Bx;L~tma:n.t s method is, high:cy' speeifie and renders other methods 
'tllll.thinkable only in so far as one can substitute an equal fpr it.. By 
definition$, the best. of Clrl.ything. can have no equalo Nenempirl.cal does 
.·, not mean. impossible of definition.~~ but rather .refers to a:rry· method or 
bypothesis that does net. include all the data of expe::oienee., · Hen.ee, . 
the method finds its "significant correlative" in any alternative 
method 'Which is less than the definition of empirical. synopsis requireso 
·'· 
v. 'Empirical Coherence as the Crl terion of Trut.h 
Like the m,ethod of empirical synopsis, the eri terion of truth as 
empirical coherence is a direct ou:tgrowth of the proposition, nthe true 
is the whole. 11 As indicated in the se~ond ebapt.er, ·~oherence means .not 
•I 
o:nly «inclusive systematic consistency® but. 1'1lll""hher demands gv(a) that all 
, -~~ 
the fact~~J· of experien~e b'e considered and (b l that pr~posi tions about 
these faQ_ts be related in an orderly and signifieant wayQnl. Th.e two de-
mands beyond "inclusive systematic eonsisteney-u• are the essence of the 
method of empirical syimopsis, and through them Dl"igb:bn.an t s method. and en-
terion of truth are integratedo 
Just as the method of empirioal synopsis is so inelusive that it is 
necessary in systematic phil.osophy.9 so also the empirles.l eohere1mee cri ... 
terien of truth is so inclusive and f"Wmda.m.artal t.b.a.t it eaxm.ot be eseaped 
in systematic phil.osophjr. Brightmanvs chief reason for ae~-cepting t.Jle co-
herence criterion, as suggested in the se~ond chapter.9 is that, like self-
existence, ••it cannot be defined wit.bou·~ being affimedo~~t2 To de:TJGT that 
coherence is the test of truth one must appeal eitner to ~ont:~a.r&iction -or 
to some :f.'om o:f.' coherence.- vtA.nd even if I appeal to the realm of eJontra,r.. 
diction and incehere:neell if' I mean What ;r say a.nd stic:k to itp I am again 
appealing to coherence. If I do not mean what I say~ it is time to stop 
talking.n3 
1. An Ih.troduotion to PhilosoE!r:~ · Po 69. 
2. Ibid.,. p. 72. 
3. In "llu.s't We· Accept the Ooherencs Theoey?ll1 (Philo Fo~ 11 (19,3) 1 
34-36) Hugo A.. Bedau has ooallenged the reasqfiig iii'tirelved in the sug-
gestion that one cannot deny the coherence ~riterion without affirming 
it. But the curious thing is that Bedau refi'l)l""Gs to the very type of 
22.3 
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To understand Brigb.~ t s interpretation -of coherence as the eri-
terion of truth it is essential. that it be related to the epistemie ·P:N-
cess itself,. Truth, which is the object of the criterion$. .;i.s. an· accurate 
deseripticm o;t: reality. Truth, it must be remembered, is hyp~thetioal..·• 
Before an hy'fHDthesis conoerrdn.g the .pature o.f reality is possibie the 
Shining Present. must stand -in interactive relationship w.i. th tbe nl'llmrt 
inating Absent. Although the Absent illuminates,· it forever remains ab-
sent. Only inferential hypothesis can bridge the gulf between the Shining 
. 
Present.· and the Ill'llllti.nating Absent. The empirie'al. data· of consciousness 
make an.· b:ypothesis possible. An idea can. be compared only w.t th another 
idea., never wi 1;;h nunex:perielleed real..i ty, uv1 <Or ·the etbject in the Ill:um:i.na.-
ting Absent. Hence, i.f truth is an accurate description of realit,v, and 
if all that is available to the Shining Present is the idea arising 
.from t)le empirical data, what 'Ultimate test coul.d there bs other than co-
herence as defined above 1 Correspondence, while a good' definiti'bh' ·of · '•; 
truth, is no criterion because a tertium quid is neeessa.ry for a basis of 
compd~~. ·In:.·f.tLfJbo··.'genes1s and naturep al.1 ideas are the same.; o~ in 
their. meaning are they different. EvaJ:nation of correspondence.,· then1 j,n .. 
volves meanin~, and meaning involves Brightman's c<m~eption of coherence, 
whieb., like the method of empirical synopsis, is defined in such a wa;y 
argument that his article is attempting to refute. Be attempts to re ... 
.fute :a_ propositi0n on the basis of refuting tbe consequences of a sup-
._ position that is exactly eontr~ .. to the original pr®p~ion to be 
.• refuted,. eo:ooluding that practical consequen~es are :the ·tes~ !er t:Mlth 
-.but failing to indicate how one is to decide ·which of a11 practical. 
co~equenees is best. 
· 1. An Introdilction to Philosopb;rD Po 60. 
·:'~ 
that it is irrefutable .. :. Before the coherence criterion as here under.,. . 
stood can be superseded» on~ m:U.st offer a more adequate· empirical. scheme. 
Whether this is pessible re±nains to be seenD and whether i"t; provides a· 
basis for a more adequate criterion a:1sc remains to be seen. But at .this 
point it must· be admitt-ed that if' one gx>ant.s "t.b.e S~'"lletu.~e of Brigb.tman~S 
psychology and epistemology; ·be must;!) if he is coherent (and c0herent ··he 
:must be if he 'is philosophical in ~· Sy'stematie.~sense)p grant tbe vali'!i-
ity of the coherenee'eriterion .. 
3., . The Empirical Schene 
The foregoing sections of evaLuation have attempted to prove that n<> 
.. 
a1. ternative bas superseded either the method of e:mpirieaJ. synopsis Gil" the 
criterion of empirical coheranceo Moreover 9 both substantiate the valid.:l.i 
·• 
ity of the dialectic of~evaJ.u.a~ion as dee~ribed earlier .. 1 Assuming that 
the method and criterion cqmbined con~itut,e the pest amrl.la.ble standard 
for judgment, the dialectical precess continues in the phase of the an~ 
tithesis. 
. 
i.. The Meaning of vtEmpiric.a:;l.eu 
·· 'the ·desc;r:iption in tb.e third chapter indicates that Brightman defines 
•. 
as empirical anything integrally related with experiences and experience 
: . .: : ;· :. ·'. - -... . . . . ........ ·. . ··~ 
he defines a:s the entire ccnscious life .. 2 Anytbing having its basis in . 
experience ·is empir:ica1. in origin9 and anything wlrlcll is necessarily 9ri-
1.. See page 212. 
2 •. -'See ·page 43o 
'••'11 
.. •. 
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ented.w.i.tl+ experience as a whole is required by the empirical principle. 
Hence, philosophy must begin, continue, and end in conscious awareness or· 
experience.. On what other course than experience can the philosophical 
race be run, the battle lost or won? · Ex:perlence is all that one has., 
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Granting the thinker his rlght to definition, it is impossible,· at 
this point, to· determine. ;wl\ether or. ~<:It B:cightmann s view oi' experien~EI is 
coherent. !lather one·-sh01il-d sa'y that the definition is,comprehensible. . 
But·. the assertion that experience is all that one has, 'involves epistemic 
and antic implications so broad that ·they lllUSt be considered before any 
evaluation of the definit-ion canoe madeo These epistemie and ont:ie i:m,... 
plications will. provide tbe basis for ex~g Br:tghtma:r.J)S view of experi-
ence· to determine 'Whether or not he is coherent in his 'W!ageQ ., Before one 
can eval.uat~ a definition that is so bread that. it includes everything_, 
one must see how this complete 'Whole is dividedp what its parts arep aiJd 
hew they function together. Thus does one examine. the datmn jmd the data 
of experienceo 
ii. !rhe. Immediate Empirical DattllJJ. 
Brightman:• s in.terpretation of the dat'ctm. self is fundamental in his 
I . 
empirical scheme.· · -I't is the key to the understanding of his entire phi ... 
l.osophy·., · T:b,.e datum self re;Cers to any l.oous of CO!llJSlil!:ious awa:reness. re...o 
. . 
gardless of either its compl.eri ty or potential! ty o 1 Just as the definin 
tion of ex:p@rience includes a.ny and aJ.l· conscious awareneSs.? the datum. 
self refers to ~ giv·en specific ~ocus or 'Who~e of conscious awarenesso 2 
1 •.. ~'The Dialectic of Religious Experienee.?u p., 560o 
2. A Philosophy of Ideal~., pp .. ~4.? 15 .. 
But conscious awareness:·is not an abstraction that floats around ur:uat .... 
tended.- -Awareness is alwa:ys awareness-. .£! something, and that. soinathi.ng :is 
the complex of perceptions o · This compl.ex of' experience iilone is immediate 
or- given. All else is inferred from the perceptions which are given;· But 
it must bEl emphasized that both awareness and perceptions ~e given~ Con• 
sidered separately 'they are abstra.etic:.rns, bu:t ta:k..e!li. together they ~®ati;., 
tute th~ . locus of experien.&e j) a. datum self.,·· . Hence, the datlllll. self» as ·a 
locus of. consci.o11Snessj) cannot be ev·a.luat-ed until it is seen in rel:ation 
to the so...ealled data of exper:l.enee or conscicmsn~ss.. Indeed, as will be 
shown in the next paragraph, it is onl.y the rel~tionshiE of the :ilmrJediate 
datu and the s~alled types of empirical' data that can be evaiuatedp 
beea1lse ea.~h is an abstractioo :when considered apart from the othero 
-iii~ .The ~ypes o:f Empiclcal Jiata 
The vari~ types of empirioal. data have been pointed out in the 
third chapter, but the classification itself sho·old not be considered too 
significant, etteept in the basic distinction between sensory and nonnsen-
sory data9 ·Even this distin~tion }las metaph\rsieal implications which may, 
in the end, make the· difference between positiviSl(J. and ·idealismo More 
important: here; . howeYer j)) thm the fin~ dis~·t~riY.ll!l! b9tween the d:tff'er-· · 
ent types o:f.' data is the relationship be·tween the sc ... •;al.led data and the 
locus 0f conscious awaren~sso 
If the· datum self as mere awareness is an abstraction when considered 
apart from the contents of that aWa.reness ........ the data or expe1"ieme--then 
th_ere :m:uSt be an active relationship between the two in order to enter 
canerete reality~ This is q1li.ckly granted., Awareness that is awareness 
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of -:aething in ·particula:c is meaningJ.ess .:1 though p.ot inc~m'!eeivablt:~o A 
bigger question revolves upon the meaning and si¢ficaiJ,ca· of the data 
themselves, partieularly the sa-ca~led sensory datao I!'tb.e data are. 
Wholly 1Vi thin the realm of conscious awareness!) haw is one to bridge the 
gap between the data themselves and the objects tb.ey seam· to sign.i..fy? 
P.erhaps·tl:!.e' data belo:o.g· to the objeeti11e world? · The • Pl'f>blam of solip-
sism j_g relevant here~;.· 'The .. qn.estians. a.reg lll[hat is' "the a.~~taal content 
of sensatien? How much is immediate i,n.lmow:i.ng? Th.e a:rmswers to ·fhi!J!!§e 
qdestions depend upon the re:J.a:t.iolDShip between the· empimal s:t'ltua tions o 
iv. The Empirieal Si tua tiona 
'It was ~een in tb.e third chapter tb.at the enrpiri.teal sit-uations are 
-With,· and in, present consci.ouslfn.ess, t.he sit"Uatio:u expel'ienced, or tbe 
shining present. The shining present ~ludes all preeenlf conscious 
~ . 
awarenesso Present conscious a~areness suggests a s~~allad objective 
. l 
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world to Which it refers!) the s'itua:tion beli.eved-i.n, or the illaminating 
· amsent .. · Either of these' emp'iriea1 situa.t,ions when oonsid.ered apart from; 
the other .:I,s. an abstraction!) but ''When related accurately they become the 
f ott;nda tian for tall though til value .9 . etc n An accurate descrip·tion of the:ir 
relationship is one of the basic 'problems for eputamo~ogyo As ep:".ua-te:.. 
mologically polemical.,· the relationship between the empirical si·t..mrk;ions 
will be examined in the next· sectiono l. 'lb' concern here is g Is this di.~ 
·vision of the total empirical situation. into the sh.i.U.~ preserit and 
1. See below, p. 232o 
--
---
I . 
il1Ull'lina.ting absent an accurate orie? OI· are the immediate data of con.,-, 
sciousness such as to bridge the gap? If sol> the gap is artificial<t 
It can be said that the distineti~n betwecan the shining prese~t _ ~~ . 
the illum,ina:bing absent is an accurate description of the total empirical 
situation in that it points out that a1.1 is :o . .ut. i.m:medis.te fm- coMcious""' 
ness. The activity of consciousness involved in the pr~~ess called ill<-> 
ferenoe, however~ becomes the basic proolemp be~ause it bas ma:ny ·lll9ta.-. 
physical implicationso What this activi:ty is.9 as diiltin~t and separate 
from s6lli.sation, remains to be seenJ> indeed» if' it is distinct and sepa.-. 
rate in any meaningful sense at allo This is the prob:tem of the epis-
temic process .. 
v. The Empirical Whole:: Persona.li ty 
Though the fundalnentu concept in Brigb:t.ln!in' s definition of per_sODM 
ality is consciousness» the twe are not synoxzymo·us. The difference be~ 
tween them. is illustrated in the d.istinction betwen "selfn and WpersoiL:ttt 
nA ~ is any conscious situatitm e:x:perie:uc:ed as a whole» 1tl while na 
person is a self that is potential:ly self ..... ~oDB•.:iiouep ration.al.p and i .... 
deal. ~2 By ttpotential:l.y self.-.t:ons!Ciiousw~ Brlgh~:ma.n dQee n"" .. t mean that the 
person is a self' that nay eventua.lly devel..:>p the '-'Japa<ed.ty c.f ref'le©t.ive 
consciousness. Rather he means that thEJ person ie a self 'Who is alxoeady 
1 •• A :Philosophy of Religion.!~ p., 350 .. 
2. Ibid. Note here also the importance of the distinc-tion between self-
experience and self..-.conseiousness., 
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OO.pabJ.e of· self=aonse.ioUlil1.06SS and po~n.tially so only in ihat it may 
cho.ose wh.en. it Will exercise this trait of ·personality.- Persona.lityj) 
then, is a niore highly developed state or condition of consciousnesla9 
For this .reason.:it. was. ineluded in t:he th:ird o."hapte::- as the •piri~a.l 
whole~'· Bat, as was seen in the fourth and fifth ~hapters!) the ra&l im...l- .'. 
~ortance of both co:nsc:Lom.ness and psr.so:oal.i ty las ·1:11 tlaeir -si.gllrl.f·:ltcao.ce 
.ftt11'. apiste:mol-®gy~:k..:tllrl.·llleta.physics .... · Brightnian:'s ;-de£-initioue'··of'~theae terms 
ean be ~CC~!a:ptEni- ~siJzy" » b'n t hiS iJnterpretat~® of' their 1"6D'~e to'· both 
eptstemology · a'hd. ~taphysies will prl11tide a \la.Jsis· for fv."l:her- d.is~sU>Jm 
l. below. :. 
4.. '!'he S~heme of Erldenee 
:i.:cal scheme, aJ..thougb :i:t entails some di.ffi<!ll'altissp- is· O:tl)he:roent as: far as 
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it gees... But :its .depth ·of' meaning Qamlf!llt be fu.lly appreciated until: 11• ~is 
a':!ld. it~ ·objecti-ve referenoeQ>-
lll. knowledge begins w.i. th the data of' conseioUSlOSSISo Eve:.oy datum is 
a sigh~ suggestil!lg sone hypoihesis f) however a1ement~·., Btl!:t befcore the 
suggest:iy~:~lidim.cy toward an hypa)tb.esis is trastworthy:1 the data ~-t 
··at---
l.. Pages 238ff o ., 
--------~ --------
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unde!!.gO philosophicai interpretation!>' As indieated:l)l the rprocess of phil-
·o·sopb.±cal1mterpretat:ton includes five fairly distinct phases. The first 
phase is <:3. hasty preliminar-y synopsis to ttsensetf: the-;situat.ion as a: whole. 
Then there is the .more careful scientifi-c analysis and synthesis.:~· Which 
serves as a- basis for the third phase, the suggesting o.f synoptic: hypoth-
eses. The f-ourth aspect involves the···probJ:.em o;f verification' 6.f ·the·~ 
op:tid hypotheses, and t'he.,;.fi.,na;J.; ...step:. is ·tb.e reorientation· in the :Light·· of 
··the entire pr·oces-s... Once the hypotheses -are adequate:izy- tested by the: cr::i.-
terion, they may be assumed to be true temporarily, and hence, may be.•M-
ferred to as knowledge<> 
The problem of epistemology is: 11How do our ideas refer to their 
object?n2 Stating the probJ.eiil. in ·this way assumes. that the epistemic 
situation is dualistic, that is, involving idea: C\l).d object., The epis-
···-.; 
temic monist claims that such a description. of the epistemic situation 
·; .. ·,_ ..... 
creates an artificial chasm forcing one into skepticismo For the monist, 
idea and object are one. But the monist faces real difficulty, whether 
... 
• .. l .• 
the "one 11 is idea or objecto How i,S· he. to e:x:pJ..a.in the problem of error? 
Furthermore, his epistemology decides his metapnysics in advance. To as-
sert that .the so-called object is exhausted in the idea of it, :i.s to lead 
to self-refuting so:Upsismo On the other ha.rtd., to ~SEiert that the so-
called idea is .totally exhausted in the obje~t· is to deny the possibili'lj.y 
o.f a truth-possessing self-conscious se:Lf which is an empirical and. indu-
bi table ... fact_. ·Hence., the mon:i.st is boldly unem.piricala.: One is fo:~;ced 
.. ~ Page aB. 
2. .An Introduction to Phi~~so:E?z.t. Cha.Eter r.y. 
·W :fl.Ccept th~. reality of .both idea a1ad ebjeot .;in the· ~awing situation~ 
.····· · · Several p~oblems nw. arise... First, what is the relationship be-
tween the .monistic situati<;m.-e.xperienced and tht;{ d~is'±.ic epi.bt~c situ .. 
ation7· The following quotat1on snggests the problem.. 
.• 
.' ~. '; i 
Knowledge by aequamt.a.E.oe oovers all· immediate .experiewe~ 
hence it may be said to include all 11situations-experi ... 
anced, u while they a-re present.. Knovrledge ey description, 
on the other hand, refers to situations not now present~ 
· . hence i. t ... descr.illea. "-sit::uati-ol}S'~belie:ved-in •. lt· Si tua ti.ons~ 
~xp~r:traced are m.on.ist:W ~ s1.tua tiona-believed-in are dual. ... 
l.StJ;.C:• . · . · 
Acquain~e refers. to ~ediate or il:ltu.itive lmowledge.2 But, ~how lmlcllt 
knowledge b.1 acquaintance is there?~3 To answer this question Br.igntman 
elirphasi.z;es that 1twba t we are real)..y: acquainted with ; -what is really pre• 
sent to ·us, is not a sense datom m.erely, but is our t<~"Jtal. actual e:x:peri ... 
eri.ce at a1.lY" time_..n4 It would appear, then, that self'-e:x:per,ieme is mo-
:iri.s.tic. This -Brightman affirms, 'bl:l.t in doing S<4> he points .out that, as 
monistic, it "is ·not.; p::t'Qperly speaking, ·a .ease of kc.QW"ledge~ 'Whereas in 
·S.el£-lmowledge the asp~qt of ~elf' that knows is distinct .frQID. the as.., 
pact· 'af' myself' that is being known~u5 Besides, knowledge by' acqu.a.iw:ta.®e 
dOe's not p~suppose "tlaat idea. and ·object are om. 6 Does it not follomr 
then, tbat ei t.her 'bhere is. !mil) kno'rfledge: by' aequa;i.Btane.e {and ~ sc :ear a.~ 
s.ituati.ons-experiemed are-monistic they ar-e not a oase of knowl.edge),f) or 
.. ""' 
that si tu.ations-~erieneed are dualistic rather than monistic in so far 
as they are relevant to the epistemic situation? In either ease, some 
adjustment must be made. Unless one denies the relevance of t.he situa.-. 
tioR-eXperienced to knowledge (which in Brightman.• s scheme would be utter 
chaos) .he lllUSt conclude that the situation-experienced involves the dual.-. 
ism o£ idea and object. 
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The more coherent solution is that situations-experienc.ed are dual.is ... 
tic. There is knowledge by acquaintance,.. The h.ypothesisj) '9This is white," 
can be verified by immediate perception and as verified by immediate per>--· 
.. ., . ., 
oeption it is, by definition11 lmowled.g'e.1 This assumes, of' co'Urse» tha"h 
at an earlier tim,e the perceiving shining pre~~nt had encoun"~?ered the 
pattern of sensory data which is called "'White~•t There moe c_as~s of_ know ... ' 
ledge w~ere the o1).1y verification, once defi.ni tions are _.granted; is' pel'b 
oeption, and that perception is illtnlediate. Furthermore, this proposition 
. .. . ·.; .. -.. ., .. . . ... . . . . 
is in the shining present, and hence, is a situation,:;.~eriencedo How 
can that si tuati.on-experienced be called monistic from an epist~mie po~t 
of view? The perceiving shining present mq not. be aware of its I?erc~p­
tion as such, that is, it may be self~erience rather than self-con .... 
sci.ous experience as Brightman distihguishe_s them..~~ but is it a:t:ry the less 
d'UAllstic? Al.l self-experience (again.~~ as Brightman defines it) "is molllP. 
istic in that the self is not aware of itself as expe~iencing. In such 
experience thought about the briCk is not divid~d into a duali~ of 
ttbrick111 and tt'thought about '!#he brick~!t There is lllereJ.y ttbricko11 But 
1. It will be seen belovr in the d:iseussion of 'the prooess· ·of veri.fiea±.ion 
'hhat this prop0sition can be verified with empirical certainty., ' 
when. one examines the episiiemie sit.uation he disc0vers that the daalism 
is required for coherence for then he is conscious of the distinction be-
tween the experiencer a,nd the experienced. The onJ.y situation-experienced 
which is mo~stic is the one in which the thinker 'directs hi:s thou.ght to 
the thought-fact that he is now thi:aking about· thought-faot, 'Which is an 
. I 
unproauotive and unrewarding pursuit. Whether or not this experience is 
:moJiP.stic or du.allstic depends upon whether or not it is experienced as mon-
istic or dualistic. By- far, the mos-t of hu.znan. life is lived on the stim.u-
lus-res,ponse J.evel as contrasted t·o the consciously premeditated J.evel~. 
Hence, one might say .t'rGlm a psyohological point of view that there'is much 
more. eol\d11ct resuliling from eonditianing than there is from conscious ~e­
medi ta:tion.. · The epistemic situation is recognized as dualistic only bel.-
cause it iS com~ciously a highly analytical process relating the knower 
with the laaown. In other words, although the epistemic situation is always 
dualistic :f'rom a theoretical viewpoint, naively, •it, is gene~al],.y· n;:oriistiil. 
Another problem is the relationsnip between· the idea and the object 
in the d;aalistic epistemic si tuation• Truth is an accurate deseript;on o:f 
a real s'ii.t'e of af.ta:i:rs~l The description of the state of affairs is not 
identical with,· nor does it exhaust, the state of affairs as sw.ch. Hence, 
there must ~e some relationship betwe~n idea and the object~ the coneep-
tion and the "object« coxroeived. In h±s- di~on of time as- a; me~ 
physical categor,r,2 Brightman suggests that unless the temporal ani the 
1. See above, p. 21. 
2. See above, p. 99. 
et:ertial .. are reJ:atoo~in SG>me way~ the temporal. being ·COUld .:p.ot ·kl:I.OW t.fie 
eterna.J..·.; The same would 'be true between··idea and object in the .. epistenid.c 
situation·. Without s·ome r~lationship,· knowledg'e would ba·.;:J.nipo~sible if· 
not meaningless. But wha~·iS that relationship? 
Brightl)la.n ·sugges·ts' that an idea canliot be compared with th·e:•ebje0t 
. ~ 
11I.f' all that we have is our· experleno;e:; it. is :Unpos-. 
si ble for. ~s .to cdxii.par'~ ·ideas .'·:wi.th arri, une:k.perieD0ed: . reality. n~ ··~he ob.;;.. 
. . 
ject forever remains Ou.tside''1ih.e realm of experience •. Tb.e· data of con-
sciousness are as near as the shining present can".'ge'b -t~o the object,· and 
!mowledge of the object· mu~t ·resort ·to; .the :in.f;~e~tial activity of 'the· 
l!lind:. To suggest I that an idea cannot be· eompa:::~d· rl th the ·object .to 
'·' 
which it .refers is to say that·:.~.ere i{3 ·n.e rel.ationship' ·betw'~n themo. · 
This leaves the epistemic situation a. coinplete m:rste±7•·· .:·Fux.thermor&, :tm-
. J..ess tb.ere.is. some kind of reiati~nship, regardless bf. hOW'. hebiil~p one 
cannot escape ·the cir..o;.t..e .·of solipsi-sm.. For if our id~as have. no i'.ela- ; 
'bi6nsh:j..p with the·~ p.ci{!l~+ objective· :Wor}d, we' cannot 1;>e .at all ·certain 
• 
that we hci,ve arr~r k.nowledge of a:rrif exter:)laJ.. world.· :r:&deed., there:·is .. ~~k. 
~ternal·wG>r:l.P:, and ·this is ·j:u-a.t wh~t ~s me:ant by ~olipsism:. Yet~ if:.the 
data of :·consciousnesS.•. are t:li'.'\lstworthy enough for the. mind t.O. d+'aw.. ~J:fer-.- : 
ences fpom th~m_, · t}:iere is at least that...mu.ch relation.Sti;tP. l?etween./.!:,~e.t~~a:. 
' . : :' 
and the object. It would be admitted that the sensory sugge:3,t'ion .<?f .fu:e · 
rip. ture of tb.e desk is not valid .for metq.physical analysis· (or. 'even anal-
... . . .. .. . ,· 
ysi~·for: physic~), but the idea. of the desk as a phenomenal object.must 
.1: •. An. I'n:q-oduction to Philosophy,; p. 60. "Unexperienced reality« and 
.. dobjectlf here may be regarded as syno_nymous terms. 
. ·' 
have some rel$.tionship to the a9tual objec.t as phenomenal or both. kncml• 
fBdge am coliiQlunication would be im.possible (and one is ,returned.. to soliP-
sism). The same must be true on the level of ph.yaics and metaphysics:. 
I:r>t.here is no relationship between the idea of. the desk as it is under-
stood ~ physics (as electrons etc.) and the nature of the reality that 
aotual.ly constitutes the desk, the shining present could :r;ever escape the 
~alm of sensation wit1l :any- degree of ·certiint;-.- ,(On normal sensory' · 
levels th,e relationship may be to a great extent autollla.tic.) After all, 
the. elephant is a li ttla like a rope, a tree, and a snake • In so far as 
his tusk is a part of. him., he ·is· like a spear. 
The stabil:i.i;y an.d predictability of the so-called objective world 
would lead one to believe that he has sone fairly reliable idea of the 
act1l8.1 external world; both on the ·phenomenal and noumenal· .levels... If . 
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this is not true, even cri tiaal experience is d.Soeptive and untrustworthy, 
(If that iS _tm case, there is no need to go on- as there is no point ;t;rolfl 
which to go,~ -We can assume, the:n, that there is· $0me relationship .be-
, ;, . 
tween id..ea and object, even :if pressnt ideas are. erroneous. The epistemic 
s-ituati0n de!JiaJldB· the po'sibility ·of the relationship between idea. and 
objeet, and certainty demands the accurate knowledge of the relationship _ 
itself • To assert that tbere is no relationship is to delive-r one into . 
either a solipsistic or a ding an sich metaphysics-.· To assert that there 
is a l'elationship is to assert that critical e:xp.erience .can be trusted in 
its description of the na tore of ·the objeot to -which our idea refers •. 
'What els~ wou:l.d account: for the genesis of the ide~?1 Does not the>:&aet 
that ~very dat:um:is a s~n suggest a· relationship between>tm:e ·idea and 
the object tc;>:which itsefers?. Unless this is t:riie; the obje.etive're.fer• 
ence.· of-thought ,is. a ·deception •. 
ii. The Objective Reference of the Epistemic Process 
All thought refers beyorrl its"Blf through the capacity of self-tra.tldt 
; .. ·2'··· . ..·. . • · ... : ~ .. :.· ' . . .. .· ·,, . .' .: . 
scendence.· An examination of this activity of thought indicates that 
there are fundamental laws of objective reference which Bri~tma.n refers 
f. 
to ~s categories. A. .fundamental la.w is a principle "that is logically 
essential. to the very bei.ni of a system of objects to which it refers o ~3 
I' I· .. .' 
.A. category, then, is relative to a specific realm of being to which it 
I 
·: ~ ' . . .. ' 
refers. The categories which apply to all possible realms of being 
,.. • ! ··'-.. ;;:· ~~ \ • ·~· 
Brightlii1Ul refers to as metaphysical; they include tima, change aDd iden• 
tity 
1 
and ac~lty~po~ntiali~. 4·:. The .. -~~te'g·~;ies' ;hich app~ ~~ . ~-~~ ··: . 
' ~ • I 
specific limited real.m or rea.J.D5 he refe~~ to as phenomenal$ they include 
" , . ofr · ... 
apace (motion), value and obligation, personal identity, cause, eo.l'lilJlUDi ... 
cation,. and sub~~ce.5 · , · •· ·, .. ' 
, .. .· ... 
.• ,.~ 
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Th:e discussion of the categories is essential to the present problelfl 
...... . ~·:j' ~·~.': J::r .. ~. :/.~:~ .. ~~ '· .•. 
becau5e it iB through the categories that Brightman attempts to link 
,. ' 
·~. .. . 
epistemology and liB taphys:i.c s. To the question, nAre categories priEoi-
.. •, • ·~ o· 
.. 
... . ...... . . . ·~ ". ~ , 
1. The conception of the nature of that object that :Ls considered most 
ooh.Aran.t c:Cor, ·this atu,dy will be detailed later ... 
2. See abeve, p. .51. 
3. See ~bove page, p. 97. 
4. See above page, p. 99. 
5. See •b-ove page, P• _100, 
plea of thought or principles of being or botb? 111 he gives !SoJ specific 
answer. As laws of objective reference they would be linked wi. th thought, 
and . .as·:·r'elative t<;> the realin. or rea:l.mS:;:;or•be±Bg·-to whjch· they refer they 
would be linked with being or metaphysics,. 
A n~~ problem q.rises. On the one b.ap.d, Brightman denies that an idea 
can be, compa+ed with. its object; on th~ other, :hand, he seems to' assume a 
necessarr identity between the nature of the evidence and the hypothesis 
suggested. If the realistic hypot~esis is an unverifiable invention, is 
not his metaphysics predetermined by his 'epistemology? 
Consciousness is an essential prerequisite for knowing, b~t is it 
also a prereqUisite !or being known? From several different appr~aches 
Brightman seems to argue that reality is conscious because it is known in 
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consciousness. For example, the statement that an idea cannot be compared. 
with unexperienced reali ty2 suggests that reality that is experienced is 
essentially llidea" or conscious. In the ltMetaphysicsn3 he suggests that 
the physicist does not begin with the phy-sical universe but with experi-
ence. This would intimate that although the physicist did not realize it, 
he was beginning with subject matter that is actually conscious. (If 
there is something really significant about this distinction as it applies 
to the physicist, how is one to bridge the distinction? For all practical 
punposes the physicist begins with the physical universe, and only on a 
J,.. An Introduction to Philosophy, P• 98. See below, p. 247. 
2. Ibid., P• 60~ 
3. ttMetaphysios,n Chapter n, P• 13. 
highly epistemic, level. could,it be called experience.) 
In an article propeundi:ng the ultimate reality of time as it relates 
to God he suggests: ttif we were to consider the reasons for asserting 
2.39 
that God is temporal, .we should, I· thi~,_.,.find t(lat they readily group 
the:inselves 8+-eund ·the statement that all the significant· evidence for God 
is tempora1.n1 The question here is whether or not one can conclude that 
th«;~ object is temporal because the evideJ:\ce for that hypothesis is in 
temporal consciousness or is temporal in consciousness.,-
In t}le llMetaphysics n he suggeEts: 
The vital difference between materialist;ic energism and 
personalisnt is whether the ttenergy" is d,t3fined in terms 
of an unv~rifiable non-mental power, or is interpreted 
empirically in terms of conscious will.2 
The problem here is that of verification. On the one hand verifi-
qation can be restricted enough that his cha.rge might be justified. 
Positivism,_ for example, limits verification to ~ensory perception. 'When 
~o limited,_ even the fact that one has had a pa~t is literally unverifi-
able·, although it is tta well-grounded h~otb.esis. u3 But, while discussing 
the verifiability of pelief in God, he asserts that "we must either sur-
rentler. to solipsism or believe, for good empirical reasons, in unverifi-
able entities.••4 The ·Gtuestion the:y11 is, flow i~ he interpreting Uempir~­
cailytt in the above quotation from the ltJVtetapllysicslt7 If' verification :ts 
empirical when it is ltpersonal experience, apprehended as completely as 
. ' 
1. ttA 'remporalist View of God,.n Journal of'Religion, 12(1932), 545. 
2. "Me}aphysics,·ll Chapter X, p .. 11. 
3-. A Philosophy of Religion, P• 234. 4. Ibid. . . ' 
.· .. ·~ ·• •.· 
j.' 
p~~sl.ble, ana:cy-zed as thoroughly as possible, tested as exper:illl.entally 
as jrossible, and then grasped synoptica.J.ly as a system or totalii{V,ttl 
~ -· 
then, he ean hardly call the realist unempirical unless he assumes the 
former l.ilnited interpretati~n that ·reality must be conscious in ~rder to 
240 
be kn01rn. Hence, in his :charge that the realist tt·in.vents" an hypCDthesis 
•hich is un~erifiable he is restricting his former interpretation of veri-
t1,cation (as coherent interpretation) or presupposing that reality must 
be conscious in order to be known •. 
He goes even further. in_ Nature and Values, indic~ting that person-
alism is more empirical than naturalism in that "naturalism tends either 
to neglect or to deny the most essential characteristic of all experience, 
n,a.mely1 that it is personal consciousness.tt2 
All the evidence for belief in nature or in God or in 
other human beings is found in personal consciousness. 
All that nature ever gives to us ~r takes from us is 
personal consciousness. Anyone who asserts that there 
is any unconscious· and impersonal matter is inventing 
something for which there is no evidence in experienoe.3 
·~ . 
!'In this qv.otj:tiori' it seelM thati sensory da"\!a ha>ve ceas~d iobg3 releyant as 
evidence for anything, and the concept of impersonal energy is of mystical 
origin. The problem againt Need we assume, that merely because eon-
sciousness is personal in nature, everything of which it is conscious is 
therei'are personal? Further, if there is no evidence in oonsciousness 
for impersoru:i:l energy (including sensory data as part of consciousness), 
can the contents of consciousness be c 6nsidered evidence for anything? 
1. "An ])npirical Approach to God," p. 155. 
2. Na.t'U'e and Values, p. ll5. · 
3. Ibld.,. PP• llS-116. 
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He.re the self seems to be enClosed in a ball, the e:p.tire· ,inner. ~face of 
"Which i.s mirror-like, with no windows,. "What of the objective reference 
of thought? One must go be~ond the basic perceptions of consciousness 
. for any meaning., In this ttgoing.. beyondlt om-· should .be. guided by emp:i:r-
tcal.cofl:erence• The question now is:- Is it coherent to claim that the 
contents of ·Consciousness cannot .be evidenee for auyii:ting of an.,:imper ... 
sc>nal natUre if this means that conseiousne:s.s; cannot know .:anything essen-
·-·- . . 
trial~ different f.r-em. itself1 1hi.s see~ a hasty dismissal. of all senso-
ry data of consciousness as well as the metaphysiccil signifiaance. of the 
findings of modern physics.. If ·t.here is Uno-. ~:iid:ence'* ·w o.onseiousness 
' 
for any' iin.personal energy, then a great deal. o;(, critical experience is so 
deceptive as to shake empirical verifioa:tf:i.ons. Evidenoe is entire~ a 
problem. of relations, relations of al.l: the data relevant to'·a situation,. 
:· ~ .. 
No data are evidence ~less rele~t:cy related~ The . idea that th& st.ruo-
' . . . 
turin& of the data is :lilhited. t.o. the· nature. of ao~ciousness se~ms itself 
to·~e·.an ~.thesis~!,?.» '11b.ich.th~~~e is little. evidence. 
· . - . · ., · ; ···.·: -. ~- t~ ...... ~ .. Lt. . . . i · .. , -... 
:··. :i.' :;-A.~a~:;i.tw: Natur8~ ail<i•'va1ue~f'Br:LghtiDa.in. points out repe~ted.J:jr that 
~ --: 
~ ~·· 
"all the evidence for the existence of a world of nature is to be ... fou.nd. 
. . . . 1 .. ·, .. . . ... . . 
in the conscious experience of persona.~ To the question, "Why do per-
• ~ .. ~·--~-~ ~! .. 
soMlis·ts believe that nature is mind?tt. he give~. as h:l.s f~st ~eason 11be-
oau.se all the evidence for nature is personal aonsciou~~~s,n2 ilidiaatillg 
·. 
in a footnotet ttHencE3 it is quite Ul'lfair for realists like R. B. Perry 
. , , ... 
to make much o! the · tegcr-oen:tlria predicament. t That we are oonsoious is 
.. ·• ·' -
1 •... Natu.re and Values·, P• ~19. See also An Introduction to Philosophz~ 
P•. 295. . 
2. Nature and Val'll.eS, PP• 123~1~4. 
more than a ·predicament.; consciousness is the very s·tuff.' of all given 
reality.n1 · :More than ltunfair.,tt is Perxyts criticism i.rivalid'l 
:Perry charges that the type .of reasoning here being deserib~d in-
valves a f.allaey which be calls "the fallacy of argument· from the ego-
a 
centric predicament •. " This -predicament "consist.s in the impossibiJ.ity 
cxr· f'Ulding anything ih_at is not lrn.own.!iu3 ·Per~a~ds'd~tr;:~:'i;<;>b~Q~B,·ithat 
l ..•... ·-· . • .. >4 
nkn,awnn ·means "given as an object of ·t.hought.;~ 
It is ·impossible to argue .from the .fact that: eferyiili.ing 
one finds is laiown, to the conclusion t'b.at knowing is a 
universal condition of .being, becaus~ it· is :t::i.mposSibJ.a to 
.find non-things which are not known. . 
.•.. " 
.. 'ill ,;;1 ;. 
Brightman interprets Perry 1s point in the egocentric. p:t-e:dicament and 
then challenges it. 
His point is that the mere .fact that .we are conscious of 
. an. object_does not prove that -.the objeot.;.is consoio~. In 
that contention he is doubtless correcty but he minimizes 
two .facts .which are at:least as ilfiportant as hiS. criticism• 
These are (1)-the undeniabiiity of personal experience as 
·the or:tgin of and evidence .for all knowledge;. and (.2) the 
necessity of making every assertion of ours .fu5ly coherent 
w.ith the evidence of .that personal experience: •. 
l. Nature an.d Values, P• l24n. . .. 
a. Edwin B. Holt and others, The New Realism (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1925.), 
.. 
P• ll. In his dis.se-rtation., ·ltTb.e Role of E:tperienee an<t Value in .. :-.·~ 
Naturalistic and Personalistic Thought as Represented by the -
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Philosophies of Clarence .Irving Lewi:.s and Edgar Sheffield, Br.:igb. tman;-" .. 71 
James Russell: Gardner asserts that ttin equating experience ... ;vdth con-. 
scious life, Brightman leads us Oirec.tly toward .. tp.e · e-goaen:tr:t.a precttc-
ament." (p. 62) Gardner feels that the distinction between experience 
and the objects to -which the experien,ce re.f~rs is not suf±::i,.cientJ:y 
clear to refute the charge of solipsism., but he fails to give a de-
tailed explanation or defens~. of his acous.a-tion. 
3. T~e New Realism, P• 11. 
4. !bid., p. lin. 
5~ Ibid •. , P• 12. 
6-. .Aii'"Introduction to Phlloso.phy:t P• 297. 
::. \ 
·'·.•1 
. ~ : . i,·i j 
In this quotation Brightman agrees that Perry is correct in his oo~. 
tention that being conscious of an object does not prove that the dbjeot 
itself is conscious, but in his discussion of the two facts which he 
thinks Perry minimizes he falls back into the same kind of argument, so 
that he does not meet Perry's charge. If Perry is "doubtless oorreattt 
that ttthe mere faot that we are conscious of an object does not prove 
that the object is conscious," then, Brightman cannot argue that there is 
a necessary metaphysical identity between the nature of conscious eviden.ce 
·and the nature of the ••object« which the evidence suggests. Jrn other 
words, Whether or not the world of objective reference is personal ·or im-
personal must depend upon other evidence than the mere faot that the evi-
dence for its existence is in my consciousness. The evidence for the 
nature of the so-ealled. objective world must go far beyond the evidence· 
.. 
for its existence, and the mere fact tha.t we are conscious ef its exis~-, 
ence is insufficient evidence to prove that it is itself conscious. The 
two facts which Brightman mentions are both vital~ significant, but even 
they ·do not prove the world to be of any one specific nature unless em-
pirioal coherence as a criterion assumes that there is no impersonal,real-
ity. Brightman would deny that coherence assumes anything abeut reality 
except that it exists iPld that it can be knowm., not that it must be coR-
sciws to be known. Otherwise he would be unable to maintain that his 
epistemio dualism leaves the metapnysioal question open.l 
.... · .. ;•·<·7'!'$:,:-··~.:-:~;:_:~~:;~izt~ v~~.,;:~.;.·i...•:-;.o::. -· ••,·· 
1. Although ·Brightman.:explicitlj"'dem~s that an obj~et'~m.u.st be of the 
nature 'of c.onsciousness in 1)1:-der to be known, , there is sufficient 
empi~:L.ca.l evi,dence .in bis.epistemic scheme to warrant this charge_ ,; 
Th~ prececll::fi~ ·and·'folJ.OWing paragraphs list tbat empirical e"rl.dence, . 
In the t1Meta.phys;l.cs, nl Brightman challenges the f alla.cy of argument 
from:the egocentric predicament with an argument not unlike that in 
.;;. . . .. 
the Introduction to Philosophy. 
In essence, the predicament con~ists in the fae~ that 
everything known is known; ,~verything experienced is expe-
rienced; and the realistic polemic against idealism was 
directed at the supposed inference by idealists from the 
predicament. The idealistic argument was supposed to be 
that A is known, hence its being ·depends on its being 
known; Or A is experienced, hence its whole being is ex-
perience. Apart from the fact that the polemic oversimpli-
fies idealistic arguments and omits consideration of its 
critical and systematic features,. all that the predicament 
argument proves is (1) that there is a "shining present11 
and (2) that from it as merely present no necessary meta-
physical inference can be drawn--eit~r idealistic or 
realistic. It overlooks the fact that idealist and real-
ist alike transcend the present by appeal to reason. The 
key question in philosophy is not whether the present can 
be transcended, but how it can be transcended; not whether 
reason drives us beyond the present, but how to define the 
nature and function of reason. Hence the argument from 
the egocentric predicament has bad no cogent effect in re-
futing idealism.2 
In this discussion Brightman does not ansWer adequately the challenge 
_~the nee-realistic polemic. ~In saying that 11 the idealistic argument 
was ·au~posed to be that! is known, hence its being depends on its being 
known, or ! is experienced, hence ·its whole being is experience," is he 
implying with the phrase, ''was suppo~ed to be; tt that the ..ne.o-,reall:s"t has 
misunderstood the idealistic argu:111ent? While this ~ay be an oversimpli-
fied statement, it is, nevertheless, not a misunderstanding· of the ideal-
istic argument. Moreover, consideration of idealism's critical and 
1. tf}.(etaphysics," Chapter III, pp. 21-22. 
2. Ibid. Brightman~s argument against the alleged egocentric predicament 
hiS"been given here in full to show how unimportant he considered it 
to be. 
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systematic features, which are idealism's greatest contributions, would 
not remove the fallacy here involved, if the fallacy is actu~ involved 
in the idealistic argument. In admi-b~ing that the challenging argument 
proves nthat -from ·it as merely present no necessary metaphysical infer-
ence can be drawn-either idealistic or realistic," he grants all tha:t. 
. . I .:... . 
the neo-::realis t is s eeld..itg to prove. This is· the fallacy involved in 
idealistic .:thinking according to the neo-rea1.ist. Further, in' charging 
·that "it overlooks the fact -thS.:t idealist and: realist alike transcend the \ . 
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present by ,appeal to rea.s on,-.t1 Brtghtnlan is overlooking the fact that the 
realist agrees in this tr~cendenoe tbreugh reason, but challenges that 
the idealist uses reason itself in such away that even reason f~ victim 
of the ·same charge. If coherence is. the test of tr'llth, ~d if coherencJ' 
is limited to experience, and il' Csxperienoe~ is :iiifited: tcf eonsciwness, 
I . •.· ·• • 
then ·hait is the idealist t~ get beyond the sheer fa~t of ()onsaiousaess as 
such? For the idealist the key question may not b~ "'\'l'het,her the present : 
ean be transeended, but .ht\lW'.,t1 but for the realist the q,ues~ion is whether 
the idealist can, and if so, how he ean ·transeen9, the pres~nt in such a 
- . - ..... ..,.......- ~~ ' ... . 
way as to make me4f:1ing:f'ul.oo~tact with, and interpretation of, ~e absent, 
the _objeat~ ·The arg~en~ hete :Ls. ·tha:t of the realifJt, as Brightman inter-
prets. it,·namel;r, "that from .fine presem!7 as merel;y" present no necessary 
metA.pbysic~l infer~noe oan. be drB.lfll-e:i ther idea.listie or realistic.~~ 
:•·; ,·j'·,: ~.· ~~ ~~~· .~ ·:; . . . . ', 
,~ ... ,'~~e: t;hef!is ~~ere i~. ~?t .so .~ob. tna.t idealism as a philosophy- is fa.l-
. . . ~ . 
laeiou.s, but ;rather that any philosophy which argues from the nature of,· 
i;he evidence to the nature of the obj~clt, i~ .. based on a fallacy when oona 
so-i0u~.ss itself is ccnside~ed aa evidence :for tll.e mture cf .anythingv 
Eurthermore; it is suggested ·that _this falJ..aey· is evident in Bri~t~nts 
:0 ·~ 
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philosophy, and several furth~r qttotit-;!.ons :can_ be cited for suppor:t. "J?Wo: 
come· from the ttMetaphysios. u In rela;thg· the shilmi:ng present and the as .. 
seneeB he points~ out: that from a purely lGgieal. point of v.i.ew the realm 
of essence mght. ha.ve been eonsi.<iereli prior to -the shini.ng present but 
that sttch a procedure·.;,· rather than .;i:bs apposite-; . 
:. 1roul.d: have created the impr~~s:ion. that the,~shihing present 
was somehow derived from the essences, as the .American neo-
·- realists-believed tmt all compl&xes :were- somehow de:ttived 
fro~- neutral entiti?s~ _-wher~s in fact: the essenceiare . 
der;Lved from the shJ.nJ..ng present,. not l.t from them~ · ·· . 
futher,: he indicates that a.nycme who studies the- relations'hi.p;betWee:a.the 
shining. present .. and the · ±111lDJ.inating· absenb: · '!" 
Will readily see "Why. a per~u:nm.listic. philosopher will de-. 
sire a more clearly empirical definition, which pays 
gr.eater heed t.o the seamless: .robe of experience, and he 2 
wi11 be pre~red for a ahange .tram. !tobjectut to ttcontento ~m 
A. good illustration of the point being defended here, namely, that 
. . . . I ·F . 
'-· ' .. . ~ ,. : .: . ~ 
Brightman is serioUsly iitv~ived in the fallacy .O:t argument frqm .the 
centric predicament, can be seen in the following quotation. 
ego-
. .~ . 
• ~- l'lt' • A ,. 
••Because. na_ture is known through consciousness !I is 
or.Q.ered and purposiv13,. are we ju.stif,ied in· the· conclus-iOll't 
that it is therefore of th~. :na. ture of l!lind?vt Answers s I 
· · eerta.J..Il.ly deny that- the na·tUre ·of knOw-ledge. alone can.· 
prove the nature of the object. Order and purpose are 
signs of mind; and there are :many other idealistic B.l'lgu...- . 
ments. To invent an unexperienced kind of reality, other 
than consciousness, as the basis of na tu.re is to raise 
questions as to how it can act on mind, produce sensations 
-~{...;· • ..;: • •• ' f .'i .· ""!"• .. 
1. "MetaphysiCs;tt Chapter IX, P• 3.....1+<> 
2.• ,Ib_idH· _Chapter IX, p.-.. 3 •.. 
I 
''"··· ·-?t-· 
and conform to rat~onal law.. In fact, dualism is a com-
promise with materialism which really grants a large part 
of the materialist's argument .. l 
Although Brightman denies that the nature of knowledge alone can prove 
the nature of the object, he speaks of any alternative hypothes;is as ap 
invention of ttan unexperienced kind of reality." The latter suggestion 
negates the former • 
247 
.A. problem that arises in connection with the suggestion that Brightman 
does not seem to have escaped the fallacy of argument from the egocentric 
predicament has to do with his discussion of the categories.. As indicated 
earli~r,2 Brightman attempts to link thought and the objects of thought 
through his interpretation of the categories .. ~e·have called them the 
fundamental laws of obiective reference, so that they are both principles 
of thought and properties of objects .. ~3 On the one hand he refers to the 
categories as the fundamental laws of the objective reference of thought. 
But, on the other hand, iri defin:ing a fundamental law he indicates that it 
is essential to the .tasystem of objects to 'Which it refers .. n4 As a law o.f 
objective reference of thought the categories would obviously be associ-
atedwith thought, but, as essential to the system of objects to which 
they refer, they would obviously be associated with being .. · But if an 
idea cannot be compa~edwith the object to which it refers, the catego-
ries coul.d hardly be attached to both thought and being.. That they are 
essentially laws of thought is suggested in Brightman's revised edition 
1 .. ttBrightman•s Reply to Gerstner .. tt Asbury Seminar~an, 1(1946), ll6 .. 
2 .. Page 237. See also tiMetaphysics, tt Chapter V, p .. 33 .. 
3 .. An Introduction to P.hilosophyg p .. 96., 
4. ~to, PP• 97!)..,.97.. . 
of An Introduction to :Philosophy in a paragraph making transition :from 
the epistemic to the metaphysical problem. 
Important as is the recognition of tb.~ activity of the 
mind in lmowledge, the metaphysical problem, to which we 
shall ~ddress ourselves in the followin~t chapters, is more 
important. In terms of the results of t~e present chapter, 
the metaphysical problem may be Cj@scribed as an attempt to 
answer the questions: What are the objeots to which rrry 
ideas refer? What categories of my thought afford the 
most coherent interpretation of t~e world of experience?l 
The :four chapters that follow deal with physical things, universals and 
particulars, values, and consciousness. These are the realms of being 
that are relevant to a world view .. 2 To refer to them as "categories of 
my thoughttt is surely to suggest that the categories are principles of 
thought, and that the realms of being, to which the categories are es-
sential, are realms of being of thought. 
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For Brightman,. the categories are eli1Pirica1. They ttare as truly de-
pendent on experience as experience is on oa tegories 1 and neither experi ... 
ence nor its categories can be taken as logically independent of the 
other.. tt3 Even as empirical, the enum.era tion of the oa tegories is more or 
- - .• ·~1 ... ' 
less arbitrary, depending upon the specific realm or realms of being and 
the classification of the realms of being is arbitraryo4· ffence;' any com-
., 
ment on the enumeration as such would need to keep this ~in, mind., Although 
there· are minor questions concerning some of .fue categori.es,5 onl:y the 
1 • .tn Introduction to Philosophy, P• 99. 
2. See next section. 
3. "Metaphysics," Ohapter VII, p. 2. 
4. See a~ove, !!>• -~8. 
5. For example, Brightman considers time the primordial category, then 
change, motion, etc. · Would it notbe more accurate empiricall:y to 
suggest that motion or change comes first, and that from motion 
.... ,.,.. ..... -. ...... 
category m~st important to the. presei?-t study wil.l. be considereci in amy 
detail., the category of substanoeo 
Brightman states the nature and the .so:.Luti.on of the problem of sub-
stancre at:~ follows : 
It is a central. thesis of this book that the .f'u.nctions of 
substanee-perm.anence and ·powel'-eannot rational.~ be as-
cribed to any sort of suppose¢!. (suppositumt) being not to 
be .foUD.d in a.n;r shining present, 'bUt that.'it CB:n be,7:"ation-
all.jr ascribed to the persons as defined in the ·~egory o,f 
personal identity • . In the shining ~e~e»;t, is aJ.ways · the 
experience of personal. identity~ what more do you wam.t for 
permanence? In the Shining present is ~the power 'of choice, 
decision,,, sel.f-Qtie-ction, and. purpose. What more do. you 
want for potency? We can entertain the hypothesis that all 
il.l.uminating absents are oommnnieating person~ or experi-
ences of persons, and the further·hypothesis that the order 
and interaction~ of ~ersons is aXplioabl.~ onl.y by ~eference 
to a Supreme Person. · . · 
. . 
Brightman's oonolusion that .a;t.l substance is personal seems to be 
based ~pon.·th.e nature of expe~ienoe. In the quotation above he indicates 
that "the fun.ctions of substance-permanence and power-:-ca:nnot ration-
ally be ascr~bed to. any sort of supposed (nppesi tum!) being not to be' 
.tou.nd in any, shining present ••• o". r.t has been indicated repeatedly 
bef0re th~~ .. fP.e __ a~e condit~on ·required £or .~Pr~seneaw ~ the sh~:M..ng ])re-
... ····· ' . . . . ' . . - . 
sent is conseiousness. Hence, if the only explanation for the f1mctions 
____ __,__..,.;...__..;_...,....·· .• t : . 
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eom.e both t:im.e and spaee? Further, theve seems to be &ll ineonsistenoy 
in the disaussion of cause as a category. In Chapter V (pp. !6-27) of 
the "'Metapb:y-sies~· Brightman refers to cause as a phenomenal category, 
limited to specific limited realms of being, while in Chapter VII, (p • .3) 
he refers to cause as a meta.peysical category and compares it with time. 
(It shcrn.ld be remembered here that the "'Metaphysics" was in first draft 
only". Had Brightman lived to if'inish it in revised form, these minE>r 
prob;Lems propably would have di!!ia.ppeared.~) 
1. ll'Metapl:~n:ili~s,·tk Chapter V~,p,.·.o:3:3.-3h'o·~ In _.~his· qnestiO:n ·one fijlds·:t,he· key; 
to the unders-tanding of Brigb. tm.a.n t s theistic cosmology • 
of substance must actually be in the shi:ni.ng present, then no solution 
other than some form of shining present can be given. The question ist 
Does not this line of. thought involve the fallacy of argument from the 
egocentric predicament? If any hypothesis suggesting an imperson~ 
reality is an unverifiable invention with no evidence in experience, then 
there is no alternative open, and the metaphysics is predetermined. 
A further question involves the problem of interaction. Brl:ghtm.an 
assumes that int~ra.ction is essential for metaphy"!J¥c¥t , But inter~ction 
\ ·Jflr····· 
between matter and mind is impossible; hence"' substance must be o;f the 
nature of mind. 
Idealism holds that the dualism of matter and mind is in~ 
coherent Slld impossible, that the ttneutralrt way out ,Lthat 
is, the way of neo-realis~ is an attempt to explain the 
real and concrete in terms of abstract concepts which, 
after all, are relative to the purposes of minds and that 
the materialistic solution not only flies in the face of 
consci·ousness but is ultimately self-contradicto:ry.l 
But, is this an accurate description of the facts? Two questions arise: 
Is interaction logically essential for metaphysics? and, Does interaction 
presuppose a similarity of the interacting ttentities"? 
Ultimate reality seems to be some form. or forms of energy. Ill-
order to kl'l.<YW ultimate reality; consciousness is required in s.om.e ,form. 
Gonsciousnel!s is activity .of some kind. Renee, knowing involves aQtiv-
ity, but it does not necess~ly involve interaction, if by interaction 
one means a kind of activity which changes in eome way the two or more 
ttentitiestt involved in the interaction. Granting that the stone is active 
1.. An Introo:u.ction to Philosophz, P• 234. 
' 
r 
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;t.;n .i,ts il;l.ternal. essence,;;. that is, in e:J_eetron,. proton, eta • ., and g:t"anting 
. . ' 
that ·tl;l.e peree~v:i,ng knowing consciousness is active: in the peroeptio:o 1 
.(and :tt :.must be granted. that mere oonseio~sness .itself in:~olves ·some kind 
of. ac:&i'll1:t7)i ·it does not _follow neces.sa;r:)..ly that the~e is interaotio:n in 
knoldiig~:-, Tb.ere is no- empirical evi.denoe that.lmowing in any way al.teO!'S 
·the thingknOnl• Can the same .be .snd ci&IlOerning: being--itself? 
. ~ 
Unless._-one ;Ls::to d~rry the metaphysical- signifio~e .of. the f:i.nd:tngs 
of modern physics,.na:melyl that all physical ;re'a+ity .is essentia~ .c~ 
. . .... (;. . - . . 
pliaated elecroriaal energy patterns; and ~SS': one is. to dallY the actu~ 
experienee of aotaa.l a~oious aoiii~ty' in consciousness, cme must con-
elude tbB.t all reality .known to. exist is activity in soma fo~~- ·--But it 
does not neeessari~ follow that. t~ b~~g .'of tb.-is ao~iv:Lty imvolves illa-
terae;b:L~n with o~er activity.,· ~eed, it '-:may be. found that the being of 
consciousness depend~ upon ~~raotion of body cells ,.-and that tbe be'ing 
of· these o~lls dependl3 \lpon the apparel!1t i:D.teraotion of so~ -more basic· · · 
,..... . ,. 
entities,· but it does not neeessari~ follow that· -the iJlteract:i.(:;n. betWeeli 
the. moat/ basic' or ultiniate entities (whatever their nature ar natwes 
,· ., 
may be) contain within themselires tiD.e ·pl.•:b.oipl.P.J of ·:tnteraction.. ,The ae- · 
tivity that- aecaunts for appar.ent, interactian inay 'be metaphysic~ dis-
tinct :from the basic· ent:i. ties· oonsti tu ting rea.Jj_ty o, 'l't, is concei vabl~--
tb.:at this apparent ·interaction .is .ultilllate:q due -to the aot.ivity of some 
cosmic BeiDg, :whose naturea is .such as to orga.Jlize the basio. entities in.to 
a universeo If ihis is true.? it .iS possible. that' in.~raction is un-.. ,:. 
J.. For more detailed _ciiseussion see Clha.pter VIIor . 
necessary for being, the principle of integration or organization being 
: ! 
such that it makes'possible the Universe. If the hypothesis of either 
such a basic entity or such a principle of integration is an invention 
that is imverifiable, then it must be discarded. The question ist Is 
2$2 
Brigh~n correct in his assertion that the ttneutral entity'·' of nee-
realism. is an unverifiable invention lacking any evidence in experienoe?l 
The hypothesis that the ttneutral entityn is an unverifiable inven-
tion· lacking any evidence in ei:perience involves the meaning of both ver-
ification and evidence. If verification is limited to the immediately 
experie:q.ceab1e, then the uneutral entitytt is not capable of verification, 
but neither is the hypothesis of other persons or God (according to 
Brightman);;· But, if by verification one :p~.eans a:pprehending, analyzing, 
testing,·and interpreting personal experi~nce as completely and thorough-
ly and coherently as possible,2 then one ~y c~im verification for God, 
other personalities, and the neutral entityCI But to use the narrow inter-
pretation of verification when denying that the· so-called neutral entity 
is verifiable and to use the broader interpretationwhen asserting the 
verifiability of other persons and God is most ~consistent. MOreover, 
to charge that one is verifiable because it is in experience while the 
other is not, is to presuppose the fallacy of argument from the egoceri---
trio predicament. 
The s·ame is true with the argument of evidence, whether for the neu-
tral entity or for God, except that for the former the emphasis is ana-
1. Nature and Values, pp. 115-116. 
2. See above·,-:p. 96. 
'· 
J.;y:t:i:c a:rtd :f:Ci>r ·tlie latter the .. enrphasis iS synoptic. The neo-realiet could 
.. never find· ertdence for (jod by contemplating the neutral entity in tota.1 
~-··. . 
a;bst:riactior:i._, nor coul4_ .tlJ.e _theist find any evidence for the .neutral enti-
·, ~ ' . .... . ' . . 
m:eth~d.:.mu.s:IY-inv0lv~ ·:both anaJ..y~i~ and·syn.op~:fs~ ·and: the extent to which 
...•. .... : ! ~,;~-1 .. ~·" 
., 
.· ~itper is·yalid. d.~~ends upou the :r:ature of th:e iilvestiga~o_n, Fo~ __ the 
~-f~· .. ; .. ·.~.:!. · ~.7 • . .... l1 .. . -·~ ~ . : . :. ~"' ·. ~- 4 • ... -.~--- ''( ·.:,, .. ! .:. "' 
constitutioifof· ~eality .a.s a ~~le one needs both analysis and synopsis, 
. ,, . - . . 
"'- ... :. 
· bUt ·:iri no case doe:S coherence ·p~~mit~;aw'-conclii"sion "Which is contrary to 
the verifiable knowledge of. either. Hence.? just as the ana4rst :.hkS':'-no 
righ~ to ·~:9nclude that ~her'e is no God~1beca.use he finds no' -~V\d~~~~:\;f.'Olj· 
,· .. ~ ~:·.: ~: '•·' .. :,;.::; .. : , .. ~ .. : .•: ' . . . . .. . .·. . . . . " . . ·. . 
any, so'.also the synoptist has no ~ight to 'conclude that there ·is no neu-
. . . . . . 
t~aJ.. -e~ti'~y b~eause he finds no eVidence for it. Thus, one cannot label 
all reaii ty as a:rry one kind unle.ss it . is coherent with· the total empiri-
- ·> 
....... . .... :t.~:; ., ..... ·.... ~- .. 
·cal method.. Unless there is' a basic incoherence in reality itself, the 
philosopher pannot coherently verify a:txy hypothesis that is certainly 
coritrqry to the verifiable knowledge of science; nor can the scientist -
coh~r-entiy verify a;ny hypothesis . that is .unlerifiable from ... the point of 
philosophy, If each seeks truth, and truth is coherent!> then the truth 
of'soience and the truth of philosophy cannot be contradictory and still 
be t:ruth. Both spience and philosophy support the hypothE;lsis that all .. "". 
--. 
·:r:~ality is some form of energy, but neither has sufficient evidence to in-
dicate that all energy is of one form, 
:Brightman's conclusion that .all substance (and hence all·reality) ;. 
is personal leads to further'difficulties in the realms of beingo 
iiie· · The Relevant Realms of Being 
. ~· 
A. detailed evaluation of ~ach. -of tht:t realms of being relevant to;a · 
'· 
werld vi9w 1$ 1lDn.ecessary fo:r- the present prc:>blenw:.· )lelevant dise~si~n· 
. ' 
of the realm of.phjsical·things has appeared under the category of-su~-
• r J 
. . . . . . ' 
temic rather .than an ontio probl~ln.4t ,, (In .. the llll:Jllli3.tapeysics;.w tb.e realm of 
,· . 1 • 
universals and particulars has .been .Changed· tti "ther realiil ~f:. ess~e~~. ·t· 
but. even the ~;-~-~~ces;,· a~· indi~a~ed. earlier.?~ -~1fe no.· othe~ eJdSteno~ -~ 
' .. . . • • : .. . . . ! . ~ • -. . ·. . ~ . • . . . • " • ·" • 
£imeti.on of any sort.~. e:x:ceptas ~t:;;elating s~lves w.ith ·ea.oh· other])'~) · 
. ~- ·J . . . . (" 
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Similarly,.." the. realm of values is total:cy- dependent ·:ror both its· ex:tste~oe 
. . . • : ·: . ~ !- . 
~ . ~. 
and:mBaning,upon the_, last .named realm, -that of :cons:o:i.ousnass. or:.personaJ..-. 
' ' .. 
:tty.. Hence; the. only reall;y relevant realm. of being that here needs ex~ 
5-amina:tian is that- of. consciousness or personality..· . ..., . 
. ,, ... 
·· .Qonscious:ne.ss is just. what .it .is experienoed'.to. be;. and for. Bl?-gb.~n, · 
thilt.,.J.imits consciousness to consciousness. :we del not· experie:oa e ·.the sub-
oonacious$:-the brain, ·.or the ·hand .. ··JUl. tkese -~!El situa.ticms-b~lieve~in, 
:inferences f-r:em: conscious:tlBss .. · Undoubted:cy- the body .stands in intimate 
rela.ti~nship with: the. mind~ ·-si:nee there iS dnteraotion between• them; but~ 
J.~ See Ohapter IV. 
2. ~~e· ab<W-e; P• 126. 
3·~·See 9Jb!{ve, p. 127. · · 4.· ".utetaphysics,tt Chapter IX, P• lle 
5.;. w:Lth all the other realms dependent upon the realm o! oonsoiol;tsness ,. 
is it not confusing to refer to consciousness itself as a realm? 
· Indeed, the shining present i.s .re.ferre_d to :as. a precategoria..L- ~ll11. •. 
(ttMetaphys:i.cs, 1Q Ohapter IX,· Section 2o) This distinction might have 
worked .for greater coherence bad it .been incorporated .into thc:l-.strue~ 
ture 0f .both t}le revised TJltrodll.ction to· PhilOSOp\)j aM_ the W,Mei;a-
phySias.1' . 
:rsr- Br:Lghtman, no part .of. the body is _any part of the mindj) alld llG· part 
of too S:U"b...¢.M~.ciloWJ is any pa.;rt =of -tb.e eons~iou-5 be~a:iise as soon as any. · 
·so~lle.d slib-Go:qs~ieus enters eora.Sei~U.s:Dessj)· it :fs no· longer w~b~~~& 
Wha:tV'is .. inferred ,to . ..:be. the sub<onsci.od.sj: Brightman in~;rp:J:"ets as .'another 
.. \..•' ., 
§~1$.~tha t .sta.rrds; ·in ±a'b.:ima~. reia.tiormsh~p -itt4.':th~- norlila.l oonsc:ious sEd£·~ 
·:a:e~ :t:i:nds ·ina.t :.the .mYstery- .of::1.h~ .:uq.nd'"-body interaction :is: lessened it the 
• 4 • • . ..: '\:·.).,"';; 't •4"; • :~ : •.• 
b'ody is :iti.terpre.ted;':..al.ong with a-11· s~alled phy'sieaJ. substa.me,o asg3ome 
-. .. 
f.orm of}L;mi::md, -·:in tkt.i-s~:~a.Se itJie: energizirtg of: the ·Divi:ne :M:U,id~ .. ::(ThiS 
• . f • .• • ' -~ ': . ') .. ~;.: ~ . • 
·As .Brightl!L9.li :t:nterprets both co:nse:iousness and· body, there is a. -;; 
eJ.ea:r <iistinbt:ian.:·b€ftween. them. If: .. tfu.i.s distincitiozi·'is genuine!) enipir .... · 
i~al. evid~n~~ demands that. the ir{t~te r~l:a.tionship betweeli· them be ou:r 
0£ ·:interaction. .M -def~d bY B:rlghtma:n, ea.eh eertai:nly in:f'l:uencss i;he 
other• Bu-t ts' -Glie distinetien. between lid.n'd and 'bodY-· a geim\i:i.ne· er an a.rt;t... 
.f±c1.!al.:problllm· from·ai!l.em.pirlea:l pout of view'? 'There seemS ·to be ·littl.e. 
if. may emp:ix-i.ca1· e"ri.denee 'that such a olrsar distinction :ex:ilstsc. ·~·It;·i:s · ~­
-true that ceiise·i&usneS.s may tarn upo:n .. ::ttself .. in introspeoti.on and§' ia .. 
...__ 
oth-er '.moments of contemplation, ~rumticm 'witb.eut any recogn:ized-rel.ation .... 
~P.iiP. :b9. the. pPY-siaal. orgalrl.sm. But I> upon exa:mina tiOll.!_, one invariably 
. ' 
findS -co.l'l8ad:OU:sness functiontng onl;;r as an organism that is aware. That 
the· mind ean think rlthout being aware of the organism rlth which it is 
in-variably associated is :in no 'WtlY evidence that it has Oli!t·h existence 
aparb from the sustaining crr ganism$ :&mpirioal. evid.enee seam.s to suggest 
tha~ the· func_tioning of' the mind iS so intimately rela;ted to th~ ~functien-
. . . 
ing: of the- i'elevant parts of the organism, (blood.~~ brain, etce~) that the 
,,·, 
problem of ho'Vt they are related seems an ttiuventedtt one. ~e .seU'-co~ 
- ' s~i~ms o:I:gan~m. .experienl3es i.ts~J.f aa consoio=us. "Whem: the: toe strikes. 
r 
the ·atone, ·the a.~ns~ious organism exper;i.enees pa~n in the toe .and one 
spea,ks of being oonsaioi$ of pain, ... :n()t a_s su:C..'b.~ but. as localized in ~e ... 
·::toe• .·.When: tn:e. :fo.qt:'is ·anestb.etize9-~ .. ;Lt .:.is· ~~d.iaw';Ly e:Jtperienead as no 
. . ·. . . '. 
more i.D.tima~J.y.rela.ted to~ eonscious~ss or the cons~ious organism that~,.· 
. is the bed that suppor,;lios it.. Uhen·::par"bs: of the:~rain·ar'e anesthetized~. 
'Var-ious tr.a.j.ps ·of OOl1SCio)l!3ness a.r,e ·a.f~ected, depen~ o~·~~e ~~ation 
.. ·.; 
and .the e:x:tensiqn o£: tlae anestp.asia .. Memory, an essential trai~,for per-
sonali.ty .(though not' neo.e·ssarily for oon,se;i_onsness), see:g1s inti~tely re-
. ·'' ·. · .. 
. . . 
Qated to. tl).e c.o:rid.iM.qn of the l;>rai,n. Hen;e, _it,~· possible that t..'J.ere .. is 
~0. pr0b~em of relationship in :that .th·ere is no ultimate distino.tion be;,. 
:tween mind :a;nd~.b·oczy-. 
~s in4icated earlie;r; J3:1:"ightman finds the,.solution_pf' t®. mi.nd.-.boey-
probl~ in denying aw ultimate· metaphysical distinct.;to;n be.tween- ·hb.emo· 
. . . ' ~ . 
Bta.t. inS.:tead of interp;reting mind in te;rms of body, .. he intarprets bodi,. in 
·• • • • r' • • ••. 
term.s. of· mincl.. .. ·.Essentially -~e h~ma.n body is pal"t .of the energ:l.z~ o£ 
tb:e divine .mind_p so ~hat· the so-oal..'\ed minQ."':'';,ody rela.ti<:m is, in. ess~ce~. 
a_ ~roblem. of communication .be?"een human :a;ad Divine m:bda.o . 
~Although i:t. is conceivable, BrightmanVs solution of t.":le mind . .,..bo~.,:·. 
problem raises several diffieulties.ct . First, the possibility of :Luter ... 
aa.tion .as such. Mere conscio-q.snesa as such i15 an, a~strac·!<ion since· al~ 
a.onseiousness :Ls co.x:tsciousness ef something~ B.ut·.the .. so-ealled .object .. of 
~onsoiousnes~ . is. equally-:abstz:~ct _when cons:Ldered apart fr~m eonsoious-
ness. He~ce, the two must be considered in·-intima.te relationo 
. ~ . . ~ 
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Brightl!Uin, "no part of rrry body is rtry mind; no part of rrry mind is any part 
. of rrry body •. The interactiort between my mind and my body is, I think, one 
' .. ~ . ; 
instance of direct interaction between_:my mind ap.d Godts m:ind.nl. WhatJl 
tllen, apart from. any body of any kind, is the. aspect of mind that ~eeps it 
' 
from being a complete abstraction, and, again, how is one to make possible 
the actual objective reference of thought? To deny that ttmyu body is arry 
part of ":my" consciousness is to deny that "I" am conscious of my actual 
body which is to deey the existence of the body except by inference. 
Does one need to infer that his body exists? Is not the relationship be-
257 
tween consciousness ap.d body so intimate as to be immediate? If sensation 
is a kind of intuition,2 and hence is immediate, is not the sensing of 
one's own body a kind of immediate kn~l~dge? Certainly sensation is a 
part of.nzy: conscious:ness only beca11se of a certain condition of nmyn phy-
sic~ organism. 
Moreover, Brightman' s interpretation of the. relationship between the 
subconscious and the conscious seems dubiou~. Ope must grant that under 
some c6nditions the body may house more than one self, but these are ab-
norma~ conditions •. Psychiatry has proved the,. causal significance of the 
.. ~· . . " 
subconscio':s on. the .c'onscious. Therefore, to. in~erpret the subconscious 
as another conscious self which exists independently both of the normal 
conscious self and of the body, and to interpret the normal conscious self 
as indep~Ildent' of both the subconscious and the body, seems highly nebu-
lous. Rather than overlooking the relationship between consciousness and 
1. "Brightman's Reply to Gerstner," p. 116. 
2. See above, P• 57. 
its ennronment,l the problem here is the 1natute of t.ha;t relationship. 
G.an it not be suggested that Brightman minimizes to the po-int of· 
etior the role of the body in consciousness,. the lfele of the brain in 
· memor;y, ~d the role of the emoti9ns amd tJmeil'e' ehemistey- in persosli ty? 
To ·grant that all thes.e :rnhction as Science describes them and yet to 
suggest that ''no p:~.rl of .mY body is my mind" and the "no part of my mind 
is ~ part of mlf body" seems not only ttnseientifie but philosophically 
unempirical as well. SensAtion links mind and body in an inseparable way. 
To interpret all substance as personal reality is to lead not onl.y 
to the mind-body problems :tdttn.ti<med, but beyond them to the problem of 
cosmology, the interpretation of nature as a whole. 
5. The 1Resu1tant Theistic CosmoJ.ogy 
In any systematic philosophical scheme the foregoing discussion 
would serve as an obvious clue to the resultant theistic cosmology. In 
the fourth chapter it wa$ seen that all substance, for Brightman, is es-
sentially persona?,:_in, c~actero Further, it was seen that the most ten-
able solution. to the mind-body problem is that. of interaction, and that 
the pro~lem of i~teraetion is most coherent~ interpreted as interaction 
. between hruna.n and di. vine ndnd, the body being bterpreted as part of the 
energi-zing of the Divine Mind. In so far as the body participates in the 
rea.lni of natUJ:?e, it would f~llow that nature is also part of the ener-
gizing o:r' .the· Divine M:i.nd. 
1~ See above, p. 69. 
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i!J ·Na tu.re as Mind 
Several problems arise when nattire i·s interpreted as mind. The 
f'irat, ·and most important, was mentioned in the discussion of substance. 
Has the philosopher sufficient evidence to eoncf.Lude -that mind or per-
a onali ty exhau.s ts all reality? While nai{u.re demonstrates an apparm t 
teleelogy, has one sufficient evidence to c~t.tade that all reali'\;y is ex-
hau.sted in mind, that there is no impersonal reality? The senses suggest 
a world of-space and motion that is indubit.a.ble. Critical thought preves 
that this world of space and motion is deeei·v-ing and that in essence it :is 
different than it appears to the senses. The phy-sieist finds ·the M.tlire 
of reality to be e-leet:viaal energy patterns. The idea.Hs tic philosopher'· 
I 
suggests that the analytic method is inadequate for discovering the nature 
~ •, 
of' ultimate reality. Furthermore, the method of synopsiS iadicates that 
the whole is most meaningfully interpreted as the working of' a Cosmic 
Mind. The imlnediate question that arises is whether or not the synoptic 
' '. 
philosopher-interprets the nature of mind in such a way that it is not 
contradictory to the f'indings of the physicist. If mirid is conscious-
mess and consciousness has absolutely no spatial c~terpart~ then haw 
does one ever achieve a phenomenal world that is more than illusory? 
Brightman insists that the world of nature is phenomenally real. As 
phenomenally real, it involves space and motioJm. But if' in esseue it is 
mental in aharaoter, and if mind has no spatial aspect at all» haw is o•e 
to relate the phenomenal and the noumena.l? Is. ·this .not another exampl$ 
of the fallacy a.:t· argument from the. eg_oo_r.~.n.tric pre.dicam~nt? To remove 
even the ~~ of partiole from the electron and proton, hOW'· is oltne to 
explain the phenomenal world? 
rt· is conceivable that the universe is the energizing of the Divine 
Mind; and that what I experience as nmyn body is but my most immediate 
environment of God and that the mind-body problem is but a communication 
of human and divine mind. But this conception is more manufactured from 
ab. empirical point of view than is the "neutral entityn because .. it is 
contrary to sensory experience and unnecessary on a critical level of 
. . 
expElrience. Nature displays evidence of the working of mind_, but there 
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is always the· physical medium. .If the philosopher interprets the electron 
as mind itself, rather than the working of mind t.l:l.rough something n.ot it-
self, does he not, on the one hand, go beyond the evidence of phisics, and 
on the other hand~ fall short of explaining the evidence of sensory 
experience? 
-The idealistic interpretation of nature leads to another problem of· 
serious dimensions, the problem of God and evil9 
ii. God and Evil 
T,ne activities of nature suggest creative evolution as if teleo-
logically oriented, working toward- a goalo This evidence for teleology 
is overwhelming evidence for the being of some Cosmic Pux~osero But 
nature also demonstrates the lack of purpose, qysteleological tenden-
cies., 'Wb.ic~ suggest a universe without any purposero The empirical evi-
dence suggests .that there is both purpose and lack of purpose, both good 
• 1', •: • • ' • 
and evil, both order .and chaos a Both scieBce and philosophy agree that 
there is far more order than chaos, and hence that there is convincing evi-
dence for the existence of a Divine or Cosmic Purposer. But, as Brightman· 
bas shewp,,l empirical coherence eannot deny- the reality of evil. The 
.. 
... 
problem, then, iS: How is one to aecount for the evil or disvalae? I.f' 
one concludes that nature is part of the energizing of the Divine Mind 
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and that there is no other cosmic reality,. then one must solve the problem 
of· eVil' in one of two ways: ei tber evil is only appar-ent and serving an 
unknown geod of Some Divine Purposer that is beyontft human comprehension1 
or there is ~ome :internal hind:i:>Ei.nce within the Divine Personality which 
give~L:rlae to natural eviio Brightman chooses the latter alternative in 
. his th!!6ry of liThe Given," ass.erting that t.he appeal to ignorance com.-
promises human knowledge of good. 
Without question, Brightman faces squarely the prQblem of natural 
evil, and chooses the more coherent of the alt~rnatives suggested. ~ut 
the question ar:ts es whether or not it is mo~t coherent to explain the 
problem of natural evil be appealing to l1mi tation either in man, in the 
fo:rm. of ignorance, or in God, in the form of .99The Given.~ Human know-
Jedge seems extensive and certain enough to insist on the reality of eVil_, 
but is human knowledge sufficient to ascribe a limitati.oo to the very 
Person o:f God- himself? If there is su~h a limitation as Brigh'tm.::lln de-
scribes, .. then God is not fully coher,ent.. If God fa.~ls short of complete 
coherence, .is there any ultimate just,ification for the urit..erion Gf ·em-
pirical coherence? PerhapS there is a possible solution net includea 
among Brightman's alternatives. The ne:x:t chapter will attempt a reorien-
ta:tion that 'Will h0pe to discover a possible alternative that is, empir-
ically, more coherent. 
1. See above; P• 174. 
CHAPTER VII 
:aEORIEN!ATION 
,. 
The preceding1 Chapter attempts to isolate some .of the more important 
' - ' 1 ,t, • 
problems in,volved in evaluating the relationship between the empirioal. 
evidence and' the resultant theistic cosmology in the thought of Edgar 
Sheffield Brigh:bn~.. Some question remains· eonc.erning the adequacy of the 
solutions of -tn.r~e of those problems. First, has Brightman sUfficient eva 
idence to conclude that all substance is personal, and hence~ that nature 
' is the energizing of the Divine Mind? Second, is his conception of the 
Finiteoinfinite God the most coherent solution of the problem of natural 
evil? Third,. does his personalistic idealism adequately solve th.e mind-
body problem? The present chapter will attempt the ambitious task of es ... 
tablishing a brief reorientation in which these problems approach a more 
coherent solution. 
1. Prel:i.minary Orientation 
A reoriem.ted cosmol.ogy, -which attempts to solve more coherently the 
three problems mentioned above8 needs to be introduced with a brief dis-
cussion of at le?St three propositionso First~ the method of analysis-
s.ynopsis and the criterion of empirical coherence are both indispensable 
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_·, 
\,"•· 
for cosmology. Since both method and criterion have been discussed in 
detaU in both the second and the sixth chapters, discussion here will be 
. . 
very brief. Second, th& epistemic si'tnation usua~ involves a dualistic 
relationship between idea and object. Third, the object is ontological.J.y 
independent of the idea. 
i. A' Review of the Fundamentals of Philosophy 
Philosophy has been defined as the systematic attempt to understand 
experience as a whole. Such a definition contains in embryonic form two 
fundamental presuppositions. First, if the attempt to understand is to 
be systematic it must involve some method of procedure. It has been seen 
that the only method that is adequate to the goal of philosopbw as here 
defined is the method of analysis-synopsis. This method requires the con• 
sideration of all the relevant data both analytically and synoptically. 
Second., any' systematic attempt to understand experience as a whole requires 
some test for truth, since differing experiences suggest conflicting ~ 
.pothese~. It has been shown that the only adequate criterion of trtith for 
th~ goa.l o:t 'phil.osopey as here 'd~filied·iie ·:tba:t-.:of:l:empiriaal eoher~ee..,. -~ "' 
Empir:tcal . col£e~oe as . &. m>ttarioli ~· ._t~th::re4tlltr.es not onl;r i:nclusi._...· ; 
ness but ··als&.'· syatema:tic consistency. 
"Experience88 is the key word in the defini t.ion of philosoplzy". It, has 
been described in such detail in the preceding chapters that, discussion 
here will be limited to those aspects of experience t,hat are· ·particularly 
relevant to the task of the present chapter. 
ii. The Idea and Object of EXperience 
Experience is conscious awareness. Conscious awareness is indefin-
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ableo It must be experienced in order to be under$tgod~.and once it is 
. '•t. 
experienced, its meaning is clearo 
When any condition can be described accurately as awareness, it is 
awareness ~ somethingo The locus of awareness is the subject, and the 
something of which it is aware is the obj_ect. The state of awareness that 
is correlative to any specific object is the idea. The object of aware-
ness is not necessarily physical, but refers to anything which can be per-
oeived or thoughto 
Theoretically, all experience is epistemically dualistic, involving 
idea and object. Although it is conceivable that in carefully directed 
thought the subject ~Y reduce the objective environment until it is aware 
of no more than the subject as conscious subject, such a manufactured mon ... 
11 
ism is of little valuee Moreover, from a naive standpoint, most experience 
appears as monistic in the sense that the awareness is not actually con-
scious of being aware. In contrast, objects that are deoepta..ve or frds.._ 
trating tend to set the subject at variance with its environment and make 
it conscious of itself, provided it has the oapaoity for self-conscious-
ness. At a:ny rate, teebnica.l analysis of the epistemic situation suggests 
the dualistic hypothesis of idea and object. 
In suggesting that the idea and the object are identical., the epis-
temic monist is incoherent. !n identi£.ying idea and object as idea the 
monist is led either to solipsism or to Absolute Idealism. Solipsism is 
contrary to the coherent interpretation of the empirical evidence i.n that 
it cannot be def'ended systematically without appealing to a criterion that 
contradicts its thesis~ name~s that ideas have an objective reference. 
Hence it is self-re.fu.t;ing. But to make ttmyn ignorance and finitenessJI as 
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well as the ignorance and finiteness of other limited selves (loci of 
awareness) an actual part of an Absolute Awareness is to make that Absolute 
Awareness a congeries of self-contradictions. In identifying idea and ob-
.• 
ject as· object, on the other hand, t4e monist denies the reality of the 
subject., In either case, he is·unable· to explain the experience of deeeP'"' 
l 
tion or error coherentl~~ 
the dualistic hypothesis~ 
• 
A. coherent interpretation ef experience requires 
In contrast with ·the epistemio mbnist, Brightman suggests that an 
idea cannot be compared with its object. Ideas can be. compared only with 
1 
other ideas. To describe the essentials in ~ epistemic dualism as idea 
and obj eot and then to ass~e.ri'·~t on.~' :OalmG't: be r:compared :·:'1'/i.th ·the other f.s 
to sever the relatf:~nship and to end in an epistemic monism of either idea· 
or object. If the epistemic situation really involves both idea and ob-
jeot- and if idea and object are not identical.,. then some relationship be-
tween them is essential. .~~ledge of the SO"!'"called objectiYe world pre-
supposes some e~istemic ba~is for the comparison of idea and object;. Un~ 
i, 
less there is some epistemic r~1ationship between an idea and ~ts object 
the origin of • the idea is a complete mysterY'. Sensory experience suggests 
a direct reiati9nship between consciousness and the so-called physical e~ 
'Vironment,. Altho~gh it is true that the patterns· of senso:ry data are the 
.only evidence the~e is for the existence of a world of o~jective reference, 
in so far as ·r~~ional inference is adequate to suggest the nature of the 
world of objeo~ive reference it presupposes same relationship between i!iea 
and object. Moreover, from the empirical standpoint trese patterns of. 
1. An Introduction to Philosopq, p. 60. 
sensory data are identi:fied with the objMt rather with the idea. To :rel-
egate the patterns o:f sensory data to the shining present and the object 
itself', which so ·at:imulates the awareness, to the illuminating ~bsent is 
a dubious epistemic distinction. 
The crucial question is: At what point does one distinguish between· 
the idea and the object? Are the primary qualities Subjecti~e or objective? 
A.re the secondary· qualities subjective or ·objective? The sensory data that 
are primarily visual are experienced as attributes o:f the object· as· distinct 
:from the subject• Even though eolor-blindness proves that the world is ex-
perienced as it is partly because o:f the nature o:f the sensitivities o:f the 
subject,· still the visual qualities of the object seen are objective, how-
ever color is. defined. Furthermore, the color assumes a certain shape anti 
location. Hence, whatever gives the obje~t the color it has is part o:f 
the objeet. The same seems to be true with the other senses. The abill. ty 
to·distingu~sh odors depends on olfactory acuity, to be sure, but it also 
presupposes a distinction of odors in the relevant :frame of objective ref-
erence •. The fire feels hot because its activity•is such as to stimulate 
the organism in a specific way. To ·draw the hypothesis, "hot$:"· the orgaw-
ism must exercise the proper sensory acuity. Henae, it is faulty to sug-
gest either that the idea creates the object or that the object creates:. 
the idea •. Epistemically, .idea and object· are mu.tually interdependent •. 
This mutual interdependence denies both that idea ~d object are identical 
and that they are inaomparable.. '!he ()ohe;rent interpretation of t.he emp~ 
ieal·evidenee suggests. that both idea and object are such that the subject 
ean achieve a ·trustworthy knowledge of the object. 
iii.. The Ontio Ind.ep.19ndence of' the Object 
.. ·.· 
While both .idea .and object are· essential in the epistemio relatiorn 
ship~ the idea. may 'be considered more J-mportant, since the object·is ap-
parently unchanged b.r the epistemic process. The fact that the object is 
apparent~ unchanged in the epistemic process is evidence for the anti~ ~ 
dependence e.f the object, that is; that it exists apart from its being · 
known. Experience of the objective world is such that it is more accurate-
ly deseribed as discovery than as creation;. Henoe; in the epistemic .frame 
of reference it is possible to argue from epistemology to metaphysiCS$ 
from idea to objeet, bat in the antic frame of reference it is more cohe~ 
ent to· argue from the object to the idea.1 The following discussion. of 
o0smo:J-ogy; will be approached from the standpoint .of the. ontio independence 
0f the object. 
2• Theonie~0nto~c Cosm0logy 
In so far as cosmology involves'a contrast between idea and objeotJ 
it should be approaehed from the standpoint of the ontic independence of 
the object because the nature of the idea depends more upon the nature of 
the object then does the nature of the object depend upon the nature of 
the idea. If the object of awareness is a physical thing l0cated in space 
the counterpart in awareness will involve one set of categories. If the 
bbjept of awareness i'S·an hypothesis or any other creation of awareness 
l. All argUm.enta tion is lim.i ted to the individual hllm.an laval, and on the 
human level it is mere coherent to argue from the ontic existence ·0.f the 
object to the epistemio existence of the idea than it is to argue from 
the epistemic existence of the idea to the ontic existence--or ~ other 
kind of existenoe-of the object. The solution of the proli>1em on a 
cosmic level will be attempted below. 
ihe corresponding state of awareness will involve a different set of eat-
.. ' egories~ On this basis it his ·been suggested·that there mnst be same kind 
of correlation between idea ani objee"\;~ On the same ·basis the problem &f 
. . 
cosmology will be· approached from the hypothesis of the ontic independence 
of the object. 
i. The Problem of Cosmos 
Cosmos here refers to the t~tal environment of a~ specific conscious 
awareness• Although this total cosmic environment could be divided into 
many lesser rea~s, it seems sufficient for the purposes of the present 
chapter to indicate only two, permanence and change, or substance and oau-
sation:. The problem of cosmos is: How is one to account most coherently 
for a universe that involves both permanence and change? When these two 
basic realms are· interpreted adequately they will not only answer the prob:;;t 
lem of cosmos but Will also explain the other lesser realms. Permanence 
and change will be discussed here in terms of substance and causatiOllllo 
(1) Substance. Brightman suggests _that the function of substexm~e is 
the oC!>rrelation of enduring permanence with change.l The preceding ·para.-
graph suggests that the correlation of enduring permanence with change is 
the problem pr function of the total cosmic envirol'llll.ent~ Hen.ce it might 
be suggested that Brightman makes substance synenymous with reality in de.-
fining its f'unation as the conelation of enduring permanence With chari.geo 
With such a fUnction, substance would necessarily involve both the prim-
eiple of permanence and extension, and the principle of change. U:n1ess 
1. See above~ Po 10.5. 
Brightman. ocmld posi-t two dif'f'eren-t kinds of' subs-tance, one -to aceeunt f'o:r 
. I ~ .. . . 
permanence and ex-tension and the o-ther -to account for change, his ontolog~ 
ioal conclusions would need -to be monis-tic, whe-ther ·idealis-tic or realis-
tic. He accep-ts the former alterna-tive. 
In the presen-t discussion subs-tance will be limi-ted to ref'er to that 
realm or aspec-t of reali-ty ttwhieh underlies all outward ma.nif'estations .wl 
The func-tion of subs-tance, then, if it is -to be distinguished from the 
function of' all reali-ty, is not -to correlate enduring permanence with 
change, but -to a-t-tempt -to account f'or that aspect of' reali-ty which is ex-
perienced as being more or less permanent, namely, (and the phrase here 
will suggest the tendency toward either metaphysical idealism or realism) 
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the realm of nature, -the so-called physical world. ~o sugges-t that the so-
called world of' ·nature is permanent primarily because it is remember-ed as 
having been experienced in a similar way at an earlier time and helfllce that 
the real permanence is consciousness itself, :is the ki.nd of reasoning d&-
scribed by Ralph Barton Perry as -the argumen-t f'rom the "ego-centric pr.sdilfF 
·' 
a.men-t.u2 The essence of the permanence of' the starry cons-tella-tions, for 
example, is experienced, not as that trait of consciousness called mem~r,r, 
though-memory is obviously essential, but rather as a more or less fix~d 
pattern of stars in the sky. The same is true with the brief duration 
of a meteor. It must be admitted that if c0nseiousness did not abide 
through the trait of memory, nothing could be known as either temporary or 
permanent--indeed, nothing could be known at all. But, as indicated earlier 
1. Webs-ter's Collegiate Dictiona;r. 
2. It is not implied here tha-t th~s applies to Brightman without qualifi-
ca-tion. 
·in the chapter,. the fact that cossoiousness· :Ls essential f'or 'the epistemi.c 
realm :does not in any way prove that it is essential for the permanence of' 
the ontic realm, unless·"a thing must be perceived in order to be. It has 
been shown earlier that although an object must be p~rceived in order to 
be known~ the empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis that .. an·· 
object must be perceived in order to exist ontologically.1 Hence it is · 
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both unscientific and unempirioal to argue·~ the existence sf' conseious-
ness to the eXistence of nature. Paleontologists and anthropologists f'ind 
more permanence in· the cosmic environment than in the individual human :coill"' 
sciousness~~ Moreover, consoiousness·experiences itself' as intermittent 
and f'ragmentar.y in comparison with the cssmic enVironment. Hence, the 
hypothesis of tlie entio independence of' the object is sustained and it is~· 
more empirical to argue 'from the existence· of nature to the existence· of' 
consoiousness than vice versa. Substance;· then, may be def'ined as that· 
enduring reality which "underlies all outward 'mari.ifestatit!>:O.S·~w2 
If' substance is ·that reality 'Which "un.derlies all ·outward ma.nifesta'-
tions,u the method of' discovering its natu.re is that of anal;y'sis ·B.ll'rld the 
task is that of the physicist. After subjecting this realit~ to ·the most 
rigid" analysis the physicist discovers that~·~substa.ncelln 'in essenci'e is s01ne 
kind of' electrical energy patterns,-whieh are described, in so far as tbe.y 
are kn0WR, as electrens, protons, and :neutrons. These are the-a b cts or 
pbysios, the alphabet of substance$ but in their own ixmer substan~e» ·the 
.. " 
1. To suggest that. a thing must be perceived by God in orde~ to be does 
not elucidate the epistemio problem on the human levelo The expla.na:tion 
of' the relationship between God and the existent. object will be attempt... 
ed belowo 
2o Websterts Collegiate Dictionary-. 
electron, proton,· and neutron remain unlmow:a .. 1 
When the phy;sicist sbif"bs his interest to the apparent)zy'" nebu.l.c:m.s 
realm of philosophy, his· empirical ~etht)d assumes another dimension~·that 
of synopsis. But, as seen earlier, the val-id us~ o,t· .the philosophical 
method of empirical analysis~synopsis requires th~t both aspects of this 
eo-~rdinated method be held o£·such importance that neither cam be used to 
the total exclusion of the other. In other -wt>rds, neither can suggest as 
probably true any hypothesis thd t is believed with· more certaint,y" w the 
other to be probablY false. Therefcre) the synoptic philosopher cam cono 
elude that _all substance is mind only· if he interprets :m:ind most coherent-
ly in terms of electrical. energy patterns that in peys±es are called el.ee-
trona,. protons, and neutrons. That this is an adequate. explanation of 
the Oesmic Mind is no more ccilaerent than an al.ternative theory.. If he 
refi.ses tb:is requirement· he must redefine his philosophical method and 
criterion. 
When the philosopher takes serious1:y the method of analysis and the 
results of,physics he may charge that the mentalistie interpre'tati.cn o£·· 
nature,. whether panpsycbistie, personalistic, or absolutistic, is ·ineohe:t'l-' 
ent on the evidence that su.bstance)::in its outward manifestations, is not 
necessari~ experienced as mind, certainl.y net as~the experiencer experi-
~nbes· his omt mi:il.d~ ., To i:il.~rpret · substance coherently as mmd;·. it· must· 
be experienaed on the most critical level a.s nearer to the experience o:f 
mind than o:f non-Jil!nd. This is exactly what does not happelllo On the 
J.. A& Einstein and L~ Infeld, The -Evolution of Physics• (NoYos S:bn<m 
and Schuster, 1938). 
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sensory level it is experienced as non-mind. On the ontic level it can be 
interpreted as mind only by disregarding ·the facts of analysis which give 
no empirical evidence that the electron, proton, and neutron are mind. On 
what basis, then, can the philosopher suggest that all substance is mind? 
Perhaps there ~s an alternative hypothesis which is more coherent. 
It may be more coherent to infer that the electron, the proton, and the 
neutron have in common some even more basic and substantial element, 
which because of its internal and external relations demonstrates itself 
in the ways which the physicist describes as electron, proton, and 
neutron. For want of a better term, one ~ay refer to this basic and 
substantial element as an ttonton.ul 
The anton, as an even more substantial element than the electron, 
proton, and neutron, is an abstraction in that it is far beyond the cogni-
zanee of immediate experience. It is a construct of the imagination, but 
it does not follow that .it has no counterpart in external realit,r. The 
o~ton is a necessary construct in order to explain the phenomenal demon-
stration of nature. The phenomenal demonstration of nature is real. The 
senses may deceive, but if that deception is so thorough that it permits 
a noumenal interpretation that in essence denies any ultimate realit.Y to 
anythi~g, in any way phenomenal, such as an onton, then something other 
than experience must be used if reality is to be known. 
If the onton is the basic element in all substance and as such is 
far beyond the level of immediate experience, the problem of its phenom-
1. It ·may be that the electron, the proton, and the . neutron are three of 
the basic types of ontonic hierarchies, that is, of hig~ly organi~ed 
and integrated ontonic structural patterns. · 
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enal demonstration becomes urgent~ As the constttutive elements of sub-
stance, ontons need some existing principle or principles o:f·relation-
ship ·!in order to constitute even the phenomenal· worldo. The solution to 
the problem o:f the phenomenal demonstration o:f tb~ anton involves the other 
fundamental realm o:f being in the antic aspect of the basic experience of 
cosmos, namely, causation. 
(2) Causation. The problem o:f internal or external relations is es-
sentially that o:f causation.,· Bright.man correctly defines the problem o:f 
causation as the need to di~cover why Change occurs as it does and. not 
otherwise.! Substance and causation, permanence and change must be seen 
in relation to each other. Apart from each other, each is a meaningless 
abstractic,:m. Each is an indubitable experience.. I:f the prE>blem of per-
manence is most coherently solved through the positing of the anton, does 
it also solve the problem of causation or change? 
One infers the existence of the onton on the basis o:f the evidence 
found in examining physical things ·in. the world of natureo To posit. that 
natare is composed o:f countless ontons is to imply that these countless 
ontens are arranged :in e:lttremely intricate patterns in the mere proeress of 
inanimate phenem.enal demonstration, and :hence suggestive of some prinei-
ple or principles of integration. When one beholds the change that is 
ertdemt in animate phenomenal demonstration (i.e., the ~~tel worl.d), be 
is overwhe:bned by the order a.ttd the complexity o:f this inconceivably iJ1.... 
' 
trioate universe• That these CQ'lm~'-l$SS ontons should ever be organized in 
such a way that life a~uld begin is, in itself, evidence for teleological 
1. See above; P• 102. 
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change~- .That life could net only reproduce after its awn kind on a mwriad 
of different levels but at the same time adjust to a changing environment 
and evolve to ever increasing higher species is irrefutable evidence that 
the basic pattern of change and causation in nature as a whole is t~leo-
logical. That the whole universe seems, for the most part, to be involved 
more or less in one total inclusive plan is sufficient evidence to suggest 
that the principle of causation is located basioally9 not in the individ-
:ual anton, but rather in· some reality that organizes the co"tlllltless onto11.s 
according to a purposive plan. For want of a better term, this reality 
·may be referred to as o•Theon•" Three questions immediately arise g What 
is the nature of the .anton? What is the nature of Theon? And what is the 
relationship between these ultimate realities? Each of these questions. 
will be considered in turn. 
Theoretically it is possible to discuss the nature of these realities 
separately, though they cannot be defined in essence.. The onton refers to 
the most basic constitutive element in phenomenal reality. As such.it may 
be inferred to be simple, Without :r,::arts, eternal, uncreated and ind~struc-
.. 
tible, and hence immutable. As the most basic constitutive element in phe-
nomenal reality it would be neither a structure nor a pattern in that each 
of these would presuppose some more basic constitutive entity of which it 
is constructed. As ultimately simple, it is not sentient, conscious, or 
purposive, though, as will be indicated later,.~ intricate structural 
hierarchies it may be instrumental in the expressiol?- of a pa.rpe>se not its 
own, and in even more complex structural hit!rarchies it may be related to 
other on-tons in such a way that the hierarchy is aware and purposiveo This 
high:cy" compJ.ex -level of physical extension involves subjection to causation 
!15 
which is external to the onton its elf .. · Though the on ton may be instrtrinen-
tal in the expression of Theonic causation and structured in such a way 
that it may participate in hierarchical consciousness and hierarohicai pur-
pos~,· in and of ~tself it is neither sentient nor purposive •. In so far·~s 
the onton is far below the level of immediate human experience~ it is an 
inference;. an invention of the ilnagination that is 'necessary to explain=· 
phenomenal demonstration. To refer to the onton as a 11neutrai entityau 
would be unfOrtunate in that· the nomenclature suggests an indefinite :Ulmer 
nature. Although the ·details of the inner nature of the onton remaih~ and 
may very·well forever remain, unkndWJ:l., it may be assumed that it has a def-
iri.ite nature as a constitutive entity •. Whatever ·its· nature, ,it would seem 
to be such as to include the potentialitY of being the constitutive eJ,e:men.t 
·-·~ 
in spatial extension. Both purpose and extension inVolve Theonie causationo 
Theon; considered theoretically in· separation from the onton, is even 
more mysterious in that, from the standpoint of the antic independence of 
the objectll there is no evidence for Theon apart frem the activity of -the 
ontonii.c structural hierarchies.1 The inner natU~e and dimens·:ien of Theon 
:rttust forever remain beyond the 'limits ·of human knowledge and deserlp't:ion. 
In sq far as there is evidence that· the eosmos is orderly and unifil!ld 
there is evidence that Theon is the unified principle that appar~tly pur-
sues a goal t~ough the organization and integration of the ontons. The · 
natu.re and the efficacy of this integration are a mystery o S orne kind of 
power or energy is involved in structural hierarchies if the onton is b,r· 
nature a simple entity. Without the eonstant integrative force the ontons 
1. The 'term 11The6ntt is an adaptation of the Greek word Theos, and ie 
tapitalized to suggest i-ts synoilYDl! with the term "God.it 
would revert to their original Unstructured cond.i tien of being·. ·How "the 
structural hierarchies· are not- only sustained but also used in "creative 
advanoelt remains a mysteiy. The best analogy is 'that of volition, but .! 
even voli "Cion is insufficient to describe a cosmic process that is so far · 
beyond that of human volitionc.· So marked is the ·distinction between the 
human and·the Theonic situations that no attributes that app~ adequatelr 
to the huma.n can apply adequately to -the 'Theonic. · Hemce, Theon is not 
referred to as consciousl or good, or even wise, not that Theon is less 
'than conscious, or less than good, or less than wise, but rather· that 
Theon is so far beyond the at-tributes conscious, good., and wise, that they 
are inappropriate~ Nor does it follow that 'Theon has no quaJ.ities. Any-
thing that is ontically real has q_uali ties of some sort. The point here 
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is that the nature of Theon is l;leyond man's grasp. To discuss Theon at all 
~:~ one is forced ·to use terms that. refer to human attributes at the highest 
level, but· it should always be kept in mind that Theen is ip.eomparable., " 
Knowledge of Theon and co:mnrunication with Theon are poetic and mystica1·o . 
Although it is possible to discuss Theon and onton separately on a · 
theoretical level, the empirical evidence for the rtature and fUnction of 
either Theon or·onton depends upon their relationship. The nature of that 
relationsbxp is the most difficult problem of any metaphysical interpre~ 
tion,· and hence is not suggest~d with any sense of fina~ity. While the 
essence of the relatiohship remains unknown, it can be asserted that the 
relation ls not initially one of interac-tion, if:by interaction one means 
actiw-e mutual interchange beaause of mutual influence. The relationship 
between T:Q.eon and onton is possible because of the essential charae·ter of 
Theon. Theon organizes ~ integrates the ontons into hierarchies so 
-eOinplex that they are extended and pencei ved. · · How this is achieved is a 
mystery, even as the fact of life itself is a mystery both in genesis and 
function. But, in so far as the onton has a specific nature, whatever 
tht:tt nature may be, and in so far as Theonic c<;iusation involves a plan$ 
·Theonic causation will need to work accordingly. To the extent tha·t the 
nature of the onton or of the ontonic hierarchies requires any adjus'tment 
in Theonic causation, to· that extent it may be said to influence Theano 
It is f!uggested that the onton is eternally the same and in no eon-
clition ®r structural relationship does its essence change. The experi-
ence of phenomenal ·change·is, the result of changing and evolving patterns 
of structural ontonic hierarchies, which are possible only because of tlie 
active influence of Theon• Theon is able to organi-ze and integrate the 
ontons into hierarchies expressive of purpose because of a commonoharac-
teristic, though not a common essence. Though there is a common ~harac-
teristio, there is still a basic ultimate dualism. It would be fol~ to 
attempt to describe in detail a relationship which is'in essence unknow~ 
able. But, if the human mind can universalize from the experience of 
particulars; eould not a similar quality on a cosmic level, inconceivably 
more intrieate and efficient, be inferred to account for antonio structur= 
al hierarchies ~ 
Substance and causation are here defined·as being uitimately.dif:f'er-
·,_ 
ent in esse:noe and. yet being ultimately ·real.o" Some kind of ontic dualism 
is essential"' in order to explain this ultimate difference.. The dual-ism 
suggested is that between onton and Theon. Phenomenal demonstration re-
~:nires· the positing of the anton. Phenomenal demonstration and orderly 
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change demand the p0siting of Tb.~on. In Theonie "causal efficacyu the 
dualism is largely overcome, because of the nature of Theon. The aspect 
in which the dualism. is not overcome is an aspect of the problem of chaos. 
ii. The Problem of Chaos 
' 
Unless one is to deny that experience coherently interpreted is the 
ultimate tribunal of truth that is available to human experiencers--and 
this is relevant to the present discussion even if the viewpoint is that 
" . . ' ' 
of the ontic independence of the object--one must concede the validity of 
the experience of chaos. Chaos.does not here refer to complete disorder 
any more than did cosmos refer to complete order. Cosmos was defined as 
the total environment of any specific conscious awareness. The cosmic en-
vironment was seen to include both substance and causation, permanence 
and change. But change is both orderly and disorderlya Chaos refers to 
those aspects of the total cosmic environment that are involved in dis-
orderly change. 
Defining the problem of chaos in terms of the problem of cosmos sug-
gests by implication its subordinate position. ·Though it must be under-
stood against the background of cosmos, the fact of chaos itself places 
upon the coherent philosopher the responsibility of accounting for app~ 
ently dysteleological causation. The same universe that exemplifies in-:-
dubitable evidence of cosmic order exemplifies also indubitable evidence 
of cosmic disorder. If nature were under the control of one coherent 
causal principle and were sensitive to its own creative development, and 
. . 
to the intrinsic values of consciousness, natural disorders such as hurri-
canes, epidemics, floods, and other forms of natural evil should not 
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eccU.rlt' The problem· of chaos is : How is one to explain most coherently 
the fact of ontic ~isorderly change? 
In-so far as.the problem of chaos involves ultimate reality as de-
fined earlier in t~e problem of cosmos, the explanation of chaos must be 
found in e~ther the nature or the relationship (or both) of the ult~ate 
realities, that is, Theon and the ontons. If one solves the problem of 
cosmos through the combination of the substance of the onton and the 
causation ?f The9n, and if one finds that the problem of chaos involves 
both subs~ance and causation, then both Theon and the ontons seem to be 
involved in the solution o:f the problem. Certainly some of the intricate 
ontonic structural hierarchies are involved. Since Theon is essential 
for the organization and integration of these structural hierarchies, 
does .it follow that Theonic ttcausal efficacy" is actively invo;J..ved in the 
chaotic event? 
Although the essential nature o:f the onton is unknown, it has been 
shown that it is coherent to infer that it probably has a definite na-
ture. As the most ba~ic constitutive element, essentially simple, _the 
onton probably has a tendency to revert to its original unstructured form. 
This tendency may be referred to as ontonic structural drago Moreover~ 
having a definite ·nature, the onton not only limits the structural possi-
bilities but also involves both fortuitous and pejorative potentials. 
,_ . 
Fdrtuitous potentials refer to those potential structural relationships 
which in highly complex ontonic hierarchies are unpredictable. That such 
potentialities exist in the structure of an ontonic universe as intricate 
as the cosmic environment is evident in the phenomenal world. ·unless the 
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universe is interpreted as rigidly deterministic, there must be room for 
the concept of chance. How else is one to explain in specific detail the 
fact that one soldier survives the battle while another does not? Ma~ 
factors are involved, including human freedoma But without the concept 
of fortuit,r, all the factors combined are insufficient to explain the fact 
that one specific soldier was injured or killed while another escaped 
without harm. Pejorative potentials refer to those potential structural 
r~lationships which, when actualized, either.obst~ct or destroy some as-
pect of Theonic causationo Hence, Theonio causation is not the causal 
explanation of such destractive or obstructive hierarchies. 
When adequately explained, the pejorative potentials account for the 
chaotic event. At least three basic factors are involved in the actual-
ization. of a pejorative pot~ntial. One is the nature of the onton itself, 
which necessarily limits the structural possibilities because of its 
nature-whatever that nature may beQ Another factor is the antonio s·l;;ruc-
tural drag which tends to reduce the hierarchies to less complex ontonic 
patterns--the tendency of the hierarchies to revert to unstructured for.m. 
A third factor is the fortuitous potential itsel~, which might ooneeiw.ably 
be complex enough to include causal powers, which in their ramifications 
are exceedingly obstructive or destructive. (It might be pointed out here 
that some of the fortuitous potentials may well be creative, but in their 
teleological "concrescence" they would depend upon Theonie energye) The 
combination of these factors on their many different levels, and other 
probable organizational and integrative difficulties, seem adequate to ex-
plain the occurrence of the specif'io chaoti.c __ eyent. Hence, Theonic causa.-
It was suggested earlier that the initial relationship between Theon 
and the ontons was not one of interaction, but rather Theon~in~egrating 
the ontons because of the nature of Theon. However, in the phenomenal 
world the relationship between Theon and the more complicated ontonic hi-
erarchies may be one of interaction in that some· of these hierarchies ex~ 
emplif'y awareness and individual ·causation or volitio.n. This ~pirical 
fac·t introduces the problem of consciousness. 
iii. The Problem of Consciousness 
The total cosmic environment is extremely complex, composed of-count-
less levels of ontonic structural hierarchies. The nature ·of the partie-
ular ontonie structural pattern determines what the nature of the "objeatu 
will be, whether stick or stone, whether animate or inanimate. One of the 
most complex hierarchies is the human brganism.· Actually it would be more 
accurate to explain the human organism as a complex hierarchy of complex 
hierarchies,l involving at an inconceivably complex level both ontonic 
struc:tu.re and Theonic causation. This complicated ontonic structure is 
integrated in such a way that it is aware. 
Oonsoiousness is the awareness of an organism. Awareness itself can-
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not be defined. To comprehend the meaning of awareness, one must be aware, 
and once aware, one experiences immediately the meaning of awareness. 
1. In a more detailed study a nomenclature would be worked out which 
would distinguish one t.1pe and level of hierarchy .from anothero For 
the present purpose only the briefest outline can be given. From 
this basic outline maliy of the interstitial .hypotheses oa:n ·be ·inferred. .• 
Just as no description is adequate to the experience of the fragrance and 
color of a ros~,· so also; and even more;_ no definition can cammunioate ·· · 
the meaning of awareness •. Awareness must.be experienced in order to be 
understood. 
., 
·The. chief concern at·this p0int is the relationship between the 
awareness and the corresponding ontonic "hierarchy; or organism. Awa:re.-
ness is a term which is used to describe a relationship between the onton-
ic cells in a larger ontonic structural hierarchy called the organism.l 
Consciousness is invariably associated with an organism, not in the sense 
that the organism which is invariably associated with consciousness is it-
self invariably an object of that awareness, but rather that there is no 
empirical evidence for the existence of consciousness apart f~om some or-
ganisll\. The human experiencer is often unaware of "hisfl ,or~anism, but he 
has no empirical evidence for the functioning of awareness completely 
apart from the or~anism. It may well be that the'lower forms of orga~ic 
life, in"so far as they are conscious, are never conscious of "their11 own 
individua:l organisms, and. the evidence is insufficient for hypothesizing •. 
But on the level of human experience, awareness always involves, even if 
it does not include within its scope, the concomitant organism. Hence, 
•· 
the hypothesis that they are causally interrelated is not without foun-
dation. 
The reJa tionship between awareness and the organism is so intimate 
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1. An eminent biologist suggests: liThe conclusion seems inescapable, hew-
ever, that it is not the character of the protoplasmic components but 
tb.e relations between them that hold the secret of a· liVing organism." •. 
Ectnund W. Sinnott, The Biology of the Spirit. (New York: The Viking 
Pr~ss, 1955) P• 51. 
that it is que'Stionable whether there is any real distinction between 
them. The organism is an ontonic structural pattern, as indicated abeve, 
the complexity of which still exceeds human comprehension. Awareness is 
the co-operative functioning of the fundamental lesser ontonic structures 
(that is, the brain, the nerves, the blood, etc.)~1 integral to the· larger 
structural whole. Ontonic changes in the fundamental lesser patterns pro-
duce chang~s in the consGious ·funct1.oning. The acuity ,of the awareness. 
seems closely related to the oorrelati~e condition of the concomitant or-
gani$m. Fatigue hinders awareness. The location and the extent of bodi-
ly injury are dir.eotly related to the level· o:f awareness. Anesthesia 
destroys awareness, at least temporarily, ··by. changing the relationship ~l:>e­
tween ·the cells.•2 Hence, one concludes th.at awareness is ''one inseparable 
functional aspect, perhaps ·the most intricate and complicated,· of. tb~ on-
tonic structural hierarohy·referred to as the organism. 
· The hypothesis of· <the intimate correlation between the levels of 
awareness and corresponding condition o:f the concomitant organxsm ~ises 
the question o:f organic correlation with experiences generally rega:rded. 
as non-sensory. While it may be debated whether or not the· experience o:f 
1. Though some parts of the organism are more vital :for awareness than are 
others, the entire normal organism is involved in awareness. In The 
Biology e>:f the Spirit, pp. 73-74, Edmund W. Sinnott says~ ttLife and 
mind essentially are one. Mind is not something limited to the human 
brain, or to any brain, but its primitive beginnings are to be found 
in the activity o:f every living cell. Only with the evolution of the 
nervous system in animals, and the complex patterns of behavior that 
result, does the regulation o:f activity begin to seem distinct from 
the regulation of grovrth--does the mind, irl short, begin to se·em dis• 
tinct from the body." 
2. The e:f:feot of death on awareness is suggested in the §ifth footnote on 
page ·287 ... 
283 
.. 
bea'Clty·; for example, is sensory or non ... sensory, the discussien above 
would suggest that all experiences are organic, or a~ least associated 
with an organism. The exact correlation betWeen the various types of ex-
perience,which are usually regarded as non-sensory-the true,,the holy, 
etc.--and the corresponding oh~ges in the.orgaoism, if any, would be, 
vitally significant here.l The fact that diligent cerebration requires 
more blood for the braincthan does thoughtless consciousness suggests the 
hypothesis that there is an organic correlation'with thought. Even extra-
sensory perception could hardJ..y be referred to as extra,...organic percep-' · 
tion, though ·it does indicate that there may be avenues of communication 
that 'are undeveloped at present.- The· problem of the relationship between· 
value experience and the ontonic hierarchy is relevant here, as is the 
problem of the place of human consciousness in the eternal Theonic''pu~ · 
pose.. For the solution ·of some of these problems tlie frame of reference 
needs to be shifted from the ontic to the teleological. 
3. ·The Teleological Orientation of the Ontic 
i. The Primacy of Teleology 
If. the preceding discmssion is accurate, it can now be suggested 
that the ultimate orientation of the ontic (i.e., the Theonic-ontonic) is 
teYeological. The preponderance of empirical evidence suggests the hypo-
1. The relevance of lie detection to the argument is uncertain in that 
there may be an organic change associated with lying;, while there may 
be no such change l3,5Sociated with telling the truth. 
284 
thesis.th.at the universe apparently is pursuing some goal, that Theoni~ 
aausation is drawn and directed toward some end.. The -teleological pre-
cess presupposes,tb.atsome goal is the directing factor.· The·goal, which 
may-very well change and grow ~long with creative development, would fune-
tion in the ttconcresce!J.cett of the most basic ontonic hierarchies (proton, 
electron, neutron, meso~, etc.) through the more complex on-tonic hier- · 
archies (atoms, molecules, crystals; etc.) to even more complex hierar""' 
chies (protoplasmic cells,. ·simpler organisms, more complex o~ganisms, 
eto.) a.nd finally, to the mest complex ontonie structural hierarchy, the 
human organism.l In so far as the initial fomation of the uni:verse pre-
supposed a prior purpos~, one may speak of-: the ·primacy of teleologyo · 
The primaey of teleology is also evident on. the human 'level.;· The 
primary problems 0f 'life are· not so 'mueh problems of be?-zlg as~ the,- are .of 
valua$ Only the philesophically tlinitiated,tt to use a term of Barden P. 
Bqwne, .concern'themselves with the problem of being). while ever,r conscious 
organism is repeatedly confronted with the problems of evaluation. 
Cosmos and chaos,. for example, can be defined from· either an ontolog-
ical or a teleological point of view. From the ontological point of view1 
1. Two things need to be indicated here. First, as indicated earlier, 
the human organism should be referred to technically as a complex· on-
tonic structural hierarchy of other complex antonio structural hier-
archies. But·· when it is spoken of as a unit' it may·· be referred to as· 
complex on tonic structural hierarchy. In a more detailed study a 
carefully invented nomenclature would make the distinction.. Secondly, 
in like manner the universe may be referred to as a unit and hence 
spoken of as an ontenie structural hierarchy. As such, it would be 
far more complex than the human organism; which is only a'mi:nute ·sub ... 
sidiary hierarchy in comparison. The universe is· ens:empted here, being 
in a class by itself. 
·ee-smos·: refers· _to the total orderly c0smie environmentJ and chaos refers 
to that aspect of the cosmic environment which is disorderly. From the 
teleological point of view, the experience of cosmos refers to any aware-
ness, the total effec.t of 'Which is essentially desirable, advantageous -to 
area ti ve well-being. The experience may vary from the mere bodily valu..e 
of painless 'functioning to the awareness of the highest mystic vision• 
The experience of chaos:, in contrast, refers to any experience, the totai 
·effect of which is undesirable in that it is destructive or obstructive 
of ereative well-being~ Similarly, this experience may vaey from the 
least inertia to the intrinsic horror of insanity~ sla-very, and inter-· ··• 
ne.oine warfare, whether in nature or human society.. From either point of 
view, both cosmos and obaos are ~elati-ve terms, meant to signif.r. general 
tendencies or classificatio,_ns rather than to designat·e extreme conditions 
of either perfect order or complete disorder, perfect bliss ·er utter 
misery. 
ii. .·The Criterion of Teleology 
The definitions of cosmos and chaos from the teleological standpoint 
suggests ncreative well-bemgtt as the criterion of value.l The extent of 
the value or disvalue of any experience is measured by its effect on ere-
:. ~· . 
ativE;J well-being. The term 11 creativett is used to suggest not only the 
integrative nature of value experience but also its evolving tendency., 
It is synonymous with Henry Nelson Wieril.an1s conception of "qualitative 
l. The ultimate criterion for Theon is beyond human. comprehension liru.t"ihe 
criterion suggested here seems most appropriate on the human level. 
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mean;i.ng •. ttl 
"Well-beingtt refers to that condition which the organism considers 
most sa tis.:f'ying ~ The expertences of the various kinds of well ... being 
(values) ttare primarily emotional but ma.y··be much enriched by intellect~rt2 
Unless the norms..:.-true ideals or standards· for measuring value-3are eo~ 
berently. organized) the organi$m may we;ll not only fail to realize the 
highest possible values .but may even destroy itself.4 With the proper-
use of coherent thought and volition the· organism may discover and· ·experi-
ence-the highest -values in both the individual and social. frames of refer-
ence; .. 'When, correlated with thought and volition that are empirically .. -co-
herent, creative well-being is the most reliable cx:iterion for measuring 
human values, ideals, and norms.5 Moreover:, coherent human values, 
ideals, and norms are the most reliable evidence ·available for a-ttempting 
to W·er the nature o·f the goal of Theonic-ontonic il:rteraction.. · On its 
most· satisfying empirical level creative well-being is an ineffable 
awa.reness.6 
l. 11Qual5t.a.tive meaning is that connection between events whereby present 
happ~nings enable me to· feel not on:Ly the quality int:r:.•insic to the. 
events now occurring put also the qualities of many other events that 
·are related to them. Qualitative meaning is that connection between ·•· 
events whereby the present happening conveys to me the qualities of 
other ·happenings and some qualities pertaining to what will· happen ·in 
the future, as the fu"tlure is interpreted by the past." The Source of 
Human Good, (Chicago: University of Chicags Press; 1946), 'pp.· 18-19. · 
2. Edmund W. Sinnott, The Biology of the Spirit, P• 121. 
3.~ See the discussion above on pages ·128-l4o. 
4. An example is an organism given to alcoholism~ 
5. Defin;i.tions of these terms have been given on page 129. It might be 
'·added· here that creative well-being is the best criterion for inferring 
· ··_, what the Theonio criterion might be, but the ap.alogy has a:ll the · 
limitations of anthropomorphism suggested on page 276• · 
6. The most coherent interpretation of the goal of Theonio~ontonic inter-
action seems to suggest the hypothesis of human immortalit,r. 
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iii. The Ineffable Awareness 
There is·an aspect·to all experience that is incapable ~f description 
or communication, namely, t.lle actual essence of awareness itself. To 
under~-U,md awareness, one must be aware. Two examples of ineffable awa~e-
. ~ . 
ness a;r:-e the color and the fragrance of a rose and the awareness of the .. 
theme· ?nd· the harmony of.· a symphony.. One may speak .of colorJ fragranqe, 
harmony, and sentiment, but the actual awareness of~ the specif~c color, 
the specific fragrance, the specific. hann.ony, and the specific sentiment 
is· .ineffable. In, attempting to co:tmnunicate t.his ineffable awareness-. one . 
:resorts to the ·la;nguage and symbolism. of po~try al).d music •. In· so far as. 
the· attempted. communication is successful,. in that. it· seems· to stimulate 
in the communicant a. similar ineffable awareness, the attempted· communi~ 
cation becanes an experience of creative well-being. The most ~l.uable· 
experience of creative well-being is the ineffable awareness of Theon .. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS 
The problem of this study has been an evaluation of the relationship 
between the empirical evidence and the resultant theistic cosmology in 
the philo.sophy of Edgar Sheffield Brightman. In order to evaluate a r~ 
lationship the factors related needed to be described in detail. This 
description of tbe empirical evidence and the resultant theistic cosmol-
ogy was the task of the second, third, fourth, and fifth chapters., On 
the basis of that description a chapter of evaluation pointed out the 
major problems that .were especially relevant to the study. Three major 
problems remained for solution-the attempted task of the chapter on 
Reorientation. On the basis of all the preceding discussion several con-
clusions may be formulated. 
1. Brightman t s method of empirical analysis-synopsis is the un-
i:m.peachable method of philosophy. Neither aspect can be used to the ·total 
exclusion of the other if one is to reach sound conclusions.. However, in 
philosophical judgments Brightman finds that the final court of appeal is 
synopsis, asserting that it is more coherent to interpret the lower in 
terms of th~ higher than the higher in tenn.s of the lower. Chapter VI 
has suggested that both analysis and synopsis must be held in mutual in-
terrelation if the method is to function accurately. This is not to deny 
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that the emphasis in science is analytic and the emphasis in philosoppy 
is synoptic, but it is to assert that if truth is a coherent whole, 
'whether scientific or philosophical, neither aspect of this co-ordinated 
method can be used in complete isolation !rom the other. In other words, 
synopsis cannot accept as probable truth any hypothesis that is contrary 
to the k:nOWlil. fac-ts of analysis. It is suggested that Brightman's con-
clusion-that all r.eality is personal is contra~ to the'know.n faets of 
analysis, namely, that the nature of the· electron,. p:toton,.and neutron, 
is : UDkn~•· ·,If the basic elements in aJ:l s o-ca:JJ.ed. physical reality: are 
elec:tron~?, protons' and neutrons,: and the essential natur~ of these ele-
ments is unknown, then, if one accepts· the reality of physical :aatare an.d 
the ec:mclusions of modern physics, it. seems one can ·interpret all .reality 
a1=1 mind only if he ·interprets mind· as· some fOl"'Il· of ~:J,eetr0n,, prot,o~F and 
neutron·,.· Brightman avoids ·this interpretation.·of mind· on a cosmic leve-l 
through a distinction between phenomenal and noumenal reality.' But a new 
problem'then ~rises: If the only ultimate reality. is mind, and mind is 
non-spatial (without· exten~ion), how is one to explain the way in which 
the Divine Mind objectifies itself? Hence, i.t is suggested ·that Brightman 
overemphasizes ·the synoptic aspeqt and minimizes the analytic aspect of a 
oo..-0rdinated method•. (This· is notto.minim:i:ze the contribu"\;ion Brightman 
has made to philosophy in his study of philos-ophical methodology_ •. .) 
2~ Brightman 1s criterion of truth as em.piriaal coherence is the 
irrefutable criterion of truth for philosophy.. It is irrefutable in that · 
it .cannot be. de;mied rl thout· being affi!"lned~. .A:rry systematic appeal to any 
otber·lesser·method·lll.USt appeal in the end. to coher~noe.as Brightman q.e-
fines it. His definition and defense of empirical coherence as the eri-
290 
t·erion: of' ·truth for philosophy is one of' his great ·contributions' to ·that 
field of· investigation •. 
3~ Brightmants empirical scheme involves several difficulties.~ ·on 
the one ·hand he says that experience is· all that we· have and on the. ether 
hand he says that all· _experience has an ob jeotive · ref'ereno~;. · Furthe;t>.;., P,e 
affirms the in tel'dependence bf. the shining present and the ill'Ulhina ting 
absent ·when he' indicates that the shining present does not·. shine· of its 
own accord but r~fleets: the illuminating absent; ~ut ·he also suggests . 
that an idea cannot be compared With its· object• This raises.t.b.e. question 
·of' -the ·na:ture and status of' sensory data in· consciousness.. A.re these de.ta 
not .linked with both consciousness and the so~aalled objective illuminat-
ing absent? If' so, one can compare idea with object.~ If ·one cannot e.om-
.pare: idea with object, how is one to explain knowledge? Moreover, it 
seems that valid inference presupposes ·the poss.ibility of .comparing idea 
and object. 
4. :The dialectic of the epistemic process in the scheme of _ev.i.dence 
does not seem to have. eseaped tb.e ... ;ra.llacy o,i\ .. ~rgU'ment fr~ ·uthe eg(i)ii-i 
centric predioament .•. u· Ollapter VI has. described in de.tail several ~spects 
.of Brigbtman'·s thought which lead to .this conclusion:. ·the hypotheses that 
~•experience is all that we have,n· that the idea· eannot be compared with· 
the object, that God is temporal because ·uall the significant· e-vidence for 
God is. temp·ora:J..;:tt1 that· the neutral entity is an unverifiable invention 
With no eVidence in experience, and .that nature is mind because .all ert-
J..,.._ See above, P• 23~. 
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denoe is in conscious awareness. 
It should be stated specifical~ that the thesis here is not that· 
Brightman claims that an object must be conscious in order to be lmown .. 
This he specifically denies in a quotation cited above on page 242. But 
in maintaining that an idea cannot be compared with any unexperienced 
reali~l, he is suggesting, as he· indicated in the discussion of the em-
pirical datum, that the unconscious is excluded from experience. In so 
far as he insists that ~xperienoe is all there is, that one cannot com-
pare an idea with unexperienced reality, that the realist invents an en-
ti~ for which there is no evidence in experience, and the other propo-
sitions mentioned above; it is suggested that his epistem.ie scheme is 
such that an object must be of the nature of consciousness in order tc 
be ·mown.,.2 
'· On-the basis of the preceding conclusion it is suggested that 
there is some question concerning the philosophical status of the eate-
gories. To define the categories as the fundamental laws of the objective 
reference of thought seems to classify them as essentially epistemic. 
But to suggest that they are relative -to the specific realm or realms of 
being to which they refer seems to identify them with the ontic. In the 
11Metaphysicstt3 Brightman indicates .. that the categories are empirical 
which would seem to suggest that they are both epistemic and ontic. The 
problem is: If an idea cannot be compared with the object to which it 
refers, how can the categories be identified with both? 
lo An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 6o. 
2. See above, P• 293. 
3. Chapter V.i 
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6. In concluding· that all substance is personal Brightman goes be-
yond the limits o£ the evidence. If the two essential aspects of the , 
method of analysis-synopsis are held in such co-ordination that the. con-
clusions of the method as a whole when emphasizing synopsis cannot in any 
way violate the legitimate findings of analysis, then the philosopher can-
not on the ba$iS of synopsis hypothesize that all reality is personal when 
the emphasis of analysis denies that hypothesis. Scientist and philos-
opher may agree that an analysis of so-ealled physical reality leads to 
electrons, protons, and neutrons, the a b c's of physics, the essential 
nature of which is unknown~ It is legitimate, then, for the philosopher 
to attempt to explain the nature of the physical world through·the em-
phasis of synopsis, but it does not necessarily follow that all reality 
is mind because the a b c•s spell purpose in cosmology~ It may well be 
that reality is ultimately dualistic, Theonic aridontonic. 
If the argument in Chapter VII is valid, the concept of substance 
requires the positing of the anton, and phenomenal demonstration and or--
derly change demandr the posit:i.ng of Theon., Theon and anton constitute 
an ultimate metaphysical dualism which is largely overcome in teleologi-
cal causation because of the integrative activity of 'l'heon.. Natural evil 
is evidence for an aspect of the dualism which has not been overcome. 
7.. Brightman's discussion of the problem of natural evil is another 
of his great contributions to philosophy. He has made it impossible for 
the coherent philosopher to solve the problem of evil either b7 d~ing 
that evil exists.or by appealing to human ignorance to save Divine 
benevoJ:enoe•:. There .seem to· be only two alternatives from which to choose. 
Evil exists in spite .of'. Goa's will because of a. limiting factol1' wll;i.eh is 
either,. internal or external. to the Divine Person •. HaVing ~terpret~ all 
reality as personal and nature as ·the energizing of· part .. of the Ditvine· 
Mind; Brightman has to .conclude, tha-t ~he limiting faoter is within the· , 
Divine Personali<h;r. · Thif! st'tldy•has. challenged such a, conelusi<!lnJ..Ol4 d;h~. 
. ·.~ . ·. . . . ' ' 
basil3. that it . is more. coherent to·. p~si t. a Theonie-ontonie d:ua1.i~m,. large..,. 
~- -
J.y, but not eomplet·ely; overcome through the in~egrative activity o;t' 
T~eon •.. Several aspects in. the· ontonio .. structural soh·eme .are beyond·th~ 
c0ntrol of Theonio_ causation., T{l.ey are the fact ii:hat.· th~ nature o.f'.; the 
0nton ·limits · str~ctura~, possibilities, · the tendency:; of the · ontonie ·.strue..: 
t:are t9 revert to ·less integra ted hierarchies or what· ha.ii beep. re.fe;rred 
to as ontonie .. strugtural drag, ·an!;! fortuiteus and pejorative potaE:tials. 
These, .. ~it is· suggested here, . constitute .a mor~ eoher.en'j:. i:pterpretation·; of 
the eaus e of natural evil than does, the concept· of liThe· Gt ven .u 
a.. Brightm~··S :·solution: to th~ so-called·mina~body•problem ·iS co-
herent on:ty if, the problem is real. The empirical evidence,. however,,, 
;, 
suggests that. the problem is more invented than ·aotual, B;lld that .it is.-
both uns cienti.fic· and unelllpirical to claim. that •!no· part of my body"' if! "fffY 
mind;. no part of my .mind is any~part,of my be>dy.ltl ·Consciousness invari-
ably e:xp~riene,es. itself .. in. intimate association ~itb. some organism, ~ot 
that the orga~sm itself,.i.s invari-ably the CDbjeet of•:that eonsciousp.ess1. 
bat· that the tyro seem insepar.ably ·linked" Fllrthennere, sensation is in-
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d:i:visibly'·linked both with the- organism and w:tth con.soi'€m.sness. in. such a 
way that one.'must coneentrate Upon aey SG>-ca.lled distination to be aware 
of it; and even then,·consciansaess cannot b~·theoretieal~ abstracted~. · 
from the· brgatlism •. Hence, it has be~n suggested that~ the solution of:tb.e 
so-called mind-body problem is n0t the interpretation o:f' body as. pairb:of 
the ehergiziilg of the Divine 'Mind but rather the interpretation 'of.·.c!i>n~ 
soiousness as the awareness of the organism~ Awareness isi';a spee:f..f'i• re ... 
lationship between the antonio cells of the organismi.~ Hence awa.veness is 
inseparablefrom the organism in the present Theonic-ontonic cosmology• 
The place of human ·awareness in the eternal seheme. (immorta.lity1. depends 
upon Theonio causation. ,Teleology is central in a 'rheon:to-ontonic ems-
melogy. 
9 • · Brightman·l s interpretation of the relationship between, thi:J' :eon~ 
scious and the subconscious seems unnecessarily nebulous~ While"i t ·is 
conceivable that the subconscious is another conscious self associated 
with tl>l.e same organism,- it .is not at all certain that it is a· reality dis-
tinct from the normal consc-ious self. Is it not more coherent to inter-
pret· subc0nseiousness as a condition of the· orgarui.sm· ·iJl which -there iS 
less aeu~.:ty than there :is in actual:· normal consoi'ott.snes'S'?·. T0 asssrt tha"t 
there .·is 'a sharp distinction betweel'l. the conscious and the· subconscious, .... 
and also between each of these and the orgB.l'J.i'Sm -n-e'eessarily ·assoeiated~ 
with i·t-, is without empirical evidence, unless ·'theoretical pessibili--ty ~an 
be referred· to as · empirical evidence:. 
10~ Finally, then, what can be concluded concerning the evaluation 
·~ the· relationship between the empirical evidence and the resultant 
theistic cosmology in the philosophy of Edgar Sheffield Bright~n? It 
should be indicated that the relationship between the empirical evidence 
and the resultant theistic cosmology is thoroughly coherent if one accepts 
as coherent each succeeding stage in the total argumento But it nas been 
suggested in the sixth and seventh chapters that the coherence of some 
phases of Brightman~s argument is questionableo His method and criterion 
are essentially sound& His method of philosophical interpretation is 
especially significant~ but~ as indicated and defended before, his empir-
ical scheme seems to be inconsistent and his dialectic of the epistemic 
process does not seem to have escaped the fallacy of argument fro~ the 
egocentric predicamento Moreoverp he seems to draw unjustifiable in-
ferences from the empirical evidence in suggesting that all reality is 
personal~ and hence that nature is the energizing of the DivinB Mind; 
and further, in positing the nonrational Given as the solution of th~ 
problem of natural evilo Hence it is concluded that the empirical evi-
dence might be interpreted more coherently in terms of the Theonic-
ontonic cosmology described in Chapter VIIo 
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The purpose of this dissertation is the evaluation of the relation-
ship between the empirical evidence and the resultant theistic cosmology 
in the philosophy of Edgar Sheffield Brightman. Such an evalua~ion re-
quires a description of both the empirical evidence and the resultant 
theistic cosmology. Hence, the first five chapters describe t~e perti-
nent areas of Brightman's thought. 
The first chapter states the problem of the dissertation, defines 
its limitations, outlines the methodology, surveys previous relevant re-
search, and gives a brief biography of Brightman. 
The second chapter describes the fundamentals in Brightman, 's system 
of thought: the definition of philosophy, the importance of truth, the 
concept that ttthe true is the whole,tt and then, in more detail, his 
method and his criterion of truth. His method of analysis-synopsis de-
mands that all relevant data be included in hypothesizing. His c~iterion 
. I .:-,, 
of empirical coherence requires that the hypotheses interpret t~e datq 
with the most inclusive systematic consistency .. 
The third chapter describes the empirical scheme involved in 
Brightman's thought. Any and all conscious awareness is empirical• The 
empirical scheme begins with the iinmediate empirical datum self, which 
refers to the given conscious self at the moment, including the types of 
empirical data-sensory, intuitive, rational, irrational, and mystical. 
These data signify an objective world. The immediate empirical situation 
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Brightman calls the situation~xperienced or the shining present; what the 
immediate empirical situation refers to, Brightman calls the situation-
believed-in or the illuminating absent. Oriented and related, the two 
situations comb:ined constitute an empirical whole, personality, the key 
to reality. 
The :fburth chapter describes the· scheme of evidence in Bri~htJDan 's 
thought, defining evidence as all the data relev~t to any sugg~sted h7-
pothesis. The epistemic process in the scheme of evidence inc1~des th~ 
problem of epistemology ("how our ideas refer to their objects 1•), the 
dialectic of the epistemic process (thesis: the experience of the dat~; 
antithesis: the problems arising :from the experience of the datum; and 
synthesis: the nature of the possible solutions), and the methoP,. of phil-
' 
osophical interp~etation (preliminary synopsis, scientific analvses, syn-
optic hypotheses, verificatj;on, and reinterpretation) •. 'fhe inf.):lrpretajl;;ion 
of the evidence presupposes the objective reference of ~~ought.· The laws 
of the objective reference of thought, relative to some specific realm or 
realms of being, are the categories. The metaphysical categories, whl.ch 
. ' 
apply to the universe as a whole, are time, change and identity, and a.c-
tuality and potentiality. Tl,le phenomenal categories, which apply to ~ore 
restricted realms of being, are space (motion), va~ue and oblig~tion, 
' 
personal identity, cause, communication, and substance~ The four realms 
of being that are fundamental in the formulation of a cosmology are phys-
icai things, universals, values, and consciousness. ~ese are ~he evi-
dance. Since the coherent interpretation of each of these sug~~sts th!3 
existence of mind on a cosmic level, Brightman Goncludes that all real-
ity is personalo 
The fifth chapter describes the theistic cosmology, or metaphysics 
of nature, resulting f'rom the previous evidence. The chapter includes 
the discussion of four basic aspects of the reality of nature. First, 
nature is phenomenal. Although all reality is personal~ Brighttp.an does 
not deny the phenomenal r!3ality of nature. Second, nature is n,ou:$en.al. 
This follows logically fro~ the conclusion that all reality is Fersonal. 
Third, nature is Divine Activity. If nature is noumenal,:it is i.Jiter--
preted most coherently as an aspect of the energizing of the Divine M~d. 
Fourth, such an interpretation of nature raises the problem of natural 
evil. This problem Brightman explains mainly with his concept pf the 
nonrational Given, an obstacle within the Divine Personality which hiD.- · 
ders the Divine volition., As part of the DiviiJ.e Person, nature is iruma-
nent in God, though God is transcendent to nature. The only re~litie•s 
other than God are finite persons. 
The sixth chapter attempts to discover whether or not the relatiqn-
ship between the empirical evidence and the resultant theistic cosmology 
is coherent. It recognizes that the relationship is consistent, but 
f~nds that the demands of coherence over consistency require an exami-
nation of the problems arising from some of the major hypotheses. Hence, 
.. 
the chapter proceeds through the outline of the previous five chapters, 
examining the more important hypotheses for inclusive systematic consist-
ency. Three problems that are particularly relevant to the purpose of 
the study as a -whole receive further examination, namely, the nature of 
substance, the so-called mind-body relationship, and the explanation of 
the cause of natural evil. 
The seventh chapter attempts to establish a reoriented cosmology in 
3J.6 
which these three problems approach a more coherent solution. Such a 
solution involves the discussion of cosmos, chaos, and consciousnessa 
Cosmos refers to the total physical environment, the two basic character-
istics of which are permanence and change or substance and causation. 
Substance is that aspect of reality nwhich underlies all outward mani-
festations.tt (Webster's Dictiona;ry) To account for substance an entity 
called ttontontt: is posited as the most· basic constitutive element in the 
cosmos. The nature of the onton is unknown, but it is inferred to be 
simple, eternal, and inun.utable. Causation refers to the reason for spe-
cific change. To account for extension and change an efficient activity 
called ttTh.eontt ·is posited. The nature of Theon is unknown, but Theon is 
inferred to be the unifying causal power that apparently pursues a goal 
through the integration of the ontons into structural hierarchies. 
Chaos refers to the disorderly change in the total cosmic environ-
ment. At least four factors are involved in ontonic structural change 
which together seem to account for chaos:: first; the fact that the 
nature of the onton necessarily limits the structural possibilities; 
second, the tendency of the hierarchies to revert to unstructured form; 
third, the potential structural relations which in highly complex ontonic 
hierarchies are unpredictable (the fortuitous potentials), and fourth, 
the potential structural relations which, when actualized, either obst;t>Uct 
or destroy some aspect of Theonic causatio~ (the pejorative potentials). 
Hence, Theon is not the direct cause of chaos. 
Consciousness is the awareness of an organism, an organ~sm being a 
highly complex ontonic structure. Since there seems to be no evidence 
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for awareness apart from the organism, awareness maybe defined as a spe-
., 
cific biological relationship between the ontonic cells of the or~anism. 
In so far as Theonic causation seems to pursue a goal, tel~ology is 
primary in Theonic-ontonic cosmology. Although the Theonic goal is ~eyond 
human knowledge, creative well-being seems to be the best available cr~-
terion for inferring the Theonic purpose& The most valuable exrerienc~ 
of creative well-being is the ineffable awareness of Theon. 
From the preceding discussion ten conclusions may be formulated. 
1. Brightman's method of empirical analysis-synopsis is uniffipeac~-
able if both analysis and synopsis are used as interdependent. Neither 
aspect of this co-ordinated method should be used to the total ~xclusipn 
of the other. 
2. Brightmap's formulation of empirical coherence as the criterion 
of truth is irrefutable in that it cannot be denied without beipg affirmed. 
3. Brightman ts empirical scheme is confusing in that he sa.ys on the 
one hand that ttexperience is all that we have, 1t and that the idea ca.nn,pt 
be compared with its object, and then on the other hand that evt3ry dattJ.ID. 
is a sign and that all experience has an objective reference. Knowled~ 
seems to presuppose some relationship between the idea and the: object, and 
this relationship seems to imply a basis for comparison~ 
4. The epistemic process in the scheme of evidence does npt seem to 
have escaped the fallacy of argument from the egocentric predicament;. 
This conclusion is based primarily on the propositions that ttall evidence 
for anything is personal consciousness,n and that ttthe realist invents an 
unverifiable hypothesis with no evidence in experience.tt 
5. Brightman suggests tha-t the categories are empirical and hence 
both epistemic and ontic. · But if the idea cannot be compared with its 
object, the status of the categories would seem to be uncertain. 
6. Brightman's hypothesis that all reality is ultimately personal 
seems to interpret the empirical evidence less coherently than the hy-
pothesis that the nature of ultimate reality is unknown. 
7. To explain natural evil through ontonic structural drag and 
fortuitous and pejorative potentials seems more coherent than positing 
a limitationwithin the Divine Personality. 
8. Defining mind as a relationship between cellular ontonic pat-
ter:p.s seems to be a more coherent solution to the so-called mind-body 
problem than Brightman's theory of interaction~ 
9. In contrast with Brightman's hypothesis that the subconscious is 
another self associated with the same organism, this study suggests that 
the subconscious is a condition of the organism that is less acute than 
consciousness. 
10. A Theonic-ontonic orientation is offered as possibly a more 
coherent solution to the problems involved in a th~_istie cosmology than 
Brightman's personalistic idealismo 
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